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ABSTRACT 
 
This work is not a ‘reinterpretation’ of the nowadays Hilbert-Dirac quantum mechanics 
QMHD. It exposes the principles of a new representation of microstates called a second quantum 
mechanics and denoted QM2. This representation is rooted directly into the a-conceptual physical 
reality wherefrom a representation of the microstates is reconstructed bottom-up, conceptually and 
formally, and in uninterrupted relation with factuality.  
QM2 emerges as a fully intelligible, consensual, predictive and verifiable representation of the 
factually generated microstates.   
First a qualitative but formalized representation of the general characteristics of any physical 
theory of the microstates is developed, quite independently of the quantum mechanical formalism and 
outside it, under exclusively the [operational-methodological] constraints entailed by the requirement 
of a consensual, predictive and verifiable description of entities that – radically – cannot be perceived 
directly by human conceptors-observers. This representation is called infra-(quantum mechanics) and 
is denoted IQM. The specific purpose of IQM is to offer a reference-and-imbedding-structure for the 
construction of any acceptable theory of the microstates: only a pre-structure of this sort could permit 
to overcome the inertial ties that immobilize the minds inside an out-dated theory. Indeed IQM insures 
by construction comparability with QMHD thereby endowing with criteria for estimating from various 
and definite points of view the adequacy of its mathematical formalism. In this sense IQM can be 
regarded as a first realization from a class of structures conceived in order to act as infra-(scientific 
disciplines). 
Then, by systematic reference to IQM, is worked out a preliminary critical examination of 
QMHD. Thereby it appears that: (a) QMHD is devoid of any general formal representation of the 
physical, individual entities and operations that are quite essentially involved: the whole level of 
individual conceptualization of the microstates is lacking, massively; only abstract statistics of results 
of measurements are clearly defined inside QMHD. (b) The mathematical formalism from QMHD does 
involve – and in a fundamental role – a definite model of a specimen of a microstate; but this fact 
remains implicit, so its consequences are not systematically recognized and made use of. (c) QMHD is 
simply devoid of an acceptable representation of the quantum measurements. 
These lacunae are then compensated constructively.  
First a new representation of the quantum measurements is elaborated for any unbound 
microstate, without quantum potential or containing a quantum potential (while the category of bound 
states does not raise questions of principle from the point of view of IQM). The elaboration involves 
incorporation of a second central feature from Louis de Broglie's interpretive approach, beside his 
model. The obtained representation of the quantum measurements is founded upon Gleason's theorem 
on the possibility of a Hilbert-space expression of any mathematical measure, so in particular also 
probability-measures. The predictive probability-measures on results of outcomes of quantum 
measurements, are ten constructed factually, via measurements, just like in the case of the verification 
of predictions of this kind. Thereby the constituted representation emerges independent of the 
Schrödinger equation of the considered problem. So the use of this equation – when it is available – is 
quite generally duplicated by a factual-formal procedure of establishing the predictions. This offers 
possibilities of control of the output of the Schrödinger equation when idealizations or/and 
approximations are involved. And when the equation cannot be solved or even cannot be defined, this 
offers the possibility of a total replacement of such an output. A posteriori, the surprising peculiarities 
of such a situation inside a fundamental theory of theoretical physics appear as quite consonant with 
the new possibilities and trends generated by the progresses in informatics and in nanotechnology. 
Finally, around the core constituted by the representation of the quantum measurements 
indicated above, is structured a very synthetic outline of the whole of the Second Quantum 
Mechanics, QM2 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
« The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking, or 
rather, not to thinking, but to the expression of 
thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we 
should have to be able to think both sides of this limit 
(we should therefore have to be able to think what 
cannot be thought). »  
            Wittgenstein, Preface of the Tractatus  
The first attempts at a representation of microscopic physical entities 
started in terms of usual 'objects' endowed with delimited spatial volumes. 
Therefrom classical models and ways of reasoning were more and more 
deeply lowered into the domain of small space-time dimensions. This 
process however has come to a clear crisis around 1900: The connections 
with classical physics ceased being compatible with the experimentally 
established facts. Therefore Bohr and Plank introduced non-classical but ad 
hoc "principles". Thereby the intelligibility dissolved. 
And then, de Broglie’s 'corpuscular-wave' model fractured the 
evolution: It changed the origin on the vertical that connects knowledge of 
macroscopic physical entities, to knowledge concerning microscopic 
entities. Indeed de Broglie’s model is placed just upon the extreme frontier 
between the microscopic, still a-conceptual factual physical reality, and the 
realm of the already conceptualized. And therefrom it tried to proceed 
upward toward the previously conceptualized in classical terms, and to 
connect to this, intelligibly.  
So the direction and the nature of the actions of construction of 
knowledge along the mentioned vertical of conceptualization were 
reversed.  
Instead of continuing to try to guess top-down starting from the 
classical level and advancing 'downwards' into the realm of microscopic 
space-time dimensions via mental extrapolating procedures that were 
unconsciously trussed up into inertial strings developed since millennia 
inside the classical knowledge and thinking, there timidly began to emerge a 
new, fluctuating tendency to construct representations bottom-up, by a sort 
of conceptual climb in the dark guided by operational-observational-formal 
requirements.  
The direction of constructive thought – where it begins and how it acts 
in order to reach a definite representational purpose – is quite determinant. 
The succession of the acts of conceptualization is tied with specific 
questions and reactions to these. So the mentioned inversion of construction 
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of representation involved quite fundamental changes in the process of 
conceptualization and these in their turn induced obscure and strong mental 
confrontations between ancestral habits of thought and new procedures that 
still lacked definite and stable contours, but of which the necessity had 
become obvious and the consequences were strikingly sensed though feebly 
understood. The method of constructing scientific representations of 
physical reality was undergoing mutation.  
The mathematical representations of Schrödinger and their results – 
directly initiated by de Broglie's model – and on the other hand Heisenberg's 
algorithms that were founded on different principles but for bound states 
offered equivalent results, led to impressing first successes, and these, for a 
while, neutralized the conceptual disquietudes. 
 Meanwhile Bohr, strongly aware of the radically new characters of 
the emerging theory, but of which the source and nature withstood 
identification inside his mind, tried to protect these characters from any 
premature restriction, via a preventive interdiction of any model of a 
microsystem. Furthermore, as it is well known, he founded this interdiction 
upon the assertion of the general philosophical requirement of a strictly 
'positivistic' attitude in science, consisting of the acceptance of – exclusively 
– purely operational basic procedures, free of any interpretive assumption.  
But this was an impossible requirement.  
When the entity to be studied is quintessentially un-observable and is 
unknown, if strictly no model is assigned to it any criteria are lacking for 
deciding what sort of operation deserves being considered to be a 
'measurement-interaction' between 'that' entity and a given qualifying 
quantity; and also for deciding what value of the involved qualifying 
quantity is entailed by the observable marks obtained by one given 
'measurement-interaction' of a chosen sort. One cannot even know in 
advance where in space-time the entity to be studied 'is', nor what extension 
and contours the space-time support of this entity possesses; its inside and 
outside keep non-conceived; nothing insures even that such classical 
delimiting notions possess meaning with respect to what, a priori, is called 
'microsystem' and 'state of a microsystem'. No specifically adequate 
language has been constructed as yet, nor criteria for constructing such a 
language. So a fortiori there is no intuitive basis for beginning to construct 
the desired knowledge. When one wants to enter upon a bottom-up process 
of conceptualization of physical entities, as de Broglie conceived to attempt, 
the perspective of a whole implicit order of constructability opens up 
necessarily like a ladder from the as yet never conceptualized toward the sky 
of classical knowledge. This ladder has to be constructed and climbed step 
by step. If this is attempted in a purely formal-algorithmic way, void of any 
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explanation, the procedure cannot but seem arbitrary and the result cannot 
be endowed with intelligibility.  
And precisely this happened indeed.    
In a certain very warped way Bohr's interdiction of any model of a 
microstate protected indeed the development of the emerging Schrödinger-
Heisenberg mathematical representation, and later its mutation into the 
nowadays Hilbert-Dirac reformulation. But on the other hand this 
interdiction led to hidden violations of certain laws of thought that – 
remarkably – do irrepressibly work inside the human constructive processes 
of conceptualization. And this entailed non-intelligibility of the achieved 
formalism. Moreover, it nourished a hidden inner contradiction. Namely, de 
Broglie's 'corpuscular-wave' model that had triggered Schrödinger's 
contributions, though rejected by Bohr’s positivistic philosophical diktat, 
remained quite essentially involved in the quantum mechanical formalism as 
well as in the current language that accompanied its manipulations. But it 
remained there in an only minored way, masked inside mathematical forms 
and superficially utilized words, so immobilized in atrophy by absence of a 
declared and definite conceptual status. In consequence of this – up to this 
very day – this model keeps acting most fundamentally inside the formalism 
without being exposed to overt control and optimization.  
This circumstance led to the occultation, inside the quantum 
mechanical formalism, of also many other features, factual, operational and 
conceptual, that irrepressibly do act, but without being mutually 
distinguished, named, and genuinely dominated from a semantic point of 
view. The most massive such occultation is that of the radical difference of 
nature and role between individual representations and statistical ones.   
Therefore since 90 years our representation of microstates 
irrepressibly nourishes endless questionings and fumbling that pulverize 
systematically against a paradoxical negative dike of absence of definite 
criteria for defining the exact contents and the adequacy of this or that 
mathematical representation. The mathematical representations proliferated 
densely and they still do so. While in their core there subsists a deleterious 
semantic magma. There is an urgent need to overtly organize meaning, to 
generate intelligibility. We are not yet robots. We are still human beings that 
need to understand in order to optimise with depth, generality and precision, 
in the full light of rationality. A powder of purely algorithmic, 'technical' ad 
hoc solutions, amorphous with respect to rationality, does not yet fully 
satisfy everybody.    
What lacks – dramatically – for organizing meaning is a structure of 
insertion-and-reference constructed independently of the quantum 
mechanical formalism and outside it, that offer a clear and thorough 
understanding of the non-classical specificities of the process of 
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bottom-up construction of a human representation of non-perceptible 
microscopic entities.  
Only this could permit an explicit, exhaustive and coherent specification of 
the way in which a mathematical representation of micro-phenomena can be 
brought to signify in a controlled and adequate way.  
In the first part of this work I construct such a structure of insertion-
and-reference 1. It is the very first one of this kind and it might open the way 
toward many others of the same type but tied with other representational 
aims. 
In the second part, by reference to this structure, are identified the 
main lacunae that vitiate nowadays quantum mechanics. Moreover some of 
these are immediately compensated locally thus offering a cleansed ground 
for a new construction.  
In the third part are outlined the main contours of a second quantum 
mechanics, baptized in advance 'QM2', that is constructed bottom-up and 
emerges freed of interpretation problems and fully intelligible, via a step by 
step explicit identification of the incorporated semantic contents and a 
constant control of the semantic-syntactic consistency2. And this entails an 
unexpected and major reward:  
QM2 permits to discern a natural and – a posteriori – an obvious path 
toward the unification between nowadays microphysics and the theory 
of gravitation. 
The approach practised in this work is not usual. So it will surprise, 
and many readers might feel rejected. I take the liberty to express that I am 
deeply aware of this. But I have not been able to find a less singular way 
toward a fully intelligible representation of the modern microphysics 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
1 For Maxwell’s classical electromagnetism, because “fields” are not directly perceptible, a fully new 
syntax of specifically adequate field-descriptors has been independently created before the 
formulation of the theory itself.  
2 For the sake of effectiveness throughout the whole following work all the involved descriptional 
elements are posited finite, so discrete. 
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PART I 
 
INFRA-QUANTUM MECHANICS 
A qualitative but formalized structure of reference-and-insertion, 
built outside the Hilbert-Dirac mathematical formalism 
for guiding the construction of a fully intelligible Quantum 
Mechanics 
 
 
 
"To reach the truth, once in the life one has 
to unbound oneself from all the received 
opinions and to reconstruct the whole 
system of knowledge, starting from the 
ground". 
René Descartes 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART I 
 
A human being who wants to construct knowledge concerning states 
of microsystems – ‘microstates’ – makes use of physical entities to which he 
associates this denomination, of instruments and operations, and he 
introduces representational aims and corresponding methods of acting and 
thinking. Thereby the human observer introduces severe constraints that 
structure the process of construction of knowledge. It is not possible to 
preserve the process from such constraints. They are precisely what ‘forms’ 
it. Nor is it possible to eliminate a posteriori the effects of theses constraints 
from the constructed knowledge, these are essentially incorporated to the 
achieved form to which they have led. Any piece of knowledge is a 
construction and this construction remains irrepressibly relative to its whole 
genesis. So, if the observer-conceptor wants to stay in control of the 
knowledge that he has generated, to be able to understand and to freely 
optimize it – he has to be thoroughly aware of the conceptual-operational-
methodological weft of this knowledge.  
In what follows – quite independently of the mathematical formalism 
of quantum mechanics – is elaborated a structure of the necessary and 
sufficient features of a procedure – not a 'description', nor a 'theory', but a 
method for reaching an a definite aim – that is specifically appropriate for 
creating scientific knowledge, i.e. communicable, consensual, and verifiable 
knowledge, on a 'microstate', so on a physical entity that is radically non-
perceivable by, directly, the human biological sensorial apparatuses. By 
comparison with the processes of construction of the classical 
conceptualization, this new procedural structure involves a deliberate change 
of the origin, on the vertical of conceptualization, of the processes of 
construction of knowledge: deliberately, it starts at the bottom, upon the 
very limit between the volume of what has already been drawn before inside 
the volume of the actions of conceptualization and what we imagine to be 
the as yet a-conceptual universal physical substance.  
So the order of conceptual constructability is inversed, the 
construction progresses bottom-up. This entails a fundamental change in the 
content of the classical concept indicated by the historically introduced word 
'microstate': this content transmutes into that of a factually defined concept, 
because definitions in the classical sense cannot be realized any more.  
And this in its turn is what entails the emergence of the famous 
'problem' of the 'essentially' probabilistic character of the modern 
microphysics.  
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In order to bring into maximal evidence this pivotal feature I have kept 
in use, unchanged, the word 'microstate'. This introduces a key-connection 
with the classical top-down historical evolution of the scientific 
conceptualization toward microscopic space-time dimensions, inside the 
molecular and atomic physics, but at the same time it acts as a reference for 
comparability between a top-down and a bottom-up conceptualization. 
Which entails intelligibility. Whereby it becomes possible to identify how 
have germinated and developed the basic misunderstandings that since a 
century plague Physics, and to dissolve them. While the narrow guides that 
emerge progressively lead to a second Quantum Mechanics that is itself 
fully intelligible and thereby brings forth the methodological unity of 
Physics.  
The approach proposed in the first part of this work is structured in 
qualitative but explicit, formalized 3 and finite effective terms. The result is 
called in advance Infra-(Quantum Mechanics) and is denoted IQM.  
I would like to convey to the reader from the start what follows.  
Nothing – throughout the construction elaborated below – is conceived 
as an assertion of ‘objective intrinsic factual truth’. Just a succession of 
methodological steps is figured out, each one of which is imposed with 
necessity by the global aim to construct a guiding structure for the 
elaboration of a satisfactory representation of physical entities that – 
radically – cannot be directly perceived, by the local aim of the considered 
step, and by the corresponding cognitive situation. In order to instil 
intelligibility, each step is explicitly referred to the structure of our classical 
thought-and-languages that have emerged and settled in our minds by 
interactions with entities that are perceived. But on the other hand each 
constructive methodological step transgresses our classical forms of thought 
by definite features commanded by the radical novelty of the conceptual 
situation that characterizes it, and these features are explicated.  
IQM is the global procedural whole that is obtained when the 
methodological steps indicated above are put together under constraint of 
logical coherence. It is a coherent procedural reference-and-hosting-
structure for building a specifically appropriated representation of factually 
defined micro-entities.  
                                                      
3 We employ the word ‘formalized’ in the sense that: The posits are explicitly stated; all the specific 
basic terms are endowed with explicit and finite definitions; and the elements introduced in this 
explicit way are constructed as general and syntactically related void loci for receiving in them 
particular unspecified semantic data. Furthermore, once posited or constructed, the elements are 
explicitly connected in full agreement with current logic, i.e. with the usual syllogistic. 
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I think that in the absence of such a structure it simply is not possible 
to construct for such entities a fully appropriate and fully intelligible 
mathematical representation of scientific knowledge. 
IQM is organically tied with a general method for constructing 
scientific human knowledge – consensual, predictive and verifiable –, the 
Method of Relativized Conceptualization, MRC (MMS 4, [2002A], [2002B], 
[2006]). MRC offers the general framework for constructing in a unified 
way any desired infra-discipline. The Infra Quantum Mechanics IQM is the 
very first such 'infra-discipline' and it leads to a second Quantum Mechanics 
QM2.   
This second Quantum Mechanics developed inside the Infra-Quantum 
Mechanics that is an application of the general Method of Relativized 
Conceptualization, brings into clear evidence a fundamental methodological 
unity between all the domains of the modern physics. In particular it brings 
into explicit and detailed perceptibility in what a sense, and how Quantum 
Gravitation and the Modern Microphysics belong organically to one same 
basic constraint of a radically relativized reorganization of the scientific 
representations of matter: in the modern scientific approaches, the constantly 
increasing distance between direct sensorial perceptibility of that what is 
represented, and a scientific representation of this, obliges to relativize with 
method and rigor the scientific ways of constructing knowledge.  
This fact, implicitly, burgeons already everywhere inside the sciences 
of matter. The Method of Relativized Conceptualization MRC and the Infra-
(Quantum Mechanics) IQM only offer an explicit perception and a coherent 
expression of this now ubiquitous fact. 
  
                                                      
4 MMS is to be read "M. Mugur-Schächter".  
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PROLOGUE 
 
 
The extract reproduced below from the volume 
"Einstein 1879- 1955 (6-9 juin 1979), colloque du 
centenaire, Collège de France, Editions du Centre National 
de la Recherche Scientifique" – is useful for reminding of 
the state of mind concerning the fundamental problems in 
Quantum Mechanics in 1979, that still persists today.  
 
 
•  
 
I reproduce the original French version 
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 (EXTRAIT) 
REFLEXION SUR LE PROBLEME DE LOCALITE 
M. Mugur–Schächter  
UNIVERSITE DE REIMS 
B.P 347 51062 REMS CEDEX 
 
But 
Depuis huit ans ce que l’on appelle le problème de localité 
retient de plus en plus l’attention. Des théoriciens, des 
expérimentateurs, des penseurs pluridisciplinaires investissent des 
efforts importants pour élucider ce problème. Les aspects techniques 
– mathématiques et expérimentaux – ont été déjà examinés dans un 
grand nombre de travaux et ils sont bien connus de ceux qui font à ce 
sujet des recherches spécialisées. Mais la configuration conceptuelle 
qui est en jeu me paraît avoir des contours beaucoup moins définis. 
Le but de l’exposé qui suit est d’examiner cette configuration 
conceptuelle. J’essaierai de procéder à cet examen d’une manière 
aussi simple et frappante que possible, presque affichistique, à l’aide 
de schémas et de tableaux. Ces moyens me paraissent être les plus 
adéquats pour donner le maximum de relief aux insuffisances que je 
perçois dans la définition même du problème de localité. 
 
Bref rappel 
Le paradoxe EPR (I935). Le problème de localité est soulevé 
par un théorème bien connu de J. Bell (1) qui se rattache à un 
raisonnement formulé en 1935 par Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen (2). 
Ce raisonnement, connu sous la dénomination de "paradoxe EPR", et 
été construit pour démontrer que le formalisme de la Mécanique 
Quantique ne fournit pas une description complète des microsystèmes 
individuels. Les hypothèses qui constituent la base de départ du 
paradoxe EPR sont indiquées dans le tableau suivant (où des 
notations abrégées leur sont associées): 
•  
Le "paradoxe EPR" consiste dans la démonstration du fait que 
les hypothèses énumérées ne sont pas compatibles. 
L’interprétation proposée par Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen, de 
cette démonstration, a été la suivante: 
Les prévisions du formalisme quantique se montrent correctes. Il 
n’existe donc aucune base pour abandonner l’hypothèse ∀MQ. 
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L’hypothèse ∃(r.d.l.) exprime un credo métaphysique que l’on est libre 
d’accepter ou de rejeter. Mais si on l’accepte, alors il faut l’adjoindre 
aux prévisions de la Mécanique Quantique. En ce cas la démonstration 
de l’incompatibilité du système d’hypothèses [∀MQ + C(MQ) + 
∃(r.d.l.)] oblige à abandonner hypothèse de complétude C(MQ). En 
d’autres termes cette démonstration oblige alors à accepter la possibilité 
d’une théorie déterministe et locale (TDL) des microphénomènes, où le 
formalisme quantique sera complété par des éléments descriptifs 
additionnels, des paramètres cachés (par rapport au formalisme 
quantique) déterministes et locaux (p.c.d.l.) qui permettent d’accomplir 
une description complète des microsystèmes individuels. Cette 
description complète fournie par TDL doit être compatible avec la 
Mécanique Quantique – en vertu de l’hypothèse ∀MQ – et avec la 
Relativité, en vertu de l’hypothèse ∃(r.d.l.) qui se trouve intégrée dans la 
théorie de la relativité. Cette structure d’idées peut être représentée par 
le schéma suivant: 
•  
Les réactions pendant 30 ans. Les réactions ont été diverses. 
Pourtant la note dominante a été nettement celle du positivisme: 
l’hypothèse "réaliste" ∃(r.d.l.) est dépourvue de toute signification 
opérationnelle. Elle est donc essentiellement métaphysique, extérieure à 
la démarche scientifique. L’incompatibilité dénommée "paradoxe EPR" 
n’existe que par rapport à cette hypothèse non scientifique, et donc elle 
ne constitue pas un problème scientifique. Pour la science il s’agit là 
d’un faux problème. 
Le théorème de J. Bell (I964). Trente années plus tard J.Bell a 
démontré un théorème qui semble contredire l’interprétation associée 
par Einstein Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen à leur propre démonstration. La 
conclusion du théorème de Bell peut s’énoncer ainsi (ou de manières 
équivalentes): il n’est pas possible, à l’aide de paramètres cachés 
déterministes et locaux, d’obtenir dans tous les cas les mêmes prévisions 
que la Mécanique Quantique ; en certains cas, de tels paramètres 
conduisent à d’autres prévisions. Si alors on veut rétablir l’accord avec 
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les prévisions de la Mécanique Quantique, il faut supprimer le caractère 
local des paramètres cachés introduits, ce qui contredira l’hypothèse 
∃(r.d.l.), que la théorie de la Relativité incorpore. Par conséquent la 
théorie déterministe TDL compatible à la fois avec la Mécanique 
Quantique et la Relativité, dont Einstein Podolsky et Rosen ont cru avoir 
établi la possibilité, est en fait impossible. 
La démonstration repose sur la production d’un exemple. On 
considère deux système S1 et S2 à spins non nuls et corrélés, créés par la 
désintégration d’un système initial S de spin nul. On envisage des 
mesures de spin sur S1 selon trois directions a, b, c, à l’aide d’un 
appareil A1, et des mesures de spin sur S2 selon ces mêmes directions, à 
l’aide d’un appareil A2 qui peut se trouver à une distance arbitrairement 
grande de A1. L’hypothèse ∃(r.d.l.) est ensuite formalisée: des 
paramètres cachés sont introduits et ils sont soumis à des conditions 
telles qu’elles fournissent une traduction mathématique des 
qualifications de "déterministes" et "locaux". Ainsi la conceptualisation 
introduite auparavant au niveau d’une sémantique claire, mais 
qualitative, est élevée jusqu’à un niveau sémantique syntaxisé. Un tel 
pas est souvent important, car il peut permettre des déductions 
mathématiques à conclusions quantitatives. Et en effet Bell a démontré 
que l’hypothèse ∃(r.d.l.) ainsi formalisée entraîne nécessairement une 
certaine inégalité concernant les corrélations statistiques entre les 
résultats de mesures de spin enregistrés sur les appareils A1 et A2. Or, 
cette inégalité n’est pas satisfaite par les corrélations statistiques prévues 
par la Mécanique Quantique. On pourrait retrouver les corrélations 
quantiques en supprimant la condition qui traduit mathématiquement le 
caractère "local" des paramètres cachés introduits, c'est-à-dire en 
renonçant à une partie de l’hypothèse ∃(r.d.l.). On exprime ceci en 
disant que, dans la circonstance considérée, "la Mécanique Quantique 
est non-locale" ou "implique des effets non-locaux" qui la rendent 
incompatible avec ∃(r.d.l.). Schématiquement, on peut résumer l’apport 
de Bell ainsi (en notant (p.c.d.l.)B les paramètres cachés soumis aux 
conditions de Bell). 
•  
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Comme les statistiques dont il s’agit sont observables, il est en 
principe possible d’établir expérimentalement si les faits physiques 
correspondent aux prévisions de la Mécanique Quantique ou à celles 
entraînées par les paramètres cachés déterministes et locaux au sens de 
Bell. C’est l’un des traits les plus forts du théorème de Bell. 
Si l’expérience infirmait la Mécanique Quantique, la situation 
conceptuelle créée paraîtrait claire. On devrait admettre la possibilité 
d’une théorie déterministe et locale des microphénomènes, mais 
différente de celle envisagée par Einstein, Podolsky et Rosen, car elle 
n’obéirait pas à l’exigence d’identité prévisionnelle avec la Mécanique 
Quantique, pour tous les cas. 
Mais un certain nombre d’expériences de vérification a déjà été fait 
et il se trouve que les résultats obtenus à ce jour – bien qu’ils ne 
tranchent pas encore définitivement – étayent fortement la supposition 
que la prévision de la Mécanique Quantique s’impose comme correcte. 
Il s’agit donc de comprendre la situation conceptuelle qui semble 
s’établir et que l’on dénomme "problème de localité". 
 
Interprétations 
Le problème de localité est ressenti diversement. Je distinguerai en 
gros trois interprétations, en omettant ou en bousculent beaucoup de 
nuances. 
I- Interprétations de refus. Un certain de nombre de physiciens 
semble considérer cette fois encore qu’il s’agit d’un problème 
métaphysique qui n’existe que par rapport au concept non opérationnel 
de paramètre cachés, mais qui se dissout dès qu’on refuse ce concept. 
D’autres physiciens considèrent que le problème n’existe parce qu’il est 
faussement posé (3). 
2- Interprétation minimale. Selon d’autres physiciens (4), (5), (6), 
(7), etc.…, le problème satisfait cette fois aux normes positivistes les 
plus draconiennes, parce qu’il conduit à des testes expérimentaux. 
Toutefois, ils refusent de conceptualiser au-delà de ce que ces tests 
mettent en jeu. Ils ne prennent en considération strictement que des 
corrélations statistiques entre des évènements de mesure qui sont séparés 
par une distance du genre espace et qui peuvent manifester soit 
"indépendance instantanée" c'est-à-dire localité, soit au contraire 
"dépendance instantanée" c’est-à-dire non-localité. Toute relation avec 
des concepts sous-jacents "explicatifs" est évitée. De ce point de vue, le
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concept de paramètres cachés n’aurait qu’un rôle de révélateur 
conceptuel (ou de catalyseur) d’un problème auquel il reste finalement 
extérieur. Car ce problème, une fois qu’il a été perçu, subsiste sans 
référence nécessaire au concept de paramètres cachés. Il s’agit d’un face 
à face direct entre la Mécanique Quantique et de Relativité. 
•  
3- L’interprétation épistémologique. Il existe enfin une tendance 
(8) à connecter le problème de localité à notre conceptualisation la plus 
courante de la réalité, qui postule l’existence d’objets isolés possédant 
des propriétés intrinsèques et permanentes. La violation des inégalités de 
Bell serait incompatible avec ces suppositions. Il s’agirait donc en 
dernière essence d’un face-à-face entre la Mécanique Quantique et – à 
travers le concept de paramètres cachés et à travers la Relativité – des 
postulats épistémologiques fondamentaux. 
•  
Je n’examinerai pas l’interprétation de refus, car elle ne peut 
conduire à aucun élément nouveau. 
Quant aux deux face-à-face impliqués par les deux autres 
interprétations, aucun d’eux ne me semble s’imposer dans la phase 
actuelle du débat. Seule une question ressort clairement: 
Qu’est ce qui est en jeu – au juste – dans le problème de localité? 
L’examen qui suit montrera que, pour fixer une réponse, les 
conceptualisations existantes et les tests sur l’inégalité de Bell ne 
peuvent pas suffire. Inévitablement d’autres conceptualisations encore, 
et les tests correspondants, devront être abordés. Sinon, aucune 
conclusion définitive ne pourra être tirée, même si l’inégalité de Bell est 
clairement violée. 
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Le problème de localité et le terrain conceptuel sous-jacent 
Reconsidérons le problème de localité en essayant de séparer ce que 
l’on perçoit directement lors des expériences, de ce que l’on calcule, et 
des intermédiaires qui relient ce que l’on voit à ce que l’on calcule. 
A. Ce qu’on voit lors des expériences. On voit (tous les détails mis à 
part) un objet central Ao et deux appareils A1 et A2 placées à gauche et à 
droite de Ao à des distances égales. Sur certaines parties de AI et A2 
apparaissent de temps à autres des marques visibles. 
•  
B. Ce qu’on calcule. On calcule des corrélations statistiques en 
employant trois sortes de distributions de probabilités conduisant à trois 
fonctions de corrélation, une fonction F(TDL)B caractéristique d’une 
théorie déterministe locale au sens de Bell, une fonction FMQ obéissant 
aux algorithmes de la Mécanique Quantique, et une fonction Fobs 
correspondant aux statistiques observées. L’inégalité de Bell distingue 
F(TDL)B  de FMQ. L’expérience doit montrer si la réalité observée reproduit 
FMQ ou F(TDL): 
•  
C. Les intermédiaires entre ce qu’on voit et ce qu’on calcule. 
L’ensemble de ces intermédiaires est très riche et complexe. Il serait 
insensé de vouloir donner une énumération et une caractérisation
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déterministes et locaux de Bell violent la pudeur sémantique dictée par 
le positivisme. Alors autant aller jusqu’au bout et avouer l’ensemble des 
questions sémantiques liées aux interprétations 2 et 3 du problème de 
localité telles que je les ai distinguées plus haut. 
Je commence par l’interprétation minimale. Je perçois deux 
questions. 
En premier lieu, les contenus sémantiques assignés aux qualificatifs 
"déterministes" et "locaux", tels qu’ils sont impliqués par la 
modélisation mathématisée de Bell, permettent-ils la représentation la 
plus générale concevable d’un processus d’observation d’un "microétat" 
à l’aide d’un "appareil" macroscopique? 
En second lieu, en supposant que la modélisation de Bell d’un 
processus d’observation n’introduit vraiment aucune restriction non 
nécessaire, quelle sorte de non-localité, exactement, la violation des 
inégalités de Bell démontrerait-elle? La non-localité que la théorie de la 
Relativité interdit clairement, ou bien des prolongements spontanés et 
encore flous de celle-ci qui pourraient en outre s’avérer contraire à la 
réalité? 
Pour l’instant, il me manque les éléments pour développer la 
première question. J’aborderai donc directement la seconde: 
Ce qu’on appelle "le système" qui se désintègre en Ao, pour autant 
qu’il existe, doit comporter une certaine extension spatiale non nulle de 
départ Δxs(to)≠0 (ce qui peuple ce domaine d’espace, est-ce un "objet" 
ou un "processus", ou les deux à la fois? les définitions même manquant 
pour répondre). Ce qu’on désigne par les termes "désintégration" ou 
"création d’une paire S1 et S2", comment le concevoir? Les mots 
indiquent dans le substrat conceptuel l’hypothèse d’un processus, d’une 
entité réelle en cours de changement. Pour exister, ce processus doit se 
produire quelque part et il doit durer, il doit occuper un certain domaine 
non nul d’espace-temps Δsc(t).Δtc  ≠ 0 (l’indice c: création)  à l’intérieur 
duquel "le système de départ S" existe encore mais change, cependant 
que S1 et S2 n’existent pas encore mais se forment. 
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•  
Dans l’écriture qui désigne ce domaine d’espace-temps, le facteur 
de durée ⊗tc= t12, o – to s’étend – par définition – d’une certaine "valeur 
initiale de temps" to où le changement de création commence, jusqu’à 
une "valeur finale de temps" tf ≡ t12, o à partir de laquelle "la paire S1, S2 
de systèmes corrélés" commence à exister (des objets? des processus 
eux aussi? les deux à la fois?). Quand au facteur d’extension spatiale   
Δsc (t), il semble obligatoire de concevoir, puisqu’il s’agit d’un 
processus, qu’il change en fonction de la "valeur de temps" t, avec (to < t 
<tf ), en restant toutefois métastablement connexe tant que t < tf  (c'est-à-
dire tant que S subsiste encore et que SI et S2 ne sont pas encore créés). 
Pour tout t > tf, toutefois, ce domaine spatial devrait être devenu non 
connexe via une scission plus ou moins "catastrophique" conduisant à 
cette nouvelle forme de stabilité à laquelle on rattache l’expression "la 
paire SI, S2 de deux systèmes corrélés". 
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Je m’arrête un instant et je regarde ce que je viens d’écrire. Quel 
mélange de "nécessités" et d’arbitraire, de signes et de mots qui ont l’air 
de pointer vers un désigné précisé et sous lesquels pourtant on ne trouve 
que des images floues et mouvantes accrochées à ces mots et ces signes 
de manière non séparée. J’écris entre guillemets "valeur de temps", par 
exemple, parce qu’à chaque fois que je réfléchis au degré 
d’inexploration où se trouvent encore les concepts de durée et de temps 
et leur relation, je ressens une réticence à écrire quoi que ce soit en 
dehors d’un algorithme qui fixe une règle du jeu. Le paramétrage de la 
propriété fondamentale de durée à l’aide de la variable de temps t, telle 
que cette paramétrisation est pratiquée dans les théories existantes et 
même dans la Relativité, est encore certainement très simplificatrice et 
souvent falsificatrice, rigidifiante, mécanisante en quelque sorte. Les 
changements ne sont pas toujours des déplacements d’entités stables 
intérieurement. Pour pouvoir rendre compte pleinement de l’entière 
diversité des types et des intensités de changements, il faudrait une sorte 
de grandeur vectorielle, un champ de temps processuel défini en chaque 
point de l’espace abstrait encadré par l’axe de durée et par les axes des 
changements envisagés. 
Mais un tel temps se transformerait-il selon Lorentz? Quel rôle joue 
la vitesse d’un "signal" lumineux face aux vitesses de propagation 
"d’influences" (?) dans un tel espace processuel? Qu’est ce que la 
Relativité impose véritablement aux processus quelconques et qu’est-ce 
qu’elle laisse en blanc? Lorsqu’il s’agit de processus très "intenses" 
localement, "catastrophiques", comme l’est probablement la "création 
d’une paire", que devient "le temps"? 
En théorie relativiste générale de la gravitation, par exemple, un 
gradient non nul du champ de gravitation est lié à une impossibilité de 
définir un temps unique, pour les observateurs d’un même référentiel, si 
ces observateurs sont spatialement distants l’un de l’autre. Quand à 
l’invariance de la vitesse de la lumière elle-même (et non la vitesse 
d’autres sortes "d’influences") lorsqu’on passe d’un référentiel à un 
autre, elle n’est postulée que localement, car il n’existe aucune 
définition uniforme des distances et des temps dans des champs 
gravitationnels variables (9) (espace-temps courbes). Comment savoir 
quelle sorte de "courbure" locale de l’espace-temps est produite (ou non) 
par un processus – essentiellement variable – de création d’une  paire? 
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Enfin, la Relativité n’introduit aucune quantification au sens de la 
Mécanique Quantique, sa description est continue. Lorsqu’on écrit 
[vitesse = distance/temps], le temps est un paramètre continu. 
Si ensuite on se demande comment on trouve la valeur de t, on 
s’aperçoit qu’elle est de la forme NTH où N est un entier et TH une 
période "d’horloge" (supposée constante !) ce qui ramène au discret. En 
macroscopie cela peut être négligeable aussi bien sur le plan du principe 
que sur le plan numérique. Mais lorsqu’on considère des processus 
quantiques et relativement très brefs, quel est le degré de signifiance 
d’une condition comme 
•  
Quelle horloge faut-il choisir, avec quel TH, et comment par ailleurs 
s’assurer que lorsqu’on écrit ⊗t = 10-x, on fait plus qu’un calcul vide de 
sens? 
On comprend, devant de telles questions, les prudences positivistes 
et les normes qui conseillent de se maintenir dans la zone salubre de 
l’opérationnellement défini et du syntaxisé, où la pensée circule sur des 
voies tracées et consolidées. Au dehors, on s’enfonce dans une véritable 
boue sémantique. Pourtant ce n’est que là, dans cette boue, et lorsqu’on 
force le regard à discerner les formes mouvantes, que l’on peut 
percevoir du nouveau. De toute façon le problème de localité nous y 
force: c’est un problème très fondamental où tout comportement inertiel, 
inanalysé ou approximatif, conduit inéluctablement à l’arrêt de la 
capacité de raisonnement, ou à des problèmes et perspectives illusoires. 
On ne peut pas cette fois suivre un chemin parce qu’il est construit. On 
est obligé de choisir et de suivre la direction qui convient. 
Je reviens donc sur la création d’une paire corrélée S1, S2. J’imagine 
ce processus comme ayant des analogies avec la formation de gouttes. 
(Ceci peut être faux, mais ce n’est pas a priori impossible, et on n’a 
besoin que d’un exemple de possibilité). Je dessine donc ainsi la 
projection spatiale (en deux dimensions) du domaine d’espace- temps 
⊗sc (t).⊗tc , to < t < tf, pour 4 époques: 
* t = to ; 
* to < t < tf 
* to < t < tf – (c'est-à-dire immédiatement avant tf) ; 
et t = tf + (c'est-à-dire immédiatement après tf) 
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Supposons maintenant que la distance dI2 entre les appareils A1 et 
A2 est plus petite que la projection maximale de ⊗sc(t) sur l’axe x 
correspondant à t = tf –. 
Les appareils A1 et A2 seront donc atteints non pas par "S1" et "S2" 
respectivement, mais par "S en cours de désintégration", qui peut 
néanmoins déclencher des enregistrements sur A1 et A2. Supposons 
encore que la durée des évènements de mesure se trouve être telle par 
rapport à d12, que la distance d’espace-temps entre les événements de 
mesure soit du genre espace. Enfin, supposons que, en dépit de tout cela, 
les évènements de mesure ne soient pas indépendants au sens de Bell, 
c'est-à-dire supposons qu’un changement de A2 puisse agir à une vitesse 
v > C sur le résultat de l’un des enregistrements de A2. Les statistiques 
de résultats d’enregistrements sur A1 et A2 seront alors "non localement 
corrélées" et l’inégalité de Bell sera violée. Mais serait-il en ce cas 
justifié de conclure qu’on a démontré une contradiction avec la théorie 
de la Relativité? La théorie de la Relativité ne statue que sur des 
"signaux" (quelle est exactement la définition?) se propageant "dans le 
vide". Elle ne statue rien du tout concernant la transmission 
"d’influences" (définition?) à travers un "système" (objet? processus?). 
En particulier, elle n’impose rien du tout concernant "l’ordre temporel" 
(?) ("causal" ou "non causal") (?) d’événements placés à des endroits 
spatiaux différents d’"un même système". L’exemple imaginé – un 
modèle de "création d’une paire" – n’appartient tout simplement pas au 
domaine de faits que la Relativité décrit. Aucune théorie constituée ne le 
décrit encore. Pourtant cet exemple, quelles que soient ses inadéquations 
face à la réalité inconnue, caractérise certainement d’une manière en 
essence acceptable ce qui mérite la dénomination de processus de
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création d’une paire: un tel processus doit occuper un domaine non nul 
d’espace-temps, dont la projection spatiale, connexe au départ, évolue, 
devenant non connexe. 
Cet exemple de possibilité me semble suffire comme base pour la 
conclusion suivante: les tests destinés à vérifier l’inégalité de Bell, 
même s’ils violaient définitivement l’inégalité, ne pourront jamais 
établir à eux seuls que le principe einsteinien de localité a été enfreint. 
Pour préciser ce qui est en jeu, la modélisation de Bell et le test 
correspondant devront être associés à d’autres modélisations et à 
d’autres tests, concernant l’extension d’espace-temps des évènements 
qui interviennent, non observables ("création") et observables (mesures). 
La minimalité de l’interprétation minimale n’est en fait qu’une 
prudence, une peur encore positiviste de se laisser entraîner trop loin en 
dehors du déjà construit. Cette prudence cantonne dans un face-à-face 
indécis, où la Mécanique Quantique est opposée indistinctement à la 
localité relativiste et à des prolongements inertiels et confus de celle-ci 
qui ne s’insèrent en aucune structuration conceptuelle constituée. Mais 
une telle prudence ne peut pas durer. Un processus de conceptualisation 
en chaîne s’est déclenché subrepticement et aucun obstacle factice ne 
pourra l’arrêter. Cette affirmation n’est pas une critique, elle désigne la 
valeur la plus sûre que je perçois dans la démarche de Bell, et elle 
exprime ma confiance dans l’esprit humain. 
Je considère maintenant l’interprétation épistémologique. Celle-ci 
s’avance déjà précisément dans le sens de cette inéluctable modélisation 
supplémentaire. Les termes considérés sont ceux de "1 système" et "2 
systèmes corrélés mais isolés l’un de l’autre" (au sens de la Relativité). 
La modélisation supplémentaire mentionnée fait intervenir le postulat 
épistémologique courant d’existence de propriétés intrinsèques pour des 
entités réelles isolées. On déduit de ce postulat des inégalités du même 
type que celle de Bell, concernant des statistiques de résultats de 
mesures sur des entités supposées isolées. On établit donc une 
connexion entre des tests sur des inégalités observables d’une part, et 
d’autre part le postulat épistémologique d’existence de propriété 
intrinsèques pour des objets isolés au sens de la Relativité. Sur cette base 
on admet (il me semble?) que la violation de l’inégalité de Bell 
infirmerait à elle seule la signifiance de la conceptualisation en termes 
d’entités isolées possédant des propriétés intrinsèques. Or j’ai montré 
ailleurs (10) (en termes trop techniques pour être reproduits ici) que cela 
n’est pas possible. Ici je ne ferai à ce sujet que quelques remarques 
qualitatives. 
Tout d’abord, les considérations faites plus haut concernant la 
création d’une paire peuvent aussi se transposer d’une manière évidente 
au cas de l’interprétation épistémologique. Mais prolongeons encore
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autrement ces considérations: plaçons-nous cette fois d’emblée à 
l’instant t=to où SI et S2 sont créés. Pour t>to’ S1 et S2 occupent 
maintenant deux domaines d’espace disjoints Δs1(t) et Δs2(t) qui 
s’éloignent l’un de l’autre et qui rencontrent ensuite respectivement les 
appareils A1 et A2, produisant des interactions de mesure. L’interaction 
de mesure de S1 avec A1 est elle-même un évènement qui occupe un 
domaine non nul d’espace-temps Δsm1(tm1). Δtm1≠0 (l’indice m se lit: 
mesure) où tm1∈Δtm1 et le facteur de durée Δtm1 dépend de l’extension 
spatiale Δsm1(tm1) liée à l’époque  tm1∈Δtm1 (en  supposant  que  cette 
extension spatiale reste constante au cours de l’époque tm1∈Δ tm). Il en 
va de même pour l’évènement de mesure sur A2 dont l’extension 
d’espace-temps est Δsm2(tm2).Δtm2≠0. Comment définir maintenant la 
distance d’espace-temps entre ces deux évènements de mesure? Quelle 
que soit la distance spatiale fixée entre A1 et  A2,  comment savoir si la 
distance correspondante d’espace-temps entre les évènements de mesure 
est ou non du genre espace? Car c’est cela qui décide si oui ou non la 
condition cruciale "d’isolement" réciproque de ces évènements de 
mesure, se réalise, et c’est sur la base de cette condition que l’on  
s’attend  à l’inégalité de Bell pour les statistiques des résultats 
enregistrés. Que la distance d’espace-temps entre les évènements de 
mesure soit ou non du genre espace, cela dépend évidemment (entre 
autres) des facteurs d’extension  spatiale Δsm1(tm1) et Δsm2(tm2). Or, que 
savons-nous de la valeur de ces facteurs? S1 et S2 se déplacent-ils "en 
bloc", "mécaniquement", comme le suggèrent le modèle de Louis de 
Broglie et le concept récent de soliton, ou bien s’étalent-ils  comme  le  
suggère  le concept quantique courant de paquet d’ondes à évolution 
linéaire Schrödinger? 
On pourrait peut-être espérer avoir une réponse plus claire dans le 
cas où S1 et S2 seraient des photons "dont la vitesse est C". Mais la 
vitesse de quoi? Du front de l’onde photonique, oui, mais que penser du 
"reste" du photon? Comment est fait un photon, comme un 
microsystème de Louis de Broglie, avec une singularité et un 
phénomène plus étendu autour? Le comportement manifesté par des 
ondes radio le laisse supposer. De quelle extension alors? Dans la phase 
actuelle, que savons nous, exactement et individuellement sur ces entités 
que l’on dénomme "photons"? La Mécanique Quantique newtonienne ne 
les décrit pas ; l’électromagnétisme ne les décrit pas individuellement. 
La théorie quantique des champs a été marquée, au cours des années 
récentes, par des essais "semi-classiques" dont le but est d’éliminer tout 
simplement la notion de photon afin d’éviter les difficultés conceptuelles 
liées aux algorithmes de re-normalisation (11). 
On peut donc conclure en toute généralité que, quelle que soit la 
distance spatiale fixée entre A1 et A2 (qu’il s’agisse de microsystèmes à
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masse non nulle au repos ou de photons), pour savoir si les évènements 
de mesure sur ces microsystèmes sont séparés ou non par une distance 
d’espace-temps du genre espace, il faudrait connaître (entre autres) 
l’extension spatiale des états de ces microsystèmes, en fonction du 
temps. 
Sans détailler plus des enchaînements logiques non essentiels, ces 
seules remarques suffisent pour indiquer la base de l’affirmation 
suivante. 
A eux seuls, les tests de l’inégalité de Bell ne permettront jamais de 
conclure concernant la signifiance de l’assignation de propriétés 
intrinsèques à des entités réelles isolées au sens de la Relativité 
d’Einstein. Donc pour l’instant aucun face-à-face n’est encore défini 
entre la Mécanique Quantique et les postulats épistémologiques de notre 
conceptualisation courante de la réalité. Seule une direction de pensée 
est tracée, qui suggère l’intérêt de recherches nouvelles sur la structure 
d’espace-temps de ce que l’on appelle des microsystèmes individuels. 
Cette direction de pensée me paraît courageuse et très importante, mais 
dans la mesure où elle se reconnaît et s’assume. Elle s’associe alors 
naturellement à des recherches récentes sur l’extension des 
microsystèmes à masse non nulle au repos (12), (13) et sur le concept de 
photon (11). Il est très remarquable de voir que toutes ces recherches se 
concentrent sur les phénomènes et concepts d’interférence. En effet c’est 
là qu’à travers le statistique peut apparaître l’individuel. C’est là que 
peut se trahir – si on l’y cherche – la confusion entre des interférences 
mathématiques de statistiques standard et d’autre part des statistiques 
d’interférences physiques d’une entité individuelle qui se superpose 
avec elle- même (14), (15). 
A travers le problème de localité, j’ai dirigé volontairement les 
regards sur la couche sémantique qui se trouve sous les mots qu’on 
emploie. L’état de celle-ci est en quelque sorte l’objet principal de ces 
remarques. La boue sémantique au dessus de laquelle nous voltigeons 
salubrement d’algorithme en algorithme, accrochés à des cordes de 
mots, me paraît mériter d’être connue de plus près. Il faudra bien y 
plonger pour forger les concepts nouveaux qui manquent et en fixer les 
contours d’une manière qui permette de s’élever jusqu’à des 
syntaxisations. 
Le concept d’objet au sens macroscopique de ce terme est cerné 
avec rigueur – bien que qualitativement – à l’intérieur de la logique des 
classes d’objets et de prédicats. Celle-ci est par essence une théorie des 
objets macroscopiques explicitement structurée et de généralité 
maximale. Mais cette théorie est foncièrement inapte à une description 
non restreinte des changements. En effet, la logique des classes d’objets 
et des prédicats est fondée sur la relation d’appartenance ∈: si pour
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l’objet x le prédicat f est vrai, alors x appartient à la classe Cf définie par 
f: f(x) → x∈Cf. Mais cette relation fondamentale d’appartenance ∈ est 
conçue au départ d’une manière statique, hypostasiée. Aucun 
aménagement ultérieur ne peut compenser les rigidités introduites ainsi 
au départ. La théorie des probabilités d’une part et d’autre part les 
différentes théories physiques (la mécanique, la thermodynamique, les 
théories des champs, la Mécanique Quantique, la Relativité) sont 
arrivées à combler cette lacune à des degrés différents. Mais chacune 
pour une catégories particulière de faits et par des méthodes implicites et 
diversifiées. Une théorie générale et spécifique des évènements et des 
processus, une logique des changements absolument quelconques, à 
méthodologie explicite et unifiées, n’a pas encore été construite*. 
Considérons maintenant de nouveau la logique des classes 
d’objets et de prédicats. Elle transgresse foncièrement l’individuel, 
puisqu’elle décrit des classes. Elle semblerait donc être vouée 
naturellement à une quantification numérique de type statistique ou 
probabiliste, à l’aide d’une mesure de probabilité définie sur les classes. 
Pourtant, à ce jour, une telle quantification numérique de la logique n’a 
pas pu être accomplie. Les "quantificateurs" logiques ∃, ∀, Ø, sont 
restés qualitatifs ! 
Complémentairement en quelque sorte, à ce jour, la théorie des 
probabilités n’a pas encore développé explicitement un traitement 
classificateur. Le concept fondamental employé est celui d’espace de 
probabilité [U,τ, p(τ)] où p(τ) désigne une mesure de probabilité posée 
sur une tribu d’événements τ, définie sur l’univers U={ei, i=1,2,….} 
d’événements élémentaires ei. Cette tribu peut refléter, en particulier, 
une classification des événements élémentaires ei commandée par un 
prédicat f et en ce cas des propriétés spécifiques "logiques" s’ensuivent 
pour l’espace [U,τ, p(τ)]. Via ces propriétés classificatrices, la 
connexion entre logique et probabilités pourrait être amorcée. Mais ceci 
n’a pas été tenté, et la connexion reste pour l’instant non élaborée. 
Considérons maintenant la Mécanique Quantique. Elle introduit 
des espaces de probabilité. Pourtant les relations entre ces espace sont 
telles que certains mathématiciens affirment que "la Mécanique 
Quantique n’est pas une théorie de probabilités". La connexion entre la 
théorie des probabilités et la Mécanique Quantique reste pour l’instant 
elle aussi très obscure. 
 
* J’ai pu prendre connaissance d’une tentative originale et courageuse de formaliser la  
durée (I6). Jusqu’ici seules les valeurs associables à la durée ("le temps") ont fait 
objet de certaines formalisations. 
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D’autre part les relations de la Mécanique Quantique avec les 
divers concepts suggérés par le langage qu’elle introduit – 1 système, 1 
système de 2 systèmes corrélés, etc. – restent elles aussi très obscures. 
La Mécanique Quantique n’indique en fait strictement rien concernant 
ces concepts tels que l’on pourrait vouloir les imaginer en dehors de 
l’observation. Même la probabilité de présence n’est qu’une probabilité 
de résultats d’interactions d’observation: il est permis par la Mécanique 
Quantique d’imaginer qu’un "système" qui fait une marque sur un écran 
à un moment t, se trouvait, en lui-même, aussi loin que l’on veut de cette 
marque, aussi peu que l’on veut avant le moment t. La Mécanique 
Quantique laisse parfaitement non conceptualisée en elle-même, "la 
réalité" dont elle codifie de manière si riche et détaillée les 
manifestations observables à travers les interactions de mesure. 
Considérons enfin la théorie de la Relativité. Cette théorie est, à sa 
base, individuelle, non statistique, et continue, non quantifiée. En outre, 
elle décrit "ce qui est", bien que relativement à l’état d’observation. Sa 
connexion avec les espace de probabilité à évènements foncièrement 
observationnels et quantifiés de la Mécanique Quantique, soulève des 
problèmes bien connus et très résistants. 
Ainsi nous sommes actuellement en possession de plusieurs 
structurations syntaxiques constituées, chacune très complexe, riche et 
rigoureuse. Mais ces structurations sont comparables à des icebergs 
émergeant de la mer de boue sémantique, sous le niveau de laquelle les 
bords et les bases disparaissent. Quand à l’ensemble des concepts liés à 
la propriété fondamentale de durée, les concepts de processus, 
d’évènement, de changement, de permanence, de succession, de 
TEMPS, ils n’agissent librement qu’à l’état épars, primitif et subjectif, 
tels que l’expérience et le langage les a diversement induits dans les 
esprits. Car les organisations auxquelles ces concepts ont été soumis à 
l’intérieur de la théorie de la Relativité, de la théorie des probabilités, ou 
à l’intérieur de telle ou telle autre théorie physique, sont toutes 
particularisantes et amputantes. La situation est encore telle que la 
décrivait Bergson: «La déduction est une opération réglée sur les 
démarches de la matière, calquée sur les articulations mobiles de la 
matière, implicitement donnée, enfin, avec l’espace qui sous-tend la 
matière. Tant qu’elle roule dans l’espace ou dans le temps spatialisé, elle 
n’a qu’à se laisser aller. C’est la durée qui met des bâtons dans les 
roues’ » (17). 
Je résume une fois encore par un schéma: 
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•  
Quand il n’existe encore aucune unification entre la démarche 
statistique, discrète, observationnelle, orientée vers le microscopique, de 
la Mécanique Quantique, et d’autre part la démarche individuelle, 
continue, réaliste, orientée vers le cosmologie, de la Relativité, quant 
tout ce qui touche à la durée et au temps est encore si peu élucidé, quand 
tout ce qui touche à la manière d’être de ces entités que l’on appelle des 
microsystèmes – ou plus encore, de microétats – est encore tellement 
inexploré, quel sens cela peut-il bien avoir d’affirmer qu’on se trouve – 
sur la base de tests de "non-localité" – devant un face-à-face 
contraignant, direct ou pas, entre la Mécanique Quantique et la 
Relativité? Ou bien entre la Mécanique Quantique et notre 
conceptualisation du réel? 
Conclusion 
Je ne puis qu’écarter, pour ma part, les face-à-face que les autres 
physiciens pensent percevoir. Pour moi la valeur du théorème de Bell 
réside ailleurs: ce théorème, et l’écho qu’il soulève, illustrent d’une 
manière frappante la puissance d’action des modélisations 
mathématisées, lorsqu’elles sont connectables aux tests expérimentaux. 
Pendant des dizaines d’années, les tabous positivistes ont fait obstacle 
aux modèles. Le résultat est ce vide vertigineux de modèles syntaxiques, 
et même seulement qualitatifs, que l’on découvre maintenant sous les 
algorithmes quantiques. Or, la modélisation de Bell a déclenché une 
dynamique de conceptualisation et de syntaxisation. Cette dynamique 
atteindra peut-être l’attitude positiviste. Elle ébranlera peut être la 
Mécanique Quantique et la Relativité. Car elle attire et maintient
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longuement l’attention sur l’état du milieu conceptuel dans lequel les 
théories actuelles sont immergées. De ce contact prolongé sortiront peut- 
être des théorisations nouvelles, plus unifiées, plus étendues et plus 
profondes. Je perçois (ici comme en théorie de l’information) les 
premiers mouvements de formalisation de l’épistémologie, les premières 
ébauches, peut-être, d’une méthodologie mathématisée de la 
connaissance. Et cela pourrait s’avérer plus fertile que toute théorie 
particulière d’un domaine donné de réalité. 
•  
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The most striking in this account from 39 years ago is that the public 
conceptual situation concerning microphysics did not notably change in its 
essence.  
As for the author of the present work, she believes that by precisely the 
work exposed below – and from her own point of view – she has finally 
accomplished in its essence the program delineated in the Conclusion 
reproduced above, that has been in work since 1979.  
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 1.I 5 
 
THE FIRST GERM OF DESCRIPTION OF A MICROSTATE: 
GENERATION OF A MICROSTATE  
AND  
QUALIFICATION OF ONE SPECIMEN OF A MICROSTATE 
  
1.I).1.  OPERATION G OF GENERATION OF A MICRO-ENTITY-TO-BE-STUDIED 
AND  
A BASIC METHODOLOGICAL DECISION  
COMPOSED OPERATION OF GENERATION G(G1, G2,...Gk)  
 
In agreement with Dirac we distinguish between stable characteristics assigned to a 
'microsystem' (mass, spin, etc.), and unstable dynamical characteristics assigned to a 
'microstate' (position, momentum, etc.). So far this is just a verbal sign posited to point 
toward a physical thing that is entirely unknown as to all its specificities.  
By its definition the concept of knowledge means qualification of something-to-be-
qualified. In this first part of the present work we want to establish the general a priori 
features of any process of creation of scientific knowledge on microstates, that is, of 
communicable, consensual and verifiable knowledge tied with microstates, when one 
wants to start at the extreme 'bottom' and to proceed down-up. So – once given the 
cognitive situation that is at work – we have to establish how it is possible to produce out 
of the as yet never qualified, a microstate in the role of entity-to-be-qualified, and how 
and in what a sense it is possible to qualify this in a scientific way. 
 
(1.I).1.1. A basic question 
 In current languages and in classical grammars an object-to-be-qualified is usually 
supposed to pre-exist, as such. It just "is" there. Its definition is realized by use of 
grammatical predicates (“bring me the brown thing from that drawer”, etc., and look in a 
dictionary). The predicates also are considered to pre-exist – in the air of thought, 
platonically – or expressed by verbal pointers of location ('there', etc.), or even by just 
pointing physically toward the object-to-be-qualified. In the classical logic these 
assumptions are sanctified. The objects-to-be-qualified are represented by a set of letters 
('x', 'y', 'z',....) and the functional expressions like fP(x) that contain such a letter (x in this 
case) and where P designates a 'predicate', are called propositional functions and they 
become true or false according to whether x satisfies the predicate P or not, which is a 
physical fact that is perceived by the human observer. All this is founded upon the 
naïvely realist postulate that the objects-to-be-qualified are perceived 'such as they really 
are' via their intrinsic 'properties' represented by predicates, and upon the fact that, 
classically, most of the objects-to-be-qualified are directly perceived. This last fact 
however has increasingly many exceptions and this wraps up the central view in a 
thickening ball of procedures for reaching perception. 
                                                      
5 To be read ‘chapter 1 from Part I’. 
 
 
 
38 
But how can a radically non-perceivable and unknown microstate be introduced as 
that-what-is-to-be-studied, when in general it does not even pre-exist? (In this respect the 
unbound microstates are the most striking example). How can a microstate be obtained in 
this role, and in a way endowed with some sort of stability so as to be kept available for 
further cognitive action concerning it, that permit also verifiability, so scientificity?  
Of course as soon as we presuppose an unknown microstate and we indicate it by 
some word or label we already have presupposed that it is tied with something that pre-
exists and out of which that microstate can be brought into the role of an object-to-be-
qualified. But in order to effectively bring into this role a given sort of micro-entity-to-
be-studied, some definite macroscopically controllable physical operation of generation 
of this should be realized accordingly to some previously established knowledge, and on 
some specified space-time support: If not we cannot even think of this micro-entity, so a 
fortiori we cannot study it. Furthermore this operation has to be repeatable, for if not no 
verifiability of its consequences can be conceived, so again a scientific study is out of 
reach. 
This problem does not exist with respect to the directly perceivable objects from 
our current life that – admittedly – just subsist while we cease observing them, and when 
we want to perceive them again we manage to bring them again into our domain of 
perception. But for a radically non-perceivable micro-entity this problem emerges 
basically and dramatically. In the historically realized top-down approach, from a small 
step to another small step, this problem remained more or less hidden by the classical 
models and assumptions. But when one wants to start at the extreme 'bottom' and to 
proceed down up, this problem is gaping and it has to be solved explicitly. 
 
(1.I).1.2. Operation G of generation of a micro-entity-to-be-studied  
Then let us focus upon an operation of generation of a micro-entity in the role of 
micro-entity-to-be-studied, in the scientific sense. We denote it by G.  
As remarked, the repeatability of G is an unavoidable pre-condition for 
constructing scientific knowledge on microscopic physical entities. But how can we 
know that when G is repeated it emerges the same?  
Well, we cannot know whether yes or not G comes out the same when it is 
repeated. Nor can we insure factually a positive answer. This is so because the operation 
G is a factual physical process that has to be inter-subjectively specified and 
communicated, which is possible only by some finite definition. And any finite factual 
definition is quite essentially unable to constrain into absolute (or 'total') sameness the 
whole factual singularity of each realized replica of the operation G (Umberto Ecco has 
said that as soon as we speak or write we conceptualize and thereby we quit and lose 
irreversibly the infinite singularity of any piece of factual entity).  
Here the unconceivable infinity of possible ways of being of any fragment of 
factual physical reality stays face-to-face with the finiteness of the human capacity 
to constrain and to control in predefined ways.  
However giving up because of this the whole project of establishing how it is 
possible to create some sort of knowledge on the dynamical states of micro-entities 
would be an unacceptable weakness from the part of a human mind. We are in presence 
of a problem of strategy, of method. So we have to conceive an appropriate strategy. 
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 (1.I).1.3. A methodological decision ('the microstate corresponding to G'  
and 'one specimen' of it)  
We organize a first methodological decision denoted MD that introduces a global 
strategy of speaking and thinking on the basis of which it becomes possible to start, to 
act, and to achieve the bottom-up construction of IQM. 
MD  
- Each time that one individual operation denoted G of generation of a dynamical 
state of a micro-entity-to-be-studied, is realized as such, in agreement with a 
definition expressed in terms of a finite number of parameters that are controllable 
factually from our macroscopic level of existence – which, for us, is the only sort 
of possible factual definition – this operation G itself is admitted to come out the 
same by construction, with respect to its factual finite definition.  
- That what emerges in consequence of one realization of G is not directly 
observable by our bio-psychical apparatuses but it is posited a priori to be 
observable indirectly via future appropriate operations of qualification; and it is 
conceived as one specimen (or variant) denoted σ(msG) of something more global 
than any individual specimen σ(msG). 
- The more global entity posited above will be labelled by ‘msG’ and we call it 'the 
microstate corresponding to G'.  
- This amounts to denote 
     msG≡{σ(msG)} (σ : specimen)  
- On this basis we shall enter upon the bottom-up constructive research of an 
observable and verifiable, law-like one-to-one relation  
G ↔ msG                                                                                                            (1) 
 
The necessarily finite character of the human definition of G and the obvious fact 
that absolute sameness is just nonsense, have imposed inside MD a factual and multiple 
content for the new concept called 'the microstate corresponding to G' and denoted msG. 
Whereas the classical concept of a microstate is defined abstractly and the content 
assigned to it is specified individually. So  
A microstate 'msG' in the sense of MD is essentially different from a microstate in 
the classical sense.  
Nevertheless the word 'microstate' is kept in use6 because it can play the very 
useful role of a recurrent element of reference and of comparison between the classical 
top-down approach specified conceptually via abstract definitions, and the factual 
bottom-up approach practised here. This word will work as a memento that in this work 
the origin of the process of construction of knowledge has been changed. That we now 
start from the extreme boundary between the previously conceptualized and the as yet a-
conceptual universal physical substratum, of which the existence is unanimously 
presupposed throughout Physics.  
So we start from local zeros of previously constructed knowledge on – specifically 
– each individual micro-entity brought in as an entity-to-be-studied, as is the case for a 
specimen σ(msG) of the microstate msG 7. And therefrom we construct bottom-up. This 
changes also the order of constructability of concepts (abstract concepts or factually 
defined ones) as well as the place inside this order of each sort of piece of verifiable 
                                                      
6 The absence of an explicit specification that the concept 'msG' is different from the classical concept of 'microstate', has 
nourished a harmful and years-long misunderstanding with Henri Boulouet.  
7 A specimen σ(msG) of msG is more than msG alike to a classical microstate, but it emerges entirely undefined in its 
individuality, its specificity. 
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knowledge. It can be hoped that the explicit awareness of this new order from a bottom-
up approach, when compared with that from the classical top-down approach that started 
spontaneously from our everyday level of ancestral conceptualization, will bring forth 
many clarifications concerning the problems of interpretation of the modern 
microphysics. 
The posit (1) – via the definition msG≡{σ(msG)} – expresses the way in which is 
infused into microphysics the so much discussed "essential indeterminism". Namely by 
the imperative necessity to introduce a new sort of factually defined concept of 
microstate, associated with the ineluctable finiteness of our capacity to produce effective 
assertions, so in particular effective definitions.  
The 'essential indeterminism' of the modern microphysics is factual, observational, 
and predictive; whereas the classical postulate of determinism is abstract, purely 
conceptual, and it is devoid of any rigorously attainable observational support; 
which is explained by the notion of 'imprecision of measurement', unpredictable 
(chaotic) mathematical development, etc.8. 
But it is very noteworthy indeed that: 
The whole posit MD and in particular the one-one relation (1) G↔msG that found 
the "the essential indeterminism" of the modern microphysics, in fact still express 
a basically deterministic view. 
 Indeed, the relation (1) G↔msG amounts to the assertion of existence of a 
probability measure, which still is the assertion of a 'law', of a one-one causal connection 
"if this G, then that (msG)":  Our human minds – such as they have been modelled by 
optima of adaptation of our ways of perceiving, thinking and acting – have selected and 
imprinted upon our minds a principle of causality. This is a mental fact. This principle 
works so strongly that in order to transgress it, we still use it, but in a way that displaces 
its frontier upon 'probabilistic' factual-operational-observational contours, instead of 
point-like individual assertions. So what acts in this circumstance is not in the least an 
"essential indeterminism"; this is a factual impossibility to in general insure an in 
principle rigorously individual prediction. And the Methodological Decision (1) permits 
to nevertheless save a global inner coherence founded upon a general deterministic 
postulate, by distinguishing explicitly between: (a) a general abstract posit of punctual 
causality, and on the other hand (b) the sort of scientific consensual, predictive-verifiable 
knowledge that can be generated in a cognitive situation that is entirely founded upon 
factual-physical operations, in the strict absence of any direct sensorial human 
perceptibility.  
 
(1.I).1.4. Mutation of the classical concept of ‘definition’: a split 
We have noted already that in the classical conceptualization the entity-to-be-
studied is conceived to pre-exist as a stably available potential support for qualifications 
achieved by identifying predicates conceived to represent 'properties intrinsically 
possessed' by this entity. The direct perceptibility permits this confortable ellipsis that 
absorbs in it the necessity of an explicit operation G of generation of the considered 
entity as an entity-to-be-studied. But for microstates this is not possible. And that is why: 
MD splits the classical concept of definition into a sequence of two distinct 
operations that can be achieved only separately, namely; an initial action of 
generation of the object-entity-to-be-studied, that is already specified inside MD; 
                                                      
8 The investigations on "chaos" have brought forth that 'determinism' does not entail observational predictability. 
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and a subsequent act (that still remains to be specified) of qualification of the 
object-entity-to-be-studied generated before. 
 
(1.I).1.5.  Composed operations of generation G(G1,G2,...Gk):  
a principle of composition of physical operations of generation 
From its start, the study of microstates has brought into evidence a class of 
microstates that have been called ‘(auto)-interference-states’ and that have played a 
founding role in the emergence of quantum mechanics (the paradigmatic case is Young’s 
two slits experiment). The process of generation of an interference-state permits to 
distinguish at least two operations of generation G1 and G2 that are involved in the 
following very peculiar sense: Each one of these two operations can be produced 
separately, and if they are, then two different corresponding microstates msG1 and msG2 
do emerge. But when G1 and G2 are ‘composed’ into only one operation – let us denote it 
G(G1,G2) 9 – then, accordingly to (1), there emerges only one corresponding microstate 
msG(G1,G2) that manifests ‘auto-interference effects’.  
On this factual basis tied with the just indicated way of speaking, we introduce here 
an only qualitative but nevertheless a general ‘principle of composition of operations of 
generation’ according to which: 
In certain operations of generation of a microstate, two or more operations of 
generation – deliberately produced by human researchers or brought forth by 
natural processes – can ‘compose’ while acting upon one preliminary unspecified 
microstate, so as to generate together one microstate-to-be-studied, in the sense of 
MD.  
When this happens we shall speak of one microstate msG(G1,G2,...Gn) with a composed 
operation of generation G(G1,G2,...Gk) 10. When this does not happen, for contrast and 
precision we can sometimes speak of a ‘simple’ operation of generation. 
The operation of  'composition of operations of generation of a microstate' defined 
above, as well as the corresponding underlying principle of possibility to compose such 
operations, are only very feebly defined here. But in the Parts II and III of this work this 
principle will gain more specification and it will entail most essential consequences.  
 
 (1.I).1.6. Universality of G  
At a first sight it might seem that the concept of operation of generation of an 
entity-to-be-qualified constitutes a radical novelty of which the necessity is specific of 
microphysical entities. But a deeper analysis reveals that in fact this mutation only brings 
into evidence a universal phase in the human conceptualization (MMS [2002], [2006]) 
that acts quite obviously already inside all the 'exceptions' that surround the core of the 
fully classical conceptualization. Indeed any definition presupposes – more or less 
implicitly but quintessentially – an operation of initial specification of the entity-to-be-
defined. Often this is a specification via a merely psycho-sensorial out-cut from the 
continuum of the directly perceived surrounding 'exterior reality'; or even only a reflex 
                                                      
9 This notation stresses that only one operation of generation has been effectively achieved by 'composing' other 
operations of generation that could have been achieved separately but have not been separately achieved.  
10 We do not try to specify the conditions that restrict the possibility of composing operations of generation (in 
particular, the space-time conditions) though such conditions do certainly exist. Nor do we try to specify some limit to 
the possible number of composed operations of generation. These are features that are still unexplored from both a 
factual and a conceptual point of view because inside nowadays quantum mechanics – together with the concept of 
operation G of generation of a microstate itself – they remain hidden beneath what is mathematically expressed, in 
consequence of a basic confusion between 'superpositions' in the mathematical sense, and factual superpositions in 
space-time, of operations or of physical entities. The consequences of this basic confusion will be narrowly surveyed 
and in the third part of this work they will play a quite essential role.  
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human gesture (turning the whole head or only the eyes toward some delimited domain 
of direct perceptibility); or even an exclusively mental selection via a focalization of the 
attention. But in many 'classical' situations the act of specifying the entity-to-be-qualified 
consists of a deliberate and laborious physical operation of separation and of supply into 
immediate accessibility (think of medical analyses or geological or archaeological 
procedures). And sometimes, exactly like in the case of microstates, a 'classical' 
operation of generation consists of a deliberate radical creation of the entity-to-be-
qualified (production of prototypes in the industry of artefacts11, simulated test-situation 
in a detective research, etc.). In short: 
Strictly always a human being, in order to acquire some knowledge on some thing, 
somehow singularizes this thing from inside the continuum of 'the reality', 
explicitly or implicitly12.  
That is so because a human being can have only finite perceptions and can perform 
only finite actions, whether these actions are psychical, or psychophysical, or physical. 
So he is obliged to somehow delimit inside the in-finite whole of what we call 'reality' 
that what he wants to qualify, to parcel this out in some sense. This inescapable necessity 
to parcel out induced by the human imprisonment in finiteness has very basic and 
unexpected consequences. 
This is what introduces a basic impossibility to assert an individually deterministic 
one-to-one factual-observational relation in MD, which in the case of 
microphysical entities-to-be-qualified becomes systematic and obvious and entails 
the non-classical posit msG≡{σ(msG)} and a corresponding displacement of the one-
to-one deterministic relation (1) upon the probabilistic level of qualification. 
The systematic and obvious character mentioned above is indeed specific of the 
human cognitive situation with respect to microstates. But the presence, in any act of 
scientific conceptualization, of an operation G of generation of the entity-to-be-studied, 
that is controlled by the involved human cognitive situation, is not specific of the human 
cognitive situation with respect to microstates. This presence is a universal cognitive 
fact; a more or less hidden fact, but a quite universal fact. This simply has not been 
explicitly remarked, precisely because it is universal, but also no doubt because in the 
current life – historically and during a very long time – inside the domain of physical 
reality that was accessible to direct perception it has very often been possible to put 
spontaneously a physical entity in the role of entity-to-be-qualified, or even to realize this 
in reflex unconscious ways. While inside the global methodical approaches, the act of 
bringing an entity in the role of entity-to-be-studied got lost in an ocean of other, more 
complex and more specific norms (think of the global requirement of 'reproducible 
experimental conditions' in classical physics).  
The universal presence of the operation of generation of an entity-to-be-qualified 
throughout the human conceptualization is not an abstract principle like the posit of 
determinism. It just is the necessarily existent first phase of any processes of construction 
of knowledge; and in particular of scientific knowledge, consensual, predictive and 
verifiable. So the abstract principle of determinism on the one hand, and on the other 
hand the effect in any given process of construction of consensually observable and 
verifiable knowledge, of the presence of an operation of generation of the entity-to-be-
qualified followed by acts of qualification, must be radically distinguished from one 
another. And the relation – in any given cognitive situation – between the general 
abstract principle of determinism, and on the other hand the different sorts of effects of 
the involved pair of an operation of generation and an operation of qualification, has to 
                                                      
11 Cf. H. Boulouet [2014]. 
12 And probably any living being does this. 
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be specified, in a way that permit clear comparison between the various sorts of cognitive 
situations.  
It is true that the acts of measurement introduce systematically observational 
imprecisions with respect to a posited general causal behaviour of the physical reality. 
But: 
These imprecisions of measurements are not the unique source of the statistical-
probabilistic character of that what can be observed. This character is also strongly 
dependent upon the sort of operation of generation that is involved.  
And a clear comparability between the effects entailed in different cognitive 
situations, by the different sorts of pairs 
 [(an operation of generation of the entity-to-be-qualified), 
 (an operation of qualification of this entity)] 
cannot be realized – cannot even be conceived – without the use of a common, general 
language defined inside a general methodological framework that organizes a consensual 
unity of the criteria. While on the other hand precisely these effects are the source of an 
illusory 'incompatibility' between macroscopic and cosmic physics, and the modern 
microphysics.  
An explicitly constructed common methodological framework is a necessary 
condition for understanding and dominating the conceptual and factual consequences of 
the way in which, in each given cognitive situation, the pair [(an operation of generation 
of the entity-to-be-qualified), (an operation of qualification of this entity)] that is 
involved introduces – or not – observational dispersion. This becomes clearer by the 
following examination of the acts of qualification of a microstate. 
 
(1.I).2. BASIC FEATURES OF THE GENERAL CONCEPT  
OF QUALIFICATION OF ONE SPECIMEN OF A MICROSTATE 
 
(1.I).1.4. Classical qualification 
Inside the classical thinking an act of qualification involves more or less explicitly 
a genus-differentia structure. The genus can be conceived as a semantic dimension (or 
space) and the differentia can be regarded as 'values' from a spectrum of values carried 
by this semantic dimension. The spectrum can be numerical or not, ordered or not, and it 
can be specified by the help of material samples or otherwise. Let us denote the semantic 
dimension by X and by Xj, j=1,2,…J, the values from the spectrum posited to be carried 
by X (for instance X can be ‘colour’ and then the spectrum of values Xj consists of a finite 
number of definite colours {red, green, blue, etc.} defined by a finite set of material 
samples (since for effectiveness we consider only finite definitions)). 
As already recalled, inside classical thought with its languages, logic and 
grammars, a given semantic dimension and the spectrum of values carried by it are 
currently imagined to somehow pre-exist in the realm of ideas, even if only potentially. 
But here – and even for classical acts of qualification – we conceive them as being 
constructed more or less deliberately by the human observer who conceptualizes 
accordingly to his local aims of description, and under the general and permanent though 
ignored control of the irrepressibly restrictive general human ways and possibilities of 
thinking and doing, and of the cognitive situation that is at work. All this, considered 
globally, acts like a net of a priori constraints. 
According to the classical conception again, there also usually just 'exists' some 
possibility to estimate what value Xj of X has been found for a given entity-to-be-
qualified when it has been examined 'via' X. This amounts in essence to imagining more 
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or less explicitly a sort of act of measurement-interaction – biological or not, 
spontaneous or scientific – between some measurement apparatus A(X) and the entity to 
be qualified. Let us denote by MesX such an act of measurement-interaction.  
The result Xj of an act of MesX, when perceived by the observer, becomes a piece 
of knowledge concerning the examined entity: indeed, by definition, knowledge of 
some thing is just qualification of this thing, so what is not qualified in any way is 
not known.  
This apparent triviality is simply ignored by our spontaneous conception on what 
we call 'reality'. And even inside scientific 'realistic' thought, the aim to know 'how things 
truly are', 'intrinsically', 'in themselves' – so in fact in the absence of any qualification 
that is known consensually via well-defined and repeatable examinations – is not yet 
generally perceived like a self-contradicting aim.  
The operation MesX – just like G – cannot be defined otherwise than by some finite 
specified set of controllable parameters. Unavoidably features and circumstances that 
cannot be conceived a priori transcend the control entailed by these parameters. So again, 
just like in the case of G and (1), there is no other way than just admit that all the 
realizations of MesX are the ‘same’ with respect to a necessarily finite set of specified 
parameters13. This is not reducible to 'imprecision'; it is an essential feature. 
When the registration of the value Xj  of a semantic dimension or 'quantity' X that is 
posited to be able to qualify an ‘object’ in the classical sense, is performed directly via a 
human biological sensorial apparatus, it generates in the observer’s mind a quale, a 
strictly subjective perception of a definite particular ‘quality’ that cannot be described but 
of which the subjective existence can usually be communicated by words, gestures, or 
other signs that label it consensually in connection with its exterior source that is publicly 
perceivable, namely the considered classical ‘object’14. We denote globally this classical 
coding-process by cod.proc(Xj) and we represent a classical grid of qualification (gq) by 
writing 
gq[X, Xj, MesX, cod.proc(Xj)]                                                              (2) 
 
(1.I).2.2. Qualification of one specimen of a microstate 
But how can be qualified a microstate msG that cannot be directly observed? The 
answer, if it is thoroughly constructed, appears to be a genuine saga. 
Consider a qualifying quantity A with 'values' aj. In order to qualify by a value aj of 
A the the microstate msG such as the operation of generation G has brought it forth, G 
must be followed immediately by a qualifying measurement interaction MesA realized 
inside the space-time neighbourhood of the space-time support of the operation G. 
Indeed each outcome of msG is conceived as a dynamical state of a changing physical 
entity. So, even though any specific knowledge of this changing entity is still lacking in 
our minds, nevertheless – insofar that knowledge on that what G has generated is 
researched (not on something that has evolved out of that) – the measurement interaction 
MesA must follow the operation G immediately. For this purpose a whole succession 
[G.MesA] has to be realized in order to obtain one qualification via A of a specimen 
σ(msG) of msG. And since a measurement-interaction with a specimen σ(msG) requires an 
                                                      
13 Suppositions of this kind are made everywhere inside science.  
14  For instance – as it is very well known – each one of us experiences the feeling of a quality that he has learned to 
call ‘red’ while referring to the source to which he connects this value of the quality 'colour' (say a flower). Thereby – 
by learning and via the involved sort of context – that quale and its values acquire common inter-subjective verbal 
labels that point inside each given mind toward strictly subjective, non-communicable events. So in classical 
circumstances each very currently arising quale acquires an inter-subjective labelling that is tied with the illusion that it 
just 'exists', 'objectively', 'outside there', 'in the object itself', as a 'property possessed by it'. 
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appropriate non-biological apparatus, its result can only consist of some publicly 
observable marks registered by devices of this apparatus. Furthermore, in general the 
measurement-interaction destroys the involved specimen σ(msG) generated by the 
previously accomplished operation G of generation. And so on. All these questions have 
been already discussed very much indeed and they have suffered heavy trivialization, but 
without having been genuinely studied.  
But much more radically, and rather curiously, a huge gap seems to have been 
unanimously left entirely implicit, namely the coding problem. Below our own 
examination of the process of qualification of one specimen of a microstate msG, is 
centred on this problem and, deliberately, it will be exposed in an outrageously explicit 
way.   
 
(1.I).2.2.1. The coding problem versus model of any specimen σ(msG) 
What criteria do permit to define the procedure that deserves being called a 
measurement-interaction MesA between a specimen σ(msG) of a given microstate msG for 
measuring on this a quantity A? What procedure can endow the publicly observable 
marks produced by one given act of ‘measurement-interaction’ Mes(A), with meaning, 
and in terms of – precisely – a given value aj of precisely the quantity A that one wants to 
measure? To reformulate this question in summarized terms we shall call such a 
procedure a coding procedure in terms of a value aj of A and we denote it cod.proc(aj).  
So: 
When the physical characters toward which the symbol 'σ(msG)' points are still 
entirely unknown so that not even the applicability to it of qualifications via a 
given dynamical quantity A first defined inside the classical mechanics (position, or 
momentum, or energy, etc.) can be asserted a priori, how can one define the coding 
procedure cod.proc(aj)?  
This is a most fundamental problem. Nevertheless it has been left implicit. So it has 
been taken into account only intuitively, without generality, nor rigor. Let us stop on this 
problem.  
The general content of a grid for mechanical qualification of a specimen σ(msG) 
accepts the same general form (2) of a classical grid. But when a specimen of a factually 
defined microstate msG is the object of qualification the signs A, aj, MesA, cod.proc(aj) 
point toward contents – entities and circumstances – that with respect to the human 
observer involve cognitive constraints that are radically different from those that act in 
the case of ‘mobiles’ in the classical sense: 
- That what is to be qualified – one specimen σ(msG) of a microstate msG for which 
the one-to-one relation (1) G↔msG is posited – has been extracted by the operation G of 
generation directly from the as yet a-conceptual physical reality. It is still radically 
unknown in its physical specificities inside the class msG≡{σ(msG)}. It is only posited to 
exist and is labelled.  
- Every individual specimen σ(msG) remains constantly and entirely non-
perceptible itself by the observer. Suppose that a given sort of measurement MesA (for 
instance with A meaning 'momentum' P) does make sense with respect to what the 
symbol 'msG' represents, and that we know how to perform such a measurement. When 
an the act MesA is performed upon a specimen σ(msG), exclusively groups {µ}kA of some 
publicly observable marks (with kA=1,2,...mA) can be obtained on registering devices of 
some corresponding apparatus Ap(P) (a spot on a sensitive screen, a sound-registration at 
a time t, etc., some group of such marks).   
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- Since the registered group {µ}kA of observable marks is the result of a 
measurement-interaction MesA between σ(msG) and an apparatus Ap(A), its meaning can 
not be conceived in terms of some ‘property’ assignable to σ(msG) alone. The marks 
{µ}kA characterize exclusively the achieved measurement interaction as a whole. While 
in the radically incipient cognitive situation that is considered here no criteria are 
conceivable for separating a posteriori inside {µ}kA the contributions from the two 
sources σ(msG) and Ap(A). 
- A fortiori, since σ(msG) itself is not directly perceivable, no qualia tied with 
exclusively this entity can be formed and triggered in the observer’s mind via MesA: The 
observer gets no inner subjective feeling whatever tied with the nature of A and with the 
specimen σ(msG).  
The characters listed above will be globally indicated as the result of one 
primordial transferred qualification of a specimen σ(msG) of a microstate msG, which 
means: a strictly first compact whole of observable marks that are transferred on the 
registering devices of an apparatus, that do not entail any sort of qualia tied with – 
separately – the studied microstate itself, and that cannot be analysed further in effects of 
the involved specimen σ(msG) and effects of the involved act of MesA 15.  
We come now back to the central question from this section: How are we to 
conceive an act of measurement-interaction MesA in order to found the assertion that the 
registered marks {µ}kA do qualify the involved specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate 
msG in terms of a given value aj of a given measured quantity A? In what a way can an 
observable group of brute marks be brought to signify in terms of one definite value aj of 
A? How can the observable result of an interaction 'MesA' be endowed with a definite 
meaning? It seems clear that: 
In the absence of any general model of a specimen of a factually defined microstate 
msG it is not conceivable to produce an a priori meaningful definition of the 
possible results of a measurement-interaction with a specimen σ(msG) of msG 16. So 
a consensual study of a 'mechanics' of the microstates cannot even begin. For this 
purpose a general model of a microstate must be given as a basic primary datum.   
We hit again the transparent wall that imprisons us inside our human ways of 
thinking and acting. This is a major fact that cannot be transgressed. Then we must let it 
work freely and take it into account explicitly. We must organize a framework where we 
are insured that working freely accordingly to the specific laws of our thought we 
develop clearly controllable and meaningful results. Models and formal systems of signs, 
                                                      
15 Any very first – primordial  – registration of the result of a measurement interaction is 'transferred', even in the case 
of directly perceived entities like in the classical domain (private exchanges with Henri Boulouet). What is specific 
here is the fact that no qualia can be formed in the observer's mind. As soon as the studied entity accedes to some sort 
of direct perceptibility via some apparatuses (microscopes, etc., as it happened historically for molecules and atoms), 
this absence of qualia ceases. But this does not entail that the qualia that have been produced in this way can be 
confounded with 'intrinsic properties' of the studied entity. Any material entity is nowadays conceived to merge with 
the universal 'sub-quantic substance' so that it is devoid of delimiting contours. Delimitation by some G is a human 
necessity in the processes of conceptualization. Furthermore even the absence of spatial delimitation is just a model 
conceived by human mind, not some sort of unconceivable representation of a 'true property' of the studied entity such 
as 'it really is in itself'. This Fata Morgana notion is self-contradiction because any knowledge is qualification and 
any qualification is relative to the apparatuses and the physical operations by which it is achieved, as well as to the 
conceptual definition of the qualifying quantity. 
16 In MMS [2013] (pp. 117-126) I have constructed a "space-time coding" procedure that identifies – so labels a 
posteriori – the results of an arbitrarily constructed "test-interaction" T between a corresponding test-apparatus and the 
specimens σ(msG) of a factually defined microstate msG, but without endowing these results with any meaning that 
relates them to some previously achieved conceptualization. Such a coding-procedure cannot signify in terms that 
possess some meaning in terms of pre-established conceptualization, so it cannot directly connect to the classical 
science. But – and this is noteworthy – it can initiate quintessentially new processes of conceptualization that, 
indirectly, via intuitive substrata, take profit from the already established conceptualization. 
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logical or logical-mathematical, generate knowledge only when they are made use of 
together. If not, instead of genuine inter-subjective knowledge – communicable, 
consensual, predictive and verifiable scientific knowledge – we will construct either 
purely mental representation, or just meaningless heaps of unintelligible signs, verbal, 
logical, mathematical heaps of signs that will generate in our minds only unease and 
passive, vile, idolatrous submission to illusory 'results'. In the classical physics we are 
protected from such a failure by the models that emerge spontaneously from the 
perceptions generated by our biological sensorial apparatuses (which still nowadays most 
genuine thinkers, implicitly, identify firmly with 'reality such as it truly is in itself').  
But when no direct sensorial perception of the entity-to-be-studied generates 
models any more this natural resort dissolves, and as long as an efficient model of the 
entity-to-be-studied is not constructed conceptually we are simply blocked in any action 
for deciding what sort of measurement-interaction can produce information on a definite 
qualifying concept A. And only some connection with a definite cognitive situation 
where direct perceptibility offers a foundation can suggest such a model; namely, a 
connection with observable data and with the previous classical conceptualization, 
because this is the unique domain of organized meaning that emerges spontaneously for 
us and so, that can be used by us as a first ground for starting to model, even if we start 
by changing this ground 17.  But on the other hand: 
Inside IQM, that is deliberately required to define with full generality the features 
of any acceptable theory of microstates, no particular model of a microstate can be 
given without perpetrating vicious circularity: The coding problem cannot be 
treated inside IQM.  
In the second part of this work we shall identify the model of a microstate that is 
acting inside the Hilbert-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics and this model will 
play a fundamental role in the construction of a fully intelligible second quantum 
mechanics. But here we just already draw strongly attention upon the existence of the 
coding problem and upon the unavoidable necessity, in any given definite theory of the 
microstates, to posit some model of a microstate, while knowing that it is just a model 
and not 'intrinsic' factual truth.  
The conceptual situation brought into evidence above refutes the very possibility to 
obey Bohr’s positivistic interdiction of any model of a microstate.  
Which in its turn proves that in fact this interdiction has never been genuinely 
taken into account. It has only enormously intimidated the physicists and pushed them, as 
it will appear, into passive and abstruse acceptance of basic conceptual impossibilities. 
  
                                                      
17  Notice that this is how nowadays quantum mechanics effectively proceeds for constructing mathematical 
representations of the qualifying quantities: Bohr's interdiction of models strikes only the entities-to-be-studied.  
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 (1.I).2.2.2. Graphic representation of one qualification of one specimen of a microstate 
The global content of (1.I).2 are summarized graphically below in the Fig.1.  
 
 
 
 
    A  (G) 
                                       A (MesX)  
                                                   
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A-conceptual 
factuality	
Fig.1. One qualification of one specimen of a microstate:  
the germ of the structure of a primordial transferred description 
 
The apparatus for producing the operation of generation G is denoted App(G); the 
apparatus for producing the measurement interactions for the dynamical quantity A is 
denoted App(MesA). The basic operational construct that generates the result of only one 
act of measurement-interaction performed upon one outcome of one specimen of the 
microstate msG defined in (1) can be represented as a chain:  
[(G↔msG)-[G.MesA]-{µ}kA coded in terms of one aj )],    kA=1,2,…mA,    j=1,2….J     (3) 
The chain (3) that brings forth just one act of qualification of one specimen σ(msG) 
of a factually defined microstate msG will be called a (one) coding-measurement-
succession. It constitutes the very first germ of the factual constructive representation of 
the process of generation of knowledge on such a microstate. This germ is already 
endowed with a rather complex inner structure and it already specifies in what a sense the 
pairs  
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play a basic role in the construction of consensual predictive and verifiable knowledge. A 
chain (3) acts like a fragile narrow bridge over the frontier between the a-conceptual 
universal physical substance of which the existence is posited by our minds, and the 
volume of human conceptualization. 
In what follows this germ will be developed into a still far more complex concept, 
namely a general form of a full scientific description of a microstate, a deliberate, 
consensual, predictive and verifiable piece of stable knowledge on a microstate msG: the 
primordial transferred description of a factually defined microstate msG in the sense of 
MD.   
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 2.I 
 
BOTTOM-UP CONSTRUCTION OF THE  
TRANSFERRED DESCRIPTION OF A FACTUALLY DEFINED 
MICROSTATE 
 
 
(2.I).1. PRELIMINARY CONSTRUCTION OF LANGUAGE: 
DEFINITION OF  
'MICRO-SYSTEM',   'MICRO-STATE msG',   'TYPES OF MICRO-STATES msG' 
 
2.I).1.1. The general problem 
In our current life we begin by embedding structures of thought in structures of 
some current language that emerged and evolves collectively by an anonymous and 
spontaneous process. But from a scientific point of view the structures of thought 
expressed inside a current language are most often beds of Procustes because the aim of 
the natural languages is to be contextual in order to maximally permit rapid, allusive, 
suggestive, approximating transmissions of meaning, of poetic connotations, of humour, 
etc. The accent falls upon local and contextual efficiency in space and time, and upon the 
harmonics of the core-meaning. Whereas the aim of a scientific language is to induce 
maximally strict and stable consensus inside some definite group of consensus, via a 
priori definitions that point as precisely as possible toward a uniquely defined 
significance; which can be realized – nearly strictly – only via axiomatic constructions. 
The just mentioned two sorts of aims are opposite to one another. And quantum 
mechanics, like the majority of the mathematical theories of Physics, is not axiomatic, it 
is a mathematized representation imbedded in the natural language where one relies on 
contextual communication. This blurs the significance of many basic words that occur 
currently in the feebly defined verbal support of the quantum mechanical mathematical 
representations (to 'prepare' (the 'system', the 'state'); to 'measure'; 'superposition', etc.). 
Thereby much confusion is induced. In what follows we suppress beforehand the 
possibility of several such basic confusions. 
 
2.I).1.2. The specific problem 
Consider a measurement-interaction involving a specimen σ(msG) generated by the 
operation G that corresponds to the studied microstate msG. This produces observable 
marks that have to be translatable in terms of one value aj of ...... of what, exactly? Of 
one value aj of only one measured dynamical quantity A, for any sort of 'involved 
microstate', or possibly of several such quantities or values of quantities permitted for 
some sorts of microstates? Shall we organize our concepts-and-language so as to require 
that one act of measurement on only one specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG 
brings forth necessarily only one value aj of each measured dynamical quantity A? Or 
that it shall necessarily involve – at most – only one set of ‘compatible’ quantities (which 
is not the same thing as in the preceding question)? And, in this case, what exactly does 
'compatible' mean? What restrictions are we prepared to accept?  
Furthermore, according to (1) each specimen of the one micro-state tied with one 
operation of generation G can involve one or more other micro-entities (like when G 
creates a pair). How can we name these micro-entities? If we call them 'particles' – as it is 
often done – we suggest a model, which we want to avoid inside IQM. Could we then 
speak of one, or two, or more micro-systems involved by each specimen of a given 
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micro-state? This does not contradict the current way of speaking inside quantum 
mechanics. If then we do call micro-systems the component entities from one specimen 
of a given micro-state, how are we to count them, according to what observational 
criteria? What presuppositions have to be incorporated in order to stay in clear agreement 
with the concepts of a factually defined micro-state and of a specimen of it, in the sense 
of (1), as well as with the current ways of speaking and thinking that accompany the 
formal quantum mechanical writings?  
The answers are not at all obvious. Inside the current languages the word "system" 
points usually toward a complex whole that contains 'components'. But inside quantum 
mechanics, on the contrary, the word "system" – "the system" – points often just toward 
what is studied, no matter whether it is posited to involve one or several components; 
moreover the term ‘micro-state’ indicates the dynamical characters of the whole studied 
entity, and the word 'system' points toward exclusively the constant characters of 'a 
particle'.  
All these ways of using words are not severely regulated, while in what follows we 
want to stay rigorous in order to avoid false problems. So we define a language that stays 
in agreement with: 
(a) The general fact that the concept of ‘dynamical state’ 18 designates a variable 
behaviour that involves an invariant material support (violating such a fundamental slope 
of natural human conceptualization would uselessly waste energy).  
(b) MD, that introduces the basic posit (1) G↔msG, with msG={σ(msG)}, according 
to which one operation of generation G produces factually one 'specimen' σ(msG) of the 
micro-state denoted msG; while the number of the involved ‘systems’ is not restricted by 
(1) because this concept is not involved by MD. 
(c) The hidden consensual assumptions that can be identified inside the moving 
ways of speaking and writing practised inside quantum mechanics. 
Definition [(micro-state) and (micro-system). The concept delimited by the 
persistent characters (mass, charge, etc.) assigned to any element from the set {σ(msG)} 
of mutually distinct specimens of the micro-state msG in the sense of MD is called a 
micro-system involved by msG.  
Definition [(one micro-system) and (one micro-state of one micro-system)]. 
Consider a micro-state msG that is such that one act of measurement accomplished upon 
one specimen σ(msG) of msG can bring forth only one group {µ}kA of observable marks 
significant in terms of a value of the measured quantity. We shall say that this micro-state 
msG brings in specimens σ(msG) each one of which consists of one micro-system S and so 
we shall call it in short a micro-state of (with) one micro-system. 
Definition [one micro-state of n micro-systems]. Consider now n>1 micro-systems 
of a type of which we know that, for each one of them separately it is possible to 
generate a micro-state in the sense of the preceding definition; which, if done, would lead 
to ‘n micro-states of one micro-system’ in the sense of the preceding definition. But let 
G(nS) (nS : n systems) denote only one operation of generation that, acting upon some 
physical initial support that relatively to G(nS) is regarded as ‘prime matter’, has 
generated one common micro-state for all these n micro-systems; or even, out of some 
initial substratum, G(nS) has simultaneously generated the n micro-systems themselves 
that are contained by each specimen of the studied common one micro-state19, 20. In both 
                                                      
18 A somewhat self-contradicting expression. 
19 This is the case, for instance, when G(nS) consists of some interaction with pre-existing elementary particles that 
brings forth ‘a pair’. 
20 This way of speaking seems convenient in both fundamental quantum mechanics and the fields-theories. 
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these cases we shall say that the micro-state generated by G(nS) is a micro-state of (with) 
n micro-systems and we shall denote it by msG(ns)21.  
Definition [complete measurement on one micro-state of n micro-systems]. One 
act of measurement performed on one specimen σ(msG(ns)) of a microstate msG(ns) of n 
micro-systems, can produce at most n distinct groups of observable marks signifying n 
observable values of dynamical quantities. An act of measurement that effectively 
realizes this maximal possibility will be called a complete act of measurement on the one 
specimen σ(msG(ns)) of the one micro-state msG(ns) of n micro-systems. The quantities A 
and the values aj to which these n distinct groups of marks are tied, are permitted to be 
either identical or different.  
Definition [incomplete measurement on one micro-state of n micro-systems]. One 
act of measurement accomplished upon one specimen σ(msG(ns)) of a microstate msG(ns) of 
n micro-systems that produces less than n distinct groups of observable marks, will be 
called an incomplete act of measurement on msG(ns). 
Finally, for self-sufficiency of this sequence of definitions, we restate here 
telegraphically the definition from 1.I of a micro-state msG(G1,G2,..Gk) generated by a 
composed operation of generation: 
Definition [one micro-state generated by a composed operation of generation]. 
Consider – indifferently – either one micro-state of one micro-system, or one micro-state 
of n>1 micro-systems. If the specimens of this micro-state are generated by a composed 
operation of generation G(G1,G2,..Gk) in the sense defined in 1.I then we call it a 
microstate with composed operation of generation. 
Definition [one ‘bound’ micro-state of several micro-systems]. This is the usual 
verbal designation of the result of a natural operation of generation, i.e. accomplished in 
consequence of the physical laws of nature, before any human aim of investigation (like 
in the case of the natural realization of an atomic structure). But in principle it can be also 
thought of in terms of the result of a composed operation of generation (so much more so 
as a bound micro-state of several micro-systems manifests systematically 'interference-
effects'). 
We hold that the preceding definitions insure, both, global coherence relatively to 
the implications carried by the language practised inside nowadays microphysics, and 
continuity with the basic principles of the classical conceptualization and language. If 
one contests the adequacy of some feature from these definitions, he should specify the 
reasons for the contestation and propose a better usage of words. Meanwhile the 
definitions from (2.I)1 are adopted throughout what follows.  
We now announce the following 
Choice. In this work the bound microstates will occupy a very marginal position.  
We make this choice on the basis of two reasons. The first one is that a bound state 
can pre-exist any desired investigation, just as it is supposed for classical ‘objects’. The 
second reason is that furthermore, to a bound state it is possible to assign – in a certain 
relative sense of course  – a definite spatial delimitation, again as in the case of a 
classical mobile. These two features might explain why the mathematical representation 
of bound microstates has constituted the natural passage from classical physics to 
quantum mechanics when the practised approach still was top-down. But in this work we 
want to explicate and stress the radical novelties imposed by a bottom-up representation 
of microstates. Only these novelties will permit to bring into evidence: 
                                                      
21 The posit (1) entails that the uniqueness of the operation G(nS) is to be a priori conceived as a source of certain 
global observational specificities of each specimen of msG(ns) and so of msG(ns) itself.  
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- To what a degree the scientific representations can become a deliberate 
consensual construction of which the necessary and sufficient conditions of possibility 
depend strongly on the involved cognitive situation (that can evolve with the evolution of 
the sciences and the techniques).  
- To what a degree this should modify our conception on scientific representation, 
and stress the utmost importance of the relativities to the constraints and the aims that 
act. 
And these novelties are brought forth – specifically – by unbound microstates. So 
here we are quasi exclusively concerned with unbound microstates. The bound 
microstates will finally be naturally absorbed in the new representation constructed here. 
On the basis of the contents from (2.I).1 we enter now upon the construction of the 
general concept of description of a microstate. 
 
 (2.I).2. PRIMORDIAL TRANSFERRED DESCRIPTION  
OF AN UNBOUND MICROSTATE msG  
What follows is formulated in terms that are valid for any microstate. 
  
(2.I).2.1. Preliminary requirements 
We start again from the remark that inside current thinking and speaking the 
qualifications are in general just asserted freely concerning an object-for-qualification 
that is conceived to pre-exist such as we qualify it (this tree is big, today the air is cold, 
etc.); whereas a scientific description is required to be endowed with explicit consensual 
definitions that are communicable with precision and without restriction to co-presence 
of the members of a specified group of consensus, and to be predictive and verifiable. All 
these requirements subsist when it is recognized like in (1.I) that the qualifications that 
have been obtained cannot be considered to be properties of the entity-to-be-described 
alone, isolated from the measurement-interaction. And the requirement of verifiability 
entails repeatability of the involved operations as well as the existence of some definite 
descriptive invariant brought forth by many repetitions of the action of qualification: 
only such invariants can permit prediction and verification. Now, in the case of 
microstates these implications of the condition of scientificity entail specific and non-
trivial consequences among which the following are the most important 
  
(2.I).2.1.1. Consequences of the requirement of repeatability 
A classical mobile is conceived as an "object" that in general pre-exists to 
qualifications of it; it stays available "there outside". So in general a measurement 
operation MesA on a classical "mobile" can be conceived separately from an operation of 
generation G of that mobile 22. But an unbound microstate-to-be-studied does not pre-
exist in some known and attainable way, like a macroscopic "object"; and furthermore in 
general it is destroyed by the act of qualification. So the observer-conceptor, if he wants 
to create a germ of knowledge on such a microstate, has to radically generate that 
microstate before achieving on it an act of qualification, so to realize a whole 
                                                      
22 This, in fact, is confusion.  Indeed – by definition – an operation of generation G in the sense of (1) is what brings an 
entity in the role of entity-to-be-studied. And a classical mobile that just is conceived to 'exist' is not thereby 
automatically in the role of entity-to-be-studied. Always some supplementary act is necessary from the part of the 
observer-conceptor, even if this consists of just bringing the mentioned mobile inside the domain of perceptibility by 
the observer-conceptor and focusing attention upon it. As already remarked, the existence of an operation of generation 
G is a universal character of any act of qualification, so of any act of creation of a piece of knowledge. This fact is far 
from being trivial: it is part of the hidden key that opens up access to a path toward unification of microphysics and 
quantum gravitation.  
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'measurement-succession' [G.MesA]: The explicit necessity steps in, to realize repeatedly 
and in a physical-operational way whole pairs  
[(one operation of generation of the entity-to-be-qualified),  
(one operation of qualification of this entity)] 
 And this, for scientific descriptions, entails an arm-wrestling between IQM and the 
classical presuppositions. Indeed:  
In classical mechanics the studied mobile is admitted to be publicly observable, and 
the registration of the result of an act of measurement does not destroy the studied 
mobile, nor does it necessarily perturb notably its dynamical state. So it has been possible 
to conceive and to formulate a basic classical mechanical law as an individual invariant 
with respect to repetitions of an act of measurement MesA. Furthermore such a law is 
posited to characterize exclusively the studied entity itself, it is regarded as the revelation 
of a behavioural 'property' of, exclusively, the studied mobile; a classical mechanical law 
it is not explicitly referred to the whole of the measurement interaction. When the results 
of repeated measurements on the studied mobile manifest a statistical dispersion this is 
posited to be due exclusively to imprecisions in the acts of measurement, which 
withstands the knowledge of the exact individual value aj of the measured quantity A that 
is "possessed" by the entity-to-be-studied, but does not concern the existence of this 
value. According to the classical thinking this obstacle on the way toward knowledge, 
however, is doomed to disappear asymptotically while progress is achieved concerning 
the techniques of measurement; so one advances toward knowledge of how the studied 
physical entities "truly are, exactly and in themselves". 
This sort of illusory scientific realism is quasi unanimous.   
Whereas the factually defined concept of microstate msG from MD is organically 
tied with a conceptual segregation of a radically different nature that we recall 
synthetically: 
(a) Since the unavoidably physical operation of generation G can be defined by 
only a finite set of parameters while the domain of physical reality from which this 
operation stems, as well as that on which it acts, are endowed with the unlimited 
singularity of the being, it would be unconceivable that repetitions of G bring always 
forth specimens σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG that are all mutually identical, i.e. 
the posit msG≡{σ(msG)} where {σ(msG)} is a set of mutually distinct specimens, is 
quintessential for microstates; it introduces a basic 'statisticity' that is not asserted as a 
physical truth, but only as an unavoidable operational fact involved by a deliberate 
human action of construction of consensual, predictive and verifiable knowledge on 
microstates (cf. (1)). 
(b) Since one act of measurement MesA also cannot be defined otherwise than by a 
finite set of macroscopically specified parameters, when it is repeated its own effects 
equally cannot be conceived otherwise than dispersed, in general 23. 
(c) The specimens σ(msG) are not observable, while the observable result of one 
succession [G.MesA] (cf. figure 1) characterizes exclusively this succession as a whole 
in a way that cannot be analysed further.  
(d) So repetitions of the whole succession [G.MesA] are unavoidable, and these 
lead in general to a statistical distribution of the observable results of the achieved 
successions that – quintessentially – cannot be removed nor analysed (MMS [2002B], 
[2006], [2017B]). 
(e) So: 
                                                      
23 When a unity is defined it sets a conventional lower bound to the dispersion that is taken into account. The 
nanotechnologies might reduce strongly the dispersion of certain specifically targeted observable effects.   
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The researched law-like invariant – a concept that is 'deterministic' by definition – 
can manifest itself observably only in terms of probabilistic convergence of 
repeated statistical distributions of results of sequences of very numerous 
repetitions of the whole succession [G.MesA]. 
Let us remind now that: 
- According to the classical conceptual segregation, the entity-to-be-studied is 
defined conceptually via individually specifying predicates 24 and it obeys individually 
specifying laws tied with a posited individual invariance of principle of the results of 
measurements that is only imperfectly observable because of imprecisions of 
measurement. 
- This classical conceptual segregation cannot be transposed to factually defined 
microstates msG in the sense of MD, because the existence of an operation G of 
generation of the entity-to-be-studied at the beginning of any process of generation of 
consensual knowledge, has a universal character ((1.I).1.6), and because in consequence 
of (a) and in terms of the general framework (G, MesA, [G.MesA]) this classical 
segregation holds only locally inside the set of all the various processes of 
conceptualization brought in by all the various cognitive situations that can confront a 
human scientist.  Namely:  
The classical segregation holds only in the cases in which the considerations from 
(a) fade out because the operation G introduces a dispersion that is negligible in 
some sense (for instance, for the majority of the macroscopic directly perceived 
"objects" (MMS [2002B], [2006]) or for the purely mental conceptual-
mathematical representations of celestial entities-to-be-studied (black holes, 
galaxies), introduced by a purely mental operation of generation G and that can be 
confirmed or invalidated by – exclusively – verification of consensually observable 
predictions that have been drawn deductively from these representations)25.  
But for consensual predictive and verifiable knowledge on microstates all the 
requirements (a),(b),(c),(d),(e) do hold significantly and the classical segregation breaks 
down. So let us examine the consequences that these requirements impose upon the 
existence of a descriptional invariant.  
    
(2.I).2.1.2. A consensual, observable, predictive and verifiable descriptional invariant 
concerning microstates 
Consider now the constraint of existence of some descriptional invariant with 
respect to repetitions of successions [G.MesA]. In general when one given succession 
[G.MesA] is repeated one obtains different results aj. So in general a whole statistic of 
results {aj}, j=1,2,...J emerges, notwithstanding that in each succession [G.MesA] each 
one of the two operations ‘G’ and ‘MesA’ is ‘the same’ with respect to the two finite 
groups of parameters that define it. This is a fact. We are placed on an observational 
ground that – with respect to knowledge – has a primordially statistical character. 
Whereas on the other hand any 'law' that permit predictions and verification of these, is 
an invariant with respect to repetition. So the unique possible sort of observational 
invariant consists of a primordially probabilistic invariant of the statistical distributions 
of the possible results aj of realizations of the succession [G.MesA]. Which involves [a 
                                                      
24 A sort of definition assisted by direct perception. 
25 The de Broglie-Bohm formal representation of the Universal Substance introduces a limiting conceptual situation: 
both G and MesA are simply absent – basically – and so there is no source of observational dispersion any more, we are 
in presence of just a global and mathematically expressed metaphysical model that remains to be explicitly connected 
to this or that local consensual, predictive and verifiable knowledge that – necessarily – involves a superposed 
specification of local factual successions (G,MesA) and repetitions of these. 
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big set of [N repetitions of the succession [G.MesA] with N very big]] and the concept of 
'probabilistic convergence' of these statistical distributions introduced by the classical 
theory of probabilities, that in MD shifts us upon a postulated level of 'deterministically 
probabilistic' conceptualization expressed by the one-one relation (1) G↔msG with 
msG={σ(msG)}. It might seem counter-intuitive to assert that a probabilistic qualification 
is a deterministic qualification, but – globally – it is a deterministic qualification, in this 
sense that the recurrence of the convergence is predictable.  
So we consider now this concept of probabilistic convergence.  
It is a non-effective abstract mathematical concept embodied in the weak law of 
large numbers. But here we have chosen to develop from the start a strictly effective 
approach (cf. the introduction to Part I). So we have to specify an effective equivalent of 
the classical concept of probability. For this we proceed as follows.  
Consider the weak theorem of large numbers  
∀j,  ∀(ε,δ),      (∃N0 :   ∀(N≥ N0))  ⇒ [Π  [⎜n(ej)/N – π(ej)⎜ ≤ ε ]]  ≥  (1– δ)           (4) 
(The significance of the notations is well known). From this it is possible to extract 
explicitly a relativized finite implication that is defined below: The probability π and the 
meta-probability Π  are limit-(real numbers) toward which, at infinity, converge the 
corresponding distributions of relative frequencies. Consider a universe of events 
U=[e1,e2,....eJ], j=1,2,...J, with J a finite integer. If the probability π(ej) of an event ej is 
postulated to exist for any ej, then (4) asserts that for any pair of two arbitrarily small real 
numbers (ε,δ) there exists an integer No such that – for any N≥ N0 and with an uncertainty 
not bigger than δ – the meta-probability Π  of the event [⎜n(ej)/N–π(ej)⎜)≤ε] that the 
relative frequency n(ej)/N observed for the event ej inside a sequence of N events from U 
does not differ from π(ej) by more than ε, is bigger than (1–δ). This assertion itself, such 
as it stands, i.e. the passage to the limit being suppressed – with N0 chosen freely and 
with the corresponding pair (ε,δ) – will be considered in what follows to define a general 
and factual, finite concept of probability of the event ej, namely the (ε,δ,N0)-probability 
π(ej) of the event ej that will be called the factual probability law of ej with respect to the 
triad (ε,δ,N0) 26. 
In our case U consists of the finite spectrum of values aj assigned to A. And we 
make the strong assumption that the systematic repetition, for any A, of the 
corresponding succession [G.MesA], introduces sufficient constraints for entailing a 
factual (ε,δ,N0)-probability law π(aj) for any association between a chosen pair (ε,δ) and 
the relative frequency n(aj)/N found for a value aj that is present inside the chosen 
qualification grid (2) gq[A,aj,MesA,cod.proc(aj)]27, with j=1,2,...J. Which amounts to a – 
conceptual – verification of the posit (1) msG↔G. So: 
Given a definite factually defined microstate msG, the posit (1) introduces for any 
couple of pairs ((G,A),(ε,δ)) a corresponding 'factual (ε,δ,N0)-probability law'  
(ε,δ,N0)-{π(aj), ∀j}G,     A fixed                                                                          (5) 
  
                                                      
26 In (MMS [2014B]) this factual probability law has been constructed from an interpretive assumption on the concept 
of probability and it has been proved compatible with the weak theorem of large numbers (cf. also (Wasserstein&Lazar 
[2016], Leek&Penn, [2015] concerning the conceptual status of – merely – a statistic, with respect to the conceptual 
status of a probability law). 
27 The event aj being identified from a group of observable physical marks, via the utilized coding-procedure that inside 
IQM cannot be defined but that is supposed to have been defined inside the employed theory of microstates. 
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 (2.I).2.1.3. Compatibility of quantities versus specificity of the 'knowledge' on a microstate 
The initial factual and methodological definition (1) of the microstate-to-be-studied 
amounts to merely label this unknown and unobservable microstate 'msG’ by the 
operation G that is supposed to have produced it; the final purpose is to substitute to the 
mere label 'G', a ‘description' of the microstate-to-be-studied in terms of predictive and 
verifiable knowledge tied with – specifically – this entity itself. Now, does a factual 
probability law (5) constitute such knowledge?  
No, not yet, because nothing entails that only one probability law (5) established 
for msG relatively to only one dynamical quantity A, cannot be observed also for another 
microstate different from msG, i.e. generated by another operation of generation G'≠G. 
The law (5) alone might not be specific of msG.  
It seems likely however that two probability laws (5) corresponding to two 
mutually different dynamical quantities A and A‘≠A – considered conjointly – might 
already constitute an observational factual specificity associable to the considered 
particular microstate msG generated by G. While a fortiori – in as far as the language 
introduced in MD1 resists to the observable facts – all the mutually different laws (5) that 
are defined for msG are certainly specific of this microstate.   
But what sort of difference between two dynamical quantities A and A‘≠A is 
determining in this context?  
Consider two distinct dynamical quantities A and A'≠A and a given type of 
microstate msG, in the sense of the definitions from (2.I)1. 
We shall say that A and A'≠A are mutually compatible with respect to the 
microstate-to-be-sudied iff it is possible to measure them simultaneously on one 
specimen of this microstate.  
Suppose then that the microstate-to-be-studied msG is a microstate of one micro-
system. In this case each specimen of msG consists of only one system and – with respect 
to msG – the requirement posited above amounts to the possibility to achieve for both A 
and A’ a physically unique common measurement-interaction upon a specimen that 
consists of this system. So the common interaction has to cover a unique common space-
time support and to finish by the registration of a unique group {µ}(AA’),k, k=1,2,…mAA' of 
brute observable marks. Then in this case a 'difference' between A and A’ can be worked 
out only after the realization of this unique common physical-operational interaction, by 
exclusively conceptual definitions and calculi that construct two conceptually distinct 
values aj and aj’ to be assigned, respectively, to A and to A'≠A28. If the condition required 
above can be realized we shall say that A and A’ are mutually compatible quantities with 
respect to a microstate of one microsystem; if this cannot be realized we shall say that A 
and A’ are mutually incompatible quantities with respect to a microstate of one 
microsystem. In the first case the two factual probability laws (5) constructed for A and 
A’ introduce a poorer factual constraint than in the second case. So the corresponding 
knowledge is less specific and a maximally specific knowledge on the studied microstate 
is obtained by establishing the probabilistic behaviour of this microstate with respect to 
all the groups of mutually in-compatible dynamical quantities that are defined for the 
studied microstate.     
But suppose now that msG is a microstate of two (or more) microsystems. In this 
case two (or more) mutually distinct measurement-interactions can be accomplished on 
different systems from a unique specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG (cf. the 
                                                      
28 This happens, for instance, for the classical quantities p and p2/2m=T for which it is possible to first determine in a 
physical-operational way the numerical value of the common basic quantity |p|=m(vx+vy+vz), and out of this basic 
operational determination, to work out afterward, conceptually, the two results ‘p’ (a vector) and ‘p2/2m’ (a scalar) that 
are mutually distinct from a conceptual point of view as well as by their numerical values).  
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definitions from (2.I)1 and also the future point (3.I)2). So in this case we shall say that 
any two different quantities A and to A'≠A can be compatible with respect to a microstate 
of two or more microsystems. And the maximally specific knowledge on the studied 
microstate is obtained by establishing its probabilistic behaviour with respect to all the 
dynamical quantities that are defined for it. 
This settles the question of specificity with respect to the studied microstate, of the 
knowledge on this microstate captured in a factual probability law (5). 
Let us note that: The concept of compatibility of dynamical quantities that has been 
defined here in connection with the question of specificity of the knowledge created 
concerning the studied microstate, is essentially relative to: 
- the concept of one individual specimen of the studied microstate;  
- the sort of considered microstate, in the sense of the definitions from (2.I)1.  
- the coding procedure that is involved, so also the model of a microstate that is 
presupposed in the theory that is made use of;  
- the available techniques for measuring, which in general vary while time passes.  
This conclusion is striking when it is compared to the concept of compatibility of 
qualifying quantities defined in the nowadays Hilbert-Dirac formulation of the quantum 
mechanics 29. 
 
(2.I).2.2. Primordial description of a microstate. 
The considerations from the preceding point lead us to posit by definition that – 
even though the laws (5) do not concern exclusively the studied microstate msG itself, i.e. 
separately from the measurement interactions from the successions [G.MesA], ∀A that 
led to them – nevertheless: 
The set  
{(ε,δ,N0)-{(π(aj)}, ∀ j)}G},  ∀A 30                                                       (5’) 
of all the factual (ε,δ,N0)-statistical-probabilistic laws (5) established with respect to one 
given operation of generation G and all the dynamical quantities A defined for a 
microstate, can be regarded as a mechanical description 'of msG'. Indeed, it is the 
maximally specifying characterization that can be realized for the considered microstate 
msG in the sense of MD1, and it is a characterization that is specifying with a strong 
degree of certainty. So, to the initial definition (1) of the microstate msG that only labels 
this microstate by the operation G that generates it, and then, to one chain (3) that 
endows us with a very first unstable dot of qualification tied with this microstate itself, 
(5’) substitutes finally: 
- a characterization of msG in terms of a whole stable and dense structure of 
communicable, consensual, predictive and verifiable pieces of observable factually-
probabilistic data, 
- that exhausts the defined possibilities to qualify this microstate, 
- and that are all tied with this particular microstate itself, with effects of its interactions 
with measurement procedures.  
Moreover, via the coding-procedures cod.proc(aj), ∀A, posited to be necessarily 
involved by the definitions of the measurement interactions MesA, ∀A, from the theory 
                                                      
29 In the nowadays quantum mechanics the concepts of mutual compatibility or incompatibility of dynamical quantities 
are given a statistical definition that do not reach the level of individual conceptualization, and they are uncritically 
assigned an absolute, intrinsic nature embodied in a posited algebra of operators. The correlative 'principle of 
complementarity' has instilled many considerations devoid of any clear and intelligible feature of factual or logical 
necessity.  
30 From now on, for the sake of simplicity, for a usual repetitive index like 'j' in aj we shall write ∀j instead of  
j=1,2,....J, keeping in mind that the cardinal J is finite. 
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of microstates that is employed, the information contained in (5') is intelligible in this 
sense that it is connected to the already previously constructed classical mechanics. 
So (5') finally installs the concept of a microstate msG as a scientific concept that is 
endowed with a definite, stable and specific, intelligible 'own' content.  
Nevertheless the sort of knowledge represented in (5’) violates strongly the current 
classical ways of thinking in terms of "objects" that – as delimited wholes – are endowed 
with a delimited and stable global space-time location entailing a definite inside and a 
corresponding outside, as well as an inner organization conceived in terms of properties 
that these objects would possess.  
Moreover the genesis and the content assigned to (5’) violates surreptitiously but 
radically the clear-cut conventional views on 'objective' facts. The set of relativities that 
mark (5') concerns characters of the human observer-conceptor (his ways of conceiving, 
thinking and acting and his technical possibilities) at least as much as it concerns the 
studied microstate.  One is led to speak now much more cautiously, namely in terms of 
only inter-subjective consensus on predictions and verifications of outcomes of human 
methodological ways of operating. Thereby the classical notion of knowledge of some 
'thing’, recedes. 
  
(2.I).2.2.1. Notations, denominations, comments 
Let us now immediately organize and denote in detail the new sort of knowledge 
involved by (5'). In order to deal efficiently with all the unusual descriptional elements 
introduced here we shall now improve and summarize the names and notations 
associated with this knowledge31.  
- The grid of qualification introduced by a dynamical quantity A defined for 
microstates will be called the aspect-view A. The definition of each aspect-view A is 
assumed to contain the explicit specification of a coding-rule, in order to compensate the 
absence of direct perceptibility and of qualia assignable to the studied microstate itself. 
This is what insures a way to associate a meaning in terms of a definite value aj of A, to 
the group of brute observable marks {µ}kA, kA=1,2,…mA produced by one act of 
measurement-interaction from a succession [G.MesA]. 
- The whole set of all the dynamical quantities defined for a microstate will be 
called the mechanical view defined for a microstate :  {A}≈VM  (‘M’: mechanical) 
- A pair (G,A) that founds the operational succession [G.MesA] is called an 
epistemic referential; the pair (G,VM) is called the mechanical epistemic referential. 
- A triad  
(G, msG, A)                                                                                                 (6) 
of the basic genetic elements from (5’) will be called a genetic triad of (5'). It can be 
regarded like a sort of inorganic physical-conceptual string of DNA. 
- The whole set  
{[G.MesA]},   ∀A∈VM                                                                                             (7)                     
of repeated successions of operations of the general form [G.MesA] achieved by the use 
of all the genetic triads (6) realized inside the process (5’) will be called the genesis of 
(5’). 
                                                      
31 These insert IQM explicitly in the general Method of Relativized Conceptualization, MRC, both conceptually and 
verbally.  
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- The brute result of the genesis {[G.MesA]}, ∀A∈VM of (5’) consists exclusively 
of the set-of-sets of observable marks  
{{µkA}, kA=1,2,…mA, ∀A∈VM }}                                                                 (8) 
These are the factual data produced by (5'). 
The totality (8) of all the factual data emerges at very dispersed moments, and also 
very dispersed spatially, on various registering devices of possibly various apparatuses. 
Observationally, this totality consists of just heaps of traces of vanished interactions, 
transmuted into meaning by a man-made operational-conceptual-methodological 
machine32. These heaps of traces however hide inside them a very elaborate unity of 
human curiosity, project and method. In a still non-expressed way, the factual data from 
(8) are already marked in their inner content by all the organizing relativities that inside 
(5’) have been endowed with an explicit, intelligible and consensual final expression via 
the use of some definite model of a microstate. Nevertheless the factual data from (8) and 
their explicitly meaningful final expression (5’) are devoid of any own space-time 
organization, as well as of any qualia assignable to the studied microstate msG alone. 
This, of course, is a striking feature of any probabilistic description. But here, in 
consequence of total non-perceptibility of the entity to be studied, it acquires a limiting 
degree of purity. 
The definitions (5) and (5') of the primordial probabilistic predictive laws 
concerning msG – separated from their geneses (7) – will be re-noted now, respectively, 
as: 
(D/A)(msG) ≡ {(ε,δ,N0)-π(aj), ∀j}G,   A fixed                                         (9) 
DM(msG) ≡ {{(ε,δ,N0)-π(aj), ∀j}G,     ∀A∈VM                                         (9') 
The notation (D/A)(msG) from (9) will be called the primordial transferred 
description of the microstate msG with respect to the mechanical qualification A (a 
description entirely ‘transferred’ on registering devices of apparatuses). It is the basic 
concept of transferred description.   
The notation DM(msG) from (9') will be called the primordial transferred 
mechanical description of the microstate msG.  
The writings  
(D/A)(G,msG, A)         or        DM(G,msG, VM )                                            (10)                                                                                            
can replace the expressions from the first members from (9) and (9'), respectively, when 
one wants to recall the geneses of, respectively, the laws from (9) and (9'): They stress 
that in the case of microstates the gained knowledge and the conceptual-physical-
operational generation of this knowledge by the human observer-conceptor, constitute an 
intimate unity wherefrom the intelligibility stems. 
Considered globally, this whole point (2.I).2.2.1 is an application of the general 
Method of Relativized conceptualization MRC (MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006]). 
  
                                                      
32 Let us stop a moment to realize how simplistic it would be to assert that this knowledge pre-existed and has been 
‘discovered’, when so obviously it has been invented and constructed.  
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3.I  
 
THE PROBABILITY TREE OF  
THE PRIMORDIAL TRANSFERRED DESCRIPTION  
OF AN UN-BOUND MICROSTATE  
 
A primordial transferred description is a radically basic and new cognitive concept. 
But this, in spite of all the specifications and comments from the section (2.I)2, , still 
remains too abstract for triggering an intuitive and sufficiently detailed as well as 
integrated perception of the whole novelty of the concept of a primordial transferred 
description. Therefore we shall now construct graphic representations of the contents 
carried by the written representations [(1)→(10)]. We shall do this only for the two main 
sorts of unbound microstates defined in (2.I)1, namely a microstate of one micro-system 
and a microstate of two (or several) micro-systems. This will suffice for bringing forth 
that this concept involves a genuine revolution of classical probabilities and logic 33.  
 
(3.I).1. THE PROBABILITY TREE OF AN UNBOUND MICRO-STATE OF  
ONE MICRO-SYSTEM WITH NON-COMPOSED OPERATION G OF 
GENERATION 
Throughout what follows we distinguish clearly between distinct levels of 
conceptualization.  
We begin with the basic case of one unbound microstate of one micro-system. For 
this case we shall be able already to reveal non-classical specificities involved by (9) and 
(9').  
 
(3.I).1.1. Individual level of conceptualization 
By definition the very numerous successions of operations [G.MesA], ∀A∈VMec 
involved in a genesis (7) start all with one same operational realization of a 'trunk'-
operation of generation G. But afterward – in consequence of individual and relative 
compatibilities and incompatibilities between dynamical quantities in the sense defined 
in (2.I)2 – the set of all the individual space-time supports of these successions of 
operations [G.MesA] falls apart, in general, in distinct space-time genetic ‘branches’. So 
in general there emerges a tree-like graphic structure. For simplicity we presuppose here 
only two non-compatible quantities A and B. The generalization is obvious. 
The two mutually incompatible dynamical quantities A and B introduce 
respectively the two grids of qualification of form (2)  
gq[A, ak , MesA, cod.proc(ak)],  j=1,2,....M;    gq[B, br, MesB, cod.proc(br)],  r=1,2,....M    
(2’)     
For simplicity we have endowed them with the same number M of possible values aj and 
br, respectively, and accordingly to the note attached to (5') we shall write only ∀j or∀r. 
Let [dG.(tG-to)] denote the invariant space-time support of each one realization of 
the operation G of generation of the studied microstate msG; this plays the role of a 
                                                      
33 Inside MRC it appears that this revolution reaches and incorporates also Shannon's theory of information and the 
representations of complexity.   
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common 'rooting' into the microphysical factuality. Let [dA.(tMesA-tG)] and [dB.(tMesB-tG)], 
respectively, denote the mutually distinct space-time supports of a measurement-
operation MesA and a measurement-operation MesB, the time origin being re-set on zero 
after each time-registration (obvious significance of the notations). So each realization of 
one whole succession [G.MesA] covers a same global space-time support 
[dG.(tG-to)+dA.(tMesA-tG)] 
and it produces a group of observable marks {µkA}j, kA=1,2,…mA, ∀j, that is coded in 
terms of a value aj accordingly to (2’); while each realization of a succession [G.MesB] 
covers another same global space-time support  
[dG.(tG-to)+dB.(tMesB-tG)] 
and produces a group of observable marks {µkB}r, kB=1,2,…mB that is coded in terms of a 
value br of the quantity B.  
Thereby for the considered case the genesis (7) from the level of individual 
conceptualisation involved by the representation (9), is achieved. This individual phase 
has a dominant physical-operational character. 
 
(3.I).1.2. Probabilistic level of conceptualization 
Let us now start from the final result of the phase of individual conceptualization: 
values aj of A. The coding values aj are stored. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for a 
succession [G.MesB]. 
Suppose now that a sequence of a very big number N of realizations of a succession 
[G.MesA]n, n=1,2,....N, has been realized. The relative frequencies n(aj)/N, ∀j (where the 
symbol n(aj) is to be read ‘the number n of values aj of A') have been established and by 
global repetitions of the whole process an (ε,δ,N0)-convergence in the sense of (5) has 
been found to emerge indeed for these relative frequencies. In these conditions the 
primordial transferred description (9) has been factually specified fully, operationally and 
numerically. Furthermore on the top of the branch we have effectively constructed for the 
pair (G,A) a relativized Kolmogorov-like factual (ε,δ,N0)-probability-space. The universe 
of elementary events from this probability space is U={aj}, ∀j, and the probability law 
from this space is the primordial transferred description relatively to A, (9) 
(D/A)(msG)≡{(ε,δ,N0)-π(aj), ∀j}G, A fixed, (we do not yet consider explicitly the algebra 
on the universe of elementary events).  
Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for the quantity B and its values br.  
Thereby the primordial transferred description (9) relatively to B, 
(D/B)(msG)≡{(ε,δ,N0)- π(br)}G, ∀r is also effectively constructed.  
So we have the transferred description (9') for the considered case: Out of the brute 
observable factual data {µkA}j, kA=1,2,…mA, ∀j, and marks {µkB}r, kB=1,2,…mB we have 
worked out factually for the qualifying quantities A and B a purely numerical 
probabilistic content, via individual genetic, physical-operational actions (7). So when 
this second level of conceptualization is also achieved, the probability laws obtained on it 
– considered separately from their geneses 34 – possess a purely abstract mathematical 
character 35.  
                                                      
34 We stress this because inside quantum mechanics the asserted probability laws are indeed considered separately 
from the corresponding probability spaces, so in particular separately from the universe of elementary events that 
generate these laws. Furthermore they are not defined factually for the purpose of prediction, their factual 
(re)production serves exclusively the purpose of verification of the predictive statistics. This circumstance deserves 
being noted immediately and kept in mind because it plays a major role in the parts II and III of this work.  
35 Notice how, out of the qualitative and physical operational approach practised here, the factual (ε,δ,N0)-probability 
laws induce spontaneously a promontory into the realm of the mathematized, because they express exclusively the 
results of effective counting. 
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 (3.I).1.3. A meta-probabilistic level of conceptualization 
But the geometric representation from the Fig.2 does not permit to stop here, it 
pushes further. Indeed the striking awareness of the role of the unique operation G of 
generation of the specimens of the studied microstate msG from both branches hinders to 
stop because it strongly stresses that the two different effective  probability laws 
(D/A)(msG)≡{(ε,δ,N0)-π(aj),∀j}G, with A fixed, and (D/B)(msG)≡{(ε,δ,N0)-π(br),∀r}G, 
with B fixed, that crown the space-time branches from the zone of individual 
conceptualization stem both from one same trunk-operation of generation G, i.e. they 
concern one same microstate msG. So it seems unavoidable to posit that there exists some 
sort of meta-probabilistic correlation between these two probability laws {(ε,δ,N0)-
π(aj),∀j}G,  and {(ε,δ,N0)-π(br),∀r}G. Such a correlation accepts an expression of the 
general form  
π(aj)=Faj,B{π(br),∀r}G,       ∀A, ∀B                                                                  (11) 
  FAB(G)= {Faj,B{π(aj),∀j}G,       ∀AB∈VM                                                         (11’) 
where Faj,B{π(br),∀r}G and FAB(G) are two functionals that represent, respectively, the 
individual probability π(aj) in terms of the whole probability law {(ε,δ,N0)-π(br),∀r}G, 
and the global correlation between the two whole laws {(ε,δ,N0)-π(aj),∀j}G, and 
{(ε,δ,N0)-π(br),∀r}G. Together the relations (11) and (11’) will be called the meta-
probabilistic correlations involved by (1) G↔msG with respect to (A,B) and will be 
symbolized by (Mπc(G))AB  (Mπc: ‘meta-probabilistic correlation’) 36. So the description 
(9') of the studied microstate has to be explicitly completed:  
DM(msG) ≡ {[(ε,δ,N0)- π(aj),∀j}G,  (Mπc(G))AB ]},   ∀A,  ∀AB∈VM,                        
(9'')37 
(in (Mπc(G))AB the indexes j and r remain implicit). 
In order to distinguish clearly between the factual probability-laws {(ε,δ,N0)-
π(aj),∀j}G,  A fixed, from (9), (9') and the meta-probabilistic correlations (Mπc(G))AB, 
∀AB∈VM defined by (11), (11’), we shall say by definition that (9), (9') contain 
exclusively probabilistic qualifications of the first order whereas (Mπc(G))AB,∀AB∈VM 
from (9'') expresses also probabilistic qualifications of the second order 38, 39. 
  
                                                      
36 The two functionals Faj,B{π(br),∀r}G, ∀A,∀B  and  FAB(G) can acquire a precise numerical definition only inside a 
theory of microstates where are specified the general model posited for a microstate and the corresponding general 
concept of an act of measurement MesA, ∀A, with the involved coding procedure. 
37 Mackey [1963], Suppes [1966], Gudder [1976], Beltrametti [1991], and probably quite a number of other authors 
also, have tried – directly by purely mathematical means – to establish a satisfactory formulation of a meta-probability 
law associable with a quantum mechanical state-vector. The tree-like structure constructed here explicates the 
qualitative and semantic foundations of such a law. This, in the future, should much facilitate the specification of a 
consensual mathematical expression for what is here denoted Mπc(msG). 
 38  We note that the whole process of description (9’') has been developed inside an a priori given cell for 
conceptualization, namely the pair (G,VM), that acted like a local 'epistemic' referential. 
39 For the sake of brevity, from now on we cease to always write explicitly the specification ‘(ε,δ,N0)’; but it will be 
constantly presupposed: we consider exclusively factual, effective probability laws. 
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(3.I).1.4. The global result of the preceding genesis 
All what precedes is represented on the Fig.2: 
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a-conceptual physical factuality 
Fig.2. The probability-tree T(G,(A,B) of an unbound microstate msG 
We have remarked that – in contradistinction to its purely numerical results – the 
genesis of these results does possess a definite space-time structure. However the 
temporal character of progressive emergence via successively registered individual 
results is abstracted away, of course. Accordingly to the so mysterious volatility of time 
it evaporates from the structure while it is progressively accomplished. So, in the 
exclusively spatial tree-like representation that persists, only the existence of distinct 
branches still just recalls the genetic temporal classifying features entailed by the mutual 
compatibilities or incompatibilities between the measured dynamical quantities, with 
respect to the considered type of microstate 40.  
                                                      
40 I perceive this as a troubling hint that time could perhaps be conceived as just a very basic artefact of Nature brought 
forth inside human thought by the biological evolution, as a basic feature of our fitness to subsist as a species that is 
constrained to parcel in order to conceptualize (other authors also reach a similar notion, for instance Carlo Rovelli 
[2015] and Donald D. Hoffmann&Ananda Gefner [2016]). In such a perspective, in the scientific conceptualization of 
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Let us denote by T(G,(A,B)) (T: 'tree') this entirely geometrized residual structure of 
the genetic process of a description (9'') 41. The green zone of genetic conceptualization – 
purely individual and physical-operational – is clearly separated from the posterior 
superposed yellow zone of exclusively abstract conceptualization.  
 
(3.I).1.5. More detailed probabilistic examination of T(G,(A,B)  
The concept of probability-tree of a microstate involves significances that are far 
from being trivial: they have already helped us to expand Kolmogorov’s purely abstract, 
mathematical concept of a probability-space – where in particular the distributions of 
probability remain an only general pure concept that is not specified numerically – into a 
new and much more complex tree-like probabilistic whole where each element is 
defined, while the probability measure (5) (ε,δ,N0)-{π(aj)}, ∀ j), emerges endowed with a 
finite conceptual definition and a factual numerical specification. Let us explicate this a 
little more.  
- Random phenomenon. The classical theory of probabilities offers no 
formalization of the notion of random phenomenon. It just makes use of the word 
'experiment'. Whereas on the fFig.2 one literally sees how – from nothingness – a whole 
group of Kolmogorov probability-spaces emerges for a microstate msG, mutually 
connected by the corresponding operation of generation G, and by meta-probabilistic 
correlations between these. Thereby the basic concept of 'random phenomenon' acquires 
for a detailed inner structure, expressed in definite terms, namely [G, MesA or MesB, etc., 
marks {µ}kA or marks {µk}kB, etc., code {aj} or code {br}, etc.], wherefrom factual finite 
Kolmogorov probability-spaces are then constructed. Inside these mutually connected 
probability spaces are lodged numerically specified factual (ε,δ,N0)-probability laws that 
are effective and relativized to all the actions and features that determine them.  
This result can be generalized to any physical entity and it can be induced in a 
strongly enlarged abstract theory of probabilities that accepts naturally a deep-set 
unification with a relativized and extended logic (MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006], 
[2013], [2014]). Thereby these two fundamental structures of the human thought merge 
into a unification that has been shown to include Shannon's informational approach 
(MMS [1980], [1982], [2006]). 
- Probabilistic dependence. The factual Kolmogorov-type probability spaces that 
crown the two branches from the Fig. 2 admit, respectively, the denotations   
[U(aj), τA, {π(aj,∀j}G],            [U(br), τB, {π(br,∀r}G ],     
where τA and τB are the involved algebras of events. Let us consider now explicitly these 
algebras also. Inside the classical theory of probabilities the concept of probabilistic 
dependence is defined only for events from the algebra from one given space. 
Kolmogorov ([1950], p.9) has written: 
«…..one of the most important problems in the philosophy of the natural sciences is – in addition to 
the well known one regarding the essence of the concept of probability itself – to make precise the 
premises which would make it possible to regard any given real events as independent. »  
And he has posited – just posited by definition – that two events a1 and a2 from the 
algebra τ of a probability space are mutually independent from a probabilistic point of 
view if the numerical product π(a1).π(a2) of the probabilities π(a1) and π(a2) of their 
separate occurrences is equal to the probability π(a1∩a2)) of their (set)-product-event 
                                                                                                                                                                 
physical 'reality', space would be more basic than time, notwithstanding that according to Kant's postulate space and 
time, "equally", are both a priori forms of the human intuition.   
41 The expression “probability tree” is already much made use of, with various significances. All these should be very 
carefully distinguished from the particular significance represented in the Fig.2.  
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a1∩a2 from τ ; whereas if this is not the case, then a1 and a2 are tied by a probabilistic 
dependence. But inside the classical theory of probabilities the concepts of probabilistic 
dependence or independence are not defined for elementary events from one same 
universe U. Such a sort of 'dependence' can be apprehended only indirectly, by 
comparison with the probability law that acts upon a universe of elementary events 
defined as a Cartesian product of two other universes, one of which is U. But this 
involves another random phenomenon, distinct from the random phenomenon that 
generates the space where U is the universe of elementary events 42  and a rigid 
juxtaposition of these two random phenomena. Whereas inside IQM this limitation will 
be circumvented in (3.I).2 via the definition (1) of an operation of generation G 
combined with the definition of one microstate of two or several micro-systems permits 
to circumvent this limitation.  
In the case of a microstate of one micro-system, the classical definitions are 
sufficient only if each one of the two probability spaces that crown the two branches 
from the Fig.2 is considered separately from the other one. But consider now an 
elementary event aj from the space that crowns the branch MesA, and an elementary 
event br form the space that crowns the branch MesB. Observationally these two events 
are mutually in-dependent in the sense of Kolmogorov: Since the quantities A and B are 
mutually in-compatible in the sense defined in (2.I).2, the two measurement-operations 
MesA and MesB cannot be realized together, simultaneously, for only one specimen 
σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG, so the elementary events aj and br cannot even 
coexist in an actualized way. But nevertheless, the events aj and br concern the same 
microstate msG – in the sense of (1) – generated by one same operation of generation G. 
And even though inside our approach a microstate in the sense of (1) is distinct by 
definition from any specimen σ(msG) of it, the considerations that led to (11)+(11’) entail 
with a sort of necessity the assertion of a meta-probabilistic correlation (Mπc(G)) and of 
the corresponding extension (9'') of (9), because both spaces that are considered stem 
from one same operation of generation G. This argument amounts to the assertion of a 
sort of ‘probabilistic dependence’ of second order that knits into one whole all the 
distinct branch-random phenomena of which the common operation of generation G 
from the trunk of the tree introduces a priori the potentiality.  
The classical theory of probabilities also defines the general concept of 
probabilistic correlations, quite explicitly. But it does not singularize inside it a class of 
meta-probabilistic correlations that manifests specifically the fact that one same basic 
concept of a physical entity (msG or G) is involved in different and separately actualized 
random phenomena 43. This however is obviously an important case because it can be 
extremely frequent and it can entail subtle explanations for queer but observable 
behaviours. 
In short, considered globally, the probability-tree of a microstate constitutes one 
whole of potential knowledge, a closed cell of potentially possible fabrication of 
different but interconnected sub-wholes of actualized knowledge 44.   
                                                      
42 This detour could stem from the desire to stay inside the domain of the actualized. But let us notice that outside an 
algebra of events, the Kolmogorov concept of probabilistic dependence between two elementary events from the 
universe U is also a mere potentiality when these elementary events are not compatible in our sense, while in this case 
inside an algebra it can be regarded as actual only because the concept of event from an algebra involves potentiality by 
construction.  
43 K.J. Jung has introduced a concept of ‘synchronicity’ that seemed rather mysterious and has much struck Pauli, 
possibly because quantum mechanics – via the "principle of exclusion" – had suggested to him implicitly similarities 
with the behaviour of microstates, and this has been discussed in the correspondence Jung-Pauli (MMS [2002B], note 
pp. 279-281).  
44 Human psychic "time" is strongly populated by potentialities, by the virtual; so the representation of probabilities 
should fully encompass also such 'states' of events.  A probability tree in our sense is overtly constructed as a potential-
and-actual structure that spreads out freely inside the whole domain of possibilities where develop the individual inner 
times of human beings, wherefrom the public time is constructed (MMS [2006]).    
 
 
 
67 
Whereas the Kolmogorov conceptualization – even though it makes verbal use of 
the concept of 'experiment' – remains still entirely blind toward the probabilistic 
specificities entailed by the concept of operation of generation G in the sense of (1) 
when moreover this is combined with the definitions from (2.I).2. Consequently the 
classical theory of probabilities reveals imprisonment in fragmenting delimitations 
when it is compared to the concept of probability that works in the case of a 
transferred description.  
Why is this so? The answer is striking: because Kolmogorov's concept of a 
probability space does not reach the factual root of the probabilistic whole that works 
inside the definition (9'') of a transferred description; it has been conceived entirely on 
the classical level of conceptualization. Whereas the bottom-up approach practised here 
starts much deeper, on the frontier between the already conceptualized and the a-
conceptual physical factuality, wherefrom it proceeds upward via the methodological 
decision (1) G↔(msG≡{σ(msG)} that introduces the factual-operational definition of 
precisely this factual root of a new probabilistic whole. The entire probabilistic output of 
this root – with respect to an arbitrary but given collection of mutually incompatible 
branch-qualifying mechanical quantities – can be represented inside one new sort of 
enriched probability space: 
[ UT(ejb)=∪bU(ejb),       τT=∪bτb ,       {πT(ejb ,∀jb}G = ∪b{πb(ejb,∀j}G ] 
where the index 'T ' labels the considered probability-tree; the index 'b' labels the 
considered branch from T; the index 'jb ' labels the elementary event ejb from the branch 
labelled by b, and τT designates the total algebra of events from this enriched probability 
space. 
 
(3.I).1.6. The particular case of a one-trunk probability tree 
What happens if no sort of relative mutual incompatibility does act in the 
considered circumstance? In this case the space-time domain covered by the involved 
operation of generation G leads to only one 'branch' that is common to all the considered 
mutually compatible mechanical quantities; which amounts to saying that the common 
trunk-and-branch of the tree is crowned by a set of probability spaces – one for each 
quantity A – that, inside (9'') – are only conceptually distinguished from one another and 
then meta-correlated to one another, as indicated below. 
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Fig. 3. The probability-tree T(G,(A,B) of two mutually compatible observables 
 
 
Here the capacity of the case of an unbound microstate of one microsystem to 
reveal non-classical probabilistic contents of (9''), comes to exhaustion. But the most 
surprising such contents appear just below. 
 
(3.I).2. PROBABILITY TREE OF ONE UNBOUND MICRO-STATE  
OF TWO OR MORE MICRO-SYSTEMS 
We now enter upon the case of micro-states of two or several micro-systems. 
Thereby we come face-to-face with what is called the problem of non-locality. This case 
brings strikingly forth to what a degree the concepts-and-language introduced by the 
definitions from (2.I)2 and by the basic concept of a probability tree defined in (3.I)1 
introduce a structure of conditions of inner coherence that entails intelligibility. 
Consider one progressive micro-state msG(2S) of two micro-systems S1 and S2, in the 
sense of the definitions from (2.I)2). How shall we construct the probability tree of 
msG(2S) ?  
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According to (1) one microstate msG(2S)  is generated by one corresponding 
operation of generation G(2S) to which it is tied in the sense of (1) and of the identity 
msG(2S)≡{σ(msG(2S))}. 
According to the definitions from (2.I)2) in this case one complete operation of 
measurement-interaction on one specimen of the factually defined microstate msG(2S) 
involves two partial measurement-interactions, a partial measurement-interaction MesA 
with S1, and a partial measurement-interaction MesB with S2 (in particular the quantities 
A and B can identify, but in general they are permitted to be different). For maximal 
graphic clarity instead of A, aj  and B, br we shall exceptionally write in this case, 
respectively, A1, a1j and B2, b2r. So a complete act of measurement will be denoted 
Mes(A1,B2). 
In (3.I)1, for the case of one micro-state of one micro-system, we have assigned by 
construction an own branch to each given sort of 'complete' act of measurement that is 
involved i.e. which involves fully one specimen of the microstate-to-be-studied (this 
happens always for a microstate of only one micro-system). In order to stay in agreement 
with all the constructive definitions from (2.I)2) and (3.I)1, here we must apply this same 
procedure: [one given sort of complete act of measurement involving fully one specimen 
of the microstate-to-be-studied] corresponds to [one branch of the tree]. So to each sort 
of complete act of measurement of the same form as Mes(A1,B2) we assign one branch 
from the probability tree of G(2S). Then the two partial measurements MesA1 and MesB2 
from one complete act of measurement Mes(A1,B2) operated respectively upon the two 
micro-systems S1 and S2 from each one specimen σ(msG(2S)) of the studied micro-state 
msG(2S), are both lodged inside one same branch of the probability tree of G(2S). So we 
must assign another branch of this tree to the complete measurements that involve 
another pair of quantities denoted for instance (C1,D2) with values, respectively, c1k and 
d2z, where at least either C1 is in-compatible with A1 or D2 is in-compatible with B2 in 
the sense defined in (4), or where both these possibilities are realized; there is no 
condition then concerning the compatibility of C1 and D2.  
So a two-branches-tree from the figure 4 founded upon the operation of generation 
G(2S), can be denoted T(G(2S),(A1,B2; C1,D2)).  
Let us now focus upon the following fact: For one micro-state of two micro-
systems the two dynamical quantities A1 and B2 that are involved in one complete act of 
measurement Mes(A1,B2)≡(MesA1 and MesB2) are always compatible in the sense 
defined at the point 3 from (2.I)2, because the measurements MesA1 and MesB2 are 
performed, respectively, upon the two mutually distinct systems S1 and S2 that are 
involved in any one specimen of the microstate msG(2S) and so no incompatibility 
between these space-time supports of these two partial acts of measurement comes in 
necessarily 45 (if in some circumstance these two space-time supports tend to overlap it 
should be easily possible to eliminate the problem).  
Since one complete act of measurement Mes(A1,B2) contains by definition an act 
of measurement MesA1 and an act of measurement MesB2, the corresponding pair of 
observable marks ({µ}kA1,{µ}kB2 ) – let us denote it {µkA1B2 } – once it has been coded in 
terms of a pair of values a1j,b2r,  j,r=1,2,...M, constitutes one elementary event from the 
universe of elementary events U={a1j,b2r}, j,r=1,2,...M from the probability-space that 
in the Fig.4 crowns the unique branch of the complete measurements Mes(A1,B2); while 
the factual probability distribution on the universe of elementary events from this 
probability space consists of the transferred description (9) with respect to the pair of 
quantities (A1,B2) and has to be denoted as  
                                                      
45  We recall that inside the approach developed here the compatibility or incompatibility of two dynamical quantities 
is defined only for one specimen of the studied microstate and it is relative to both the nature of these quantities and to 
the type of the microstate that is considered, in the sense of the definitions from (2.I)2. 
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D/(A1,B2)(msG(2S)) ≡ (ε,δ,N0)-{π(a1j,b2r), j, r=1,2,…M}G(2S),    j, r=1,2,…M 
 
 
STATISTICAL CROWN 
2ND META-PROBABILISTIC LEVEL OF DESCRIPTION 
Mπc(G) 
 	infra-probabilistic	correlations		inside	ONE	elementary	event	
	
	
 
t                 t   
 
                                                     
                                      
      coding of (a1j , b2r)               coding of (c1k,d2z )           
                                                               INDIVIDUAL 
  
                   marks{µkA1∪µkB2}           LEVEL OF DESCRIPTION         marks{µkC1∪µkC2}  
 
  
                                                                        
                                      Mes(A1,B2)                     Mes(C1,D2)             [G.Mes(C1,D2)] 
         
      [G.Mes(A1,B2)] 
  
    
         0                                                                                                                                            x  
      a-conceptual physical factuality 
      A(A1,S1)                                                                                                                                        A(B2,S2) 
      A(C2,S1)                                                                                                                                         A(D2,S2) 
 
Fig. 4. The probability-tree T(G(2S),(A1,B2; C1,D2)) of a microstate msG(2S): 
the case of the 'problem of non-locality' 
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distance. While the corresponding description (9) – one factual probability law – is itself 
devoid of a defined space-time structure.  
The Fig.4 represents graphically a most explicit analysis of the inner texture of the 
'problem'. This is the 'problem' of non-locality re-expressed according to the genuine 
algorithm for probabilistic conceptual organization involved by the probability-tree of 
the studied microstate, such as this algorithm is entailed by the concept (1) of operation 
of generation G of the considered sort of microstate-to-be-studied, and by the definitions 
from (2.I)2 46.  
The present way of reaching this problem out of nothing conceptualized before, 
inside a radically first and merely qualitative bottom-up approach, brings clearly into 
evidence that what is called ‘non-locality’ is tied with preconceived classical, so 
particularizing assumptions, and with a general conceptualization of the 'microstates' 
inside the nowadays microphysics that is unachieved from various points of view. 
Indeed:  
- Consider the two "micro-systems" ‘SI’ and ‘S2’ from one specimen σ(msG(2S)) of 
the studied microstate msG(2S). In the absence, inside modern microphysics, of an explicit 
use of a general model of a microstate, these two micro-systems have been spontaneously 
and implicitly imagined more or less like two spatially delimited small balls radically 
exterior to one-another, so mutually 'separated' by a void 'distance' that in its turn is also 
'exterior' to these entities themselves; which raises strongly and intuitively the question 
of what ‘exists’ and ‘happens’ outside and between ‘SI’ and ‘S2’ 47, 48. Whereas the 
experimentally registered time-distance between ‘SI’ and ‘S2’ seems to be quasi null, or in 
any case smaller than is entailed by the Einstein-velocity of a 'light-signal'. This 
conceptual situation acts as a strident common call for a general model of a microstate, in 
spite of the orthodox interdiction imposed by the Copenhagen school.  
- But also other presuppositions are involved. For instance, the non-locality 
problem emerges in a particularly striking way because it is explicitly and essentially 
lodged inside the space-time frame of the human observers with their apparatuses. One 
complete act of measurement Mes12(A1,B2) involves two blocks of macroscopic 
apparatuses A(A1,S1) and A(B2,S2) that – themselves – are perceived with delimited 
volumes and are endowed with registering devices that pre-structure classes of possible 
space-time locations of the observable results of measurements coded a1j and b2, which 
can define perceived spatial and temporal distances between potential locations of these 
pre-constructed observable space-time locations of the perceivable marks. This entails 
an inextricable mixture between: a mathematical formalism; implicit expectations 
induced by the classical human macroscopic conceptualization; and cognitive human 
actions, registering 'objects', and observable pre-organized events, that are unavoidably 
involved by the acts of measurement. While obviously, such heterogeneous features with 
their respective conceptual roles have to be strictly distinguished from one another via a 
well defined methodological structure imposed upon the study.  
                                                      
46 Is it not remarkable that an approach like that one developed here – so general, and only qualitative – brings forth so 
rapidly this whole analysis, in a way so deeply tied with the basic tree-like representation of a microstate and 
independently of any mathematical formulation?  
47 The question of 'separability' has been much discussed, but via mere words and undefined subtleties. While any 
primordial transferred description (9'') of that what here, in the reference-and-imbedding structure that we are now 
constructing in a rigorous way, is called a 'microstate' in the sense of (1) simply cannot as yet entail any sort of space-
time specifications, neither inner ones nor exterior ones, since it emerges still radically devoid of any definite inner 
space-time structure: only later, in a subsequent phase of conceptualization, such specifications might become possible 
(or not) inside a theory of microstates where a general model of a microstate, necessarily, is defined. 
48 Descartes held that void space does not exist. Which I understand as the assertion that only void space with respect to 
some definite aspect can exist, because 'space' is exclusively the universal bearer posited a priori in human mind for any 
given quality that 'exists' with respect to some given physical entity. 
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- The purely conceptual probabilistic situation is also unintelligible, from a very 
basic probabilistic point of view. The space-time distances, together with the observed 
correlations, emerge in relation with only each one-branch-probability distribution 
(ε,δ,N0)-{π(a1j,b2r, ∀(j,r)}G(2S)   or    (ε,δ,N0)-{π(c1k,d2z), ∀(k,z) }G(2S) 
not inside the meta-probabilistic correlations denoted by us 'Mπc(G)' between the two 
branch-probability distributions that are involved (cf. the Fig.2). In this case, the 
considered 'correlations' appear as tied with a sort of 'probabilistic dependence’ that 
stems from the insides of the observable events (a1j,b2r),∀(j,r) or (c1k,d2z),∀(k,z) from 
one probability law (ε,δ,N0)-{π(a1j,b2r,∀(j,r)}G(2S) or, respectively, (ε,δ,N0)-
{π(c1k,d2z),∀(k,z)}G(2S)). While in the probabilistic sense, these are elementary events. 
The classical concept of probabilistic dependence defines exclusively a concept of 
mutual probabilistic dependence for two distinct events from the algebra posited on 
the universe of elementary events from one probability space, an algebra that does 
not even necessarily contain the elementary events. This classical concept of 
probabilistic dependence cannot deal with features of the inner structure of 
elementary events.  
Here the classical probabilistic conceptualization is literally overwhelmed.    
- Finally, let us consider also the direction of conceptualization, top-down or a 
bottom-up. This direction also plays an essential role in this circumstance, but via a quite 
general feature. Historically the human conceptualization has been developed top-down 
on the vertical that connects the macroscopic level of conceptualization, to the 
microscopic one, and this entailed that the notion of a common trunk G of a possible 
probability-tree from which stem distinct branches, had not yet been conceived at the 
time when Kolmogorov elaborated his theory of probabilities. The general genetic 
concept of operation of generation G of the entity-to-be-studied had not yet emerged 
itself.  So Kolmogorov has defined only probability spaces entirely separated from one 
another, each one of which tops only one 'experiment' (or 'random phenomenon').  
 
 
Fig. 5. A probability-tree T(G(2S),(A1,B2; C1,D2)) as encountered by a top-down 
approach that installs Kolmogorov's classical concept of probability spaces and then 
stops its progression downward.  
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And then Kolmogorov stopped, of course. He had already realized a very 
remarkable progress with respect to the preceding Bernoulli-von Mises concept of – 
directly and alone – the mathematical concept of a probability measure. But one isolated 
probability space gave no access to possible common roots of different probability 
spaces.  
For human beings that start their conceptualization on what we call 'the 
macroscopic level', common roots can stay hidden a very long time with respect to a top-
down approach. While in order "to make precise" the premises of probabilistic 
dependence (cf. the Kolmogorov-quotation from (3.I).1)), a sine qua non condition is to 
be aware of the existence – of the general existence – and the basic role of the 'operation 
of generation G of the entity-to-be-studied' 49, and the mentioned existence and role, 
though they always exist in some particular avatar, physical or sensorial or only mental, 
become striking and are endowed with general contours only inside microphysics, and 
only if one is attentive to the consequences of the physically operational character of the 
operation of generation G when the entity-to-be-qualified is a 'microstate'.  
- But even if the concept of operation G of generation is taken into account, still the 
Bell-case can stay probabilistically non-intelligible, because the notion that for unbound 
microstates the whole successions [G.MesA] are a condition for obtaining consensually 
perceptible marks, if it is active alone, entails only a monolithic concept of probabilistic 
correlation that cannot distinguish between correlations interior to one elementary event 
in the probabilistic sense, and correlations between distinct probabilistic events. This 
distinction, as stressed, requires explicit recourse to also the definitions from (2.I)2. 
In short, the case of the probability tree of one microstate of two or several 
microsystems is paradigmatic from various points of view, and very basic ones. It is not 
surprising that it has raised, and still raises, so many researches and considerations. The 
IQM-analyses of this case illustrate strikingly the utility and the forces of an explicitly 
constructed structure of reference. 
 
 (3.I).3. PROBABILITY TREE OF ONE MICROSTATE  
WITH COMPOSED OPERATION OF GENERATION 
Consider now a composed operation of generation G(G1,G2) (cf. (1.I),(2.I).1) of a 
microstate in which only two simple operations of generation G1 and G2 are involved, 
like in the Young two-slits experiment. And consider an effectively realized microstate 
msG(G1,G2). Let us compare its factual description (9’) with the factual descriptions (9’) of 
the two microstates msG1 and msG2 that would be obtained, respectively, if the two 
operations of generation G1 and G2 were each one fully realized separately. According to 
our present knowledge on microstates such a comparison would bring forth the physical 
fact that in general, between the probability π(G(G1,G2),aj) of realization of the value aj 
of a dynamical quantity A via acts of measurement MesA performed on one outcome of 
msG(G1,G2), and the probabilities π(G1,aj) and π(G2,aj) of this same value aj established, 
                                                      
49 Dirac's "theory of transformations" – that obviously involves probabilistic correlations – does not assert them 
explicitly. It is presented as exclusively an algorithm of Cartesian type for passing from one system of coordinates to 
another one. While it might come out in the future that any probabilistic correlation can be assigned to a certain class of 
distinct branches from a huge probability-(meta-tree)-of-probability trees). This would found in a very toned way 
Gustav Jung's concept of 'synchronicity' that has interested Pauli. (MMS [2002B], the note pp. 279-281). (In particular, 
it is not a priori absurd that certain subconscious psychical perceptions of 'synchronicity' of physical events come out to 
be connected with some sort of instinctive, reflex reactions to physical events from a same probability tree that are 
separated from one another by an arbitrarily big spatial distance internal to some basic sort of physical substance (like 
that from the de Broglie-Bohm view) relatively to which Einstein's 'limit-velocity' of, specifically, light-'signals', 
simply does not exist). 
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respectively, via measurements MesA performed onthe microstates msG1 and msG2, there 
holds an in-equality 
π12(G(G1,G2),aj)  ≠  π1(G1,aj) + π2(G2,aj)                                            (12) 
This circumstance deserves being noticed. It suggests that a microstate tied with 
G(G1,G2) belongs to a domain of phenomena that is of another nature than the domain of 
phenomena entailed by G1 and G2 when these are realized separately. But 'different' in 
what sense, exactly? In this preliminary stage of the conceptualization of the microstates 
this question remains open. Nevertheless we can already formulate the following 
important remark. 
The inequality (12) is usually expressed verbally in positive terms by saying that 
‘msG1 and msG2 interfere inside msG(G1,G2)’. But inside the present approach – according 
to the one-to-one relation (1) between a given operation of generation and the 
corresponding microstate – this expression is misleading from a conceptual point of 
view. The relation (1) entails that only the one microstate msG(G1,G2) is effectively 
generated when the operation of generation G(G1,G2) is performed. So G(G1,G2) cannot 
be coherently conceived to generate also the two microstates msG1 and msG2 when the 
microstate msG(G1,G2) has been generated. When the microstate msG(G1,G2) has been 
generated, the microstates msG1 and msG2 have to be conceived as somehow non-
achieved or non-'completed' microstates that, by construction, can at most possess the 
status of partial effects of two a priori possible full operational state-individualizations 
via G1 and G2, but that in fact have not been fully actualized when G1 and G2 are 
composed inside G(G1,G2).  
The symbol G(G1,G2) adopted here suggests that – if and when this seems useful – 
the mentioned effects can be referred two the unachieved microstates msG1 and msG2. So, 
in terms of probability-trees, the trees T(G1) and T(G2) are only two reference-trees, 
ghost-trees, only the one tree T(G(G1,G2)) is factually realized.  
And, since msG1 and msG2 have not been both and separately effectively realized by 
G(G1,G2), they do not ‘exist’ inside msG(G1,G2), as it is implied by the assertion that 'they' 
interfere inside msG(G1,G2). Such a language – like also the mathematical writing (12) or 
some equivalent one – are misleading inside the present approach: the natural language 
involves many shades, and these work inside the minds, so they have to be carefully 
dominated.   
The preceding considerations can be generalized in an obvious way to the case of 
an operation of generation G(G1,G2,...Gm) that composes several operations of 
generation.  
So inside the present approach the mathematical representation of the whole 
category of 'microstates with composed operation of generation' will have to be openly 
considered in a critical state of mind and in the third part of this work it will play the role 
of a discriminating test of the construction submitted there.  
This point (3.I)3 closes our exploration on probability trees of progressive 
microstates50. Indeed, for the reasons expressed at the end of (3.I)1 the concept of 
probability tree is not useful for bound microstates. Therefore in what follows we only 
add a brief but essential remark on the evolution of an unbound microstate. 
 
 
                                                      
50 We mention that the concept of a probability-tree has been worked out in (MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006], [2014]) 
in quite general terms (not only for the case of microstates). In the second part of this work it will appear that the 
nowadays quantum mechanics also implies it, via the Hilbert-space representations and Dirac's calculus of 
transformations.   
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 (3.I).4. ON THE EVOLUTION OF ANY UNBOUND MICROSTATE 
Is it possible, inside this qualitative and general approach, to assert something 
concerning the evolution of a progressive microstate? The answer is yes, and again it 
brings into evidence the crucial role of the concept of operation G of generation of a 
microstate.  
Imagine the final moment t assigned to an operation of generation G from (1) that 
introduces the microstate msG to be studied. In contradistinction to what has been 
assumed before, let us admit that during some time interval Δt1=t1-t subsequent to t the 
human observer does not act upon the microstate msG. Nevertheless during Δt1=t1-t the 
initial microstate msG can be posited to ‘evolve’ in the 'exterior' conditions EC that it 
encounters (exterior known macroscopic fields or obstacles). Indeed it would seem weird 
to posit that 'msG' remains immobilized from any conceivable point of view. Now – 
formally – this evolution can be integrated in (1), in the following way. 
Nothing hinders to posit in full logical coherence with the preceding development, 
that the association of the initially conceived and realized operation of generation G, with 
what happens with msG during Δt1=t1-t, act together like another operation of generation 
– let us denote it Gt1=F(G,EC,(t1-t)) (F : some functional) that generates in the factual 
sense from MD1 another microstate msG1 corresponding to Gt1 via (1). As stated before 
for any factually defined microstate msG, the microstate msG1 can be studied via 
sequences of successions  [Gtk.MesA], k=1,2,…M, ∀A∈VM. The time interval t1-t can be 
chosen with any desired value, the external conditions EC being kept unchanged. So – 
given the initial operation Gto – one can study successively a set of mutually ‘distinct’ 
microstates msGk that correspond respectively to the set of successive operations of 
generation:   
Go,  G1 =F(G,EC,(t1-to)),…Gk=F(Go,EC,(tk-tk-1)),....Gf=F(Go,EC,(tf-tK-1));   k=1,2,…K    (13)     
(K: an integer;  'f': final;  f≡K). For each operation of generation Gk from this set one can 
construct the corresponding probability tree T(Gk,A), ∀A∈VM, i.e. also the corresponding 
descriptions (9’) and (9''). So – with Gt=F(Go , EC, (t-to)) and Gt↔msGt – in general and 
simplified re-notations we have: 
[Go .(t-to)] ≡ Gt                                                                                                              (13’)  
 
The relations (13’) absorbs into the general concept of operation of generation G, 
the phase of individual evolution before measurement of any involved specimen 
σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG.  
So – by definition – inside a succession [Gt.MesA] the 'initial' state of the involved 
specimen of msG is to be understood as the state of this specimen when begins the act of 
measurement MesA. This permits to replace G by Gt in (9), (9'), (9''). Then (9''), for 
instance, becomes   
DM(msGt) ≡ { (D/A(msGt), (Mπc(Gt))XY }, ∀A, ∀AB, ∀t, ∀j,                                       (9''') 
Together the relations (13') and (9''') express an essential new concept, namely a 
factual statistical law of evolution associated with the studied factual microstate. 
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 (3.I).5. CONSTRUCTION VERSUS VERIFICATION  
OF THE DESCRIPTION OF A MICROSTATE 
What follows here is very brief to be stated, but becomes so important in the Part 
III of this work that it deserves this separate sub-section: 
How can we verify a description (9) of any sort – (9') or (9'') or (9''') ? 
The answer is obvious: Only by reconstructing it as many times as one wants and 
by modifying the parameters (ε,δ,N0) from the definition (5) (ε,δ,N0)-{π(aj)}, ∀j until 
one observes the desired degree of stability. If this is not possible the verification of the 
prediction is not realized. 
Inside IQM the sequence of operations [G.MesA] from (7) or the variant 
[Gt.MesA] of this sequence in the sense of (13') constitute the basic operator for 
both the construction and the verification of a description of a microstate. 
  
 
 
 
77 
  
(4.I) 
 
INFRA QUANTUM MECHANICS 
 
We have organized a methodological pre-structure of reference-and-embedment for 
constructing a fully intelligible mathematical theory of a mechanics of 'microstates' 
named a priori Infra-Quantum Mechanics and denoted IQM. 
IQM has been developed independently of any mathematical formalism.  
In order to insure explicit control on all the levels of conceptualization we have 
started on the level of zero pre-accepted knowledge concerning the individual physical 
and fully singular specimens of any microstate-to-be-studied51, and therefrom we have 
proceeded bottom up. 
So the origin and the order of progression on the vertical of conceptualization have 
been changed, with respect to the classical science inside which, historically, the 
generation of knowledge on microphysical entities has progressed top-down. And 
this has entailed a basic modification of the concept of 'microstate'.  
Indeed, via an unavoidable methodological decision MD, the definition of the 
concept of microstate – that classically is a precise, an individual, and an abstract 
definition – has been transmuted into a factual definition that involves a physical 
operation of generation G. And this operation, being a human instrument, cannot itself 
be defined otherwise than by a finite number of controllable parameters. Whereas any 
fragment of a-conceptual physical being introduced by a factually defined concept of a 
microstate entails a priori an unlimited set of unpredictable possible effects. And, with 
respect to the constructability of scientific predictive and verifiable knowledge starting 
from a local zero of specific knowledge, this contrast entails a 'primordially statistical' 
character. In short, we have started with a modified concept of a factually defined sort of 
microstate that entails primordially statistical scientific knowledge.  
So, starting from local zeros of specific knowledge, and according to general 
criteria of factual or logical necessity or of declared methodological choices, IQM has 
been composed bottom-up. In essence, it consists of a network of symbolizations of 
classes of conceptual moulds of different sorts (methodological procedures, physical 
operations, probabilistic laws, etc.) in each one of which – later, inside a given theory of 
the microstates – will have to be lodged a semantically more specified element from the 
same class. We have endowed this basic construct with all the foundational elements, 
formatted by all the constraints that are required for achieving any acceptable scientific 
theory of the microstates, and the whole has been organized in a logically coherent way; 
elements that are not generally necessary, as well as arbitrary a priori restrictions, have 
been excluded.  
The final result can be regarded as a structural definition of the general concept of 
a theory of the microstates. It can be characterized as follows.  
1. The core of IQM consists of a primordially probabilistic transferred description 
constructed inside a representational cell delimited by an a pair (G,A) where G 
symbolizes a physical operation of generation of specimens of the studied microstate, in 
                                                      
51 Unavoidably, the concept of a microstate itself must be given – as a receptacle where to pour future specifications – 
because from nothing, nothing more can be drawn.  
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the sense of (1), and A indicates a mechanical grid of qualification (2) that is defined for 
the studied sort of microstate (in the sense specified in (1.I).2). The most basic form of 
transferred description is  
D/A(msG) ≡ [(ε,δ,N0){π(aj,∀j}Gt],     ∀A∈VM                                              (9) 
It is written time-independent, involves only one qualifying quantity A and it stops on the 
first probabilistic level. The most comprehensive form of transferred description involves 
all the qualifying quantities A that, inside the epistemic referential (Gt,VM), are defined 
for the studied microstate and all the levels of conceptualization, and it can be 
represented by the writing  
DM(msGt) ≡ [(ε,δ,N0){π(aj),∀j}Gt,, (Mpc(Gt))AB],     (Gt,VM)                              (9''') 
Throughout IQM the physical operation G of generation of the individual 
specimens of the microstate to be studied – never noticed before – reveals a basic and 
central role.  
The descriptional structure (9''') is marked by very remarkable peculiarities: 
- It is strongly relative to a triad (6) [Gt,msG,A] of genetic elements, where the cell 
of conceptualization delimited by a given pair (epistemic referential) (Gt,A) is formed in 
adequacy with a particular descriptional aim.  
- The global basic genetic process of type (7) {[Gt.MesA]}, ∀A, that by repetitions 
of all the successions of the same general form brings forth a description (9'''), involves 
explicitly the fact that each one act of measurement performed on a microstate requires 
in general a previous corresponding realization of also the operation of generation of a 
specimen of the microstate msG to be studied, because in general a measurement-
interaction with a specimen of the studied microstate msG destroys this specimen of the 
involved micro-state even if the involved  micro-systems do persist.  
- The brute observable result (8) {µ}kA, kA=1,2,…mA of each one genetic succession 
[Gt.MesA] from (7) – a group of publicly observable physical marks – is entirely 
meaningless by itself because it carries no perceivable qualities (qualia) associable with, 
separately, the involved specimen of the studied microstate, nor with the qualifying 
quantity A. In order to gain indirectly for the observable marks {µ}kA, kA=1,2,…mA, a 
meaning in terms of a value aj of the previously defined quantity A and that be somehow 
tied also with the involved specimen of the studied microstate, the measurement-
evolution MesA has to incorporate an adequate coding-procedure.  
In its turn such a coding-procedure, in order to be definable in a non-arbitrary way, 
requires a general model of a microstate as well as recourse to a corresponding and 
explicit re-definition of the qualifying quantity A for – specifically – the sort of studied 
microstate with its particularized model. So:  
Any acceptable theory of microstates must introduce a generic model of a 
microstate as well as its variants with respect to the considered sort of microstate 
(in the sense of the definitions from (2.I).1.2), as well as re-definitions of the 
qualifying quantities A for, specifically, the sort of considered model, and 
corresponding laws of evolution.  
- A description (9''') cannot be assigned to the studied microstate itself considered 
separately, but only – globally – to the whole measurement interactions from the 
successions {[Gt.MesA]}, ∀A∈VM that generated the description (where Gt is reducible 
to Go in the sense defined in (13'). So a description (9''') is strongly and indelibly tied to 
its genetic process. The classical notion of 'object' is not yet extracted from a description 
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(9'''). This feature is intimately tied with the absence of any defined space-time structure 
assigned to the description (9''') itself 52. 
2. In contradistinction to a description (9''') itself, the genetic successions of 
operations (7) [Gt.MesA] that are achieved by the observer-conceptor in order to 
construct such a description are quite essentially endowed with a specific space-time 
structure. This fact is manifested by the tree-like geometrical structure of the graphic 
representation from the Fig.2. And this structure entails non-classical extensions of the 
classical concept of probability. These extensions: 
* Require a deeply modified and enriched concept of probabilistic dependence that 
involves an explicit distinction between what is presupposed to be only potential and 
what is presupposed to have been actualized, as well as incorporation of both these ways 
of 'existing' conceived by the human mind.  
* They vary according to whether one micro-state of one micro-system is involved, 
or one micro-state of several micro-systems. And in the second case the entailed 
probabilistic extensions violate brutally the classical probabilistic ways of thinking 
because in this case their significance concerns the interior of elementary events, in the 
probabilistic sense 53, 54.  
Thereby inside IQM the 'problem' of non-locality becomes intelligible. (As for 
Bell's theorem of non-locality, its structure involves also the mathematical formalism of 
the nowadays quantum mechanics and therefore it will be examined in the Part III of this 
work). 
3. The concept of probability-tree of an operation of generation of a microstate 
embodies and summarizes intuitively the whole complex and unexpected structure of the 
genesis of the form (9''') of the primordial transferred description of a microstate. When 
one progresses mentally bottom-up along the vertical of conceptualization, one can watch 
step by step on the probability-tree from the Fig.2 how a radical scission sets in between 
all the individual physical-conceptual genetic human actions – that do involve space-time 
– and on the other hand the final global result (9''') of all these actions. On the graphic 
representation from the Fig.2, the purely numerical content of the final description (9''') 
appears displayed on the tops of the mutually disjoint purely spatial branch-zones of the 
tree. But this geometric tree-like disposition is only a globalized and residual purely 
spatial trace of the factual space-time emergence of the successive effects of the 
individual genetic operations that have generated the tree. The temporal aspects that, in 
their actuality, had individually and successively contributed to the globalized spatial 
splitting in distinct branches of the tree, have now evaporated in – literally – 'the air of 
time'. While the global final probabilistic description (9''') – considered by itself, 
separated from its genesis imposed by human aims and ways of thinking and by the 
human ways and technical possibilities of acting – is radically devoid of any own space-
time organization.  
The description (9''') is a purely numerical drop-off from the whole physically-
operational, so the space-time factual realization, of a conceptual-methodological 
                                                      
52 In MMS [2002B]and  [2006] it has been shown that the construction of the concept of material "object" in the 
classical sense involves precisely assignation of an own space-time support.  
53 The mentioned extensions of the classical concept of probability are intimately connected with basic extension of 
also the classical logical conceptualization. It has been shown in MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006] that these extensions 
possess a general character and they admit a unification of the logical and the probabilistic approaches thereby 
dissolving obstacles that resisted since a long time.  
54 The concept of a primordial transferred description (9''') itself, in fact founds universally the whole human 
conceptualization (MMS [2002], [2006]), the macroscopic classical one as much as the conceptualization of the 
microstates. The only difference with microphysics is that inside the classical domain of conceptualization the direct 
perceptibility of the involved physical entities permits to economize an explicit knowledge of this foundational fact.  
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design for reaching a cognitive purpose: the nature of this drop-off itself, a 
probabilistic-statistic, is abstract, and its own final global structure is a-spatial and 
a-temporal.   
Of course, scissions of the same kind appear already in any human process of 
construction an abstract entity or even a material one; but nowhere with these radical 
characters. Nowhere erected upon a strict absence of any ever-perceived material 
instance of that what is studied, even inside only memories from human minds; and 
notwithstanding that what is to be studied is posited to be itself of physical nature, and to 
exist inside space and time. These radical descriptional specificities stem from the fact 
that inside IQM, for the case of microstates, we have been coercively led to entirely 
suppress any specified assignation to the specimens of the entity-to-be-studied, of any 
previously well-defined properties, and to replace these by exclusively a composition of 
a small number of basic classes of only posited and named concepts (cf. for instance MD 
and the definitions from (1.I).2) of only pre-formatted conceptual receptacles where to 
lodge later, in a prescribed way, a knowledge that is left for being generated and poured 
into these receptacles inside a theory of the microstates. This entails for the global 
structuration of the receptacles very purified inner links and general contours that induce 
a definite and detailed intelligibility. Such a result cannot emerge inside a mathematical 
theory of the microstates because there the general conceptual-methodological-
operational imperatives get mixed from the start with the features of the mathematical 
tools and with the particular consequences of the particular model that is working – even 
if only implicitly – in order to specify appropriate measurement operations and coding-
procedures.  
Considered now as a whole, IQM illustrates two essential methodological facts, and 
it raises a major problem of the scientific conceptualization. 
The methodological facts are the following ones.  
* Taking systematically into account any involved descriptional relativity restricts, 
and thereby it specifies thus entailing precision. This is directly opposed to the meaning 
of the word 'relativism'. This huge confusion should be suppressed. Descriptional 
relativities are organically tied with reference, and reference installs methodological 
specifications instead of the vagueness governed by absolutes that usually are false 
absolutes. Descartes' concept of system of reference has organized our thought, our 
power of communication; it has enhanced to an unspeakable degree our material 
efficiency. 
* The genesis of a description is the vehicle of the semantic contents poured into 
that description. So explicit geneses are precious to be known explicitly.  
As for the announced problem of scientific conceptualization raised by IMQ, it is 
the following one:  
* What, exactly, happens at each junction – inside a given theory of the microstates 
– between a factual effective realization of an output of the form (9'''), and a 
mathematical descriptor of it? How, exactly, can radically singular and potentially so 
complex conceptual-physical contents carried by a description of type (9'''), be 
pertinently loaded into an abstract construct like Schrödinger's differential equation, or a 
Hilbert vector-space?  
This question, when one stops on it long enough, triggers a sort of stupefaction. I 
think that Wigner's famous considerations on the "unreasonable" power of mathematics 
concern very precisely this question. One senses a void of satisfactory analysis disguised 
in a feeling of miracle. This sort of void should be suppressed.  
Finally let us recall that IQM is marked by construction by two related, big, 
deliberate absences. The absence of a general model of microstate and the absence of 
specified coding rules for assigning meaning to the observable result of a measurement 
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succession [G.MesA] from (7). These two deliberate absences are conditions of the full 
generality of IQM because any manner of compensating them can stem only from 
particularizing postulations that can be introduced only inside a given theory of 
microstates.  
By contrast and paradoxically, these absences are what imposes with full evidence 
a highly non-trivial assertion: Without a model of a microstate that permit to conceive 
‘appropriate’ modalities for measuring a given quantity A on a given sort of a microstate, 
and without corresponding explicit coding procedures for translating the observable 
marks produced by one act of measurement MesA, into a meaning in terms of a definite 
value aj of A, the primordial transferred descriptions (9''') are just a heap of inert puppets. 
The necessary and sufficient strings that can bring these puppets to work in a controlled 
way and to create effective knowledge on microstates consist precisely of a general 
model of the concept of microstate and particular models drawn from this that permit to 
identify measurement-interactions of which the observable results can be intelligibly 
coded in terms of a definite value of the measured quantity. 
Let us conclude.  
Out of nearly a nothingness of explicit previously available knowledge on how 
consensual, predictive and verifiable knowledge on microstates can emerge, we have 
drawn an explicit methodological-conceptual-operational construct – the Infra-(Quantum 
Mechanics) IQM – where should be embeddable any acceptable theory of microstates. 
This construct has been endowed with a formalized though qualitative structure tied step 
by step with specifications of a semantic nature, in this sense that the whole construct 
'IQM' consists of a composition of void semantic moulds for lodging in each one of these 
a more specified content of the same semantic nature as itself.  
While the Hilbert-Dirac formulation of the nowadays quantum mechanics raises 
problems of interpretation since decades, the Infra-(Quantum Mechanics) IQM 
symbolized above – by itself – seems already intelligible by construction, and even 
works. For instance, it elucidates already the endlessly discussed question of the 
'primordial' or 'essential' statistical character of the modern microphysics, and "the 
locality problem" disappears. So when IQM will be compared with quantum mechanics, 
the confrontation will reveal differences, and thereby the comparison will act like a 
machine that produces guides for constructing a coherent and intelligible mathematical 
theory of microstates: A whole set of referred criteria will be at work to help to reach 
this purpose.  
Reference is a very powerful instrument, and IQM offers an organized recourse to 
reference. In its essence IQM is just organized reference, nothing more. However it is a 
whole coherent structure of elements of reference, namely a particular such structure that 
concerns specifically the generation of scientific knowledge on microstates.  
But IQM has been organized inside the general Method of Relativized 
Conceptualization (MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006]) and thereby it opens up a 
perspective that largely exceeds microphysics and traces on the horizon the path along 
which can be realized a deep-set methodological unification of the modern Physics, 
founded upon the distribution, inside this vast domain, of the various involved human 
cognitive situations. And furthermore – as it will appear at the end of this work – beneath 
the contours of the domain of modern Physics and far beyond them – one can discern 
lines that draw out a synthetic perception of the genetic unity of the whole of the human 
Science of what we call 'reality'. 
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SYMBOLICALLY EXPRESSED SYNTHESIS OF 'IQM': 
Operation of generation G of one factually defined microstate msG: 
(1) G ↔ msG,   msG≡{σ(msG)                                                                               
One qualification of a microstate msG by a value aj of a measured qualifying quantity A: 
(2)  [(G→ msG). (MesA →  (group of observable marks {µ}kA coding for one value aj of A)], kA=1,2,…mA,   
j=1,2..J,                                                                                                 
In short    (3)   [G.MesA]→ ({µ}kA ≈ aj),    kA=1,2,…mA,    j=1,2….J,   A given                      
The definitions from (2.I).1 of the main types of microstates msG 
The factual predictive (ε ,δ ,N0)-probability law on the statistic of outcomes of A-measurements on the 
microstate msG, so inside the epistemic referential (G,A):  
(5)   (ε,δ,N0)-{(π(aj)},∀j)}G,      (G,A) 
* The set of all the factual predictive (ε ,δ ,N0)-probability laws (5) for one given microstate msG, so 
'description ofmsG inside the epistemic referential (G,VM):  
(5')   {(ε,δ,N0)-{(π(aj)}, ∀ j)}G},        (G,VM)                                                    
* The 'genetic triad' of one factual (ε ,δ ,N0)-probability law (5)    
(6)    (G, msG, A),   (G,A)  
* The 'genesis' of one given law (5)    
The set of successions of operations 
(7)   {[G.MesA]}),        (G,A)                                                                                      
* The brute observable output of the genesis {[G.MesA]}  of one law (5)  
{{µkA},  kA=1,2,…mA,     (G,A) 
* The brute observable output of all the geneses {[G.MesA]}  of all the laws (5’):   
The set of all the factual data produced by (5') 
(8)   {{µkA},  kA=1,2,…mA,           (G,VM)                                                           
* Re-notation: 'primordial transferred description of msG with respect to the mechanical qualification A, 
so inside the epistemic referential (G,A)' 
(9)    {(ε,δ,N0)-π(aj)}G ≈ D/A)(msG),         (G,A) 
* Re-notation: the primordial transferred mechanical description of the microstate msG, so inside the 
epistemic referential (G,VM)' 
(9')   {{(ε,δ,N0)-π(aj)}G ≈ DM(msG),         (G,VM)                                               
* Genetic symbolizations of the two sorts of  primordial transferred descriptions: 
(10)    (D/A)(G,msG, A),  (G,A)            or              DM(G,msG, VM ), (G,VM)          
* The meta-probabilistic correlations (Mπc(G))AB involved by (1) G↔msG with respect to the pair (A,B) 
of qualifying quantities: 
(11)    π(aj)=Faj,B{π(br),∀r}G                                                                                           
(11’)     FAB(G)= {Faj,B {π(aj),∀j}G                                                                                    
where Faj,B{π(aj),∀j}G and FAB(G) are two functionals that represent, respectively, the individual 
probability π(aj) in terms of the whole probability law {π(aj),∀j}G and the global correlation between the 
two whole laws {π(aj),∀j}G and {π(br),∀r}G.  
* The description (9') completed by (11), (11'):  
(9'')   DM(msG) ≡ {[(ε,δ,N0)-{π(aj),∀j}G, (Mπc(G))AB ],  ∀A,∀AB∈VM,  (G,VM)            
* Qualitative logical specification on the individual probabilistic predictions on one microstate with one 
micro-system and with composed operation of generation : 
(12)    π12(aj)G(G1,G2)  ≠  π1(aj)G1 + π2(aj)G2                                                                        
where all the probabilities are individual. 
* Absorption in the operation of generation, of the evolution of a microstate msG : 
(13)     Go,  G1=F(G,EC,(t1-to)),..,Gk=F(Go,EC,(tk-tk-1)),..., Gf=F(Go,EC,(tf-tK-1)), k=1,2..K  
in short  (13’)    [Go .(t-to)] ≡ Gt  
* Consequence of (13') on the transferred description (9''):DM(msGt): 
(9''')   DM(msGt) ≡ { (D/A(msGt), (Mπc(Gt))XY },  (Gt,VM)                                  
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CONCLUSION ON THE PART I 
 
When one watches the way in which IQM emerges, the naïvely realistic view that 
scientific knowledge is 'discovery' of pre-existing 'truth' collapses into dust. And in its 
place one sees, one feels in what a sense conceptual-operational procedures – involving 
physical operations or abstract ones – can progressively be assembled into a method born 
from the unlimited human curiosity and inventiveness, from the constraints imposed by 
the human ways of thinking and of acting upon what we call physical reality, and from 
explicit purposes chosen by men. What has been obtained here is such a particular piece 
of method. It is a global coherent piece of method for constructing a definite particular 
piece of procedural scientific knowledge directed by a definite project. It is not in the 
least a discovery of pre-existing 'intrinsic truths' about how physical reality is, absolutely, 
'intrinsically', ‘in itself’; not even is it – in the least – a way of 'approaching' such a 
discovery. Such discoveries, such asymptotic reaching, are mere illusion; just an 
emanation from the self-contradicting notion of 'scientific knowledge of reality-in itself'; 
a genuine Fata Morgana, the original sin of scientific thought55. 
We are trapped in a cage where 'absolute intrinsic truth' is irrepressibly felt to pre-
exist but constantly stays out of reach, change of direction, negate any definitive 
convergence, mark new starts, unpredictably, frustratingly, definitively hidden beyond a 
non-organized and changing swarm of lures toward ill-defined targets. The hope for final 
intrinsic scientific truths unavoidably entails assaults by a feeling of impotence, of 
inefficiency, of enslavement.  
I perceive only one attitude that preserves from this sort of major fail: To realize 
fully that a posit of existence of a physical reality, and consensual knowledge of 'how it 
truly is', are of different essences; that an absolute bare existence of 'reality' can be 
posited, but – as such, as exclusively a posit of existence – it is definitively imprisoned in 
metaphysics, inaccessible to consensual knowledge, notwithstanding that in the absence 
of this posit of pure existence "science" would seem to be just a game.  
While inside science, with a blindfold deliberately fixed on our metaphysical eye 
and on the basis of entirely declared posits – metaphysical or not – and data, to construct 
consensual, predictive and verifiable knowledge, humbly, hypothetically, relatively, 
respecting step by step the unavoidable constraints as well as the deliberately chosen 
ones; and to construct from the maximal possible depth, upward. Thereby only restricted, 
finite and methodized knowledge can emerge; but a fully definite and consensual 
knowledge endowed with an entirely exposed genesis where the unending inflow of 
relative meaning can be watched and is constantly left open to return and to indefinite 
optimization, precisely because it is only hypothetical and finite and relative.  
  
                                                      
55 MMS [2006], pp. 127-136.  Human knowledge by itself is not a sin; but the posit that the scientific, consensual, 
predictive and verifiable knowledge is "discovered", not deliberately constructed accordingly to methodological-factual 
laws, is a huge sin because it imprisons the mind and exhausts it in vain goals.   
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INTRODUCTION TO THE PART II 
 
The second part of this work is devoted to a global preliminary examination of the 
Hilbert-Dirac formulation of Quantum Mechanics QMHD, by reference to IQM.  
Throughout what follows QMHD is supposed to be well known.  
The main goals of the Part II are: 
* By use of IQM to yield, from the outside of QMHD, a critical perspective on the 
general structural features of QMHD, and to identify the model of a microstate that 
certainly does somehow work inside this theory since in the absence of any model this 
theory would have been impossible.  
* To establish explicitly all the immediate clarifications induced by reference to 
IQM.  
* To identify the precise reason why the theory of measurements from QMHD raises 
so stubbornly an unending variety of problems since soon a whole century. 
The goals mentioned above are pursued inside two chapters, 5.II and 6.II. 
- The chapter 5.II is devoted to a brief comparison between QMHD and IQM.  
- The chapter 6.II is devoted to critical and constructive clarifications, namely:  
-- Identification of the model of a microstate that works inside QMHD: an 
essential step. 
-- Introduction of an explicit general use of the operations G of generation of 
a microstate in all the main mathematical writings from QMHD. 
-- Incorporation of the model of a microstate that works inside QMHD, to the 
concept of operation G of generation; 
-- An explicit refusal of the von Neumann representation of the quantum 
measurements. 
-- Extraction of the essence of the QMHD representation of measurements and 
a thorough critical identification of its implications.  
Starting from the section (6.II)2 of 6.II – we shall begin by simply juxtaposing 
IQM to QMHD. The simplistically enriched provisional framework obtained in this way 
will be denoted [IMQ-QMHD]. The initial bare adjunction of IQM as just a reference-
structure will already permit clarifications and modifications. These, progressively, will 
entail a fusion of QMHD with IQM. So here we start an organic process of conceptual 
growth. At the end of the chapter 6.II this process will have brought us on the edge of the 
construction of a second quantum mechanics inside a new framework that will be re-
noted [IMQ↔QMHD] and that will then act and grow still more efficiently  throughout 
the last Part III. 
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5.II 56  
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN QMHD AND IQM  
AND THE PLAN OF THE PART II  
 
As already stated, QMHD is considered to be known. But for self-sufficiency and 
commodity we recall telegraphically the core-features of both representations to be 
compared. 
  
(5.II).1. THE QMHD-REPRESENTATION 
The basic assumptions 
The QMHD-formalism is founded on:  
° Two basic representational definitions, namely a rule that defines the 
mathematical representation of the studied microstate and a rule (of 'quantification' 57) 
that defines the mathematical quantum mechanical representation of the classical 
mechanical qualifying quantities.  
° A mathematical principle. 
° Three measurement postulates. 
° A postulate of evolution.  
* The rule of representation of a microstate). At any fixed time t the studied 
microstate is defined by a state-vector (a ket) |ψ(r,t)> from a Hilbert-space H. 
* The rule of representation of the qualifying mechanical quantities. Any 
classical measurable mechanical quantity A(r,p) is represented by a corresponding 
operator A called an observable that acts on the elements from H ; this observable is 
constructed from A(r,p) as follows:   
- The classical quantity 'position' r(x,y,z) is represented by a position-
observable R(X,Y,Z) where: the classical functional form that in r(x,y,z) relates the 
symbols x,y,z is conserved; X,Y,Z represent, respectively, the classical space-coordinates 
entailed by the chosen Cartesian referential but each one of which is posited to act 
operationally by multiplying what follows it, which is expressed by re-writing it also as 
X. , Y. , Z.  
- The classical quantity of momentum p(px,py,pz) is represented by the 
momentum-observable P(Px,Py,Pz) where: Px=i(h/2π)d/dx, Py=i(h/2π)d/dy, 
Pz=i(h/2π)d/dz; the classical functional form that in p(px,py,pz) connects px, py and pz 
being conserved for connecting also Px, Py and Pz. 
 - The classical mechanical quantity A(r,p) is represented by the function 
A(R,P) of the operators R and P constructed first with the same functional form as in 
A(r,p), and then symmetrized. 
* Born's mathematical principle of spectral decomposability. Any ket from H – 
state-ket or eigenket – can be decomposed on the basis of eigenket {|u(r,aj)>} introduced 
                                                      
56  This notation is to be read: chapter 5 from Part II: The numbering of the chapters continues the numbering from the 
first part.  
57 Cohen-Tannnoudji, C., Diu, B. & Laloë, F.,  [1973], 
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in H by any observable A, which yields the expansion of |ψ(r,t)>/ corresponding to A, 
|ψ(r,t)>/A=∑jc(aj,t)|u(r,aj)>,∀ j  of |ψ(r,t)>. 
* The three measurement postulates  
- Measurement postulate 1. An act MesA of measurement of the observable 
A yields necessarily as result an eigenvalue aj of A. 
- Measurement postulate 2 (Born's probability postulate). When the 
observable A is measured at the time t the probability π(t,aj) of outcome of the 
eigenvalue aj of A is calculated via the expression |<u(r,aj)|ψ(r,t)>|2 where |u(r,aj)> is 
the eigenket of aj and |<u(r,aj)|ψ(r,t)>|2≡|c(aj,t)|2 is the squared value of the coefficient 
c(aj,t) from the expansion |ψ(r,t)>/A=∑jc(aj,t)|u(r,aj)>,∀j of |ψ(r,t)>. 
- Measurement postulate 3 (of projection). If the act of measurement MesA 
has produced the result aj then immediately after the measurement the studied micro-
state is represented by the re-normed projection 
 Pn|ψ(r,t)> / √ |<ψ(r,t)|ψ(r,t)>| 
of |ψ(r,t)> on the direction in H of the eigenket |uaj(r)> of  aj. 
* The postulate of evolution: The evolution of the state-ket |ψ(r,t)> is defined by 
the Schrödinger equation 'of the problem' 
i(h/2π)d/dt |ψ(r,t)> = H(t) 
where H(t) is the hamiltonian observable that represents the total energy assigned to the 
studied microstate. 
The main algorithms  
The essence of the way of working of the QMHD-formalism can be regarded to 
consist of four purely formal types of problems and of the correlative algorithmic 
procedures for obtaining the solution, and a fifth factual-formal problem with its own 
solution:  
Problem 1: Determine the state-ket |ψ(r,t)> that represents the microstate to be 
studied inside the Hilbert space H assigned to this microstate. 
Solution to problem 1: Write the Schrödinger equation of the problem; solve it; 
introduce the limiting conditions in order to identify the initial state-ket |ψ(to)>. 
Therefrom the Schrödinger equation is asserted to determine the state-ket |ψ(t) > of the 
studied microstate for any time t.  
Problem 2. For any state-ket |ψ(r,t)> and any observable A, determine the 
predictive probability law concerning the possible outcomes of measurements MesA 
performed on the studied microstate.  
Solution to the problem 2:  
Write the equation A|u(r,aj)>=aj|u(r,aj)>, ∀j, and calculate from it the basis of 
eigenket 58  {|u(r,aj)>} introduced in H by A. Each eigenvalue aj of the quantum 
mechanical observable A is tied in this equation to a corresponding eigenket |u(r,aj)>. 
According to the measurement-postulate 1, the result of any act of measurement MesA is 
necessarily an eigenvalue aj. 
In order to determine the probability of outcome of any given value aj, form the set 
of squared absolute values |c(aj,t)|2, ∀j, drawn from the expansion |ψ r,t)>/A on the basis 
{|u(r,aj)>} of the eigenket of A, and accordingly to the measurement-postulate 2 write 
Born's predictive probability law {π (aj) ≡ |cj|2}, ∀j.  
                                                      
58 As usual we write ‘ket’ without plural. 
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Problem 3. Specify the way in which you can transform the representation of the 
studied microstate in H relatively to A, into the representation in H of the same 
microstate but relatively to another observable B with eigenvalues bk and eigenvectors 
|v(r,bk)>, ∀k,  k=1,2,....K. 
Solution to the problem 3:  Apply Dirac’s ‘theory of transformations’:  
For any given value of the index k we have inside QMHD that 
<vk(r,bk) |ψG,H(r,t)> = eiγ(B,k) |dk(bk,t)| = ∑j τkj(A,B) cj(t,aj) ,   ∀j, ∀t                   
where τkj(A,B)=<vk|uj>, ∀j. So for any complex factor of given index k there is a 
separate condition 
eiγ(B,k) = <vk|ψG(t)>⎮ ⎜dk(t,bk)⎜ =  ∑ j τkj(A,B) cj(t,aj)⎮⎜dk(t,bk)⎜,  ∀A,B,   ∀t       
(where ‘⎮’ is to be read: divided by) so that  
d(bk,t) =|v(r, bk)>  and  |ψ(r,t)>/B=∑ j τ bk,aj c(aj,t)  where   τbk,aj=<v(r, bk)|u(r,aj) >, 
∀j, ∀k  
Problem 4. Represent mathematically the measurement processes by which is 
verified the predictive probability law {π(t,aj)≡|c(aj,t)|2}, ∀j, drawn from |ψ(x,t)>/A, ∀ A.  
 
Solution to the problem 4: Apply ‘the quantum theory of measurement’.  
 Problem 5:  Verify the statistical predictions of the formalism. 
Solution to the problem 5: Accordingly to the quantum theory of measurements, 
‘prepare the measurement-evolution state-ket’ and operate the verification-
measurements.  
In the chapter 6.II it will appear that concerning this point 5 nothing is clearly 
specified.  
- The term 'prepare' creates much confusion. Some authors seem to consider that 
the state-ket has to be prepared (it has to be replaced by eigenket of the measured 
observable, in connection with the measurement postulates 1 and 3); other authors, more 
numerous, seem to consider that the microstate has to be ‘prepared’ (or to be also 
‘prepared’ in the sense that it has to be physically transformed in eigenstates, but it is not 
explained how, nor why); and still other authors consider that what is 'prepared' is the 
physical measurement operation (which – interestingly – would indicate a coding 
procedure), but once more this procedure is not analysed in general terms, nor referred to 
the sort of considered microstate. Anyhow: 
- The coding problem is not formulated as such, in general terms, nor, a fortiori, 
treated explicitly; only two much discussed examples are given, for the cases of 
momentum-measurements or of spin-measurements, that seem to be considered to be 
valid quite generally, for any observable and any sort of microstate in the sense of (2.I).1, 
though when examined closely they raise questions and moreover they appear to possibly 
be valid only for microstates without quantum fields. 
- The factual and conceptual connections with the problem 4 are not worked out.  
All this – as a whole – is what is called 'the measurement problem'. This problem is 
central. Here it is only recalled. In the chapter 6.II it will be thoroughly defined and 
examined. 
 
(5.II).2. THE IQM WAY OF REPRESENTING A MICROSTATE 
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This representation consists of the whole Part I of the present work where it stays 
available. It will act with all its features throughout what follows.  
 
 (5.II).3. THE COMPARISON 
  
When the two representations IMQ and QMHD are compared, the most striking 
conclusions are the following ones. 
Characterization of QMHD. 
QMHD is expressed mathematically via continuous unlimited mathematical analysis 
or algebra that allow continuity and infinities. All that is explicitly ruled is defined in 
purely mathematical and algorithmic ways. The main descriptional element is the 
concept of a state-ket |ψ> from the Hilbert-space assigned to the studied microstate. This 
state-ket is obtained exclusively via mathematical procedures and the statistical-
probabilistic predictions from QMHD are generated directly and exclusively by |ψ>, so in 
an abstract mathematical way.  
With the unique exception of the measurement-postulate 1, no representations of 
individual and factual entities or events or procedures do come in, neither 
mathematically expressed ones, nor only qualitatively defined ones.  
Even the concept of ‘micro-state’ – that is precisely what the whole formalism is 
implicitly asserted to 'represent' – is left devoid of a clearly stated definition, and even 
devoid of merely a specific symbolization. In the current way of speaking where the 
theory is imbedded this most basic concept is ambiguously indicated by both the words 
'system' and 'particle'. A fortiori there is no defined concept of operation of generation of 
a microstate, and no model of a microstate is specified, nor legally accepted to be 
necessary. The coding problem, as stated above, is not declared and so it is not treated 
overtly. 
The representation of measurements remains an abstract problem that is dealt with 
via postulations and statistical mathematical algorithms, even though an act of 
measurement has quintessentially an individual nature.  
This situation raises problems since decades. In such conditions there is no 
intelligibility. Not even only the statistical representation itself is intelligible. Indeed: 
The basic act of ‘giving’ the initial statistical state-vector |ψ(to)>, is not generally 
realizable. This deserves being stressed: Let us suppose that it is possible to write down 
the Schrödinger equation for any factual situation and to calculate the general solution 
corresponding general solution (a very overrating assumption). The concept of 'initial 
limiting conditions' for 'determining' the initial state-ket |ψ(to)> is used in a purely 
mathematical sense that should be clearly distinguished from a requirement to specify all 
the significant initial factual data. And a priori it seems very unlikely that these factual 
data be specifiable mathematically in any experimentally realizable situation (even if the 
basic sine qua non specification is reducible to only the statistical position-density at the 
initial moment at every point from the considered volume of space). Thereby already – 
and in principle – the domain of rigorous applicability of QMHD-formalism is restricted a 
priori to the domain of physical problems that do permit to produce a mathematical 
expression of the initial state-ket. When the considered problem lies outside this domain 
the treatments are systematically marked by approximations (parcelling of the spatial 
support of the global phenomenon that is studied, more or less arbitrarily simplified 
mathematical translations of just imagined and posited micro-facts, etc.) of which the 
effects or absence of effects remain out of control.  
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Any predictive statistic, by definition, is referred both mentally and factually to 
individual things, operations, concepts, which are abstracted away from the statistical 
representation, but that – genetically – have determined it; and these – unavoidably – 
have to act again if one wants to verify the predictive statistic. In this sense a predictive 
statistic, and in particular the initial one, is not a self-sufficient concept, it cannot be 
represented directly and exclusively by itself, it has to be constructible factually from 
individual measurement operations. But this is not possible when a general and 
systematic treatment of any individual concept and any individual operation, is lacking.  
Inside QMHD there remains a gap of possibility of a factually founded 
representation of the initial statistics involved by the initial state-ket |ψ(to)>, where 
arbitrary and approximation rush in uncontrollably.  
Characterization of  IQM 
Inside IQM the descriptions (9), (9'), (9''), (9''') are directly rooted into the factual 
microscopic a-conceptual physical reality and are constructed out of this on the basis of 
individual definitions of concepts and of basic physical individual operations, via factual-
conceptual procedures or conceptual-methodological posits declared as such. 
Inside IQM the concept of an individual and physical operation G of generation of 
a microstate manifests a quite determining role, namely via (1) it leads to: 
- The classification of the sorts of operation of generation (simple or 
composed, and actual or (in the case of bound states) revolved inside the past of a natural 
physical genesis.  
- In consequence of the posit msG≡{σ(msG)} the operation of generation G 
entails also the classification of the microstates defined in (2.I).1.  
- Inside IQM the specification of a model of a microstate and of coding 
procedures for each sort of possible microstate and of possible qualifying quantity, have 
appeared as basic necessities for any theory of microstates.  
The whole statistical conceptualization from IQM follows from the individual 
conceptualization, with distinct progressive stages. The basic tree-like structures from the 
figures 2, 3 and 4 that summarize graphically the whole IQM, stem all from one 
operation of generation, they continue with individual acts of measurement, these lead to 
factually constructed probability spaces of first order, and these spaces are mutually 
correlated on a meta-level of probabilistic qualifications of second order. 
The comparison 
QMHD contains no explicit representation of practically none of all the individual 
physical operations, concepts and entities that inside the reference-structure IQM have 
been shown to be basically necessary for an intelligible theory of microstates. The set of 
concepts  
[G,  msG,  'general model of a microstate',  'individual succession of operations 
[G.MesA]', coding procedures for translating the observable physical marks produced by 
one succession [G.MesA] in terms of one definite value aj of the measured quantity A], 
all these individual descriptional elements that in our usual processes of thought 
irrepressibly come first, inside QMHD are devoid of any formal representation, of any 
only qualitative definition, even of any mere symbolization: The top-down historical 
approach did not reach the depths where they are placed, nor did it follow the right 
direction for reaching them, and we failed to notice this because we were advancing 
backwards toward the microscopic factuality, with our eyes fixed upon the classical level 
of conceptualization.  
Whereas IQM draws bottom-up a statistical conceptualization from an individual 
one that is rooted into a-conceptual microphysical factuality, the QMHD top-down 
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conceptualization has been formulated directly in statistical terms founded on conceptual 
extrapolations and on postulates and mathematical algorithms; and beneath this directly 
statistical conceptualization there remained a VOID of individual conceptualization. The 
Fig. 6 represents this situation.  
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               Classical	level	of	conceptualization		                                                                                         
	
	 	 																																																								QMHD	  
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      STATISTICAL                        		 
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 IQM                                                      VOID OF INDIVIDUAL  
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 CONCEPTUALISATION                 
        
A-conceptual	microphysical	factuality	
  Fig 6. Comparison between QMHD and IQM  
 
 
 
We also reproduce beneath the Fig. 5, for comparison: 
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Fig. 5 (A probability-tree T(G(2S),(A1,B2; C1,D2)) as encountered by a top-down 
approach that stops at the level of the probability spaces). 
 
This antagonism has settled in because in a top-down approach toward the 
development of a microphysics the statistical surface of representations of individual 
factual entities – micro-phenomena, operations – appeared first. Unavoidably it has 
constituted the first phase of the investigation. In this first phase Bohr's postulates acted 
as an efficient substitute for a general model of a microstate because at that time the 
bound states were at the core of all the attentions, and bound microstates – conceivable as 
spatially delimited and pre-existing entities – are much alike to classical 'objects'; 
moreover they permit measurements via interaction-'effects' with macroscopic fields 
(Stark, Zeeman), which eliminates major specificities of the quantum measurements. So 
all the main specificities of a factually founded representation of microscopic entities that 
are not directly perceivable – a new cognitive situation – remained hidden.   
As for de Broglie's 'individual' model – that in fact has not been physically-
operationally individualized by him (he individualized it only mentally, and in a non-
stabilized way) – it emerged some 25 years after Bohr's initial work, in connection with 
also unbound microstates. And it emerged precisely at the time when Heisenberg was 
developing his new top-down offensive of mathematical representation by matrixes that 
was still taking the bound microstates into dominant consideration. So de Broglie's 
individual model, together with the corresponding Schrödinger equation, had to confront 
the already organized and solidly installed 'positivistic' attitude of the Copenhagen 
school, deliberately optimized for statistical predictions tied with bound microstates and 
measurements on these. The Copenhagen top-down approach opposed de Broglie's 
model under the protection of strong socio-psychological inertial forces. And so – up to 
this very day – nowhere inside QMHD does one find a clear distinction between 
individual and statistical representations.  
So when IQM and QMHD are brought together like in the figures 5 and 6 there 
emerge anachronistic antagonisms and the Hilbert-Dirac statistical formulation QMHD 
appears as a conceptual bas-relief of which the surface is very finely crafted but of which 
the basic underlying forms are simply undone, mere potentialities still lost in an 
amorphous substratum.  
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6.II 
 
BASIC CLARIFICATIONS: 
* A GENERAL MODEL OF A MICROSTATE, 
* USEFULNESS OF ‘G’, 
* REFUSAL OF: 
- VON NEUMANN’S REPRESENTATION OF QUANTUM 
MEASUREMENTS 
- THE WHOLE QMHD REPRESENTATION OF QUANTUM 
MEASUREMENTS 
 
In what follows the local problems or insufficiencies from QMHD will constantly be 
referred to IQM. Therefore we introduce for our framework the symbol [IQM-QMHD]. 
But to begin with, IQM and QMHD will act as two separate structures. The reference to 
IQM, however, will bring forth several basic clarifications that initiate a process of 
fusion.  
 
(6.II).1. THE [IQM-QMHD] MEANING OF AN EIGENFUNCTION OF AN 
OBSERVABLE 
AND CONSEQUENCES  
Digging out the detailed meaning of an eigenfunction. Let us place ourselves 
inside QMHD. Consider the equation A|uj(r,aj)>=aj|uj(r,aj)>, j=1,2,...J (∀j), with J finite59 
that determines the eigenfunctions {uj(r,aj)} from the basis of eigenket introduced by A in 
the Hilbert space H of the studied microstate. In general such an eigenfunction is not 
square integrable. This is considered to be a ‘problem’, in the following sense. A state-
function ψ(r,t) from a state-ket |ψ( r,t)> is required to be square-integrable, since it 
represents a set of distributions of probability. But an eigenfunction in general is not 
square-integrable and furthermore it is not required such. Why, exactly, is that so? That 
is the ‘problem’.  
Bohm ((1954) p. 210-211) writes: 
« …We obtain ψ =eipx/Ñ…… Strictly speaking, the above eigenfunctions cannot, in general, be normalized to 
unity...Let us recall, however, ...that in any real problem the wave function must take the form of a packet, 
since the ‘particle’ is known to exist somewhere within a definite region, such as in the space surrounded by 
the apparatus. To obtain a bound and therefore normalizable packet, we can integrate over momenta with an 
appropriate weighing factor.» 
So Bohm adopts an exclusively mathematical point of view. Not a moment does he 
focus upon the involved meaning. He does not even make use of a specific notation for 
distinguishing between eigenfunction and state-function. And in order to deal with the 
mathematical situation he accepts approximations without any hesitation, 
notwithstanding that the considered question seems to be a question of principle.  
The same attitude is usually found in the textbooks.  
Dirac (1958, p. 48), on the contrary, writes: 
                                                      
59 From now on any index is posited finite and any finite spectrum is denoted by a notation of the type ∀j. 
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« It may be that the infinite length of the ket-vectors corresponding to these eigenstates is connected with their 
unrealizability, and that all realizable states correspond to ket vectors that can be normalized so that they form 
a Hilbert space ». 
(« connected with their 'unrealizability' » suggests that Dirac, in a certain subliminal way, 
perceived the absence – and the utility – of a representation of the way of generating a 
microstate, as well as the possibility of some specific significance of the non-
integrability, in general, of the eigenfunctions).  
As for the most outstanding didactic exposition of QMHD, that by CTDL60, it 
proposes «a physical solution to the difficulties» (proposed also by Bohm (1954, p. 212), 
namely to replace the eigenfunction by a δ-distribution centred upon the corresponding 
eigenvalue. 
Nobody – as far as I know – has conceived that an eigenket might simply not 
represent a 'state'. 
However recourse to history reveals that the ‘problem’ of non-integrability of an 
eigenfunction is a false problem because the concept of eigenfunction has a specific 
meaning that is radically different from that of a state-function. So the problem is not 
mathematical, it is conceptual. Indeed the meaning of an eigenket stems from Louis de 
Broglie’s Thesis (1924, 1963). Louis de Broglie has derived his famous relation p=h/λ 
from his well-known model of a microstate, (erroneously named the wave-‘particle’ 
model). The model itself stems from the usage made of Fourier decompositions inside 
classical electromagnetism. In a Fourier decomposition of an electromagnetic wave each 
constant value λ of a monochromatic wavelength is associated with a corresponding 
plane wave. By analogy, to each value pxj of the classical mechanical fundamental 
quantity of momentum px of an unbound electron, de Broglie has associated a plane wave 
with a ‘corpuscular phase-function’ Φ(x,t)=ae(i/—)β(x,t) where 'a' denotes an arbitrary and 
constant amplitude of vibration and the ‘corpuscular phase’ is written as β(x,t)=(Wt-pxj.x) 
where W=moc2/√1-v2/c2 is the – relativistic – energy of the ‘corpuscular-like aspect of 
the corpuscular wave’ while pxj denotes the constant value posited for the momentum of 
this ‘corpuscular-like aspect’ (in one spatial dimension) 61.  
The ‘corpuscular-like aspect of the corpuscular wave’ remained devoid of 
representation inside the mathematical expressions that Louis de Broglie associated to his 
model. This has been a huge strategic error because in mathematical physics only what 
possesses a definite mathematical expression does subsist in the minds. The rest does not 
strike sufficiently numerous attentions and so at last it evaporates into the air of history. 
But verbally, de Broglie has clearly specified in his writings that he conceived the 
‘corpuscular aspect’ to consist of a singularity in the amplitude of the corpuscular wave. 
Namely a very localized space-domain where this amplitude is so much bigger than its 
surrounding values that it concentrates in it practically the whole energy W=mc2/√1-v2/c2 
of vibration of the corpuscular-like singularity in the amplitude of the 'corpuscular wave'. 
This singularity was posited to glide inside the wave "like a small classical mobile" that – 
in consequence of its strong spatial localization and its relatively very high energy – 
admits at any time the 'mechanical' qualifications of position and momentum, from 
which in classical mechanics all the other mechanical qualifications can be constructed; 
whereas the rest of the wave, of course, does not accept mechanical qualifications.  
                                                      
60  Cohen-Tannnoudji C., Diu B. and Laloë, F., 1973. 
61 De Broglie wrote in one dimension; here we introduce the notations ‘Φ’ and ‘β’ in order to distinguish from the start 
the representation of a physical phase of a physical wave introduced by Louis de Broglie, from the phase ϕ(x,t) of a 
mathematical ‘state-function’ ψ(r,t)= ae(i/—)ϕ (x,t)  introduced inside a QMHD state-ket |ψ(x,t)> that represents a formal 
tool for statistical predictions on results of measurements on a microstate. 
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In short, de Broglie’s model does not introduce any ‘particle’ whatsoever; it 
introduces a 'corpuscular-like wave', a wave inside which a very localized singularity of 
the amplitude admits mechanical qualifications that require a wave-'mechanics'. 
In the course of the construction of the relation p=h/λ de Broglie has proved the 
‘theorem of concordance of the phases’ 62 according to which:  
The model of a microstate of an unbound electron can be stable if and only if the 
corpuscular-like singularity in the amplitude of its corpuscular wave glides inside 
the wave in a way such that the phase of the up-down-up vibration of the amplitude 
of the localized singularity – a clock-like phase in the sense of Einstein's special 
relativity, at any given location r – is at any moment t identical to the phase-
function β(r,t) of the oscillation of the extended-in-space amplitude of the portion 
of wave that surrounds the singularity at that time t.  
This condition of stability cannot be realized otherwise than via a convenient continuous 
displacement inside the wave, of the singularity from the amplitude of the wave, because 
from the standpoint of Einstein's special relativity β(r,t) designates a wave-like phase and 
so, when one passes from one inertial observer to another one via the Lorentz-Einstein 
transformation of coordinates, it obeys another sort of variance then the localized clock-
like phase of oscillation of the amplitude of the singularity 63.  
This theorem is crucial for understanding the meaning of the QMHD-concept of 
eigenket. Indeed: Louis de Broglie’s wave-function Φ(x,t)=a.exp(i/—)β(x,t) satisfies the 
equation PxΦ(x,t)=pxj.Φ(x,t) for eigenket and eigenvalues of the momentum observable 
from the Hilbert-Dirac formalism. And the QMHD-equation A|uj(r,aj)>=aj|uj(r,aj)>, 
(∀j,∀A), generalizes this particular mathematical fact to any quantum mechanical 
observable and introduces it in the bra-ket expressions of the Hilbert-Dirac formalism, 
without any condition on integrability. This leads immediately to the following 
identification of the general meaning of this equation: 
The eigen-function uj(r,aj) from the eigenket |uj(r,aj)> associated with the 
eigenvalue aj of the observable A, plays the role of a mathematical representation 
of a sample of a definite sort of wave-movement around the spatial location of the 
corpuscular-like singularity in the amplitude of the involved de Broglie 
'corpuscular wave'.  
And if the wave-movement that surrounds the singularity is constantly represented 
by the eigenfunction uj(r,aj), then – and only then – does stay constant the value aj of the 
mechanical quantity A that qualifies in mechanical terms the displacement inside the 
wave, of the location of the corpuscular-like singularity from the amplitude of the wave. 
As soon as this has been spelled out, it leaps to one’s eyes that the form itself of the 
equation  for eigenfunctions and eigenvalues of A, simply cries it out on the roofs. So – 
no offense to Bohr – de Broglie’s model of a microstate is quite basically present inside 
the whole formalism of QMHD. It defines the physical-conceptual meaning of all the 
bases in the Hilbert-space of any microstate, as well as all the spectral decompositions of 
any state-ket. While furthermore these spectral decompositions are the core of the 
predictive formalism from QMHD.  
No more, no less.  
                                                      
62 The conceptual content of this proof of only several lines is a jewel of human thought. 
63  We note that de Broglie’s model is compatible with a relativistic model in the sense of Einstein’s special relativity. 
Why, then, does QMHD as a whole oppose resistance to the realization of a general formal compatibility with Einstein's 
special relativity? This question should be elucidated before any attempt at unification of quantum mechanics with 
relativity (MMS [1994]) (the concept of 'mass' in de Broglie's sense (L. de Broglie [1956]) is different from Einstein's 
concept of mass). 
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The whole predictive QMHD-algorithm is an undeclared infusion from de Broglie’s 
model, wherefrom the physical significances are mutely drawn. Indeed in any spectral 
decomposition  
|ψ( r,t)>/A=∑jc(aj,t)|uj(r,aj)>, ∀j  
of a state-ket |ψ(r,t)> with respect to the basis {|uj(r,aj)>}, ∀j, introduced in H by an 
observable A, the eigenket |uj(r,aj)> from the term c(aj,t)|uj(r,aj)> symbolizes the sample 
of that what is counted by the real squared modulus |c(aj,t)|2 of the complex coefficient 
c(aj,t) (exactly as, in the expression 34m, the symbol ‘m’ means that the length that is 
measured is 34 times the length of the sample of a meter from the National Bureau of 
Standards of Weights and Measures). And a sample of wave-movement – by the 
definition of the concept of 'sample' – has an arbitrary spatial extension. So with respect 
to this significance of an eigenfunction, squared modulus integrability is simply 
senseless. 
Consequences of the identification of the meaning of an eigenfuction. The 
preceding conclusion has noteworthy consequences. 
- It evaporates the false ‘problem’ why an eigenfunction is in general 64 not 
required to be square-integrable: If it were required to always be square-integrable, that 
would be a real problem. 
- In classical thinking a unique semantic dimension (for instance ‘color’) suffices 
for carrying all the ‘values’ (‘red’, green’, etc.) that one wants to singularize on this 
dimension. But when a microstate has to be qualified it obviously is very useful – if not 
even necessary – to analyse the representation more, namely so as to compensate for the 
absence of any perception of a quale for assigning meaning to the brute result of each one 
act of measurement. The Hilbert-Dirac formalism realizes this analysis by a formal 
splitting: An observable A represents – separately – the considered semantic dimension – 
a qualifying quantity that qualifies from a mechanical point of view – and exclusively 
this (‘a momentum’ ‘a total energy’, etc.); it introduces a 'grid' for qualification, in the 
sense of (2). And on the other hand – like in a catalogue joined to A – inside the set of 
pairs {(|uj(r,aj)>,aj)}, ∀j, are represented separately each one of the ‘values’ singularized 
on the semantic dimension A; and each ‘value’ is specified by a pair (|uj(r,aj)>,aj), ∀j, 
because the wave-movement of a corpuscular wave and a mechanical qualification of the 
‘corpuscular aspect’ of that wave, are both involved, and are tied in a one-to-one 
connection 65. This is marvellously expressive. And when it is discretized via an explicit 
adjunction of a unit for measuring the quantity A represented by the observable A., it 
becomes also effective. 
- This explains the high adequacy of the use of a Hilbert space H for representing 
mathematically the predictions on issues of measurements on a microstate: Each ‘value’ 
aj of A, ∀j, can be placed on a separate axis reserved to it, on which the state-ket |ψ(r,t)>, 
when projected onto that axis, determines the complex number c(aj,t), so also the 
probability |c(aj,t)|2 postulated by Born for the emergence of what is represented by the 
pair (|uj(r,aj), aj ) if a measurement of A is performed upon the microstate with state-ket 
|ψ(r,t)> (this mimics geometrically the expansion |ψ(r,t)>/A=∑jc(aj,t)|uj(r,aj)>, ∀j, of 
|ψ( r,t)>). 
Thereby the representational roles of, respectively, a state-ket or an eigenket, are 
radically distinguished. 
                                                      
64 In a bound state of a microsystem the eigenket of the total energy has the same mathematical expression as the state-
ket; it is confounded with the state-ket and the eigenket is required to be square-integrable and it is such: from a 
conceptual point of view this is a mathematically 'degenerate' situation. 
65 Degenerate spectra are not considered here. 
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- The preceding remarks indicate that Dirac’s 'theory of transformations' expresses 
in mathematical terms passages from a given ‘semantic space’, to another one: A 
considered semantic is defined formally by the corresponding pairs (|uj(r,aj)>,aj): 
Dirac’s calculus is potentially a calculus with semantic specifications 66. Thereby the 
Hilbert-Dirac formalism – in itself, independently of microstates and QMHD – can be 
useful in many disciplines. Precisely this is generally established by Gleason's theorem 
examined in (7.III).2.1.    
 
(6.II).2. FROM THE HIDDEN PRESENCE INSIDE QMHD OF de BROGLIE’S MODEL  
TO ITS EXPLICIT PHYSICAL-OPERATIONAL INCORPORATION INTO [IQM-
QMHD] 
We have posited a framework denoted [IQM-QMHD]. Inside this framework we 
shall now absorb de Broglie's ideal (non-operational) model of a microstate, into the 
physical-operational concept G of factual generation of the microstate-to-be-studied, as 
defined by the methodological decision MD from the Part I of this work. 
What follows might be perceived as shocking after the cure of positivistic purity 
suffered by microphysics since nearly a century, according to which models were 
interdicted. But let us keep in mind that just above this interdiction has been shown to 
have never acted. And the announced absorption will soon appear to have been an 
essential step forward in the process of construction of a factually rooted second quantum 
mechanics. So let us vanquish the inhibitions. Everywhere in the sciences and the 
techniques the models are unavoidable and precious and their efficiency is increased 
when they are specified with detail.     
Association via G of the concept de Broglie’s model, with a microstate msG. The 
guiding ideas are the following ones: 
 (a) We want to reconstruct a mechanics of microstates. According to de Broglie’s 
model – that appeared to be quintessentially involved in QMHD – only the corpuscular 
aspects from a corpuscular wave do admit mechanical qualifications. Consider now the 
definitions from (2.I).1 of various sorts of microstates. It is clear that what is called 
‘system’ in (2.I).1 has to be identified with de Broglie’s ‘corpuscular-like singularity’ in 
the amplitude of a corpuscular wave. So we posit that: 
An operation of generation G of ‘one micro-state of one micro-system’ introduces 
one de Broglie singularity into the domain of what a human observer can qualify in 
a factual-operational and consensual way; whereas an operation of generation 
G(ns) (ns: n systems) of 'one micro-state of n micro-systems' introduces n de 
Broglie-singularities.  
(b) It seems obvious that it would be nonsense to conceive that an operation of 
generation G defined by the use of macroscopic apparatuses and macroscopically 
controlled parameters, cuts off radically the 'corpuscular-like' singularity67 from the rest 
of the body of the involved specimen σ(msG) of the studied microsystem msG that has 
been generated by one realization of G; from the indefinitely extended ‘corpuscular 
wave’ that, before the action of G, incorporated the singularity and determined its 
displacement. Indeed de Broglie's corpuscular-like singularity is organically integrated to 
the 'corpuscular wave'. Outside this wave, by definition, it cannot be conceived. It is just 
a wave-aspect. So we posit that – in some sense and for some time – G just captures into 
the domain of what can be operated upon by human observers and what can produce 
                                                      
66  In Dirac's mind might have worked implicit general criteria that he did not care to capture and communicate.  
67 We use singular expressions for the sake of simplicity. 
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observable marks, a portion of a corpuscular wave that carries one de Broglie singularity 
if one micro-state of one micro-system is generated, or carries n such singularities when 
one micro-state of n micro-systems is generated. While the main part of the wave-like 
phenomenon to which this portion of corpuscular wave continues to be incorporated after 
the action of G, remains in the physical substratum, even though via the microstate msG 
generated by G it has been connected to the domain of the observable by men. 
Such a view violates the most current significance of the classical concept of 
'object' endowed with a definite spatial volume, even if this 'object' is in a liquid or even a 
gaseous state. We are face to face with the modern view on the frontier between a 
representation of the Spinozian "Universal Substance" and a very first process of 
individualized human conceptualization. Indeed nowadays we are aware that any definite 
"entity", a chair, a living body, cannot be conceived to be cut in an absolute sense from 
the surrounding ‘physical waves’ that are posited to exist (electro-magnetic, 
gravitational, etc.). Any "object" in the classical sense is admitted to emit and to absorb 
waves of various natures and to be traversed by such waves. 
But the global de Broglie model of the whole of the 'physical reality' (de Broglie 
[1956]) 68 does not incorporate the concept defined in MD of a physical-operational 
generation G of individualized, 'local' entities-to-be-studied. In de Broglie's global 
approach – like in Bohm's one – the physical-operational concept 'G' from IQM is 
replaced by purely mental wandering focalizations of the attention, that do not entail 
consensual, physical-operational observable effects subjected to conditions of 
predictability and of verifiability. And in consequence of this it can be posited to be 
deterministic, like the classical disciplines of Physics 69. Whereas in order to achieve 
scientific descriptions – consensually observable, predictive and verifiable – concerning 
consensually factually defined 'microstates', we inescapably have to make use of also 
local models; and these, via MD, introduce irrepressibly a primordial observational 
statistical-probabilistic character (MMS [2013]; [2017]. 
These considerations close the point (b). We furthermore posit that: 
 (c) The location of the de Broglie singularity inside the corpuscular wave of any 
specimen of a studied msG, in general varies arbitrarily from one individual specimen of 
msG to another one (this is an essential element from de Broglie’s own view (de Broglie 
[1956]). 
(d) We do not try to specify other characters of the portion of a corpuscular-wave 
that is trapped into the domain of possibility of deliberate interaction with it, via by a 
repeatable operation of generation G. But we admit that, whatever these characters are, 
they constitute a class of similarities that justifies their common designation in MD and 
(1) as elements from the class {σ(msG)}≡msG of emergences of ‘the one microstate msG 
generated by G’: the language posited in this way has already shown its pertinence, so we 
keep it.  
(e) Finally, in agreement with de Broglie’s works and with those of the nowadays 
physicists from Bohm’s school (in particular Peter Holland 1993) we also posit the 
famous guidance relation according to which the phase of the corpuscular wave in the 
neighbourhood of the singularity ‘guides’ the singularity by determining its momentum. 
(f) Consider now a composed operation of generation G(G1,G2,...Gk). The 
methodological posit (1) requires a one-one relation between any operation of generation 
                                                      
68 De Broglie has worked out the global De Broglie-Bohm model after Bohm's [1952]-work. This global model 
includes Bohm's work as well as the de Broglie's initial model of a microstate. As far as I know it is the unique global 
model of the 'physical substance'.  
69 Let us immediately and explicitly add that de Broglie representation of the Universal Substance does not in the least 
realize "knowledge of the physical reality such-as-it-is-in-itself"; it remains just a human model relative to the human 
way of perceiving and thinking from which it stems. This sort of imprisonment is definitively impossible to be 
transgressed. 
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G and its result denoted msG. So – accordingly to the definitions from (2.I).2 – we have 
to posit that: 
An unbound one micro-state of one micro-system produced by a composed 
operation of generation involves only one singularity in the amplitude of the 
corpuscular wave of the generated microstate msG(G1,G2,...Gk),cw.  
But we also admit, accordingly to de Broglie [1956], that the other operations of 
generation (G1,G2,...Gk) mentioned in connection with G(G1,G2,...Gk) – that can be 
realized separately but have not been separately realized when G(G1,G2,...Gk) has been 
realized – produce together some specific effects on the dynamic of this unique 
singularity such as it is asserted by the guidance law quoted in (e). This will appear in the 
Part III to be a very important point in the process of construction of a satisfactory 
representation of the quantum measurements on any sort of unbound microstate.  
On the basis of the assumptions {(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f)} we now finally take the 
following new step: 
The factual physical-operational modelling postulate MP({σ(msG,cw)}). In 
agreement with MD, (1) and (13'), it is posited that any one realization of Gt 
generates one specimen of the studied microstate that is specified accordingly to 
the assumptions {(a),(b),(c),(d),(e),(f)}. Such a specimen will be denoted σ(msG,cw) 
(cw: corpuscular wave) and it will be called the G-(corpuscular-wave)-model of a 
specimen of the studied microstate (in short, a G-cw model). Correlatively the 
corresponding microstate can be re-noted msGt,cw. So from now on – but only in so 
far that this is useful – the relation (1) G↔msG from MD can be maximally 
specified as 
Gt ↔  (msGt,cw ≡ {σ(msGt,cw)})                                                                           (1’) 
The G-cw model MP({σ(msG,cw)}) has been constructed under strict constraint of 
logical-semantic consistency with both IQM and the content of QMHD. It introduces a 
crucial connection between IQM, QMHD, and furthermore de Broglie's global 
interpretational approach constructed in [1956]), tied with Bohm's interpretation of 
QMHD. But inside [IQM-QMHD], via the G-cw model, the concepts of microstate and of 
specimen of a microstate as defined in MD cease to be imprisoned inside the category of  
'interpretations' of QMHD: They become basic elements of the process attempted here of 
construction of a new, consensual, predictive and verifiable representation of the 
microstates.  
Initially, in the relation (1) from IQM, the concepts msG and σ(msG) have been 
provisionally qualified exclusively by the label 'G' of the way in which they are 
produced; later in IQM, in (8), this initial definition has been enriched by a whole set of 
observable, brute, 'transferred' results {µ}kA, kA=1,2,…mA of measurement-interactions. 
Both these definitions from IQM are already 'scientific' because they are physical-
operational, observable, communicable, consensual (so reproducible), and they are 
verifiable. But they all remain exterior to the concepts 'msG' and 'σ(msG)' because IQM 
has been constructed as only a general structure of reference and insertion that rejects 
any specified model of a microstate, not as a definite theory of the microstates. While 
now, because we inside the new framework [IQM-QMHD] we research a new theory of 
the microstates, and in consequence of (1') (msG,cw≡{σ(msG,cw)}), the results σ(msG,cw) of 
one operation G and the result msG,cw of a big set of repetitions of G are posited to be 
endowed with characters that concern the insides of the specimens σ(msG,cw) themselves; 
they concern now the own nature assigned to the concepts σ(msG,cw) and msG,cw.  
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Thereby the present approach draws in, not only the possibility to investigate 
concerning factually individualized microstates, but also the possibility to take into 
consideration data that are interior to one studied microstate: The fundamental 
inside-outside opposition (cf. Atmanspacher&Dalenoort [1994]) enters the 
mechanic of microstates that we are constructing here, and this can have many 
consequences because the main specificities of the notion of a factually defined 
microstate stem from its inner non-classical 'quantum-fields'.   
So the G-cw local model enriches the initial concept (1) of a factually and 
consensually defined microstate. With respect to the absolute de Broglie-Bohm approach  
– let us denote it dBB – that has a basically deterministic character70, the price of this 
gain is a primordially statistical-probabilistic observational character. 
The results from (6II)2 constitute a noteworthy advance: They offer from now on 
clearly defined assumptions, concepts, and words for investigations that are placed – 
strictly – on the frontier between the still a-conceptual factuality and what is extracted 
therefrom factually for a radically first conceptualization able to lead to communicable, 
consensual and verifiable ‘scientific’ knowledge’. They also suggest subsequent 
developments71. And they stress explicitly the fact that absolute and intrinsic spatial 
delimitating contours of individual ‘objects’ in the classical sense are just a human 
construct that inside microphysics ceases to be useful and furthermore is likely to induce 
inner inconsistencies. Individuality, otherness, and also stable and homogeneous space-
time inner structure are only pragmatic human assumptions of which the utility is relative 
to the local cognitive purposes and actions. 
 
 (6.II).3. CLARIFICATIONS VIA 
   THE CONCEPT OF OPERATION G OF GENERATION OF A MICROSTATE 
It appeared above that the use of the concept G of generation of a microstate would 
have economized the false problem of why eigenkets in general are not square-integrable. 
Below we bring into evidence other three fundamental sorts of circumstances where the 
[IQM-QMHD] concept ‘G’ entails clarification of ambiguities or of latent problems that 
vitiate QMHD.  
Inside QMHD works a mathematical principle of spectral decomposability of any 
state-ket |ψ(r,t)>, i.e. the posit that for any state-ket and any basis of eigenket 
{|uj(r,aj)>}, j=1...., introduced by a QMHD-observable A it is justified to assert the 
equality 72: 
|ψ(r,t)>/A=∑jcj(t) |uj(r,aj)>,  ∀j                                                               (14) 
                                                      
70 In the dBB approach the equation of evolution that yields solutions in terms of terms of statistical state-ket are just 
superposed to the deterministic basic representation, in absence of any organically incorporated explanation of the 
statistical-probabilistic character of the solutions. 
71 For instance: a microstate of one system (in the sense of the definitions from (2.I).1) with electric charge or magnetic 
moment can be drawn into the realm of the observable by use of classical macroscopic fields. But how could be 
manipulated the result of an operation G if this operation generates (for instance by a nuclear reaction) a microstate 
that is sensitive exclusively to a gravitational field? (Which probably means a maximally ‘simple’ de Broglie 
singularity, a ‘pure quantum of de Broglie-mass’ (with non-null spin)? a ‘graviton’?). Such questions touch as much 
the most modern researches in gravitation, as the dBB representation of the sub-quantic substance: In de Broglie 
[1956], the chapter XI, pp. 119-131 is fascinating in relation with gravitation, teleportation, etc. And the pair 
(MP(msG,cw), (1’)) offers legal scientific access to the dBB representation.  
72 We recall that adaptation of the result of this work, to a coherently finite mathematical representation and to the 
correlative explicit finiteness of each domain of investigation – as required by our choice of effectiveness – will have 
to be introduced by conceptual-mathematical adjustments subsequent to the outline of a second quantum mechanics. 
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Furthermore, the general choice of a vector-space-representation permits to write 
the state-ket associated to a microstate msG(G1,G2,…Gn) generated by a composed operation 
of generation G(G1,G2,...Gk) ((1.I).1), as a mathematical superposition  
|Ψ12…k (r,t)>=λ1|Ψ1(r,t)>+λ2|Ψ2(r,t)>+……λk|Ψk(r,t)>                                     (15) 
of the state-ket of the microstates msG1, msG2, …. msGk that would have been obtained if 
each one of the operations of generation G1,G2,...Gk that have been composed inside 
G(G1,G2,...Gk) would have been realized separately 73. 
In QMHD the Hilbert space H of a state-ket is extended into a 'generalized-Hilbert 
space' H where the eigenket are included as a limiting sort of vectors. This entails that 
from a strictly mathematical point of view both writings (14) and (15) are just 
superpositions of vectors inside H, permitted by the mathematical axiom – included in 
the definition of the algebraic structure called a vector-space – that any two or more 
elements from a given vector-space admit an additive composition; which is expressed 
by saying that they can be ‘superposed’, i.e. added to one another. These formal features 
installed a purely mathematical language that calls indistinctly ‘superposition’ any 
additive combination of ket, whether only state-ket like in (15), or state-ket and eigenket 
like in (14), or only eigenket as in Dirac’s theory of transformations.  
One senses immediately what confusions can stem from such a mixing in-
distinction between formal elements – state-ket and eigenket – that represent concepts 
that have been shown in (6.II).1 to be so deeply different from a semantic point of view. 
No physical criteria, nor conceptual ones, are made use of inside QMHD in order to make 
mutual specifications inside the general category of such additive compositions of ket, 
syntactically permitted in H. In (6.II).2 we have seen an illustration of the consequences 
of precisely this sort of blindness with respect to conceptual-physical meaning, with 
respect to the semantic contents. A blindness of this sort is a major danger entailed by the 
intimate relation between physics and mathematics that grows inside mathematical 
physics. We have already seen how, under the protection of this intimacy, mathematics 
can simply chase the intelligibility out of physics.  
In the case of the writing (14) the mathematical form induces into the minds the 
more or less explicit semantic interpretation that all the eigenket-terms cj(t)|uj(r,aj)> from 
the second member are of the same nature as the state-ket |ψ(x,t)> from the first member, 
that all these formal elements carry the same sort of semantic contents. Which has been 
shown in (6.II).1 to be utterly false.  
And in (15) this same sort of semantic blindness suggests that the state-ket |Ψ12…k> 
points toward a physical 'superposition' of all the microstates msG1, msG2, …. msGk, 
themselves, supposed to ‘coexist inside |Ψ12…k>'. This formally induced suggestion is 
strongly privileged by the fact that inside Physics there exist 'principles of superposition' 
– of physical superposition – that, when they are physically adequate, are mathematically 
expressed by an additive composition. In the chapter 7.II precisely this sort of confusion 
will play the main role. 
Inside IQM, so now also inside the provisional framework [IQM-QMHD], any 
possibility of ambiguities of the sort specified above is avoided by construction. This 
however has to be stressed, both conceptually and via modified notations. So let us first 
detail the conceptual situation. 
 - According to [IQM-QMHD], in (14) only the state-ket |ψ(r,t)> from the first 
member corresponds – on the statistical level of conceptualization – to the studied 
                                                      
73 The choice to make use of this formal possibility, inside a physical theory of microstates, will be criticized in the 
Part III, and replaced by another choice of representation.  
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microstate msG, while all the terms cj(t)|uj(r,aj)> from the right-hand expansion of 
|ψ(r,t)> are symbols of a product of a number cj(t) and a model |uj(r,aj)> of a possible 
corpuscular-wave-movement. 
 - According to [IQM-QMHD], in (15) the resulting one microstate msG(G1,G2,…Gk) 
that is effectively generated by the unique composed operation of generation 
G(G1,G2,...Gk), cannot be coherently conceived as a coexistence of all the microstates 
msG1, msG2, …. msGk that would have been obtained via the separate realizations of 
(G1,G2,...Gk). This has been already much explained, first in the Part I and then in (6.II)2. 
So the requirement of self-consistency entails that all the state-ket from the second 
member of (15) have to be regarded as only virtual representational elements74.  
On the other hand inside QMHD these representational elements from (15) have 
been considered to be useful precisely in order to represent mathematically the state-ket 
|Ψ12…k(r,t)> by the additive expression (15). Indeed this possibility permits to deal 
mathematically with the observable factual in-equality   
π12...k (G(G1,G2,...Gk),aj)  ≠  π1(G1,aj)+π2(G2,aj)+.........+pk(Gk,aj)             (16) 
 (that generalizes the relation (12)): via the spectral decomposition (14) of |Ψ12…k (r,t)> 
on the basis of eigenket of an observable A and application of Born’s postulate of 
probability to the complex expansion coefficients cj(t), between the expansion 
coefficients there emerge mathematical ‘interference’-terms that entail the inequality 
(16), which at a first sight seems very adequate for expressing the involvement of the 
operations of generation (G1,G2,...Gk) in the unique effectively realized operation 
G(G1,G2,...Gk).  
So QMHD and IQM involve distinct views concerning the semantic acceptability of 
writings of the form (15): This is possible because IQM is constructed to represent 
the involved meanings, while QMHD occults the involved meanings under purely 
mathematical requirements.  
Such a situation is doomed to come to some factual confrontation. We are aware of this, 
and we stay attentive. 
- Quite generally now: When inside QMHD a state-ket seems to be ‘absent’, inside 
[IQM-QMHD] this means that the microstate that corresponds to this state-ket is not 
generated separately. So it has not been brought into individualized factual existence. 
The most striking case of such an ‘absence’ of a state-ket is that of one micro-state of 
two or several micro-systems, tied with the problem of locality. The formalism of QMHD 
– rightly – represents such a micro-state by only one state-ket. But for each involved 
micro-system it introduces a distinct representation-space, and the mathematical relation 
between these representation spaces is specified in a way that is indicated by the now 
current words ‘intrication’ and ‘non-separability’. Certain authors speak of « 'absence' of 
an 'own' state-ket for each ‘system’ » ; other authors speak of « absence of ‘information’ 
» (in what a sense, exactly?); as if a state-ket were a planet or a lake, something that ‘is’ 
somewhere outside, but nobody knows how to go and see where and how it ‘is’. In the 
textbooks it is written that «often a micro-system ‘is’ represented by a state-ket and, if so, 
the state is ‘pure’»; while if it ‘is’ not pure, then it ‘is’ a ‘mixture’, but in such a case 
(happily) one can nevertheless dispose of a statistical operator (how, exactly, one should 
factually act in order to construct this operator, is not clearly defined). But in the case of 
the ‘problem of locality’ not even a true statistical operator does ‘exist’, only ‘a partial-
trace’ operator 'exists'; but this cannot change the fact that there is 'non-separability' 
because – curiously – a statistical correlation is observed even when the spatial distance 
                                                      
74 We do not assert here any physical facts, only consequences of the requirement of inner consistency of the 
framework [IQM-QMHD]. How this can be connected with physical facts will be examined later. 
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between the involved systems is very big. All the mentioned ways of speaking suggest 
that the state-ket, the statistical operators, etc., are conceived to possess an existence 
quite independently of the representational choices, decisions, constructions, of human 
beings, of physicists. As soon as 'there is' a ‘system’, ‘its’ state-ket should also ‘be’, and 
nevertheless sometimes it is absent and we do not know why, nor where it is gone. The 
special case of one micro-state of two micro-systems in the sense of (2.I)1 is a 
particularly strong discloser of how the whole mathematical formalism of QMHD is 
currently conceived:  
We are in presence of a huge reification of the mathematical formalism of QMHD, 
considered to constitute the whole of QMHD by itself, by it alone. 
The fact that the whole QMHD is just a human construction achieved by men in 
order to represent what men can name 'factually definable microstates', has receded far 
out of the minds. How much more far, then, we still are from conceiving that not even 
the microstates to be studied do 'exist' out there, and sometimes not even the involved 
'systems', in this sense that in general one has to generate them in order to study them!  
This situation entails a sort of consternation. It even produces a sort of religious 
admiration for QMHD, because the experiments on locality have confirmed the 
predictions of the formalism75. 
But inside [IQM-QMHD] one understands that, and how, these attitudes stem from 
the following circumstances. 
* Notwithstanding that in general the mathematical writings from QMHD are in 
agreement with the definitions from (2.I)1 these definitions are not spelled out inside 
QMHD, and furthermore, in the case of one micro-state of two micro-systems, in the 
current language that accompanies the use of the formalism one speaks of two or several 
‘systems’ – never of one micro-state of two micro-systems. Therefore inside QMHD the 
one-one indirect and non-explicated connection 
G↔|ψG(r,t)>                                                                                     (1’’) 
between G and a state-ket that should be denoted |ψG(r,t)> because the studied microstate 
msG is generated by G, is simply out of perceptibility notwithstanding that it is generally 
accepted that always « a state-ket represents the studied ‘system’ ». But inside [IQM-
QMHD]  a connection (1’’) is logically entailed, via (1) G↔msG. 
* Going now to the roots, one finds that all the preceding examples illustrate how 
inside QMHD unintelligibility is entailed by the fact that no clear and systematic 
distinction is made between, on the one hand individual concepts (msG, specimens 
σ(msG) of a microstate msG, or |uj(r,aj)>), or individual physical operations (G, acts of 
measurement MesA,), and on the other hand the statistical descriptors like |ψ(r,t)>.  
                                                      
75 On the other hand it is true that it does seem amazing to find out to what a degree the mathematical formalism, in 
contradistinction to the physicists, is observant of (is compatible with) the involvement or not, in a given state-ket-
symbol, of an operation of generation G of a corresponding micro-state, and with the significance of the involved state-
ket from the viewpoint of the definitions (2.I)1; notwithstanding that inside the formalism the concept ‘G’ is neither 
defined nor represented, and the definitions  (2.I)1 are not stated, while the specific meaning of an eigenket has not 
been recognized either. Indeed: (a) a spectral decomposition (14) is usually conceived to involve an infinite number of 
terms, the coefficients from these terms are complex numbers dependent on time, while the eigenfunctions – models of 
wave-movement – are correctly written as independent on time; whereas (b) a superposition (15) of state-ket tied with 
a composed operation of generation is written as a finite number of terms, the coefficients are usually constant real 
numbers, and the ket from the superposition are dependent on time. Everything in the mathematical writings is fully 
concordant with the analyses made here inside [IQM-QMHD]. This raises strongly a very interesting question 
concerning something that could be called 'the semantic expressivity of the mathematical internal syntactic coherence'. 
The unique explanation seems to be that the mathematicians, when they construct a mathematical structure, imply the 
existence of operations of generation. 
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In these conditions, inside the minds used to QMHD like a New-York boy is used to 
Manhattan, an explanation is badly needed indeed, why sometimes some of the two or 
several state-ket that would be so ‘necessary’, nevertheless are stubbornly ‘absent’. 
 We are now ready to close this point by the following convention: 
Notational convention 1. Inside [IQM-QMHD] any state-ket |ψ( r,t)> that 
corresponds to a physically generated micro-state msG will be re-noted as |ψG(x,t)>, and 
the sort of operation G that indexes it will be explicitly stated, and when necessary its 
specific structure will be distinguished graphically.  
So from now on (14) will be re-written as  
|ψ( r,t)G>/A =∑jcj(t) |uj(r,aj)>, j=1…….                                                        (14’) 
and (15) will be re-written as 
|Ψ( r,t)G(G1,G2,...Gk)> = λ1|ΨG1(r,t)>+λ2|ΨG2(r,t)>+……λk|ΨGk(r,t)>              (15’) 
where, in the global symbol G(G1,G2,...Gk), the first operation of generation G is written 
in bold font in order to express that it is the unique operation of generation that has been 
fully accomplished, while the only a priori possible but not separately realized operations 
of generation that in the second member are involved by the state-ket of virtual 
microstates-of-reference, will be written in non-bold font. 
These specifications will entail clarification76. They also are an illustration of the 
gliding character of the level where takes place the collision between a top-down and a 
bottom-up approach and of the way in which the bottom-up approach can incorporate 
progressively the preceding top-down approach in a new, improving elaboration.  
 
(6.II).4. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE QMHD THEORY OF 
MEASUREMENTS 
Here we definitely walk into Absurdland, so abruptly and totally that, by fear of 
being considered subjective and malevolent, I do not dare to immediately make use of 
my own voice. So I first offer an objective look at the conceptual situation by 
reproducing an extract from Wikipedia that consists of a collection of views. 
« The measurement problem in quantum mechanics is the problem of how (or whether) wave-function 
collapse occurs. The inability to observe this process directly has given rise to different interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, and poses a key set of questions that each interpretation must answer. The wave-function in quantum 
mechanics evolves deterministically according to the Schrödinger equation as a linear superposition of different states, 
but actual measurements always find the physical system in a definite state. Any future evolution is based on the state 
the system was discovered to be in when the measurement was made, meaning that the measurement "did something" 
to the system that is not obviously a consequence of Schrödinger evolution. 
To express matters differently (to paraphrase Steven Weinberg[1][2]), the Schrödinger wave equation 
determines the wavefunction at any later time. If observers and their measuring apparatus are themselves described by 
a deterministic wave function, why can we not predict precise results for measurements, but only probabilities? As a 
general question: How can one establish a correspondence between quantum and classical reality?[3]. 
Schrödinger's cat 
The best known example is the "paradox" of the Schrödinger's cat. A mechanism is arranged to kill a cat if a 
quantum event, such as the decay of a radioactive atom, occurs. Thus the fate of a large scale object, the cat, is 
entangled with the fate of a quantum object, the atom. Prior to observation, according to the Schrödinger equation, the 
cat is apparently evolving into a linear combination of states that can be characterized as an "alive cat" and states that 
can be characterized as a "dead cat". Each of these possibilities is associated with a specific non-zero probability 
amplitude; the cat seems to be in some kind of "combination" state called a "quantum superposition". However, a 
single, particular observation of the cat does not measure the probabilities: it always finds either a living cat, or a dead 
cat. After the measurement the cat is definitively alive or dead. The question is: How are the probabilities converted 
into an actual, sharply well-defined outcome? 
                                                      
76 The clarification will lead in the Part III to a suppression of the whole concept-and-writing (15'). 
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Interpretations (Main article: Interpretations of quantum mechanics) 
Hugh Everett's many-worlds interpretation attempts to solve the problem by suggesting there is only one 
wave-function, the superposition of the entire universe, and it never collapses—so there is no measurement problem. 
Instead, the act of measurement is simply an interaction between quantum entities, e.g. observer, measuring instrument, 
electron/positron etc., which entangle to form a single larger entity, for instance living cat/happy scientist. Everett also 
attempted to demonstrate the way that in measurements the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics would appear; 
work later extended by Bryce DeWitt. 
De Broglie–Bohm theory tries to solve the measurement problem very differently: this interpretation contains 
not only the wavefunction, but also the information about the position of the particle(s). The role of the wave-function 
is to generate the velocity field for the particles. These velocities are such that the probability distribution for the 
particle remains consistent with the predictions of the orthodox quantum mechanics. According to de Broglie–Bohm 
theory, interaction with the environment during a measurement procedure separates the wave packets in configuration 
space which is where apparent wave-function collapse comes from even though there is no actual collapse. 
Erich Joos and Heinz-Dieter Zeh claim that the phenomenon of quantum decoherence, which was put on 
firm ground in the 1980s, resolves the problem.[4] The idea is that the environment causes the classical appearance of 
macroscopic objects. Zeh further claims that decoherence makes it possible to identify the fuzzy boundary between the 
quantum microworld and the world where the classical intuition is applicable.[5][6] Quantum decoherence was 
proposed in the context of the many-worlds interpretation[citation needed], but it has also become an important part of 
some modern updates of the Copenhagen interpretation based on consistent histories.[7][8] Quantum decoherence does 
not describe the actual process of the wavefunction collapse, but it explains the conversion of the quantum probabilities 
(that exhibit interference effects) to the ordinary classical probabilities. See, for example, Zurek,[3] Zeh[5] and 
Schlosshauer.[9] 
The present situation is slowly clarifying, as described in a recent paper by Schlosshauer as follows:[10] 
Several decoherence-unrelated proposals have been put forward in the past to elucidate the meaning of 
probabilities and arrive at the Born rule ... It is fair to say that no decisive conclusion appears to have been reached as 
to the success of these derivations. ... 
As it is well known, [many papers by Bohr insist upon] the fundamental role of classical concepts. The 
experimental evidence for superpositions of macroscopically distinct states on increasingly large length scales counters 
such a dictum. Superpositions appear to be novel and individually existing states, often without any classical 
counterparts. Only the physical interactions between systems then determine a particular decomposition into classical 
states from the view of each particular system. Thus classical concepts are to be understood as locally emergent in a 
relative-state sense and should no longer claim a fundamental role in the physical theory. 
A fourth approach is given by objective collapse models. In such models, the Schrödinger equation is 
modified and obtains nonlinear terms. These nonlinear modifications are of stochastic nature and lead to a behaviour 
which for microscopic quantum objects, e.g. electrons or atoms, is unmeasurably close to that given by the usual 
Schrödinger equation. For macroscopic objects, however, the nonlinear modification becomes important and induces 
the collapse of the wavefunction. Objective collapse models are effective theories. The stochastic modification is 
thought of to stem from some external non-quantum field, but the nature of this field is unknown. One possible 
candidate is the gravitational interaction as in the models of Diósi and Penrose. The main difference of objective 
collapse models compared to the other approaches is that they make falsifiable predictions that differ from standard 
quantum mechanics. Experiments are already getting close to the parameter regime where these predictions can be 
tested.[11] 
An interesting solution to the measurement problem is also provided by the hidden-measurements 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. The hypothesis at the basis of this approach is that in a typical quantum 
measurement there is a condition of lack of knowledge about which interaction between the measured entity and the 
measuring apparatus is actualized at each run of the experiment. One can then show that the Born rule can be derived 
by considering a uniform average over all these possible measurement-interactions. [12][13] ». 
 
 (6.II).4.1. Refusal of von Neumann’s representation of quantum 
measurements 
I now dare to continue by my own summary of the situation. In what follows 
immediately I place myself inside QMHD, not inside [IQM-QMHD]. So I just express first 
the current nowadays language and reasoning about quantum measurements. The 
representation of measurements on microsystems is that one proposed by von Neumann 
in 1932: 
The Schrödinger equation of the problem endows us with the state-ket of the 
problem, |ψ(r,t)>. So this state-ket is given mathematically, we dispose of it from the 
start in consequence of purely mathematical operations. We want now to represent the 
measurements. Therefore we have to write the state-ket for the measurement-interaction. 
For this we proceed as follows: Let t=to be the initial moment given in |ψ(x,t)>. At a time 
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t1 >to we want to measure the observable A on the ‘system’ represented by |ψ( r,t)>. We 
take now into account that for t≥t1 there is interaction between the studied system and the 
measurement-apparatus. "So", is it said :  
For t≥t1 the measurement-evolution must represent also the apparatus "because" 
the apparatus is also constituted of microsystems.  
So the measurement-evolution is to be represented by a state-ket of [(the studied 
system S)+(the apparatus for measuring A)]. Let us then write, say, (S+app(A) and 
|ψS+app(A)(x,t). Since we measure the observable A, the expansion of |ψS+App(r,t)> with 
respect to the basis of A comes in. Accordingly to the well-known quantum theory of a 
‘system composed of two systems’ we write the tensor-product expansion: 
|ψS+App(r,t)>= ∑k∑ j cj(t)dk(t) |uj(r,aj)>|qk(r,ak>,  ∀j,  ∀k                            (17)                             
where |qk(r,ak>, k=1,2… are the eigenket of the observable called the ‘needle-position of 
the app(A), that can be denoted χ(A), with eigenvalues, say (ν(ak), k=1,2…, that express, 
respectively, ‘the needle-positions of app(A) that correspond to the eigenvalues ak of A’. 
Furthermore – by the definition of the concept of ‘apparatus for measuring A’ – the set 
{cj(t)dk(t)} of the global, product-expansion coefficients (cj(t)dk(t)) from (17) reduces to a 
set {αjj(t)} (with αjj=cjdj) of only the coefficients with non-crossed indexation, because 
the needle position (ν(aj) of the app(A) is what – alone – indicates the obtained 
eigenvalue aj of A 77. So in fact in this case we have only 
|ψS+App(r,t)>= ∑j∑ j αjj(t) |uj(r,aj)>|vj(r,aj>,  ∀j                                            (17’) 
The measurement evolution is produced accordingly to a measurement-
Schrödinger equation where the hamiltonian operator H(A) commutes with A. And it is 
posited that this evolution finishes with a definite needle position χ(aj) that indicates one 
definite result aj 78. 
Now, the above-mentioned representation is considered to raise two ‘problems’. 
- The reduction problem: what happened to all the terms from (17’) with index k≠j 
that accordingly to a linear formalism should subsist? Where have they disappeared?  
- The problem of ‘decoherence’: how can we prove that after the realization of the 
position χ(aj) of the apparatus-needle that announces the result aj the measurement 
interaction really ceases?79  
Here finishes my own summary of the general framework accepted for the 
representation of measurements. In what follows I go now back inside [IQM-QMHD] and 
I speak again for myself and by use of the language introduced up to now in this work.  
Bertrand Russell has written somewhere that aims are induced by temperament 
while the choice of a method when an aim is given is induced by intelligence. With 
respect to the aim to represent the measurements on microstates, von Neumann’s choice 
of a method is stunning. If we followed his argument, in order to measure the position of 
a star by use of a telescope, given that the telescope and the star are both made of 
microsystems, we should represent [(the telescope)+(the star)+(the measurement 
interaction between these two entities)]; and we should prove in terms of the theory thus 
conceived, that the star and the telescope do really separate physically once the star’s 
position has been established. Such an argument manifests luminously a total blindness 
                                                      
77 So no coding problem arises according to this ‘measurement-theory’: One is protected from this problem, the 
apparatus will know where to settle its needle, since it is conceived for this aim. 
78 As far as I know, this has never been proved inside QMHD to be generally insured by the condition imposed upon the 
measurement evolution. 
79 The locality-problem incites to think that it might not do this, but so what? 
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with respect to the rather obvious fact that in science what decides the optimality of a 
representation is the cognitive situation of the observer-conceptualiser with respect to 
that on what he wants to obtain some knowledge, etc. The inner constitution of that what 
has to be qualified, or of the instruments that are made use of, has nothing to do with the 
criteria for generating the desired knowledge. Quite generally the functionality of a 
construct is not in a one-to-one relation with its material (or abstract) structure (those 
who have realized the aeroplanes have thoroughly understood that). Moreover, in the 
case of microstates, most often what can be registered is just marks on a sensitive 
registering device and/or durations determined by chronometers, not needle positions. 
From these data one has to construct conceptually the researched ‘value’ of the measured 
‘quantity’ and this quantity in its turn is constructed beforehand on the basis of 
conceptual-mathematical operations. And finally, von Neumann’s representation of 
measurements dodges the crucial coding problem. It simply makes it disappear behind an 
amorphous heap of words and symbolic writings void of definition, so of meaning. 
Indeed von Neumann’s representation of measurements transgresses QMHD:  
‘The observable’ χ(A) called the ‘needle-position of the app(A) is not a quantum 
mechanical observable, it cannot be constructed formally in a definite way from a 
definite classical mechanical quantity and so its eigenfunctions and eigenvalues 
cannot be calculated. The eigenvalues are just postulated to be the eigenvalues of 
the observable A. 
All this simply is not acceptable. A measurement-apparatus that is made use of in a 
scientific description of something else than this apparatus itself has to be introduced as a 
primary datum that stays outside the representation of the act of measurement, if not, one 
enters indefinite regression80. This is a general interdiction of logical nature. Etc. 
So I declare without shades that I quite radically reject von Neumann’s framework 
for representing quantum measurements.  
 
(6.II).4.2. The implicit assumptions from the basic features of the QMHD theory of 
measurements 
We shall now concentrate on the essential features of the representation of quantum 
measurements because: the core of the unintelligibility of QMHD is hidden there. The 
developments from 6.II and the refusal of von Neumann’s ‘theory’ of quantum 
measurements leave us face to face with the real deep problems of intelligibility. These 
problems must now be stated independently of any superfluous representational clothing 
in order to have a chance to draw into light the prime source of the vices that obstruct the 
tortuous channels toward intelligibility. To guide toward this source I begin by a global 
sketch of the conceptual situation. 
 
(6.II).4.2.1. Preliminary questions and putative views 
One constructs statistics of numbers (or of other sorts of 'results') in order to be 
able to predict statistically on results of acts of examination indicated by the verbal label 
'measurements'. Usually this construction itself is achieved by performing sets of 
individual measurements. When this is the case let us speak of construction-
measurements. And then, in order to be certain that the construction of a predictive 
statistic has succeeded, one verifies the statistic before announcing it as useful for 
prediction. In this case let us speak of verification-measurements. It seems natural to 
                                                      
80 Wittgenstein has written somewhere: «There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor 
that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris ». I dare to complete: At least one class of things 
cannot be absorbed into the quantum mechanical representation of measurements: The class of the measurement 
apparatuses. 
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assume that factually the results of construction-measurements and of verification-
measurements identify when the measurements are the same, notwithstanding that they 
are performed with different aims. So knowledge of the way of factually performing the 
individual acts of measurement should be insured before trying to construct and to verify 
the statistics that involve such measurements.  
But where can one find inside QMHD a thorough definition of the way of 
performing factually an individual act of measurement? Anywhere, strictly anywhere. 
Indeed: 
In QMHD – via the Schrödinger equation – the representation of, directly, the 
predictive statistics is generated mathematically. This circumvents the necessity to define 
individual construction-measurements like in IQM.  
But the individual verification-measurements remain unavoidably necessary.  
So the absence of any definition of the individual acts of measurement is a striking 
gap, even if indeed such a definition were necessary exclusively for verification of the 
statistical predictions. (For bound states, collective acts of verification-measurement can 
often suffice (absorption or emission of radiation versus registration of the intensity of 
spectral lines of emission or of absorption of radiation)). But for unbound microstates, 
individually defined verification-measurements are not avoidable.  
Now, inside QMHD the process of verification of the statistical predictions asserted 
by the state-ket of the studied microstate – considered globally – is represented 
mathematically by the Schrödinger measurement-evolution of this state-ket, that is a 
statistical descriptor. And it is admitted that such a measurement evolution somehow 
involves the factual individual acts of measurement that should verify the predictive 
statistic. Such a common formal location of two sorts of descriptional elements that 
belong to two different levels of conceptualization is immediately highly suspect. But 
furthermore, throughout this suspect representation, the explicit definition of an 
individual act of measurement is just supposed to be known and it is alluded to in mere 
words, without even being also defined at least in mere words: it is just pointed to with a 
verbal finger. And the end of such an undefined act of measurement that cohabits with 
the statistic to the verification of which it participates, is expressed formally via a sudden 
modification of the representation of the involved Schrödinger ket of measurement-
evolution: a modification that is not entailed by the mathematical formalism but is just 
posited separately 81. 
Some authors have remarked that in the classical theory of probabilities 'also' one 
considers a probabilistic distribution of the elementary events from a whole universe of 
possible elementary elements, while every individual act from the process of verification 
of this distribution produces just one definite result. But it seems worth noting that in the 
theory of probabilities the mathematical representation of the probabilistic predictive 
distribution is not used itself, and globally, for representing the individual acts from the 
process of verification of the predictive probabilistic distribution, and that the distribution 
itself is not provisionally modified by any individual act from the global process of 
verification of the probabilistic distribution, and re-asserted immediately afterward in 
connection with another act of verification. These coalescences between a statistical-
probabilistic descriptional element, and the representation of individual operations for a 
progressive verification of a pre-existing probabilistic predictive distribution are specific 
of the quantum representation of measurements.  
                                                      
81 Since already a century this situation seems to many physicists very strange or even scandalous; and it has 
led to a well-known very extravagant 'interpretation' by Everett that many physicists finally do admit "because it does 
not involve any inconsistency" (which is to be read, in fact, as 'mathematical inconsistency', any semantic constraint 
being expurgated: This manifests the relations that work inside some minds of physicists concerning facts versus 
mathematics-and-logic inside a discipline of physics. 
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We finally add that – according to IQM – any individual act of measurement is 
accomplished on one specimen of a microstate and so it requires an immediately 
previous realization of an operation of generation of that specimen; and furthermore, it 
also requires sine-qua-non an operational definition that involves a factually realizable 
coding procedure; which in its turn requires a general model of a microstate. Inside IQM 
– that has been constructed as only a reference-and-imbedding structure of any theory of 
microstates – these requirements have been left blank, to be specified in any given theory 
of microstates. But here we try precisely to draw from IQM and QMHD a fully intelligible 
theory of the factually defined microstates msG from (1) G ↔ msG msG≡{σ(msG)}. Now, 
it appeared in (6II).2 that the formalism of QMHD involves surreptitiously but essentially 
de Broglie's model of a microstate, and we have re-defined there via (1') the concept of 
operation of generation of a specimen of the studied factually defined microstate. So in 
what follows it will have to be specified for each one of the various types of unbound 
microstates distinguished in the section (2.I)2, what explicit sort of definition of an 
individual quantum measurement is entailed via (1') by this de Broglie model, and what 
corresponding coding-rule that definition can admit. 
The problems sketched out above can be summarized as follows:  It is generally 
agreed that a statistical representation only mirrors the physical individual facts and 
operations that it involves genetically. But this does not exonerate from stipulating of 
what consists that what is mirrored, when precisely that is studied. 
 
 (6.II).4.2.2. A fundamental distinction: 
Individual physical wave-function versus abstract statistically predictive ‘state’-
function 
Let us go back to the fact that the wave function initially introduced by Louis de 
Broglie was conceived to represent a physical ‘corpuscular wave’ Φ(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) 
assigned to any micro-system; but very rapidly afterward this initial concept has 
transmuted into a mathematical representation of predictive statistics of results of 
measurements performed on some given sort of microstate. Thereby, in de Broglie's 
mind, the content of the initial descriptor Φ became just more 'complex'. The amplitude 
a(r,t) of the function Φ pointed now toward a statistical-probabilistic prediction for 
results of repeated registrations of the position of the corpuscular-like singularity posited 
to be involved by the amplitude of any specimen of the considered microstate, while the 
phase β(r,t) from Φ was conceived to continue to point toward the physical individual 
wave movement from the corpuscular wave of any one specimen of the studied 
microstate. But in fact this violated one of the numerous semantic rules that work inside 
our minds concerning the processes of conceptualization, which are still very ill-known. 
For instance: When one applies arithmetic to a factual problem it is explicitly interdicted 
– for semantic reasons – to add prunes with apples, notwithstanding that inside arithmetic 
the operation '+' is defined without restriction. Analogously, inside mathematical physics 
works implicitly an interdiction to represent by one same mathematical descriptor two 
features that qualify physical entities of different semantic natures, so two different 
physical entities: it is just a fact that if this interdiction is transgressed, sooner or later this 
leads to confusions. So quantum mechanics has started directly with a violation of a 
hidden semantic rule. The spontaneous public reasoning – that feels the semantic rules – 
has tended to compensate this violation by selecting only the statistical mathematical 
representation of a microstate. But this contributed to simply abandon in the non-spelled-
out the individual physical descriptive elements.  
Let us suppress the initial in-distinction mentioned above via the following second 
notational convention (to be added to the first one from (6II).3):  
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Notational convention 2. The physical individual wave-like phenomenon 
introduced in the domain of scientific conceptualization by one realization of the 
operation G of generation of one specimen σ(msG,cw) of the studied microstate msG,mw – 
in the sense of (1’) – will be systematically denoted by an individual wave-function 
denoted ΦG,cw(r,t) assigned to each one specimen σ(msG,cw) of the studied microstate 
msG,mw 82. This mathematical form is posited here to include the representation of also the 
‘corpuscular singularity(ies)’ from the amplitude. While the state-function from the 
QMHD-state-ket |ΨG(r,t)> that is associated with msG,mw will represent exclusively a 
mathematical tool for predictive statistics of results of measurements on individual 
specimens σ(msG,cw). With this convention in memory with its full expression, we usually 
shall go back to the simplified notations ΦG and |ψG>. 
The distinction introduced above does not in the least interdict any possible degree 
of similitude between the global mathematical forms of Φ G  and |ψG> 83.  
On the ground lighted by all the preliminary considerations from (6.II).4.2.1 and 
the distinction from (6.II).4.2.2 we shall now start a more detailed examination of the 
nowadays "theory of quantum measurements".  
 
(6.II).4.3. The coding rule implied by the QMHD-formalism          
Since we refuse von Neumann's representation of quantum measurements we go 
back to the initial representation of these, where the measuring-apparatus is not 
represented. But we conserve the Hilbert-Dirac representation. The other notations as 
well as the point of view remain those from the association [IQM-QMHD] enriched with 
the new contents already gained in the chapters 5.II and 6.II; so we are no more inside the 
current QMHD alone. Armed in this way the main purpose in this section is the following 
one: Identify how – inside the current QMHD – the observable result of one physical 
measurement-evolution of the one specimen of the studied microstate that accordingly to 
[IQM-QMHD] is involved in one act of measurement, is more or less explicitly supposed 
to be translatable in terms of one definite eigenvalue of the measured quantity.  
We admit that via the Schrödinger equation of the problem acted by an initial 
evolution-hamiltonian operator H it has been possible to identify the state-ket |ψG,H(r,t)> 
of the microstate msG to be studied, where t≥to and to is the initial moment. If at a time 
t1≥to one wants to measure the observable A on a specimen of msG, the QMHD-procedure 
is as follows ((5.II)1). Write the expansion of |ψG,H(r,t)> on the basis {|u(r,aj,)>,∀j}, of 
eigenket of A for the moment t1 : 
|ψG,H(r,t1)>/A = ∑jcj(aj,t1)|u(r,aj,)>,      ∀j                                                        (18) 
                                                      
82 We maintain the notation Φ. 
83 For an unbound microstate there certainly exists a strong similitude between the mathematical function ΦG,cw(r,t) 
appropriate for representing σ(msG,cw), and the state-function ψG(r,t)=a(r,t),t)e(i/—) ϕ(r,t) from the state-ket of msG. But in 
consequence of the predictive task assigned to ψG(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—) ϕ(r,t) – also certainly – there is no identity between 
these descriptors (this is now clear by the definition of the amplitude function a(r,t); but even the phase ϕ(r,t) from 
ψG(r,t) might indicate only some sort of mean-phase with respect to the unknown individual phase functions β(r,t) that 
are involved in the set of specimens {σ(msG,cw)} of the studied microstate msG,cw (cf.(14). Anyhow, for now the fact is 
that in general we do not know what equation can yield as solutions the functional representations of the individual 
specimens σ(msG,cw); and even though de Broglie has asserted a common equation for ψG and ΦG,cw and has 
characterized it in detail (de Broglie [[1956],[1957]), nothing insures a priori the general validity of a common 
equation. During the years 1960-1980 neither de Broglie nor anybody else seems to have been aware of the essential 
role – for consensual verifiable knowledge – of the operation of generation of the entity-to-be-studied, when the 
considered microstate is put in this role; nor, a fortiori, of the other related mathematical representations of individual 
operations. Correlatively, nobody seems to be aware that 'giving' the initial state-ket and the initial wave-function 
constitutes a key-action for quitting the realm of pure conceptuality and stepping over into the domain of factually 
predictive and verifiable consensual knowledge.  
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The statistical prediction concerning the outcome of an A-measurement on the 
microstate represented by |ψG,H(r,t1)> is given by the set of numbers { ⎢cj(aj,t1) ⎢2,  ∀j}A.  
As for the verification of this prediction, one proceeds accordingly to the following 
algorithm: From t1 on the action of the evolution-hamiltonian operator H that worked 
during the time-interval (t1–to) is stopped and the state-ket |ψG,H(r,t1)> is subjected to a 
new sort of evolution represented by an A-measurement-evolution-ket 
|ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>. This evolution is performed accordingly to the Schrödinger equation 
acted by an A-measurement-hamiltonian H(A) that commutes with A. One A-
measurement-evolution takes a time (t1≤t≤tf) where tf  marks the end of the considered A-
measurement-evolution; thereby this evolution –is individual, it concerns one act of 
measurement. Nevertheless the measurement-evolution-ket |ΨG,H(A)(r, t1≤t≤tf)> is a 
statistical descriptor that is made use of exclusively via its expansion with respect to A 
where all the expansion coefficients are present.  
Furthermore in 
|ΨG,H(A) (r, t1≤t≤tf)>/A = ∑jcj(t1))|u(r,aj,)>,  ∀j                                                (19) 
the expansion coefficients are the same as in (18). So the new evolution (19) of the initial 
expansion |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A – but with H(A) and  (t1≤t≤tf) – is supposed not to change the 
expansion coefficients from (18); while the eigenket |u(r,aj,)> are time-independent.  
So one can ask oneself what changes – mathematically – during an "evolution" 
(19).  
But this possible question, to be kept in mind, concerns mathematical changes; 
whereas we, in order to understand what coding rule is supposed to work, we have to first 
specify what is conceived to change physically during (tf–t1), and how. This purpose is 
likely to lead us somehow from the representation with respect to A to the space-time 
representation of the measurement-evolution-ket |ΨG,H(A)( r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A. 
Let us make a break at this point in order to bring in guiding data. 
Remember Gottfiried’s presentation of quantum measurements ([1966]) and de 
Broglie’s analyses ([1957]); and also Bohm's analysis [(1951)] of the Stern-Gerlach 
method for spin measurements.  
But quite especially, remember the method time-of-flight for measuring the 
momentum observable P, which is basic since any observable A is defined as a function 
A=A(R,P), while the position-observable R has a particular character that can hide 
semantic specificities. This last method has been thoroughly studied by Park and 
Margenau ([1968]) and when it is examined closely it appears quite clearly that what is 
supposed to go on from a physical viewpoint during the process involved in (19) is such 
that: 
For any given index j a measurement-evolution (19) represents globally the 
emergence via sufficiently many repetitions of one act of P-measurement, of a statistical 
correlation between:  
- On the one hand, a more or less extended space-time domain (Δr.Δt)j,A] that codes 
for one eigenvalue 'pj' of P. 
- And on the other hand, the (finite) number of times – posited to determine 
factually the probability for registering the result pj – in which the group of all the 
observable marks registered during one act of P-measurement, is located anywhere inside 
(Δr.Δt)j,P (whereby the correlation is statistical).  
Which amounts to a coding-procedure. 
The method ‘time of flight’ has been formulated exhaustively and the case of the 
observable P is both basic and paradigmatic (the case of 'presence' R is trivial and 
degenerate while any observable A is a function A(R,P); whereas the case of spin-
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measurements is only paradigmatic). Therefore I summarize it explicitly below, in [IQM-
QMHD]-terms. We recal it beneath. 
Let δE(G) be the space-domain covered by one realization of the operation G via 
an apparatus A(G) for generating specimens σ(msG,cw)n, n=1,2,...N, of the microstate msG 
to be studied. Place a very extended detection-screen S sufficiently far from the space-
domain δE(G) for permitting to assimilate δE(G) to only a point denoted O, relatively to 
the distance OS between δE(G) and S measured on an axis Ox that starts at δE(G)≈O and 
is perpendicular on the plane of S. We act as follows: 
(a) We effectively carry out with A(G) an operation (G)n and we denote by tno the time 
when (G)n ends, indicated by a system of two interconnected chronometers, one of which 
is connected to the generation-apparatus A(G) and the other one is connected to the 
screen S (the index ‘n’ individualizes the considered realization (G)n of G). The duration 
δt(G) of the operation of generation G does not come in, alone will matter the time 
elapsed between the moment tno when the operation of generation G ends and the time tn 
when an impact is recorded anywhere on S. 
(b) If between δE(G)≈O and the screen S there pre-exist macroscopic fields or material 
obstacles, at tno the fields are extinct and/or the 'obstacles' are removed by a convenient 
device.  
 (c) After some time an impact is produced on a spot of the screen S that we indicate by 
P(xn,yn,zn,) where the coordinates are written with respect to a Cartesian system of 
reference that includes Ox and (Oy, Oz) are in the plane of S. When the impact-point 
P(xn,yn,zn,) emerges on S the system of chronometers indicates the time tn  and “the ‘time 
of flight’ Δtn=tn-tno" 84 (that has been automatically calculated in the system). 
(d) Let dn designate the vector-value of the distance between δE(G)≈O and P(xn,yn,zn,). 
The square of the absolute value of this distance is ∣dn∣2=dxn2+dyn2+dzn2 where dnx , dny, 
dnz are calculated with respect to the specified Cartesian referential.  
(e) The vector-eigenvalue pn of the quantum mechanical momentum-operator P and its 
absolute value ∣pn∣, are then calculated according to the formulas pn=M(dn/Δto)=Mv and 
⎢pn⎢=M√(dxn2+dyn2+dzn2)/Δto, where M is the ‘mass’ associated with the involved 
specimen σ(msG,cw)n of msG such as this mass is defined in classical mechanics and in 
atomic physics 85 , and v means 'velocity'. This completes the considered act of 
momentum-measurement.  
Now we note what follows. The global apparatus is made up of: a generation apparatus 
A(G); a system of two chronometers; the suppressor of external fields and/or obstacles; 
the screen S. The observable physical marks produced during the considered act of 
measurement, are: the point-like mark P, the position of the needle of one chronometer at 
the beginning of the act of measurement, and the position of the needle of the other 
chronometer at the end of this act. The observable manifestations enumerated above are 
not themselves numerical values, nor do they ‘possess’ any quale of which the direct 
perception is necessarily associated in the observer's mind with the involved specimen of 
the studied microstate. They are only perceptible physical marks – say µ1n, µ2n, and µ3n, 
respectively – registered on ‘recorders’ of the utilized global apparatus.  
                                                      
84 ‘Flight’ of what? Obviously a model is involved. Probably the model of a classical 'mobile'. 
85 So indeed here the classical model of 'mobile' is involved. For the mass in de Broglie's sense has a different 
definition, and this might come out one day to be very important. But probably the de Broglie-Bohm approach (Bohm 
[1952]), de Broglie [1956]) was not yet much known in 1968. 
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The meanings associated with the recorded marks as well as the numerical values 
associated with these are defined: 
- With respect to permanent reference elements.  
- By the way in which is conceived what is called 'one act of measurement of, 
specifically, the eigenvalue pn of the momentum-observable P'. This, in agreement with 
IQM, presupposes a general model of a microstate with respect to which this way of 
conceiving the measurement procedure makes sense and can be conceptually integrated 
in the previously achieved structure of scientific knowledge. And it seems utterly clear 
that:  
- The general concepts of 'momentum-value p' and of 'mass M' that are involved in the 
time-of-flight method, such as it is nowadays formulated, are founded upon the classical 
model of a 'mobile'. This indicates that in the required conditions (in particular the 
extinction of all the exterior fields) the method works for a classical model even though 
in fact a specimen of a microstate is involved.  
And the method as a whole seems 'reasonable' precisely because, and only because it is 
designed so as to change during one act of momentum-measurement certain features of 
the posited classical mobile – namely its position – but in a way that does not alter that 
what has to be measured for the involved specimen of such a mobile – namely the 
momentum-value pn of the momentum observable P at the beginning of the considered 
act of measurement. Indeed the procedure would be totally arbitrary in the absence of this 
assumption.  
- The vector-value dn calculated from the observable marks µ1n, µ2n, and µ3n, has an 
origin that is permitted to vary inside some non-negligible space-domain Δr (because the 
origin of the 'flight' of the posited 'mobile' simply cannot be defined strictly when the 
mobile indicates a physical entity that is a specimen σ(msG,cw)n of a microstate msG).  
The method time of flight is the only one that, accordingly to nowadays QMHD, seems to 
be regarded as 'legal' for measuring the momentum observable. This is so because it is 
implicitly supposed to realize the inner structure of an eigenstate of the momentum 
observable throughout the considered act of measurement, namely the plane-wave 
structure required by the expansion (19) |ΨG,H(A) (r, t1≤t≤tf)>/P written for the observable 
P.  
In short, we conclude that the measurement-evolution (19) that is implied by the time-of-
flight method, does entail a coding rule, via a statistical correlation. Indeed: Let us 
denote by µpj ≡ {(µk, k=1,2,3)j}pj,  j=1,2,…JP, the group of all the observable marks 
produced by any one act of P-measurement. On the basis of a reasoning drawn from the 
classical mechanics but that can be coherently related with the modelling postulate 
MP({σ(msG,cw)})and the relation (1') Gt↔(msGt,cw≡{σ(msGt,cw)}), it is possible to specify 
for any eigenvalue pj of P a corresponding space-time domain (Δr.Δt)j such that if the 
whole group of marks {(µk, k=1,2,3)j}P is registered anywhere inside (Δr.Δt)j) this means 
'registration of the eigenvalue pj'. So that one can write: 
[(registration of the marks {(µk, k=1,2,3)j}P anywhere inside (Δr.Δt)j ) means the result ' 
pj' ]           (20) 
This, as announced, is a statistical correlation that acts like a coding rule for 
individual acts of P-measurement, in the sense defined in (1.I).2.  So it seems likely that 
– on the basis of the method time-of-flight and comforted by the analyses of the Stern-
Gerlach method for spin-measurements which mutatis mutandis leads to a similar 
conclusion – de Broglie, Bohm, Park and Margenau have admitted more or less 
implicitly that any act of quantum measurement involves a coding rule of the general 
form (20). We denote this view by BBGPM.  
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In the present context the conclusion (20) is very interesting because it immediately 
suggests the following new considerations. 
- No general proof of the coding rule (20) has been worked out inside QMHD 
because it concerns individual measurement-evolutions that find no formal place inside 
QMHD. But for our re-constructive purpose this is not a crucial circumstance. Indeed, 
more or less explicitly, Park and Margenau have succeeded to somehow 'prove' inside 
QMHD the correlation (20) for the particular case of the momentum observable P. 
Moreover, as already remarked, for the basic position observable R a correlation of the 
same form is tautologically realized. And the QMHD ‘postulate of representation’ of an 
observable A(R,P) permits to form A by a simple calculus from the pair (R,P) of the two 
basic observables, so that also the eigenvalues aj of A can be constructed via definite 
algorithms from the eigenvalues of R and P. So inside QMHD the coding procedure (20) 
can be applied to any observable A, in some specifiable conditions. 
- But the method time-of-flight involves the classical 'mobile'-model of a 
microstate; whereas inside [IQM-QMHD] the modelling postulate MP(msG,cw) from 
(6.II).2 introduces the G-(corpuscular-wave)-model of a microstate defined by (1') for 
any specimen σ(msG,cw) of the studied microstate msG. And according to this model, 
when the studied microstate involves inner quantum fields the condition of extinction of 
all the fields that act upon the corpuscular-like singularity from the wave of the involved 
specimen of the microstate cannot be realized any more.    
This means that inside [IQM-QMHD] the way of conceiving what can adequately be 
called 'an act of measurement of the observable A', might in general change when 
the studied microstate involves inner quantum fields.  
Nevertheless it remains quite conceivable a priori that for unbound microstates 
without inner quantum fields the form (20) of a coding rule might subsist and be 
coherently inserted in [IQM-QMHD] in agreement with the G-(corpuscular-wave)-model 
of a microstate. But in order to decide whether this is so or not, it seems necessary to 
better understand intuitively – just to thoroughly understand – on what grounds deeper 
than merely the above-mentioned algorithmic constructability of a one-to-one coding-
rule with form (20) – BBGPM could have been led to admit implicitly a coding rule of 
this form for any observable A. So we concentrate now upon discerning such grounds.  
This brings us back to comparison with a classical mobile. The main obstacle in the 
way of such a comparison is that the formalism from QMHD does not distinguish between 
statistical descriptions and individual descriptions (the last ones are not even specified). 
Correlatively, in (19) the measurement-evolution-hamiltonian H(A) conserves only the 
mean value of the eigenvalues of A. Whereas a coding relation of the form (20) for the 
result of one individual act of measurement on a microstate of one micro-system is quite 
essentially required to specify just one definite eigenvalue aj of A (accordingly also to the 
general concept of coding relation introduced in (1.I).2). So in order to be able to obtain 
the sharpest possible comparability of (19) with a measurement-evolution of a classical 
mobile, we should focus as strongly as possible the representation from (19) upon one 
eigenvalue aj. Let us then make use of the legal limit of the concept ‘|ΨG,H(A)(t1≤t≤tf)>/A’ 
by considering only one term from the sum (19):  
cj’(t1)=0 pour ∀j’≠j,   |cj(t1)|=1,   cj(t1)=1.eiα(x, t1),     |ΨG,H(A)( r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A=(1.eiα(r,t1)|u(r,aj)>)/A    
(21) 
where α(r,t) is an arbitrary phase-function. This – strictly speaking – does not lead 
outside the formalism of  QMHD; but it places just upon its frontier. In (21) the 
representation (19) becomes 'tangent' to QMHD.  
According to QMHD the unique eigenvalue aj that is involved in (21) coincides with 
the mean value of the possible eigenvalues, so it is itself conserved by the 
measurement-evolution generated by H(A).  
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Thereby we have finally extorted an individual qualification from the statistical 
formalism of QMHD.  
However what changes in time in (19) – mathematically and physically – is not yet 
clear. 
Then let us go over into the ‘physical’-space R representation of (21) where the 
considered measurement-evolution does play out inside the framework of our factual 
perceptions. In the physical space, the ket from (19) |ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A is conceived as 
a 'wave-packet' endowed with one maximum to which it is possible to associate an 
'individual' dynamic comparable with that of a classical 'mobile'. But with the limit-form 
(21) of (19) the corresponding R-representation does not entail any more any evolution. 
It simply stays unchanged; it ceases to serve the very aim for which the R-representations 
have been defined inside QMHD. So, while the limiting form (21) itself of the A-
representation (19) has permitted to obtain an individual insight by having started with a 
statistical descriptor, this same limiting form (21) cuts off quite radically any 
comparability between the statistical descriptions from QMHD and the individual 
description of a mobile in classical mechanics. This brings into evidence that – in 
general, and unsurprisingly – it is impossible to pinpoint individual mechanical 
qualifications via a statistical description of mechanical movement. It explodes into the 
attention that any quantum-mechanical state-ket (19) |ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A, even if it is 
represented in the 'physical' space, consists of just a set of classified numbers each one of 
which specifies a result – with respect to a referential – of a position-measurement on a 
specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG. The fact that the statistical-probabilistic 
distribution of these numbers possesses a maximum, in general, that changes its position 
in the 'physical' space, is occulted in (19) by definition; and even if it were not, it is a 
maximum of an abstract nature that cannot produce observable marks 86.  
While according to [IQM-QMHD] the R-localization of that what can produce 
observable marks – namely the singularity from the amplitude of the corpuscular wave of 
the one specimen σ(msG,cw) of the involved studied microstate – is on the contrary very 
localized in the physical space, at any time, but it lies on the level of individual 
conceptualization and it remains exterior to the formalism of QMHD.  
Between the QMHD representation (19) and that what acts in the coding-procedure 
(20) there is a silenced semantic representational clash, a collision between abstract 
statistics of numbers and individual features of the physical individual entities that 
are involved, namely specimens σ(msG,cw) of the involved studied microstate. 
This clash is silenced by the fact that the formalism of QMHD either absorbs any 
individual entity or feature in a conceptually inadequate way by placing it on the 
statistical level of conceptualization (think of the case of the eigenket in (II.6).1)), or it 
tolerates from them merely ghost-like verbal reflections on the statistical representations. 
So here we have touched the limit of the investigation that can be made inside 
QMHD in order to found a general coding rule of the type (20). And notwithstanding the 
loss in the R-representation of (21), of any mechanical significance, the hints entailed by 
the preceding considerations suffice already for having conveyed a direct, intuitive, 
analogical understanding of the way in which inside [IQM-QMHD] it will be possible to 
connect intelligibly the QMHD representation (19) of the A-measurement-evolution-ket 
                                                      
86 This illustrates into what conceptual-descriptional impossibilities and inadequacies is cornered an exclusively 
statistical representation – realized before an individual representation because the approach has been developing top-
down – when, later, this representation is confronted to the purpose to generate the individual physical entities and 
features on which any statistical description is necessarily founded: a war of temporal order bursts out (We are in the 
domain of applicability of the theorem of Ehrenfest that 'connects' QMHD with classical mechanics; but the 'connection' 
is a clash (marked by the general assertion of Heisenberg's non-classical principle and theorem)).  
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|ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A, with the G-(corpuscular-wave)-model of a microstate, by going 
over into the IQM-domain of individual representations of the specimens of the studied 
microstate. For, going back in QMHD, we can add that the space-time parameters that 
define a wave-packet are very adjustable. They permit to quite satisfactorily approach – 
via a statistical representation – the two essential features to be researched for the coding-
purpose, namely: 
(a) Conservation of a mean value of the eigenvalue aj peaked around one value aj 
as strongly as one wants. 
(b) Choice of a definite direction and a convenient degree of stability for the 
dynamics of the maximum of the wave-packet throughout the time interval (t1≤t≤tf), via 
the control of the 'external' fields involved by H(A) 87. 
(c) The possibilities (a) and (b) permit to identify the optimal choices for the 
locations of the registering devices (this is what permits the method 'time-of-flight'). 
(Inside classical mechanics it is obvious that a mechanical displacement of a mobile 
throughout which the value aj of a given mechanical quantity A keeps constant, leads the 
mobile into a predictable spatial domain Δrj if the displacement lasts sufficiently; and 
that this domain can become as distant as one wants with respect to any other domain 
Δrj’ that corresponds to another value aj’ of A, with j’≠j (the source-domain being the 
same). Which permits to mutually singularise these spatial domains). 
So the QMHD-parameters of the measurement-wave-packet (19) |ΨG,H(A)(r, 
t1≤t≤tf)>/A assigned to each measurement evolution of the studied microstate can be 
adapted to the goal of insuring that the initial – individual – value aj of A from the 
corresponding specimen of this microstate, stays constantly, with controllable 
approximations, on the direction of displacement that reaches a more or less spatially 
extended registering device where any impact means ‘aj’ 88. 
Together, all the preceding considerations permit to understand inside [IQM-
QMHD] on what an extraordinary sort of mixture of concepts can have taken form the – 
implicit – supposition that any quantum measurement does admit a coding rule of the 
form (20); namely that the statistical QMHD representation of a microstate can always be 
brought to consist, wholly, of exclusively an evolution of a form of the type (20)89.  
However in spite of the extraordinary character of this path, it leads us to admit 
here a priori – in agreement with BBGPM – the possibility of principle to transpose in 
[IQM-QMHD] terms coding-measurement-evolutions of the formal type (20). But we 
know in advance that the reasons that ground this acceptance apply exclusively to 
unbound microstates of one microsystem and with simple operation of generation, i.e. to 
microstates that evolve in the absence of quantum-fields that can work on the involved 
'singularity'. Which is a very severe restriction. So we know from the start that we shall 
                                                      
87 'External' in the sense that they can be manipulated (generated, suppressed) from our macroscopic level. 
88 What a prowess we have finally accomplished! The only way to find answer to a basic question of physics – how to 
know the meaning, in conceptualized terms, of the observable result of an act of measurement – inside a basic theory 
of physics called 'quantum mechanics', has been to do, what ?  
(a) To laboriously unmask individual intruders {|u(r,aj,)>, ∀j} surreptitiously injected into an abstract statistic of mere 
numbers {⎢cj(aj,t1) ⎢2,  ∀j}A drawn from the set of all such statistics of which a QMHD-state-ket ΨG – by itself – does 
entirely consist.  
(b) And therefrom, by use of faint reflections by these individual intruders |u(r,aj,)>, of aspects of physical individual 
entities and features, to draw – at distance – on the level of the classical representation of the dynamics of another sort 
of individual real physical entities called 'mobiles', a virtual trace that is alike to a shadow of a 'mobile'. (The 
convolutions from this last verbal expression only translate the intrication of the reasoning that has permitted to knock 
out the conclusion formulated above). This conveys a feeling of the distance introduced between meaning and 
representation by the top-down constructed statistical formalism from QMHD.  
89 And let us recall that – via the expansion-postulate – this concept is quite essentially tied with the reference-concept 
of an eigenstate – an a-temporal sample of arbitrary spatial extension – of the wave-movement in the neighbourhood 
of the singularity from a de Broglie corpuscular-like wave. 
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have to face the problem of defining also another coding procedure, valid for microstates 
that do involve quantum fields.  
 
(6.II).4.4. The major confusions from the QMHD-representation of a measurement-evolution 
We shall now concentrate upon the significances involved by the mathematical 
expression of the QMHD-representation of quantum measurements. What follows might 
sometimes seem repetitive and trivial. But finally, we hope, this feeling will fade out and 
leave place to a feeling of full elucidation. Only a very detailed and rigorous analysis can 
dislodge sediments of thinking and expressing installed by more than a century of 
thought, of formal research, and of teaching. 
 
 (6.II).4.4.1. Preliminary recall 
The evolving state-ket |ψG,H(r,t)> of the studied microstate msG is supposed for the 
moment to be always specifiable directly in mathematical terms by use of the 
Schrödinger equation of the problem.  
- |ψG,H(r,t)> works as a reservoir of all the potentially available predictive-numbers 
that QMHD can offer via algorithms concerning the studied microstate msG; namely the 
probabilities of results of measurements of any observable A, performed on msG at any 
time t≥to after the moment to when the initial form |ψG,H(r,to)> of |ψG,H(r,t)> has been 
specified. The descriptor |ψG,H(r,t)> has an only potential content that remains to be 
partially worked out according to particular definite predictive purposes. Its outputs are 
purely abstract, numerical and statistical.  
- The expansion (18) |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A=∑jcj(aj,t1)|u(r,aj,)>,∀j,∀t1 of |ψG,H(r,t)> on the 
basis of eigenket {|u(r,aj>,∀j}A of a given observable A, permits to explicate from 
|ψG,H(r,t)> – via Born's postulate and for any moment t1≥to and any observable A – the 
predictive probability law denoted (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}) on the emergence by measurement 
of the eigenvalues aj of A. This permits to verify this law via a subsequent sufficiently 
long succession of effective realizations of coding-measurement-evolutions for A. So 
(18) permits to indicate the total predictive content of |ψG,H(r,t1)> in  the following more 
explicit form: 
|ψG,H(r,t1)>   ≈pred.   {∀A,  ∀t1,  |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A }                                                     (22) 
- In (18) and so in (22) the particular amount of numerical predictive content from 
|ψG,H(r,t)> that is tied with any given observable A and any given time t1, ceases to be 
potential, it is explicated by already achieved calculi. Thereby, though they remain 
strictly abstract, the expressions (18) and (22) expresses now the whole essence of the 
QMHD predictive algorithm, namely: the concept of eigenstate of an observable A that 
plays the role of a sample of wave-movement around a singularity from a corpuscular 
wave (6.II)1); the equation A|uj(r,aj)>=aj|uj(r,aj)>,∀j that determines the eigenket in 
connection with the algebra of observables defined inside QMHD; so de Broglie's 
'corpuscular-wave' model; and finally, Born's postulate π(aj)=|cj(aj,t1)|
2.  
The concept (22) is the explicit core of the QMHD predictive representation. 
- Consider now the second member of the coding-measurement-evolution ket (19)  
|ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A=∑jcj(t1)|u(r,aj)>. It has the form of an expansion (18) of the state-
ket |ψG,H(r,t1)> with respect to A but that – from the time t1 when one act of 
measurement-evolution begins and up to the time tf when this act of measurement 
evolution finishes – continues its evolution in new, 'coding-conditions', defined by a 
measurement-hamiltonian H(A) that commutes with A.  
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The QMHD descriptor of any one coding-measurement-evolution is a statistical 
descriptor.  
But, as it is well-known, this same statistical descriptor is also posited to finish by a 
'reduction' of its statistical character that reveals the individual result aj that the one 
considered act of A-measurement-evolution has actualized out from the whole spectrum 
{aj}, ∀j of a priori possible results aj. 
So from the beginning the descriptor (19) exhibits – formally – an ambiguous 
character in what concerns the level of conceptualization on which it is placed. 
- Let us finally notice also that the three descriptors |ψG,H(r,t)>, |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A and 
|ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A designate meanings of very different natures, in particular in what 
is tied with the involved time-parameters. So we stay attentive to the involved time 
parameters. 
 
(6.II).4.4.2. Critical remarks and questions  
In what follows we adopt the point of view of [IQM-QMHD].  
Consider the descriptor (19) |ΨG,H(A)(r,(t1≤t≤tf)>/A=∑jcj(t1)|u(r,aj,)>,∀j of a coding 
measurement-evolution. It is often said that "at t1 the 'system' is 'prepared' for 
measurement, and correspondingly is also 'prepared' the new ket |ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A 
that represents the measurement-evolution". What happens factually during these 
'preparations' is neither represented formally nor explicitly stated by consensually 
regulated ways of using words. In particular it is not said how the 'system' is obtained, 
physically, operationally, in order to (then?) 'prepare' it. Nor is it explicitly stated how 
is to be carried out the factual coding-measurement-evolution itself for – specifically – a 
given observable A and a given sort of microstate. It is only specified that the 
hamiltonian must commute with A, but on the physical coding-process there are no other 
indications than the directly postulated assertion that each act of A-measurement 
produces, for any 'system' (i.e. microstate), an eigenvalue aj of A that is associated with 
the corresponding eigenket |u(r,aj,)> and is "indicated by the 'needles' of the registering 
devices" (just like in von Neumann's unacceptable representation). Everything hovers 
calmly in the mathematical-verbal spheres. No particular stress whatever is placed upon 
the fact that, in order for aj to become known and since obviously a statistic of abstract 
numbers cannot itself trigger physical marks by interaction with physical registering 
devices, one should be informed how the interaction has to be organized in order that the 
'needles' inform us that they indicate one definite aj and not another aj'≠aj, or even 
something else. While in fact the written expression of the descriptor (19) 
|ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A=∑jcj(t1)|u(r,aj> places us on the statistical level of 
conceptualization, as just a continuation of the expansion (18) in new external conditions 
expressed by the measurement-hamiltonian H(A) instead of the initially acting 
hamiltonian H. And just like in the case of von Neumann's unreasonable representation 
of quantum measurements, here also is totally occulted the question of the procedure to 
follow in order to register observable physical marks {µkA}j, k= 1,2,...n, from which it be 
then possible for us to construct the eigenvalue aj that is to be regarded as the result of 
the considered act of coding-measurement-evolution. Even the concept itself of 'coding'-
measurement-evolution – that in IQM is central – is devoid inside QMHD of a generally 
defined equivalent, notwithstanding that precisely the requirement of coding the 
registered observable marks in terms of one definite eigenvalue aj of the observable A 
determines the whole definition of the physical content of 'one act of A-measurement', as 
it appeared clearly in (6.II).4.3. The method time-of-flight studied by Cohen and 
Margenau and Bohm's analysis of the Stern-Gerlach procedure have not been followed 
by an explicit conclusion formulated in general terms. In the text-books it is only added 
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sometimes that when aj 'is obtained' this 'fact' is accompanied by a ‘reduction’ of the 
measurement-ket (19) |ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A=∑jcj(t1)|u(r,aj,)> to only one of its terms.  
But this 'fact' – the postulated obtainment of aj and the correlative reduction of (19) 
– is a formal 'fact'.  
The identification between mathematical writings and physical facts has become so deep 
in the minds and so perfect that what is formal finally banishes what is factual. Indeed 
strictly nothing is specified concerning what happens physically to the necessarily 
involved specimen of the studied microstate while the formal progression symbolized in 
(19) goes on. Namely that in general, while aj 'is obtained' – which in IQM-language 
means: while aj is constructed from physical marks, from the mathematical 
representation of A, from a model posited for σ(msG), and from the corresponding way of 
registering relevant physical marks {(µkA}j – when all this has been done, then the 
physical state of the involved specimen is usually destroyed, even if the involved system 
subsists. (Which is one of the reasons that led us to speak inside IQM in terms of micro-
states of micro-systems, not directly in terms of 'systems', if one wants to stay entirely 
clear). On the other hand, curiously, the concept of "successive measurements" has 
gained a solitary emergence and it has been variously represented in more or less fiction-
forms that float high above genuine physical operability.    
All this, though in a certain sense it is well known by many physicists, is not 
treated. Consequently, the necessity, in general, to generate another specimen of the 
studied microstate before entering upon a new measurement-evolution (19), does not in 
the least trouble the attention. So: The necessarily repeated physical operation of 
generation G of a physical and individual specimen σ(msG), remains more or less hidden 
in the void of factual meaning of the verbal expressions ‘preparation of the system' and 
'preparation of the measurement-evolution-ket'. The basic concept of operation of 
generation is not consensually formed and stably asserted inside QMHD.  
In these conditions the unavoidable and obvious necessity to make use of a clearly 
individual representation of the measurement-evolutions for verifying a statistical 
description, remains obscure.  
As for the possibility to make use of individual measurement evolutions for – also 
– constructing factually any statistical description, not only for verifying a 
mathematically defined statistical description as it is done in QMHD, this does not even 
appear on the far horizon. (And why should it, when the basic descriptor |ψG,H(t)> is 
posited to be always available via exclusively mathematical means and to involve already 
any expansion (18) |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A, which, directly, generates mathematically the 
probability-law to be verified?).    
In short, all the individual descriptors (G, Gt, msG, σ(msG), MesA, [G.MesA], 
[Gt.MesA], etc.) that inside IQM are singularized and mutually distinguished, not only 
are not represented in the mathematical formalism of QMHD, but moreover, in the verbal 
expressions that accompany the mathematical QMHD-representations they act without 
being defined, in a lacunar and chaotic way, intermittent and uncontrolled. And so a thick 
conceptual mud has banked up. The Fig. 6 is strictly valid. 
 
 (6.II).4.4.3. The reduction problem 
Consider now the postulated ‘reduction’ of the descriptor (19) 
|ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A=∑jcj(t1)|u(r,aj,)>, ∀j, at the final moment tf. Let us recall, for self-
sufficiency of the present argument, that some authors have asserted that from a general 
conceptual viewpoint this ‘reduction’ does not seem unacceptable when one thinks of the 
general formal representation of the calculus of probabilities. Each one realization of the 
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involved ‘experiment’ that generates by repetition the whole universe U={(ej, j=1,2,...J)} 
of possible elementary outcomes ej, actualizes only one outcome from U. This can be 
verbally indicated in a loose way by saying that "each realization of this experiment 
'reduces' the permanent and a priori global potentiality U to only one elementary event 
ej"; why not? Well, let us repeat that in the case of the QMHD-descriptor 
|ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A it remains that the ‘reduction’ of the QMHD-descriptor 
|ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A is not compatible with the mathematical rules imposed by a linear 
formalism, whereas in the case of general probabilistic writings an incompatibility of this 
sort is not imposed 90. But one can also go a little further and suggest that it might be 
found to be conceptually inadequate to express, inside one same descriptor, one actual 
individual outcome of one given eigenvalue aj, and also the representation of the whole a 
priori set of potential individual outcomes.  
But beyond all this, what remains most mysterious is: 
Why should one desire that an individual procedure of measurement performed on 
an individual physical specimen of a physical entity-to-be-studied in order to verify 
via repetitions of this procedure a statistical prediction concerning this entity, be 
itself represented statistically? Why should one want to get entangled in such a 
circle? 
When one stops a sufficiently long moment to focus genuine attention upon this 
strange conceptual situation that has been brought into evidence so repetitively that it 
vanishes by trivialization, all of a sudden, like in certain optical illusions, a surprising 
sort of summarizing explanation leaps to one’s eyes as an obviousness: Just because 
historically only the statistical descriptor became first available and then it stayed for a 
long time the unique available conceptual resource:  
The QMHD-descriptor (19) |ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A=∑jcj(t1)|u(r,aj,)>,∀j, of a 
measurement-evolution, with the 'reductions' that it requires, is just a desperate 
aborted attempt at crowding inside a unique mathematical statistical descriptor all 
that is mentioned below. 
(a) On the one hand, the representation of all the individual, physical, actual, and 
successively realized coding-measurement-evolutions [Gt.MesA] defined in (3.I).4, each 
one of which ends with the individual factual, actual registration of its own result that 
consists of a group {µkA} j, k=1,2,...n, of physical marks that code in terms of one 
eigenvalue 'aj'.  
And on the other hand also 
(b) The globalized, unique, statistical, a-temporal, abstract assertion of the QMHD-
predictive distribution {|cj(t1)|
2}, ∀j of pure numbers, each one of which is the cardinal 
and also the posited probability of a corresponding class of outcomes of one a priori 
possible result 'aj'.  
All this has been crowded inside one – statistical – descriptor. 
But such an extraordinary attempt quite certainly involves gross confusions, and 
these do certainly entail various uncontrollable vicious consequences. One such 
consequence concerns the time-parameter that comes in, and it is identified below. 
                                                      
90 Moreover, such a mathematical representation might even suggest in certain minds that it is a 'fact' that the statistic 
itself achieves the individual experiments, so that one only has to find out what goes on factually when this happens? 
Who knows? Concerning QMHD anything succeeds to seem conceivable. Think of the current face-value way of 
understanding Schrödinger’s ironical cat-example, or much better, of Everett's infinity of parallel universes that  – 
without any irony in this case – are asserted to be 'really' generated by each 'reduction' of a mathematical writing on a 
sheet of paper: In such views the mixture between formal descriptors written on paper or screens, and physical facts, 
reaches not only perfection, but also greatness. 
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Consider the chain of statistical descriptors that leads to a measurement-evolution 
(19) and then includes it. Let us denote this chain as (ch): 
[ |ψG(r,to)>–|ψG,H(r,(t1-to))>– |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A – |ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A ]           (ch) 
The measurement-evolution (19) is connected to this chain via the statistical time-
parameter t1. Verbally, the statistical time-value t1 from (ch) is indicated as the time when 
"a measurement-evolution begins", and the statistical time-value tf from (ch) is indicated 
as the time when "the measurement-evolution finishes". As for the statistical time-value 
to, it has not a very definite significance because the whole concept of operation of 
generation is lacking inside QMHD and so also the notion (13') [Gt1.MesA] is lacking 
(with Gt1≡[Go.(t1-to)] and also Gt1=F(Go,EC,(t1-to)) where Go↔[msG≡{σ(msG)] according 
to (1)). Nevertheless it seems clear that the whole statistical chain (ch) is subtended by 
any one individual coding-measurement-succession [Gt1.MesA] (13') with Gt1≡[Go.(t1-
to)] and also Gt1=F(Go,EC,(t1-to)) where Go↔[msG≡{σ(msG)] according to (1)). 
But inside QMHD there is no indication whatever of where and how a physical 
specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate is generated and loaded factually inside 
the one individual thread of factual coding-measurement-succession [Gt1.MesA].  
In these conditions the two concepts of a QMHD statistical chain (ch) and an 
individual factual coding-measurement-succession [Gt1.MesA] are radically disconnected 
from one another. But there are correspondences of meaning that can be established as it 
is shown in the following figure 7. And for once we shall go to an extravagant limit of 
explicit statements of obvious trivialities, in order to radically expurgate the unacceptable 
QMHD representation of the measurements of its entire absurdity.  
What follows applies to both sorts of representation of quantum measurements, either of 
generation of the statistical predictions, or verification-measurements of already 
constituted statistical predictions. 
 
 
                                                                              purely algorithmic representation 
                     |ψG(t(s)o)>→(|ψG,H(t(s)1-t(s)o)>≈F(EC,(t(s)1t(s)o))  →  |ψG,H(t(s)1)>/A→    |ΨG,H(A)(t(s)1≤t(s) ≤  
t(s)f)>/A  
                      statistical level of conceptualization 
                                                          [Gto(i) (t(i)o  ≤   t(i)    ≤    t(i)1).  MesAt1(i) (t(i)1  ≤  t(i) ≤  t(i)f)] 
    individual level of conceptualization  
 
 
 (t(i)o , t(s)o), with  t(i)o  ≈def     t(s)o                     (t(i)1 , t(s)1),            t (i)1 ≈def   t(s)1             (t(i)f, t(s)f),   t (i)f  ≈def    t(s)f  
           t(i)o	:	factual,	known,																																																		t	(i)1	:		factual,	known																																		mtdc																														t	(i)f	:		factual,		known		
					corresponding	by	definition	to	t(s)o												corresponding	by	definition	to	t(s)1																																			corresponding	by	definition	
to	t(s)f	
 
Fig.7. The correspondences on a meta-temporal dimension between statistical QMHD 
times  
and IQM individual times 
 
The formal QMHD chain (ch) concerning a given problem of measurement is 
entirely placed on a level of statistical conceptualization.  
Each thread of an individual, physical coding-measurement-succession [Gt1.MesA] 
is represented on an individual level of conceptualization of the microstates and it is 
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achieved in order to contribute – by many repetitions of it – to the verification of the 
predictions from (ch). Each one realization of a succession [Gt1.MesA] runs beneath the 
whole statistical chain (ch) and along it, in its own specific, factual and individual 
temporal universe, carrying each time one physical specimen σ(msG) of the studied 
microstate, from the moment t(i)o when this specimen has been factually generated by the 
corresponding realization of the operation Go from Gt1(i)=F(Go,EC,(t(i)1-t(i)o)), to the final 
moment moment t(i)f when it triggers its own contribution of observable marks that codes 
for one given eigenvalue aj. For indeed, quite obviously:  
It is the one specimen σ(msG) carried by each one individual coding-measurement-
evolution [Gt1.MesA] that triggers upon physical devices one group of physical 
observable marks {µkAj}j, k=1,2,...n, that can be translated into one eigenvalue aj of 
which the realization is immediately counted as a contribution of one unity to the 
future final estimation of the degree of factual verification of the result 'aj', to the 
statistical prediction asserted before by the term |cj(t1)|
2 from the expansion 
|ψG,H(r,t1)>/A from (ch). This is 'the needle of the apparatus', nothing else.  
But from the point of view of QMHD the presence inside the chain (ch) of the 
considered one specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate is a Deus ex machina, since 
the formalism ignores it. 
Now, it is obvious that one common succession of the statistical time-parameters 
from (ch) and the individual time-parameters involved by a coding-measurement-
succession [Gt1(i).MesA] cannot be conceived: The operational-conceptual process 
exposed in IQM by which a statistical representation of the studied microstate emerges 
by repeated realizations of a very long sequence of repetitions of factual successions 
[Gt1.MesA] – either for generating a statistical prediction or for verifying a pre-
established one – is such that the individual physical content from one realization of the 
succession [Gt1.MesA] is entirely eliminated as soon as its own input in the statistical 
representation (ch) is achieved and inscribed: Thereby it has been transformed in just that 
humble contribution of one unity to the emerging so the changing 'verification-cardinal', 
say ver.|cj(t1)|
2, that has been mentioned above and that leads to the stable cardinal 
|cj(t1)|
2 asserted in the element |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A from (ch) for the class of outcomes of the 
considered eigenvalue aj of A. If at the end of a sequence of a very big number N of 
repetitions of a succession [Gt1.MesA], all the final 'verification-cardinals' ver.|cj(t1)|
2 – 
with any j – are sufficiently equal to those from the element |ψG,H(t(s)1)>/A from (ch), 
then the verification of the QMHD prediction concerning A has succeeded. But this can 
happen only long after the individual and repeated times t(i)o, t(i)1 and t(i)f. These 
individual times are all essentially disconnected from the statistical times t(s)o, t(s)1 and 
tsi)f, respectively.  
But let us introduce a meta-temporal dimension of comparison between (13') and 
the chain (ch). Let us denote it mtdc. Let us project upon mtdc both the statistical times 
and the individual times from the Fig.4. This brings into evidence the possibility to 
define the semantic correspondences t(i)o ≈def  t(s)1, t(i)1 ≈def  t(s)1, and t(i)f ≈def  t(s)f . So on 
mtdc, in the sense just specified, it is finally possible to achieve one common meta-
succession of 'corresponding meanings' of the statistical times and the individual times 
from the Fig.4. This will now permit to genuinely understand the mental sources of the 
'reduction problem. 
The degree of specification that marks the correspondences from mtdc is not 
uniform. QMHD does contain the non-formalized, the only spoken concepts of 'the time 
when a measurement begins' and 'the time when the measurement finishes' of which the 
statistical or individual status is left unspecified. But the concept of 'the time when the 
involved individual specimen of the studied microstate begins to exist' is not even only 
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verbally contained by QMHD. So in the correspondence denoted in the Fig.4 by 't(i)o ≈def  
t(s)o' the second time involved, t(s)o, is entirely absent from QMHD. So we stress that the 
denotation 't(s)o' – insofar as in the figure 7 it stems from the statistical chain (ch) – is a 
purely conventional insertion for our present analytic aim, because its factual 
significance in connection with the operation of generation (1) G (renoted 'Go' in (13')) in 
fact stems exclusively from IQM and it exists exclusively on the individual level of 
conceptualization.  
More: In fact in the statistical chain (ch) the time-parameter – re-noted in the Fig.7 
with an upper index 's' – is only a global and conventional label of the epoch when this 
statistic has been achieved. Any temporal regulation of the physically and conceptually 
meaningful temporal features of a coding-measurement-evolution is strictly individual; it 
concerns a corresponding individual succession [Go.MesA], nothing else; the QMHD 
values of the time-parameter from the statistical chain (ch) are just a reflexion from this 
succession, like the light of the moon that stems from the sun. Their insertion in the 
elements fro (ch) is misleading.   
But when – in the botched statistical common representation of all these various 
individual and statistical times that are implicitly involved by the mixed QMHD 
representation of the quantum measurements – the last moment t(s)f is reached and an 
individual outcome aj is explicitly asserted, this, I dare think, brings forth in the minds at 
least a vague conceptual uneasiness; possibly even a weak disagreement concerning the 
in-distinction between statistical features and individual ones; and, may be, a glimmer of 
wonder on where some representation of an agent of interaction with the apparatus has 
entered the chain (ch) [|ψG(r,to)>–|ψG,H(r,(t1-to))>–|ψG,H(r,t1)>/A–|ΨG,H(A)(r,t1≤t≤tf)>/A] 
of purely numerical abstract structures from the formalism of QMHD; a wonder associated 
with some resurgence of the entirely forgotten common-sense necessity of some 
individual and material entity able to bring into physical being the asserted observable 
effect. And so, to face at least this last necessity when exclusively a purely statistical 
formalism was available, the 'reduction' of the measurement-ket  |ΨG,H(A)(r,t(s)1 ≤ 
t(s)≤tf)>/A has been postulated.  
Which then has been felt to be scandalous from a mathematical point of view !!!!  
While the physical point of view seems to have never been declaredly required, nor 
a conceptual one, notwithstanding that this whole saga happens inside a theory of 
physical entities. 
So a fortiori no physical-and-conceptual explanation has been identified.   
That is how the general mixture between vague and lacunar individual concepts 
and statistical mathematical representations that flaws the whole QMHD-formalism, 
finally came to an outburst in the last link from (ch). This happened because there – 
inside one same descriptor – while the time-parameters t(s)1 and t(s)f do possess a verbal 
significance that focuses attention upon meanings, furthermore, the formal representation 
has to be dashed explicitly onto the individual level in order to generate some minimal 
intelligibility. And this has been done by a verbal diktat that violates the rules of the 
utilized mathematical language, which – consensually – is sacrilege. 
From a purely conceptual viewpoint, now, the preceding scan brings forth 
strikingly that: 
A unique absolute well ordered temporal succession of time parameters some of 
which characterize a statistic to be verified (or generated), and others characterize 
individual measurement-evolutions tied with the chosen purpose, is just an 
impossible concept91. 
                                                      
91 As soon as it is stated this seems trivial; but in fact it certainly is not for if it were the reduction problem would not 
have subsisted so long and steadily.  
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The 'reduction' problem, when it is transposed in conceptual terms, brings into full 
light this gross, utterly trivial fact that at the public time when one given individual 
succession [Gt.MesA] in the sense of IQM is repeated for verifying a statistic, that 
statistic has already been entirely established before, both mathematically and factually, 
while in order to verify it, one has to construct another statistic that is not yet there, and 
to construct it factually. So conceiving in one ordered succession, on one same temporal 
dimension regarded as a temporal dimension for a physically realized order of physical 
facts – not as an only imagined methodologically introduced meta-dimension –, time 
parameters that label a representation of physical individual entities and operations, and 
time parameters that label merely abstract predictive numbers that qualify these entities 
and operations in globalized statistical-probabilistic terms, is just non-sense. 
On the basis of the preceding examination we refuse, not only von Neumann's 
representation of quantum measurements, but also the essence itself of the QMHD-
representation of quantum-measurements. 
 
(6.II).4.5. Conclusion on (6.II).4  
The analyses from  (6.II).4 entail that: 
QMHD is devoid of an acceptable representation of measurements. 
How has it been possible for such a situation to establish itself in the most 
fundamental among the nowadays theories of physical domains of reality? How has it 
been possible that so well known and trivial considerations as those brought forth above, 
have stayed inactive such a very long time?  
The answer might lie in the circumstance that the nowadays representation of 
quantum measurements has emerged under the pressure of the fact that the QMHD-
formalism, such as it has been formulated in its first phase by a purely mathematical top-
down approach, offered mathematically pre-organized conceptual moulds for lodging in 
them exclusively what seemed immediately useful for prediction. The content in terms of 
individual physical operations repeated upon individual physical entities, though it is by 
definition and obviously involved by the concept of a 'statistic', remained entirely non-
described by this purely mathematical top-down construction of the predictive statistics 
from QMHD because it was not directly necessary for prediction. So the question of the 
physical individual constructability of the predictive statistics from QMHD did not even 
arise. Correlatively, the very distinction between the concept of a predictive statistic of 
abstract numbers, and its individual, physical genesis, that is involved by definition, 
faded out from the minds: these two fundamentally different concepts – one with a 
conceptual status of 'cause' and the other one with a conceptual status of 'effect' tended to 
identify on a fictitious common statistical level of conceptualization. The void of a 
bottom-up organization of also the individual level of representation of the microstates 
confined the expressivity – and the thought – on exclusively the statistical level, the first 
one that had been encountered in the historical development of the quantum theory (and 
mainly for bound microstates). The minds remained imprisoned in a statistical conceptual 
fortress that floated on a morass of vague and chaotic individual concepts, as it still does 
nowadays. There was no organized individual conceptual level of conceptualization on 
which to leap down and break free. What was lying deeper than the constructed statistics 
was not visible in the undone beneath them. 
It is very noteworthy that such a process has been possible: This draws attention 
upon the control that must be kept active, in Physics, upon the connections between 
mathematical expressions and physical-conceptual contents.  
IQM with its bottom-up approach that starts from local zeros of knowledge and 
generates intelligibility while it constructs its representations, was not even conceivable 
at that initial time. This, probably, was why de Broglie's physical and individual concept 
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of a corpuscular-like wave has been hauled upside into the emergent statistical 
formalism, disguised in two ill-understood mathematical concepts, the concept of 
eigenstate of an observable and the concept of a physical wave-function. Under the 
protection of the void of any conceptual control, the concept of wave-function moved 
immediately into the statistical descriptor called a wave-packet, and then into the still 
more abstract concept of a state-ket; while the concept of eigenstate was assimilated in its 
essence to that of an unintelligible limiting sort of state-ket. Whereby the hegemony of a 
mathematic of pure statistics stepped in, and the meanings were silenced. And so the 
individual features – that irrepressibly do impose themselves to the minds when one 
deals with measurements – have been stuffed together with statistical features into one 
common statistical descriptor devoid of inner semantic consistency, the coding-
measurement-evolution-state-ket |ΨG,H(A)(r,t(s)1≤ t(s)≤tf)>/A. This offered at least a way of 
speaking. And therefore, in spite of all the confusions and inadequacies that somehow – 
from the very start – must have acted in the minds as a resistance, this incoherent 
descriptor (19) continues to be taught up to this very day, even though it has been 
criticized so persistently and so variously92. (Think of Schrödinger's cat that has been 
written in order to criticize the emerging representation of the quantum measurements 
and nevertheless it entered the minds as an illustration of 'the strange behaviour of the 
microstates). 
On the other hand the mathematical formalism of QMHD itself, precisely by the 
reduction problem, rejects the in-distinction between an individual level of 
conceptualization and the statistical one. The formalism rejects the inclusion of both 
these mutually distinct levels of conceptualization, in one same descriptor; it succeeds to 
express that these should be formally represented in some other well-constructed way: 
The inner consistency of the mathematical structures – as well as of the logical ones – is 
sensitive to the semantic contents.  
This also is very noteworthy. 
This whole history deserves being kept alive in the minds and its implications 
deserve being made use of.  
Notwithstanding the situation brought forth above, QMHD has worked and it 
continues to work. This theory has achieved remarkable successes and it still will achieve 
other successes even if it is left just such as it now stands. Indeed the curious 
omnipresent genius of human mind invents local and individual more or less implicit 
understandings that permit to act adequately there and when one actually does want to 
act. General methods for thinking well are massively left to the theorists. And it seems 
that for the experimenters it suffices to believe that a quantum theory of measurements 
exists in order to measure adequately and to constantly make progress. This teaches 
humility to those who try to construct theories.  
This also proves that a fully satisfactory theory of quantum measurements is 
possible since no doubt it is quite often ‘applied’ without being known.  
So, practically, there is no urgency.  
But conceptually there is urgency. Indeed, what value of principle – as a theory – 
does a representation of non-perceptible microstates possess, if it predicts via purely 
mathematically constructed predictions and does not state in a clear and generally valid 
way how to conceive-and-perform measurements for verifying the predictions? 
  
                                                      
92 Somebody has asserted that "only a new construction can ruin a previously installed construction". 
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CONCLUSION ON THE PART II 
 
We have first identified in 5.II the void, inside QMHD, of an individual 
conceptualization of the microstates, which has led to a first clear perception of the 
concept of (top-down)(bottom-up) anachronistic collision between the approach from 
QMHD and the approach from IQM. 
 Then, inside 6.II we have brought forth that an eigenket |u(r,aj,)> of a quantum 
mechanical observable A has the meaning of a definite mathematically expressed model 
of wave-movement around the singularity in the amplitude of de Broglie’s general 
corpuscular-wave model of a microstate; namely, a wave-movement that keeps constant 
the corresponding eigenvalue aj while the singularity "glides inside its wave".  
This has triggered inside [IQM-QMHD] a first – important – constructive step 
toward the new theory of microstates that is researched here. Namely, we have defined a 
‘G-corpuscular-wave model’ of a microstate, denoted msG,cw, and to this we have 
associated a modelling postulate MP(msG,cw). Thereby de Broglie’s general model of an 
'individual' specimen of a microstate – an ideal purely mental model – is translated in 
physical-operational terms that permit to incorporate it to the approach develop here, 
marked by a general physically-operational character, consensually predictive and 
verifiable. Correlatively, via the relation (1') Gt↔(msGt,cw≡{σ(msGt,cw)}) the initial 
relation (1) G↔(msG) with (msG)≡{σ(msG)}, that inside IQM defines already a new sort 
of factually generated concept of a microstate 'msG' but still possesses an only general, 
purely methodological character, is enriched with features that concern the inner 
structure assigned to the IQM-concept 'msG' on the basis of a particular model, de 
Broglie's 'corpuscular-like wave' model, that is specific of the new theory of the 
microstates that we try to construct. 
We have then brought into evidence the general power of clarification entailed by a 
systematic specification of the existence – or not – of a connection between a ket from a 
mathematical QMHD-expression, with a physical operation of generation G of a 
microstate, and a fortiori with the character of this operation of generation (simple or 
composed). This led to a useful new denotation of the two sorts of ket from the 
formalism of QMHD. 
Finally we have examined the quantum theory of measurements from QMHD. We 
have refused von Neumann's representation on the basis of general conceptual reasons. 
Then we have identified the coding rule that is implicitly assumed inside QMHD and we 
have explicated that it is likely to be devoid of a general validity.  
Then we have examined the essence itself of the QMHD-representation of quantum 
measurements and we have brought into evidence that – and why – it is not acceptable 
either.  
Thereby the preliminary global critical examination of QMHD by reference to IQM 
has come to its end. We can now enter upon an attempt at constructing a second quantum 
mechanics.  
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PART III 
 
 
 
THE PRINCIPLES OF 
A SECOND QUANTUM MECHANICS 
rooted into the microphysical 
factuality 
in a physical-operational way 		
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III «	It	would	seem	that	we	have	followed	as	far	as	possible	the	path	of	logical	development	of	the	ideas	of	quantum	mechanics	as	they	are	at	 present	 understood.	 The	 difficulties,	 being	 of	 a	 profound	character,	 can	 be	 removed	 only	 by	 some	 drastic	 change	 in	 the	foundations	 of	 the	 theory,	 probably	 a	 change	 as	 drastic	 as	 the	passage	 from	 Bohr's	 orbit	 theory	 to	 the	 present	 quantum	mechanics.	»	P.A.M.	 Dirac,	 The	 Principles	 of	 Quantum	 Mechanics,	 Oxford	 at	 the	Clarendon	Press,	4th	edition	1958	(1st	edition	1930). 
 
The third part of this work is resolutely constructive. On the new basis offered by 
the clarifications, improvements and purges from the Part II we shall now delineate the 
essential features – only these – of a new sort of mathematical Hilbert-Dirac 
representation of the quantum predictions and of the verification of these that is 
operationally rooted directly into the physical factuality and therefrom it is constructed 
bottom-up.  
 
The whole representation is rigorously inserted in IQM that – accordingly to the 
aim for which it has been constructed – acts as a structure of insertion and reference.  
The framework [IQM-QMHD] that has been introduced in the chapter (6.II).2 by 
simply juxtaposing IQM and QMHD is conserved. The conjugate use of both these 
structures has already initiated in 6.II the emergence of a common language and a 
common system of notations that manifest the growth of a new whole. This growth will 
continue throughout the Part III. And so at the end of the Part III it will have become 
clear that the framework [IQM-QMHD] has never possessed the nature of a scaffold, that, 
from the start, it has acted and evolved like an organic embryo that has been incorporated 
to the growth of the conceptual substance and form of a second quantum mechanics, 
QM2. 
QM2 is not conceived as a new "interpretation" of the nowadays quantum 
mechanics. Nor as an achieved new theory of microstates; nor as a didactic 
itemization of something that already exists. It is a first outline of a fundamentally 
new representation of microstates required to be general, scientific, and fully 
intelligible. 
In the chapter 7.III we construct the contours and the main lines of a new 
representation of the quantum-measurements for unbound microstates (the case of bound 
microstates is absorbable). This representation has a factual-formal character and 
distinguishes explicitly and constantly between the individual level of conceptualization, 
and the statistical one  
 In the chapter 8.III, around the core constituted by the new representation of the 
quantum measurements constructed in the chapter 7.III are sketched out very succinctly 
the main lines of the whole 'second quantum mechanics', QM2. The de Broglie-Bohm 
approach is included, as a general model of what can be called 'the Universal Physical 
Substance'.  
But this model is radically distinguished from the operational, consensual, 
predictive-verifiable Hilbert-space representation developed here.  
The juncture between the de Broglie-Bohm basic model and our approach is 
defined on the basis of the modelling postulate MP(msG,cw) and the relation (1') 
Gt↔(msGt,cw≡{σ(msGt,cw)}), and de Broglie's guiding relation (33) p(r,t)= –ł.β(r,t).   
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In the chapter 9.III the second quantum mechanics QM2 is briefly examined from 
its outside. From its genesis and its structure is first drawn a general interrogation 
concerning the relations between facts and mathematical structures inside the modern 
theoretical physics.  
Then a major conclusion is formulated on the nature of scientific knowledge, and a 
path is specified toward a methodological unification of modern physics and even of the 
whole of modern science. 
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7.III  
 
A NEW REPRESENTATION OF THE QUANTUM-
MEASUREMENTS FOR UNBOUND MICROSTATES 
  
(7.III).1. THE SEMANTIC SELF-CONSISTENCY OF [IQM-QMHD] 
AND ORGANIZATION OF A NEW PERSPECTIVE 
ON THE REPRESENTATION OF QUANTUM-MEASUREMENTS  
This following short section is devoted to the global inner consistency of what will 
be constructed in the third part of this work.  
 
(7.III).1.1. Apparent absence of unity inside [IQM-QMHD]  
on the statistical predictions and their verification  
Consider QMHD.  
Inside QMHD the predictions on results of quantum measurements are obtained 
exclusively by mathematical operations. This is not disturbing for didactical 
idealizations. But when real physical situations are considered that are not heavily a 
priori restricted, in general it is much more difficult to work out mathematically 
verifiable predictions than it is asserted in textbooks (think of Schrödinger’s Memoire for 
solving the ‘simplest’ real case of the one electron from an atom of hydrogen). In order 
to dispose of the state-ket |ψG,H(r,t)> of the problem – that is the source of the whole 
predictive QMHD algorithm – one has to ‘give’ the initial conditions via the initial state-
ket |ψG,H(r,to)>, which often might be impossible without admitting basic 
approximations (as for instance the Laplace principle of an initial uniform distribution of 
the probabilities of the elementary events, so in particuklar of the initial distribution of 
'presence' in space, etc.). And when the acting hamiltonian cannot be considered to be 
stationary, or when it simply is entirely unknown because unspecified quantum fields are 
acting, then even the writing down of the Schrödinger equation of the problem itself is 
impossible. While when this equation can be written, nearly always the mathematical 
generation of a general solution involves already various approximations of which the 
factual effects cannot be imagined a priori, so they cannot be controlled mathematically.  
So the general formal constructability of the predictions is far from being generally 
insured inside QMHD.  
Furthermore, as it appeared in (6.II).4, inside QMHD when it has been possible to 
acceptably establish the predictions in a purely mathematical way, the verification of 
these predictions is treated in a way that is dramatically deficient as much from a 
conceptual point of view as from a mathematical point of view. This deficiency is tied 
with the fact that the individual elements, entities, concepts, physical operations – which 
QMHD does involve quite fundamentally – are not represented formally, nor are they 
defined with mere current words, even though in the QMHD representation of the 
quantum measurements one is systematically brought by postulation on the individual 
level of conceptualization when a result 'aj' of one act of measurement has to be taken 
into account, which result itself also is considered to be individual by mere postulation. 
Consider now IQM. 
Inside IQM the predictions are constructed only factually and then they can be 
verified only by repeating the factual construction (cf. 3.I).5). 
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So when the fundamental question of prediction and of verification of the 
predictions is considered, it seems at a first view that inside the framework [IQM-QMHD] 
even the slightest degree of unity is lacking between the IQM representation and the 
representation form QMHD.  
But this is only an appearance, and a very misleading one. Just below will appear a 
deep unity inside [IQM-QMHD] between predictive probabilities and the verification of 
these that – remarkably – has silently emerged. 
 
(7.III).1.2. The conditions of inner semantic self-consistency  
of the global framework [IQM-QMHD] 
IQM has been constructed like a reference-and-immersion-structure for 
understanding any given theory of the microstates, for estimating its adequacy, and for 
improving it. As such IQM has been deliberately endowed with the maximal generality 
compatible with its required status. This entailed leaving undefined the model of a 
microstate. And in consequence of the absence of a definite model, the content of a 
measurement operation ‘MesA’ remained equally unspecified inside IQM, as well as the 
‘external conditions’ EC from the generalized definition (13') Gt=F(Go,EC,(t-to)) of an 
operation of generation of a specimen of the studied microstate. This entailed that 
throughout the Part I and the Part II of this work the conditions of a full comparability 
between the semantic contents of QMHD and IQM have remained un-defined. 
But in the chapter 6.II we have realized several basic semantic elucidations and this 
has changed the conceptual situation. For self-sufficiency of this constructive chapter 
7.III we reall these conditions below:  
- In (6.II).1 we have identified the meaning of the concept of eigenket of a quantum 
mechanical observable and its intimate connection with the model of a microstate that 
acts quite systematically inside QMHD. 
- In  (6.II).2 we have incorporated this model to the physical-operational approach 
practised in this work, via the generalizing redefinition (1') Gt↔(msGt,cw≡{σ(msGt,cw)}) of 
an operation of generation, and the modelling postulate MP({σ(msG,cw)}).                                                                           
- In (6.II).3 we have stressed the clarifying role inside the QMHD writings, of the 
existence – or not – of a direct connection between, respectively, a state-ket or an 
eigenket, and the operation of generation G of the involved specimens of the studied 
microstate, and we have introduced specifying notations. 
- In (6.II).4.3 we have brought into evidence the implicit existence, inside QMHD, 
of a general type (20) of concept of coding-measurement-evolution that seems to be valid 
indeed for an unbound microstate without quantum fields.  
- In (6.II).4.4.3 we have shown that the QMHD representation of one act of coding-
measurement-evolution, namely (19) |ΨG,H(A)(r,t1)>/A=∑jcj(t1)|u(r,aj,)>,∀ j , attempts to 
express the second factor MesA from an IQM individual coding-measurement-succession 
[Gt.MesA] by use of a statistical descriptor that occults the originating first factor Gt (cf. 
the Fig.7 and the corresponding comments) and asserts a final fall on the individual level 
of conceptualization; which is unacceptable both conceptually and mathematically. 
- In (6.II).4.4 we have reached the general negative conclusion that QMHD is devoid 
of an acceptable representation of quantum measurements.  
The semantic progresses listed above entail also a massive positive conclusion that 
has taken form silently and that concerns specifically the general question of prediction 
and verification of results of quantum measurements. We explicate it below. 
To begin with, suppose optimistically that we are in a physical situation that has 
permitted to write the Schrödinger equation of the considered problem, to solve it, to 
write down the initial state-ket |ψG,H(to)>, and so, to identify the state-ket of the studied 
microstate, |ψG,H(r,t)> for any moment t≥to. Consider now an expansion (18) 
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|ψG,H(r,t1>/A=∑jcj(aj,t1)|u(r,aj,)>,∀j, of this state-ket |ψG,H(r,t1> at a given moment t1, 
and the predictive probability law (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}) defined by this expansion inside 
QMHD. The examination from (6.II).4.4.3 of the QMHD representation of the quantum 
measurements induces the following remark: 
In general the statistical prediction (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}) from an expansion (18) can 
not be verified experimentally otherwise than via a very big number of repetitions 
of whole individual coding-measurement-succession [Gt1.MesA], in the sense 
defined in IQM.  
And in order for the verification to be expressible inside [IQM-QMHD], the merely 
general structural definitions imposed by IQM and the clarifications from 6.II have to be 
now completed by specifying in an organized way the conditions of operational semantic 
compatibility between IQM and QMHD. These are the following ones: 
(a) We make use of the model msG,cw of a microstate, such as this model is 
expressed by the modelling postulate MP(msG,cw) and by (1') G↔msG,cw,  with 
msG,cw≡{σ(msG,cw)}.                                                                               
(b) We posit that in (13’) Gt=F(Go,EC,(t-to)) with Go↔msGo and [Go .(t-to)]≡ Gt, 
the external conditions ‘EC’ have to be those expressed inside QMHD by the hamiltonian 
operator H that, in the Schrödinger equation of evolution of the problem, acted abstractly 
upon the state-ket |ψG,H(t)>, (to≤t≤t1) thus determining it, when this equation can be 
written and solved. This permits then to write inside [IQM-QMHD] 
Gt1=F(Go, H, (t1-to))                                                                                       (13’’)  
where 'F' means ' a functional of ' and H includes what is called 'obstacles' (walls, 
barriers, wells).  
 (c) When inside the succession of operations [Gt1(t1-to).MesA(tf-t1)] the act 
MesA(tf-t1) of an A-coding-measurement operation begins at a time t1, H is replaced by a 
measurement-hamiltonian H(A) that commutes with A; and then, throughout the 
duration (tf1-t1) of the act MesA(tf-t1), the measurement hamiltonian H(A) acts upon the 
(unknown) individual physical wave-function Φ(r,t)=ae(i/—)β(r,t) of the specimen σ(msG) of 
the studied microstate msG that is involved, accordingly to the distinction introduced in 
(6.II).4.2.2 between a state ket and a wave-function93. 
 (d) The act of coding-measurement-evolution MesA(tf-t1) from the succession 
[Gt1.MesA(tf-t1)], and its formal representation, must be explicitly defined in a manner 
consistent with: the modelling postulate MP(msG,cw) accordingly to (a); the type of 
microstate that is considered (in the sense of the definitions from (2.I).1); the 
mathematical language chosen for constructing the representations.  
The specifications (a),(b),(c),(d) define the a priori conditions of inner semantic-
operational self-consistency of the framework [IQM-QMHD]. Inside [IQM-QMHD] they 
apply a posteriori to IQM also. All these specifications must be added to those made in 
(6.II)4.4.3 (that are illustrated in the Fig.4) in what concerns time parameters versus level 
of conceptualization. On the basis of requirements obtained in this way we shall now 
bring into evidence the nature of the unity that can be realized inside [IQM-QMHD] with 
respect to statistical predictions on results of quantum measurements and verification of 
                                                      
93 This condition brings forth the general ambiguity, inside QMHD, of the significance of a solution of the Schrödinger 
equation, namely whether this solution points toward a physical wave-phenomenon or a statistical descriptor. Indeed 
the condition (13’’) holds also for the indirect acts of measurement on a bound microstate from an atomic or molecular 
structure where it is clear that one specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate, with its physical wave, subsists for an 
arbitrarily long time and meanwhile interacts from time to time for measurements with test-particles or other devices 
(Zeeman or Stark effects, etc.); so that in this case both H and H(A) act on a physical wave, while the solution 
|ψG,H(t1)> of the equation permits to calculate statistical predictions. This situation has to be thoroughly understood. 
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these. As long as this unity will be realizable we shall stay inside the framework [IQM-
QMHD]. When this will cease to be possible – which will happen – the framework [IQM-
QMHD] will have to be improved explicitly.  
In this way at the end of this chapter we shall be endowed with a general 
representation of the quantum measurements endowed with intelligibility.  
 
(7.III).1.3. Basic assertion on the prediction-verification unity inside [IQM-QMHD] 
Consider the factually constructed IQM-descriptor  (9) (D/A)(msGt1)≡{(ε,δ,N0)-
π(aj,t1)}Gt1,  ∀j. We formulate the following ‘assertion’ Ass.1 supported by a 
corresponding ‘argument’ Arg(Ass.1)94 : 
Ass.1. If the IQM description (9) (D/A)(msGt1)≡ {(ε,δ,N0)-π(aj,t1)}Gt1 has been 
constructed by use of coding-measurement-successions [Gt.MesA(tf-t1)] of which 
the content has been specified accordingly to the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d) of 
semantic-operational inner self-consistency of [IQM-QMHD], then the statistical 
predictive QMHD-law (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}) defined by the expansion (18) can be 
found to be verified if and only if it identifies in content – inside the limits 
permitted by the parameters (ε,δ,N0) – with the statistical assertions of which the 
factual description (9) consists. 
Arg(Ass.1). Obvious: Since inside IQM the description (9) (D/A)(msGt1) is 
constructed factually, in order to verify this description inside IQM one is obliged to just 
repeat its construction. No other way is conceivable inside IQM. This means that inside 
IQM the experimental verification of (D/A)(msGt1) is certain a priori, by construction 
(3.I).5)95. So if a very big number of repetitions of the succession of operations 
[Gt1.MesA] accomplished for verifying the QMHD prediction (A,{cj(aj,t1)2}),∀j, are 
realized in the same way permitted by the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d) as the successions of 
operations [Gt1.MesA] by which the IQM description (9) (D/A)(msGt1) has been 
constructed, then these successions of operations, while they verify (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}), 
they also reconstruct (D/A)(msGt1)               n 
In other words, the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d) of semantic-operational inner self-
consistency of [IQM-QMHD] entail the following unifying identifications:  
- Under the constraint of these conditions the predictive content of the IQM description 
(9) (D/A)(msGt1)≡{(ε,δ,N0)-π(aj,t1)}Gt1,∀t1,∀j – a 'factual probability law' – identifies with 
the predictive content denoted {A,|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}  of the QMHD expansion (18) 
|ψG,H(r,t1)>/A} ; only the notations differ. 
- Under the constraint of these conditions the IQM 'complete' description (9’’) 
DM(msG)≡{[(ε,δ,N0)-πt1(G,aj)}, (Mπc(G))AB],∀A,∀AB} , ∀j has the same global 
predictive content as the QMHD representation (22) |ψG,H(r,t1)> ≈pred. {|ψG,H(r,t1)>/A} , 
∀A, ∀t1 of the state-ket |ψG,H(t1)>.   
At a first sight it might seem that the pair (Ass.1, Arg(Ass.1)) expresses a circularity 
or at least a triviality. But in fact this is not at all the case because the identifications 
stated above under the sole constraint of the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d), stem from the 
specification, in rigorously defined and structured terms, of the factual-operational 
source – on the individual  physical-operational level of conceptualization from IQM – 
                                                      
94 Throughout what follows we speak in terms of ‘assertions’ and ‘arguments’ because we are not yet inside a formally 
closed structure where can be given 'proofs' in the strict sense. From now on, for brevity, we drop the specification (tf-
t1).  
95 In so far, of course, that (D/A)(msGt1) has been considered to have been accomplished only when a convenient choice 
in (9) of the set of parameters (ε,δ,N0) has stabilized the quasi-identical recurrence of (D/A)(msGt1) when one 
reconstructs it inside the correspondingly admitted fluctuations.  
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of the statistical-probabilistic exclusively numerical contents of the two basic QMHD 
descriptors |ψG,H(r,t1)> and { |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A. So: 
The enlarged and common framework [IQM-QMHD] that acts in the pair (Ass.1, 
Arg(Ass.1)) offers quite non-trivial complete 'vertical' specifications – from zeros 
of local individual knowledge up to statistical predictions constructed from these – 
that inside QMHD alone are entirely lacking (cf. Fig.6 and the comments, and 
(6.II).1, (6.II).4.4.3).  
Via the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d) the pair (Ass.1, Arg(Ass.1)) knits together the 
physical, factual genesis of a QMHD predictive statistical law (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}), with 
this law itself, so with the Hilbert-Dirac mathematical formalism. Thereby any 
mathematical law appears now as the result of thoroughly defined and structured 
individual physical operations96.  
Inside the framework [IQM-QMHD] the pair (Ass.1, Arg(Ass.1)) fills now entirely 
the void of formalized organization of the individual-factual level of conceptualization 
that flaws QMHD (Fig.6) and it does this by beginning to specify the semantic contents of 
the conceptual moulds deliberately left void inside IQM – model of a 'microstate', 
'coding-measurement-successions' – that from now on will permit to construct defined 
ways of controlling any QMHD predictive statistical law (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j} via actions 
from the individual, physical-operational level of conceptualization. The force and 
fertility of this pair will appear below. It is a first massive manifestation of a process of 
intimate fusion of IQM and QMHD. 
 
 (7.III).1.4. An immediate consequence of the assertion Ass.1: 
Possibility of principle to circumvent the Schrödinger equation or to complete its performance  
As soon as the first impression of triviality is dominated and the assertion Ass.1 is 
really understood, it immediately points further toward a very surprising and remarkable 
possibility.  
The QMHD-predictive mathematical representations should be, not only verifiable 
by a long set of repetition of coding-measurement-successions [Gt.MesA] that are 
specified accordingly to the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d), but also constructible in this same 
way, radically, just like inside IQM. 
Indeed, since the results that are obtained by a long set of repetitions of coding-
measurement-successions [Gt.MesA] realized accordingly to the conditions 
(a),(b),(c),(d), do verify the prediction (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}) entailed by the QMHD 
expansion (18) |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A=∑jcj(aj,t1)|u(r,aj,)> only if they re-construct its predictive 
content, these results also construct the content of (18) exactly in so far that this content 
is factually true. So:  
Whenever this is convenient, it should be possible to circumvent the use of the 
Schrödinger equation of evolution for generating the state-ket of the studied 
microstate.  
                                                      
96 Inside IQM the statistical writings (9) (D/A)( Gt,msG, A) and (10) DM(Gt,msG,VM) stress precisely the organic unity, in 
the case of microstates, between the statistical predictive knowledge that, once established, can be considered and made 
use of separately, and on the other hand the conceptual-physical-operational genesis of this knowledge – respectively 
the individual genetic triads (Gt,msG,A) and (Gt,msG,VM) – via repeated actions [Gt.MesA], ∀A, of the human observer-
conceptor, wherefrom the intelligibility stems. But there this is done in only general and qualitative terms, whereas 
inside the framework these terms are particularized via the modelling postulate MP({σ(msG,cw)} and they will be 
worked out quantitatively. 
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This possibility is the consequence of the change introduced by IQM, of origin on 
the vertical of conceptualization, and so the order of conceptualization, that now 
progresses bottom-up.  
The problem to be solved for attaining this purpose of liberation of the hegemony 
of the directly statistical outputs of the Schrödinger equation is purely representational. 
Namely one has to find the means, inside [IQM-QMHD], to express the content of (18) in 
the same mathematical Hilbert-space form as that from (18), in order to conserve access 
to Hilbert-space calculi, like inside QMHD. The solution might consist of just dropping 
the results of a long set of factually realized repetitions of coding-measurement-
successions [Gt.MesA], into the pre-imposed Hilbert-Dirac mathematical form of a 
corresponding expansion (18). Indeed the Schrödinger equation of evolution itself is not 
a necessary element of a Hilbert-Dirac representation of the predictions on results of 
quantum measurements. And furthermore, a factual generation of a Hilbert-space 
representation of these predictions would simply suppress all the restrictions of a purely 
mathematical nature that the Schrödinger equation carries with it and imposes not only 
upon the very possibility to obtain these predictions directly by calculus, but also upon 
the contents of the predictions, in consequence of the so often necessary idealizing 
approximations. So if a factual generation of (18) were realizable this would entirely free 
(18) of any purely syntactical restriction that does not concern specifically the physical 
and conceptual nature of the knowledge that is researched; this knowledge would be 
obtained just as free of restrictions as it is inside IQM.  
But of course one would have to survey the possibility of specific consequences of 
a factual bottom-up approach for generating the Hilbert-space representation. 
On the other hand, when it has been possible to write down the Schrödinger 
equation of the problem, once the predictions have been factually generated for a time-
value to and expressed in the mathematical form of an expansion (18) of a state-ket, this 
would permit to make then use of the equation for calculating by its use the predictions 
for subsequent times t1>to. Which would simplify notably the mathematical tasks; extend 
the domain of effective utility of the Schrödinger equation; and clean the results of any 
effect of a priori mathematical approximations.  
In short, the two distinct representations IQM and QMHD, far from being unrelated 
inside [IQM-QMHD] concerning prediction and verification, quite on the contrary appear 
now all of a sudden to be soldered to one another in this respect, and under a vast new 
horizon. 
 
(7.III).1.5. Possibility of a 'normal' relation between a predictive statistics  
and the individual measurements that verify it 
In (6.II).4 we have analysed why and how the reduction problem has emerged, and 
it appeared that the main cause has been the absence inside QMHD of an organized level 
of individual conceptualization where to lodge the representations of individual physical 
entities and operations. But inside the framework [IQM-QMHD] the infra-quantum 
mechanics offers now a strongly organized level of individual conceptualization, while 
the assertion Ass.1 specifies the 'vertical' connection between the individual level of 
conceptualization, and the statistical level. So nothing withstands any more a 'normal' 
relation between a predictive statistics and the measurements that verify this statistic. Of 
course, specifying such a normal relation more than this is already very well known by 
everybody can only consist of sheer triviality from A to Z. Nevertheless, given the so 
astonishingly long-lasting more or less passive acceptance of the reduction-problem, it 
seems necessary to state these trivialities explicitly. So: 
- We require that any statistical prediction on results of measurements on 
microstates be available before the verification-measurements begin. We state this 
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common-sense requirement no matter how the predictive statistic has been constructed  – 
mathematically or factually – and how it is expressed – as a formal law 
(A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}), or as a factually-probabilistic description (9) (D/A)(msGt1)≡{(ε,δ,N0)-
π(aj,t1)}Gt1.  
If the statistical-probabilistic prediction is constructed factually as in the case of (9) 
(D/A)(msGt1)≡{(ε,δ,N0)-π(aj,t1)}Gt1, the requirement formulated above means that before 
any action of verification begins, a sequence of many repetitions of an individual coding-
measurement-succession [Gt1.MesA] that – itself – is not expressed equally in statistical 
terms, has been repeated by adjusting the parameters (ε,δ,N0) from (9) until the global 
result exhibits the desired degree of stability of the normed cardinals of the various 
classes of mutually distinct registered results aj (the π(aj,t1), ∀j), i.e. they stay constant up 
to (ε,δ) as long as N0 is kept invariant; the involved predictive statistic is available only 
once this has been done97. Now:  
- A factually constructed probabilistic prediction (9) is verified by its re-
construction (IQM and Ass.1). 
- An only mathematically calculated probabilistic prediction (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}) is 
verified iff the corresponding stable factually generated (ε,δ,N0)-probabilistic distribution 
obtained as required in IQM for (9) and accordingly to the conditions of compatibility 
(a),(b),(c),(d) from (7.III).1.2 – is (ε,δ,N0)-identical to this mathematically established 
prediction (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}).  
Any experimentalist, no doubt, conceives and works precisely in this way.   
While on the individual level of conceptualization, during an individual time-
interval (tf–to), each one individual coding-measurement succession re-written more 
explicitly as [Gt1.MesA→aj, creates outside the stable formal statistical chain (ch'), one 
whole thread of operational evolution that begins with an operation of generation (13'') 
and is closed by the registration of its own result aj.  
In this way no mixture is made between individual time parameters and statistical 
time parameters: When the individual successions [Gt1.MesA]→aj are repeatedly 
performed for verification of a previously fully accomplished prediction, the expression 
of the expansion |ψG,H(t1)>/A and of the corresponding predictive law (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}) 
are already just history, just a pre-constructed reference that waits to be made use of 
later98. And when finally – a posteriori – the verifying confrontation has to be done 
globally, nothing withstands it any more, because at that time the mathematically (or 
factually) established statistical-probabilistic prediction (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}) and the 
factually constructed verifying statistical-probabilistic distribution (9) of all the results aj 
produced by the repeated coding measuring successions ([Gt1.MesA]→aj), are 
conceptually homogeneous, they are both already fully accomplished statistics.  
No scandalous reduction is necessary any more. Everything is plainly 'normal', and 
is intelligible. 
  
                                                      
97 In the top-down approach from QMHD this constructive phase is absorbed in the abstract construction of the state-ket 
|ΨG,H(A)(r,t> via calculus, i.e. in the construction of the Schrödinger equation of the problem, of its solution, and of the 
determination of the initial state-ket |ΨG,H(A)(r,to>. 
98 It is not any more an on-going process, like in (19), that, while it is statistical i.e. abstract and carries in it also all the 
seeds 'c
j
(t1)' of the statistical predictive law (A,{|cj(aj,t1)|
2,∀j}), nevertheless is also posited to generate actual verifying 
individual and physical data (as it is supposed in (19). 
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(7.III).1.6. Global formulation of the purpose formed in (7.III).1  
In consequence of the inclusion of the general reference-and-embedding structure 
IQM, the framework [IQM-QMHD], such as it has been specified in (7.III).1, offers the 
possibility of a radically bottom-up conceptualization of the microstates.  
Such an approach, while it generates representation, generates also the 
corresponding intelligibility.  
The imprisonment into an exclusively top-down approach that initially permits 
only a directly mathematical definition of the statistical-probabilistic predictions 
conceived under the mental hegemony of the classical thinking, is overcome.  
Indeed, the preliminary results obtained above suggest that finally it should be 
possible to construct a very monolithic and intelligible new Hilbert-space representation 
of the microstates. A representation where the expansions (18) |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A, ∀A, can be 
determined factually for any time t1. 
When the Schrödinger equation of the problem can be written, this would permit to 
instil in it a factually established initial state-ket |ψG,H(r,to)>/A that carries in it 
indubitably reliable factual truth, precisely because it consists of factual data instead of 
an priori mathematical representation of factual data that is affected by basic restrictions 
and approximations; while for any time t1>to the equation would be very useful for 
calculating the expansion (18) |ψG,H(r,t1)>/A that is entailed by this certainly true 
factually constructed initial expansion |ψG,H(r,to)>/A; which would be economical, 
synergetic. Moreover the equation would also be useful in a new way, namely as a 
generator of elements of reference or comparison between mathematically established 
assertions and factually established ones.  
While when the Schrödinger equation of the problem cannot be written or when it 
is difficult to be solved, the factual generation of the needed expansions (18) for any time 
could suffice for nevertheless coming in possession of predictive and verifiable 
knowledge. We are at the time of big data and of a vertiginous progress of the computing 
tools.  The limitations that stem from the nowadays constraint to make use exclusively of 
the Schrödinger equation for generating predictive and verifiable consensual knowledge 
knowledge on microstates, can be dissolved. Only the conceptual-semantic restrictions 
from IQM would remain active.  
But such 'restrictions' are knowledge themselves. 
Our further purpose is to achieve the possibility outlined above.  
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 (7.III).2. CONSTRUCTION OF A FACTUAL-MATHEMATICAL 
 [IQM-QMHD]-REPRESENTATION  
OF MEASUREMENTS ON UNBOUND MICROSTATES 
Initially in Dirac's Hilbert-space reformulation of the wave-mechanics the 
projections (Pr.j|ψG)=c(aj,t1) of the vector state-ket |ψG(r,t1)> of the studied microstate 
on a basis defined in the Hilbert space of this vector were more or less explicitly 
considered to be a descriptive feature specifically tied with microstates. But since 1954 
Gleason’s theorem contradicts this view.  
This is at the same time a very important and a very seldom-understood fact. 
 Indeed Gleason’s theorem establishes a fundamental and general connection 
between the Hilbert-space mathematical structure, and the mathematical representation 
of the basic concept of a 'measure', in the mathematical sense. So, in particular, this 
theorem establishes also a fundamental and general connection between the Hilbert-
space mathematical structure and the possible mathematical representation of the 
omnipresent measures of probability. Thereby Gleason's theorem concerns also Quantum 
Mechanics, but in particular.  
In short, Gleason's theorem dissolves the belief that the Hilbert-space formalism is 
specific of the QMHD representation of microstates. 
 
 (7.III).2.1. Gleason's theorem on a Hilbert-space representation of mathematical measures,  
versus Born's postulateand Hilbert-space representation of a probability laws,  
Gleason. Gleason's own formulation of his theorem – let us denote it Gth – is as 
follows: 
Gth. « Let µ be a measure on the closed subspaces of a separable (real or complex) Hilbert-space 
H of dimension at least three. There exists a positive semi-definite operator T of the trace class 
such that for all closed sub-spaces A of H   
µ(A) = trace (TPA) 
where PA is the orthogonal projection of H  onto A. »  
This formulation includes the case of mathematical representation of probability 
measures, of any probability measure. So Gth applies also to the factually established 
probability measures (5) (ε,δ,N0)-{π(aj), ∀j}G concerning outcomes of measurements on 
microstates, defined inside IQM and associated there with Kolmogorov's mathematical 
representation. Thereby Gth offers a choice between Kolmogorov's mathematical 
representation of probability laws, and Gleason's Hilbert-space representation.   
But Gleason's theorem itself is quite independent of the concept of 'microstate'. It 
is independent of even any theory of the microstates. 
Let us briefly examine, in relation with Gth, the historical evolution of the 
mathematical representation of the probabilities that concern outcomes of quantum 
measurements.  
The Schrödinger-deBroglie Wave-Mechanics versus Born's postulate. Consider 
a problem concerning a microstate msG. Inside the Schrödinger-deBroglie 'Wave-
Mechanics' – denote it WM – let ψ(r,t) be the solution of the Schrödinger equation of 
that problem; and let c(aj,ψ) denote at any time the coefficient from the term of index 'j' 
in the expansion ψ(r,t)/A=∑jcj(aj,t)(u(r,aj,) of ψ(r,t) with respect to the observable A. 
Born's postulate – let us denote it Bp – asserts, about individual probability values, the 
calculated, predictive, numerical equalities  
|c(aj,ψ |2   =Bp      π(aj,ψ)     ∀j                                                             (Bp) 
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where: the symbol '=Bp' is to be read 'equal according to Born's postulate' 99; π(aj,ψ) is 
the abstract, predictive, individual probability for the outcome of the eigenvalue aj if A 
is measured on the microstate represented by the wave-function ψ that has been 
identified by Schrödinger-calculi, and via the expansion ψ(r,t)/A. So: 
Born's postulate is about the mathematical representation of probabilistic 
prediction inside WM.  
This prediction remains to be verified, which can be realized only via individual 
factually realized coding-measurement-evolutions from repeated successions of 
operations [G.MesA]. And in (6.II).4.4 it has been shown that the 'quantum theory of 
measurement' does not offer an acceptable conceptual and mathematical representation 
of the verification of the Born-predictions. Not even the distinction between 
probabilistic predictions and verification of these, is fully expressed. 
Dirac's formalization QMHD versus Bp and Gth. Let us recall that: In the first 
edition ([1930]) of his famous book Dirac has had the very useful idea to represent the 
solution ψ(r,t) of Schrödinger's equation of a problem by a vector in a Hilbert vector-
space. He called such a vector 'the state-ket' associated to the studied microstate and 
denoted it '|ψ(r,t)>'. The set of eigen-functions {uj(r,aj)),∀j} of any observable A from 
the wave-mechanics became a basis of eigen-'ket' {|uj(r,aj)>),∀j} regarded as vectors 
that are tangent to the Hilbert-space of |ψ(r,t)>, which leads to a generalized Hilbert 
vector-space denoted H.  
Thereby Dirac constructed the 'modern' formulation QMHD inside which he gained 
the possibility of the well-known and very expressive vector-representation of Born's 
postulate from the WM:  
Consider a microstate to be studied. Let |ψ> be its state-ket100 with expansions 
(18) |ψ(r,t)>/A=∑jcj(aj,t)|(u(r,aj,)>,∀A. Let {|uj(r,aj)>,∀j} be the basis of eigen-ket in 
H defined by the observable A and let {π(aj),∀j} be the probability measure on the 
Universe of elementary events {aj,∀j} from the Kolmogorov probability-space tied with 
A. In this new mathematical vector-context, Born's postulate acquires the representation  
π(aj,|ψ>)     =Bp     |c(aj,|ψ>) |2  =H     |Pr.j|ψ>|2        ∀j                                                                                                                
where: the symbol '=H  ' is to be read 'equal inside H '; and Pr.j |ψ> is the projection of 
|ψ> on the H-direction of the eigenket |uj> from the basis of eigenket {|uj(r,aj)>,∀j)} of 
A and the numerical real value of this projection is |c(aj,|ψ>) |2. This last geometrical 
feature is new and it is essentially associated with the fact that upon the direction 
introduced in H by an eigenket |uj(r,aj)> one can explicitly associate the real number 
|Pr.j|ψ>|2 =Bp π(aj,|ψ>) with an explicit writing of, also, the eigenket |(u(r,aj,)> itself, 
which brings forth the meaning identified in (6.II).1 for the eigenket |uj(r,aj)> from the 
expansion-term c(aj,t)|uj(r,aj)>101.   
                                                      
99 This is not at all an assertion a priory obvious. It is only suggested by the significance of a Fourier coefficient in the 
classical electromagnetism (de Broglie has made use of the suggestion) and it is active in the association between the 
eigenket {|u(r,aj> and the eigenvalue aj in the equation of eigenket and eigenvalues of A. 
100 For grasping the essence it suffices to consider exclusively pure states. 
101 I quote: "the sample of that what is counted by the real squared modulus |c(aj,t)|2 of the complex coefficient c(aj,t) 
(exactly as, in the expression 34m, the symbol ‘m’ means that the length that is measured is 34 times the length of the 
sample of a meter from the National Bureau of Standards of Weights and Measures)". (The mathematical structures, by 
their axiomatic construction, incorporate meanings that remain often hidden in their applications; this one of the 
sources of Wigner's wonderment about the power of mathematics.   
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Now, according to Dirac's initial conception the equality |c(aj,|ψ>) |2 =H   
|Pr.j|ψ>|2  was  just a geometrical feature entailed by a vector-space, that entailed no 
particular relation with probabilities. So Born's postulate seemed to express a necessary 
and independent supplementary datum. But as soon as Gleason's theorem is known it 
entails for this case that the whole probability measure πA={π(aj),∀j} can be 
represented by a trace as defined in Gth, while for the individual outcomes aj one can 
write  
π(aj,|ψ>)  =Gth    [ |Pr. j|ψ>|2   =def     |c(aj,|ψ>) |2 ] ,     ∀j                                            
(23) 
where : The symbol '=Gth'  and '= def ' is to be read ‘equal according to Gleason’s 
theorem’. And the symbol '=def ' is to be read ‘equal by definition', because |c(aj,ψ |2 just 
denotes by definition the numerical value of the projection |Pr.j|ψ>|2 that is assigned by 
Gth to π(aj,|ψ>). The new information introduced by Gth consists precisely of a 
mathematical relation between a Hilbert-space structural feature – traces (in the 
mathematical sense) – and a whole probability measure, again in the mathematical 
sense; which entails a mathematical relation between another Hilbert-space structural 
feature – |Pr.j|ψ>|2 – and an individual abstract, pre-calculated, predictive probability 
value π(aj,|ψ>) 102. There is nothing factual in (23). This is noteworthy. 
Conclusion on Gth versus Born's postulate. Born's postulate and Gleason's 
theorem have different semantic natures; there is no conceptual identity between them, 
even though they make use of a same mathematical descriptor, namely the 
representation by |c(aj)|2 of the real number that measures the individual probability 
π(aj) of an outcome aj if A is measured on a given microstate. Indeed:  
- Born's postulate concerns explicitly and exclusively microstates. Like any 
'postulate' from Physics it involves assertions of specified facts that concern a definite 
category of physical entities (there exist probability laws on outcomes of measurements 
on microstates, the state-ket |ψG> of the studied microstate is known, etc.).  
- Whereas Gleason's theorem is strictly void of any assertion of this sort; it has the 
status of a purely logical implication 'if-then' that concerns a general relation between a 
mathematical 'measure' and the mathematical structure called Hilbert-space. When a 
Hilbert space is made use of for the mathematical representation of microstates, this 
general relation entails that [if a probability-measure {π(aj),∀j} is somehow 
mathematically given as such (for instance like in the case of Bp), then for the 
individual abstract predictive probability values π(aj) the writing π(aj,|ψ>) =Gth 
|Pr.j|ψ>|2 from (23) that involves a Hilbert-space representation, is by itself 
mathematically self-consistent, and the descriptor |c(aj,|ψ>) |2 drawn from an expansion 
(18) |ψ>/A permits to effectively calculate the value |Pr.j|ψ>|2; which entails that in 
such a case Born's postulate is not necessary any more. 
Throughout the history evoked above, the distinction between predictive 
probabilistic assertions and verification of these has been very vague and 
fluctuating, or radically absent. This is intimately tied with the fact that the 
theoretical microphysics does not represent the individual physical entities or 
operations, only statistics tied with these while verification is necessarily via 
individual measurements.  
  
                                                      
102 One can also say, more clearly perhaps, that the abstract, predictive, individual probabilities π(aj,|ψ>) calculated 
from |ψ> can be asserted to have the numericalvalue |c(aj,ψ) |2 that, by geometric definition of |ψ> in H , denotes the 
value |Pr.j|ψ>|2. 
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Gth versus [IQM-QMHD]. Let us now consider Gth relatively to [IQM-QMHD]. 
Gleason's theorem permits to regard (23) as just a generally valid translation from the 
mathematical language of the general Kolmogorov-theory of probabilities into the 
mathematical language of Hilbert-space representations103. 
Inside the Dirac formulation QMHD, Schrödinger's equation is made use of for 
defining an abstract, calculated global representation of a given probability law, by a 
Hilbert-vector ψ>. But Gth does not require any equation. It involves a radical 
separation between, on the one hand the nature, the semantic features of the facts and 
entities to which the considered probabilistic concepts are applied, and on the other 
hand the mathematical representation of these probabilistic concepts themselves. In 
particular, Gth does not exclude factually constructed mathematical representations. 
So: 
Gth can be applied directly to the factually constructed probability laws (5') 
{(ε,δ,N0)-{(π(aj)},∀j)}G},∀A, from IQM, as well as to the more complex concept 
of probability law that is involved in the transferred description (9'') where are 
explicitly included also the meta-correlations Mπc(Gt))AB between distinct 
probability laws that are involved in (5').  
Inside [IQM-QMHD] one can connect each elementary event from the universe 
U={aj,∀j} of possible individual outcomes aj of a coding-measurement-succession 
[G.MesA] on a studied microstate msG, with a Hilbert-space-vector – say VH – such that 
the semantic specificities of each aj inside the set U={aj,∀j} be represented in H by a 
corresponding 'semantic direction' (σδ)j. Then according to Gth the set {(σδ)j,∀j} of 
semantic directions defines in H a basis of eigenket {|σδj>,∀j} and the numerical value 
of the projection |Pr.j(VH )| of VH  on the direction of a given eigenket |σδj> from this 
basis can be utilized to represent the absolute numerical value of the individual factual 
probability π(aj,VH) from a factual probability law (5) {(ε,δ,N0)-{(π(aj)},∀j)}G]. Then 
the whole law itself can be represented by the use of an expansion of VH on the basis of 
eigenket {|σδj>,∀j}.  
The possibility of such an expansion, instead of being insured by postulation as it 
is done in QMHD (cf. 5.II).1), can be realized by a factual construction, thereby 
charging it with a priori certain factual truth, like in the case of the IQM 
description (9'') that emerges "verified", i.e. the process of verification just repeats 
the process of factual construction of the predictive statistics by repeated 
individual coding-measurement-successions [G.MesA]. 
Indeed one can construct the Hilbert-vector VH progressively, via individual coding-
measurement-succession [Gt1.MesA], under a priori organized conditions of formal 
mutual consistency with Dirac's top-down statistical ket-representation of the 
expansions |ψ>/A ∀A, from QMHD. Such a factually and progressively generated 
equivalence VH ≈|ψ> between VH and a QMHD state-ket |ψ> would realize a connective 
encounter between the historical top-down approach that has generated QMHD, and the 
bottom-up approach from IQM. In this way would be accomplished a new 
                                                      
103 Pitowsky (2008) has drawn this essence in connection with ‘quantum logic’. He asserts that for him "Hilbert spaces 
are a new theory of probabilities". For me the probability-trees of a transferred description in the sense of IQM are 
indeed a new theory of probabilities – of probabilities of facts, not of mathematical elements, and that introduces 
fundamentally new and basic semantic probabilistic features – whereas Gleason's theorem offers just a new and very 
efficient mathematical language for representing the nowadays classical Kolmogorov-concept of probability.   
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representation of the microstates that incorporates the individual entities and operations 
with which the predictive statistics are organically tied.  
The final result of such an approach would admit a conceptual-mathematical 
representation of the quantum-probability laws by a very synthetic and expressive fusion 
between:  
- the tree-like representation defined in IQM of the factual emergence of Kolmogorov-
spaces and of correlations between these, via repeated individual coding-measurement-
successions [G.MesA],  
and on the other hand  
- the Dirac-Gleason Hilbert-vector representation of the probability laws from these 
spaces.       
We shall now try to realize this inside [IQM-QMHD]. We begin by constructing 
the announced sort of representation for unbound microstates without quantum fields.  
 
(7.III).2.2. Factual-formal construction of a Hilbert-space representation  
of quantum measurements on unbound microstates without quantum fields 
The condition of semantic consistency (d) from (7.III).1.2 requires to specify 
consistently the IQM-concept of a coding-measurement-evolution MesA from an 
individual measurement-succession [G.MesA] performed on a microstate of any sort (in 
the sense of the definitions from (2.I).1). For the basic case of measurements on unbound 
microstates with non-composed operation of generation we are already prepared to 
achieve this. The case of the other types of microstates will be considered later.  
 
 (7.III).2.2.1. The coding-postulate for unbound microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c)  
with non-composed operation of generation  
 The analyses from (7.III).1 have suggested that the sort of measurement-evolution 
that is presupposed inside QMHD by the BBGPM approach can – in coherence with the 
Hilbert-Dirac representation – be conceived to perform implicitly a coding-measurement-
evolution of the general form (20). But it also has appeared there that the mentioned 
supposition has a restricted validity, in this sense that it can be ‘understood’ only in the 
absence of quantum fields. (Why this is so will appear later). So in (6.II).4.3  – founded 
upon the analysis of the method ‘time-of-flight’ for measuring the basic momentum 
observable, and by reference also to the Stern-Gerlach procedure for spin-measurements 
– we have admitted the efficiency of a coding-measurement-evolution of type (20) in the 
absence of quantum fields, so for unbound microstates with non-composed operation of 
generation. Such microstates will be denoted ms(unbound,1)G(n-c). For these we shall now 
postulate explicitly, in strict and detailed [IQM-QMHD]-terms, the coding-measurement-
evolution of the general type (20) required by the condition (d) of inner consistency and 
that is compatible with the other conditions, (a),(b),(c).  
Recall. In (6.II).1 it has been found that inside QMHD works implicitly de Broglie's 
general 'corpuscular-wave' model. In (6.II).2, via the modelling postulate MP(msG,cw), 
this general model has been brought to consistency with the general IQM concept (1) of 
an operation of generation G of a specimen σ(msGt) of the studied microstate. So here the 
coding-measurement-evolution admitted in [IQM-QMHD] for the particular sort of 
microstate denoted ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) will have to be specified in consistency with the 
modelling MP(msG,cw) and with the observable A to be measured; and furthermore it 
must obey all the conditions of semantic consistency formulated in (7.III).1.2. 
Consider a coding-measurement-succession [Gt1.MesA].  
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According to the conditions of semantic consistency we have that in (13’’) [Go .(t-
to)]≡ Gt,  with [Gt =F(Go ,EC,(t-to)), Go↔msGo, and the external conditions ‘EC’ during 
(t1-to) are those expressed in QMHD by the hamiltonian operator H from the Schrödinger 
equation of the problem. So Gt1 has to be written as Gt1=F(Go,H,(t1-to)) ('F 'means: 'a 
functional of'). 
According to the modelling postulate MP(msG,cw) the operation Gt1 introduces via 
G≡Go a specimen σ(msGo) of the initial state of the studied micro-state msGt1 that is 
represented by an unknown physical individual wave-function ΦGo(r,t=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) 
(cf.(6.II).4.2.2). So until the moment t1 when the act MesA of measurement-evolution 
begins, the evolution of σ(msGo) is represented by the action upon the individual physical 
wave-function ΦGo(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t), of the exterior fields from the hamiltonian H that 
determines also the evolution of the statistical QMHD descriptor |ψG,H(t1-to)>.  
In (6.II).4.3 we have admitted the BBGPM implication that a measurement 
hamiltonian operator H(A) that commutes with the measured observable A – if it works 
on σ(msGt1) after t1 and in the absence of quantum fields – installs for the wave-function 
ΦGt1(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t)) of σ(msGt1) with t≥t1, a structure of wave-movement represented 
by an eigenket of A. While correlatively, for the corpuscular-like singularity in the 
amplitude of ΦGt1(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) it generates a dynamic that leads it into a space-
domain Δrj (or a space-time domain (ΔrΔt)j) that is in a one-one relation with a given 
eigenvalue aj of A.  
Formulation. The above recall leads to the following [IQM-QMHD] version of a 
coding-postulate of the general form (20): 
P(cod)G(n-c). A coding-measurement-evolution MesA from a succession [Gt1.MesA] 
performed upon a microstate ms(unbound,1)G(n-c), admits the general 
representation: 
 [(Gt1→σΦ ).MesA(σΦ)]    →  H(A)      (marks registered in (ΔrΔt)j > ‘aj’)               
(20’)              
(σΦ: an abbreviation for σ(msGt1) and Gt1≡[Go .(t1-to)]: a functional F(Go,H(A),(t1-
to)). 
If in particular it is supposed that the coding-measurement-evolution MesA is 
performed by starting it at the time to when the initial operation of generation Go finishes, 
then we make use of the corresponding particular form of P(cod)G(n-c) : 
[(Go→σΦ ).MesA(σΦ)]     →  H(A)    (marks registered in in (ΔrΔt)j > ‘aj’)          (20’’)  
 
So, like (20), the postulate P(cod)G(n-c) concerns an individual specimen of the 
studied microstate: Inside [IQM-QMHD] this postulate 'explains' the non-analysed QMHD-
postulation of ‘emergence' of an eigenvalue aj of the measured observable A104.  
And it is noteworthy to remark that the QMHD hamiltonian H(A) works on the 
individual level of conceptualization, while the QMHD hamiltonian H works on the 
statistical level of conceptualization.  
                                                      
104 We are so deeply used to the purely mathematical and purely statistical representations from QMHD, that the content 
of the whole point (7.III).2.2.1 might seem queer inside a work of theoretical physics. But the reader is asked to 
remember that we want to root quantum mechanics in factuality, and in a non-perceivable and as yet a-conceptual 
physical factuality. This requires suppression of the inertial psychological refusals induced by feebly intelligible, 
purely algorithmic top-down representations, supported by philosophical interdictions, that vitiate the modern 
microphysics since more than 100 years. Human minds act on the basis of models and this fact has to be incorporated 
explicitly and fully to the processes of generation of scientific knowledge. 
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This is coherent with our critique of the reduction problem in (6.II).4.4.3. 
The coding postulate (20') is presupposed throughout the constructive action from 
the following point.  
 
(7.III).2.2.2. Factual-formal construction of a Hilbert-Dirac representation 
for the results of coding-measurement-evolutions (20') on microstates 
ms(unbound,1)G(n-c)   
We shall now proceed in a radically constructive way.   
We go back to the QMHD-concept (22) |ψGt1,H(r,t1)> ≈pred. {∀A,∀t1,  
|ψGt1,H(r,t1)>/A}  that has been mentioned to be the core of the QMHD-representation of 
prediction. We make the following assertion Ass.2 : 
Ass.2. Inside [IQM-QMHD] – via repeated individual coding-measurement-
successions [G.MesA] that obey the coding-procedure (20') and the consequence 
(23) of Gleason's theorem – it is possible to generate for a microstate of the type 
ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) a formal-factual equivalent of the Hilbert-Dirac expression 
(22) of a state-ket as the set {∀A,∀t1,  |ψGt1,H(r,t1)>/A}  of all its expansions, where 
the involved Hilbert-Dirac state-ket |ψGt1,H(r,t1)> :  
(a) Is independent of the Schrödinger equation of the problem. 
(b) Involves an extension of its semantic contents from (22), in this sense that – by 
construction – it offers for any observable A and any factual initial situation, 
predictive probability laws and correlations between these that are a priori certainly 
endowed with factual truth inside the limits of the a priori chosen and arbitrarily 
small (ε,δ,N0) imprecisions from the IQM-description (9'') that corresponds to the 
constructed state-ket in the sense of the assertion Ass.1.  
Arg(Ass.2). Consider the QMHD-state-ket |ψG1,H(r,t)> of a microstate msGt1 of the 
type ms(unbound,1)G(n-c).  
- The assertion Ass.1 and the corresponding argument have established that, if the 
probabilistic predictions (in the sense defined in (3.I).1) of any given state-ket |ψGt,H(r,t)> 
are available and are verified by the repeated realization of coding-measurement-
successions [Gt.MesA], ∀A, ∀t that satisfy the conditions of inner consistency 
(a),(b),(c),(d) defined in (7.III).1.2, then these predictions are necessarily (ε,δ,No)-
identical to those asserted by the factual (ε,δ,N0)-probability laws (5') from the IQM-
description  
(DM(msG))t ≡ [(ε,δ,No)-{π(Gt,aj)}, (Mπc(Gt))AB],  ∀A,∀AB, ∀j, ∀t               (9’’) 
that is constructed by use of the same set of coding-measurement-successions. We select 
one given description of this kind in order to work with it and we denote by DM this 
selected description.  
- So, if – inside the new framework [IQM-QMHD] – a factually constructed state-
ket of the Hilbert-Dirac formal type – let us denote it |ψGt1,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) – can be 
associated to the selected IQM-description of type (9'') (i.e. to the factual probability laws 
(5') from it and to the corresponding correlations (Mπc(Gt))AB]), then the Ass.1 and Gth 
entail that up to imprecisions (ε,δ,N0) we must have the equalities: 
|cj(aj,t)fact(DM)|2    =(ε ,δ ,No) (Ass.1, Gth)    π(Gt,aj)fact(DM) ,  ∀ j, ∀A, ∀t                                   (23') 
where: |cj(aj,t)fact(DM)|2  denotes a factually defined representation of the absolute 
numerical value of the expansion coefficient of index j in the expansion of 
|ψGt,H(r,t)>fact(DM) with respect to the observable A;  
- the symbol '=(ε,δ,No) (Ass.1, Gth)’ is to be read ‘(ε,δ,N0)-equal according to the Ass.1’ and to 
the consequence (23) of Gleason's theorem;  
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- π(Gt,aj)fact(DM) is the (ε,δ,No)-probability of aj according to the factually constructed 
description (9’’) from IQM.  
We shall now actually construct factually the state-ket |ψGt,H(r,t)>fact(DM), by use of 
(23').  
1. We first prepare the necessary 'materials'. Namely:  
1a. The form of an as yet unknown state-ket |ψGt,H(r,t)>fact(DM) that is conceived a 
priori as a Hilbert-space vector of the type (22) |ψG,H(r,t1)> ≈pred. {∀A,∀t1,  
|ψG,H(r,t1)>/A}  where each QMHD-observable A introduces a basis of eigenket 
{|uj(r,aj)>,∀j,} so that we lodge the factually generated data directly in a Hilbert space H 
associated to the microstate to be studied. Therefore we write for each observable A the 
expansion-form 
|ψGt,H(r,t)>fact(DM)/A = ∑j   e
iα(A,j) |cj(aj,t)fact(DM)| |uj(r,aj) >, ∀j,∀t1                        (24) 
where the expansion coefficients are deliberately written as a product in order to be able 
to treat separately the question of the numerical values of the two factors eiα(A,j) and 
|cj(aj,t)fact(DM)|.  
1b. We establish factually for the studied microstate msGt1 the (ε,δ,No)-probability 
laws {π(Gt,aj)},∀A,∀t, from the description DM  of type (9'') of the microstate to be 
studied (msG))t. We act accordingly to IQM, by use of (13’’) and of coding-measurement-
successions [Gt.MesA] that obey the coding postulate (20') P(codG(n-c)), and by respecting 
all the conditions (a),(b),(c),(d) of semantic compatibility defined in (7.III).1.2). 
This exhausts the first purely factual phase of the construction. 
2. We shall now establish the points (a) and (b) from the assertion Ass2, denoted 
respectively (2a) and (2b). 
(2a). Consider now the general graphic form (24) – still void of any numerical 
specification – of the QMHD-expansion of |ψGt,H(r,t)>fact(DM) with respect to A. For each 
coefficient from (24) we have: 
cj(aj,t)fact(DM) =  eiα(A, j) |cj(aj,t)fact(DM)| ∀j,  ∀t1                                                                    
(25) 
We concentrate upon the factors |cj(aj,t)fact(DM)| (the factors eiα(A, j) will be examined 
later).  So far in (25) the expansion coefficients cj(aj,t)fact(DM) are endowed with, 
exclusively, the general geometrical meaning that is assigned to them by definition, 
namely that of the projections onto the directions introduced by the eigenket {|uj(r,aj)>} 
of A in the Hilbert-space H of the factual state-ket |ψGt,H(r,t)>fact(DM) that is to be 
constructed. The expressions (24), (25) are still void mathematical molds. We shall now 
endow them with defined contents.  
Let us imagine for a moment that we are inside QMHD and that it has been possible 
to write the Schrödinger equation of the problem and to solve it, so that the researched 
state-ket |ψGt,H(r,t)> and its expansion (18) |ψGt,H(r,t1)>/A=∑j e
iα(A, j)|cj(aj,t1)||uj(r,aj)> are 
known. However – because of quasi ubiquitous mathematical idealizations or 
approximations, in general we would be unable to know also to what a degree Born's 
postulate is indeed factually true in this case; concerning the factual validity of the 
expansion coefficients from (18) there would subsist doubts.  
Whereas in our case we are no more inside QMHD, we are in the framework [IQM-
QMHD] where according to the achieved point 1 the probabilities 
π(Gt,aj)fact(DM),∀j,∀A,∀t1, have been established factually, not by calculi via the 
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Schrödinger equation. And now – by just a constructive definition – we posit, up to an 
(ε,δ,N0)-imprecision, the new formal-factual equality 
|cj(aj,t)fact(DM)|2       =;constr,def,, (ε,δ,No)         π(Gt,aj)fact(DM) ,    ∀j                 (26) 
where the symbol '= constr, def. (ε,δ,No)'  is to be read  'is equal by definition and with (ε,δ,No)-
precision'; the index 'fact(DM)' is to be read ' factual, involved by DM '.  
Let us stop here to note immediately that the genesis and the final numerical 
content of the first member from (26) – |cj(aj,t)fact(DM)|2 – are essentially different in 
nature from those of the QMHD descriptors from (23) π(aj) =Gth    [ |Pr. j|ψ>|2  =def  
|c(aj,ψ) |2 ], ∀j, tied with Gleason's theorem (and via (Bp) with Born's postulate). This is 
so because of the different sorts of geneses of these two expansion coefficients.  
- In (23) that concerns the Hilbert-Dirac QMHD the numerical value of the 
descriptor |c(aj,ψ |2 – and also that of the predictive probability π(aj,ψ) – have been only 
calculated from the solution |ψ> of the Schrödinger equation of the problem 
(hypothetically considered to have been available), as the inserted symbol 'ψ ' reminds 
explicitly. So this predictive value remains to be also verified, necessarily by repeated 
individual coding-measurement-successions [G.MesA] that incorporate the coding 
procedure (20').  
- Whereas in (26) the descriptor |cj(aj,t)fact(DM)|2 has first been just written in the 
graphic form of a coefficient from the expansion of a Hilbert-Dirac state-ket, and its 
numerical value π(Gt,aj)fact(DM) is known to possess the nature of a 'probability' and to be 
factually true within an 'imprecision (ε,δ,No)' because it has been constructed such via 
individual coding-measurement successions [G.MesA] and accordingly to the definition 
of DM in (9'') from IQM; but that now inside [IQM-QMHD] incorporates also the coding 
procedure (20'). So no verification is necessary any more, the verification is insured by 
construction105.    
We can now re-write (24) with the following ‘factual-mathematical’ form of the 
right-hand member where instead of the form |cj(aj,t)fact(DM)|2  is inserted the number 
√π(Gt,aj)fact(DM) : 
|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  /A = ∑j    e
iα(A, j). √π(Gt,aj)fact(DM). |uj(r,aj)>),  ∀j, ∀t1,                   (27) 
The same procedure is valid for the spectral decomposition of |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) 
with respect to any other dynamical observable different fro A. So this settles for any 
observable the question of the absolute numerical values of the expansion coefficients 
from (24), (25).  
Consider now the imaginary factors eiα(A, j) from (24), (25). 
In the expression eiα(A, j) the observable A is a variable. When one passes from A to 
another given observable B the QMHD concept of a state-ket |ψGt1,H(r,t)> involves 
conditions of mutual consistency between the expansion-coefficients of |ψGt1,H(r,t)> with 
respect to A and the expansion-coefficients of |ψGt1,H(r,t)> with respect to B. These 
conditions are taken into account in Dirac's theory of transformations and they can be 
specified via a trivial lemma L(Ass.2) made explicit inside QMHD for any state-ket 
|ψGt1,H(r,t)>:  
                                                      
105 This is nearly a procedural and semantic opposition with respect to those assigned to the descriptor |c(aj, ψ |2 from 
(23); this sort of opposition reflects the general distinction between the top-down abstract and directly statistical 
approach that marks the formalism of QMHD, and the bottom-up factual approach practised here, where the descriptors 
|cj(aj,t)fact(DM)|2 are constructed by factual individual coding-measurement-successions [Gt1.MesA]. (This distinction 
must be somehow tied with the change of the 'good' order of reading, and the choices, in Physics, of a direction of 
rotation; indeed (26) is 'better' read from right to left, so with the motion of the pointer of a clock on its projection on a 
line).   
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L(Ass.2). If in (25) an arbitrary set {eiα(A,j)} of complex factors is introduced for the 
observable A, then Dirac’s theory of transformations determines consistently with this 
initial choice, all the complex factors to be introduced in all the other expansions of 
|ψGt1,H(r,t)> corresponding to any other given dynamical observable B, that does not 
commute with A, so [A,B]≠0.   
Proof of L(Ass.2). Consider the expansion  
|ψGt1,H(r,t)>/B =∑k  e
iγ(B,k) ⎜dk(t,bk) ⎜⎜vk(r,bk)>,  k=1,2…K,   ∀t                               
(18’) 
of |ψGt,H(r,t)> on the basis {⎜vk(r,bk) >} of eigenket introduced in H  by a given 
observable B, [A,B]≠ 0 that does not commute with A, where the numbers  eiγ(B,k) 
⎜dk(t,bk)⎜ are the expansion coefficients. For any given value of the index k we have 
inside QMHD that 
<vk(r,bk) |ψG,H(r,t)> = eiγ(B,k) |dk(t,bk)| = ∑ j τkj(A,B) cj(t,aj) ,   ∀j, ∀t                  (28) 
where τkj (A,B)=<vk|uj>, ∀j. So for any complex factor of given index k we have a 
separate condition 
eiγ(B,k)  =  <vk|ψG(t)>⎮ ⎜dk(t, bk)⎜ =  ∑ j τkj(A,B) cj(t,aj)⎮⎜dk(t,bk)⎜,  ∀A,B,   ∀t     
(29) 
(where ‘⎮’ is to be read: divided by).  
So the lemma is proved for a QMHD state-ket |ψGt1,H(r,t)> if the condition (29) is 
fulfilled.  
We impose the condition (29) for also the formal-factual state-ket (27) 
|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) . 
Thereby the Hilbert-Dirac representation of any expansion of the factual-formal 
state-ket |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  is now achieved: all the contents of the representational 
elements are fully specified, semantically as well as structurally and numerically. So we 
finally write: 
|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  /A  ≡   ∑j    e
iα(A, j).√π (Gt1 ,aj). |uj(r,aj)>,  ∀j, ∀t1, ∀A              (27’)                                     
And this in its turn permits to write for the global factual-formal construct 
|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  the synthetic integrated form:  
|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)     ≈pred.   {∀A,∀t,  (|ψGt,H(r,t1)>)DM,ff  /A}                              (30) 
like in (22) for a QMHD state-ket. 
The representation of |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  from (27’) specifies explicitly – and 
directly – all the first order probability laws involved in (30), from all the probability 
spaces that crown the branches of the IQM-probability-tree T(G,∀A) of the studied 
microstate (Fig.2). Furthermore –the imaginary factors eiα(A, j) from the expansion-
coefficients and the lemma L(Ass.2) – (27’) are likely to determine also the [IQM-QMHD] 
mathematical representation of the general syntactic structures (11) and (11') of the meta-
probabilistic correlations (Mπc(Gt1))AB, ∀AB that have been defined in IQM. Indeed – 
insofar that also the QMHD expression of the IQM meta-correlations (Mπc(Gt))AB have 
been specified in |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  via (9'') and by the condition (29) – the formal-
factual relation (30) has necessarily emerged as a full correspondent of the QMHD 
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equivalence (22) |ψGt,H(r,t)>≈{ |ψGt,H(r,t)>/A} , ∀A,∀t 106. And this correspondent has 
been constructed without making use of the Schrödinger equation of the problem. 
So the point (2a) from the Ass.2 is established.  
Let us add that in the equivalence (30), in consequence of the fact that no 
Schrödinger equation has been made use of, the global factual-formal state-ket 
|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) is not endowed with an own explicit integrated functional expression: 
such as it has emerged, it has to be regarded as just defined by the second member of 
(30). 
(2b). We have repeatedly stressed that a QMHD state-ket |ψGt,H(r,t)> obtained via 
the Schrödinger equation of the problem is in general marked by purely mathematical 
constraints – idealizations, approximations, or just guesses, etc.; which – in the absence 
of any defined individual genesis of the calculated statistical predictions – can induce 
into the consequences of the mathematical constraints uncontrollable deviations from the 
unknown factual truth. Whereas in (30) all the involved numerical values √(π(Gt ,aj)) 
from the predictive probability laws imported from (27’) have been defined via factual 
individual successions of operations [Gt.MesA] and accordingly to the definitions (5') 
and (9'') from IQM. So, with chosen and arbitrarily small (ε,δ,N0)-uncertainties, the 
semantic contents involved in (30) are by construction in conformity with the factual 
truth of the asserted predictions and with the verification of these, realized together: In 
what concerns the factual truth of the predictions the argument Arg(Ass.2) insures it a 
priori by construction; and in what concerns the verification of the predictions, it follows 
from (3.I).5 and from the assertion Ass.1.  
So, in consequence of their independence of an equation of evolution, the 
predictions drawn from the formal-factual state-ket |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  are in general 
different from those that are drawn from the corresponding QMHD state-ket |ψGt1,H(r,t)> 
and they are certainly true factually, by construction. In this sense (30) extends the 
QMHD-domain (22) of possibility of factually true predictions on microstates.  
Which establishes also the point (2b) from the Ass.2.  
The whole assertion Ass.2 is now fully established.                      n 
                                                      
106  We believe that the imaginary factors eiα(A, j) determine the QMHD mathematical expression of the IQM meta-
probabilistic correlations (Mπc(Gt1))AB from a probability-tree and from (9’’). Consider the IQM descriptor (11) 
p(bk)=Fbk,A{p(Gt ,aj)}, ∀k, ∀j, ∀(A,B) that denotes meta-probabilistic correlations (Mpc(Gt))AB between whole 
probability laws that crown two distinct branches of a given probability-tree. Inside QMHD the Dirac transformation 
from the Hilbert-space representation of the state-ket |ψG(t)> of the studied microstate with respect to the eigenvalues 
aj of an observable A, to the representation of |ψGt(t)> with respect to the eigenvalues bk of another observable B that 
does not commute with A, is defined by dk(t,bk)=∑j τkj(A,B) cj(t,A), ∀j, ∀k, ∀t. Of course, the aim of Dirac’s QMHD 
calculus of transformations is entirely ignorant of the IQM operational-semantic categorization of the set of all the 
considered pairs of observable events {(aj,bk)},∀(A,B),∀t  tied with the studied microstates, inside a tree-like 
probabilistic whole founded upon the operation of generation G or Gt that corresponds to the state-ket |ψGt> of the 
studied microstate. This is so because the individual operations G or Gt – like also any corresponding coding-
measurement-evolution – are not represented inside QMHD. So inside QMHD Dirac’s calculus of transformation from 
one ‘representation’ of |ψG(t)> with respect to an observable A, to its resentation with respect to another observable B, 
is asserted as just a mathematical algorithm devoid of any more general meaning. Nevertheless the isomorphism 
between the writings (11), (11’) and those from Dirac's theory of transformations suggests that these formulas point 
toward the possibility of a much more general Dirac-like 'calculus of semantic proximities', that remains to be made 
explicit and exploited: For instance, the scalar product of two distinct state-ket of two different microstates but 
expressed inside one same representation, might be used as a measure of a concept of ‘degree of angular proximity’ 
inside this representation, so relatively to qualifications by the observable that determines the representation (MMS 
[1993]); while a Dirac transformation alone leads from one semantic universe to another one that is disjoint from the 
first. It seems rather clear that inside QMHD the imaginary factors from the expansion coefficients determine phase-
relations between different terms in one expansion and furthermore they define meta-probabilistic correlations that are 
likely to coincide with those denoted in IQM by the sign  (Mpc(Gt))AB. 
 
 
 
 
150 
We close this argument by adding explicitly to the formal writing (30) a graphic 
indication of the remarkable fact that the predictive content from (30) emerges already 
verified: 
|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  ≠pred.  |ψGt1,H(r,t)>,                                                                 (31)        
 [ |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)     ≈pred.  { |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) /A} ,∀A,∀t1}  ]verif 
Important remark. Throughout what follows the equivalence from (31) is just 
posited to entail the possibility to construct for the first member (|ψGt,H(r,t1)>)DM,ff  an 
integrated mathematical functional expression of the form ψGt1,H(r,t)>ff=a(r,t)e(i/—)ϕ(r,t) 
(there should even exist an infinite family of such possibilities, since in the lemma 
L(Ass.2) the initial choice of imaginary phase-factors has been arbitrary). Inside QMHD 
this integrated expression is obtained by calculus from the Schrödinger equation of the 
problem (iff this equation can be written and the solution can be found on the basis of 
acceptable approximations 107). But we stress that an integrated solution is not more 
useful than (31) itself because any prediction-verification process is founded on 
expansions (22) and the Hilbert-space representation (23) of these, which (31) permits 
directly. Moreover, since (31) emerges verified, the Hilbert-space representation – in 
contradistinction to how it is used inside QMHD – has here mainly a role of consensual 
communicability of probability laws, un-separated in terms of prediction and verification. 
We summarize: Via the assertion Ass2 we have constructed a new representation of 
the quantum measurements for the quasi-classical case of the microstates 
ms(unbound,1)G(n-c), no matter whether the aim of these is to construct a prediction or to 
verify it. This new representation is rooted directly into the a-conceptual physical 
factuality, it is constructed bottom-up, and – by construction – it emerges both predictive 
and verified. Since furthermore, while it constructs a representation of the results of 
quantum measurements on microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c), it also constructs factually a 
Hilbert-Dirac mathematical representation (31) |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) of the studied 
microstate itself, the approach brought forth by the argument that proves the assertion 
Ass.1 appears to be remarkably synthetic.  
  
                                                      
107 We quote as it stands the following extract from the French Wikipedia:  Rareté d'une résolution analytique 
exacte 
La recherche des états propres de l'hamiltonien est en général complexe. Même le cas analytiquement soluble de 
l'atome d'hydrogène ne l'est rigoureusement sous forme simple que si l'on néglige le couplage avec le champ 
électromagnétique qui va permettre le passage des états excités, solutions de l'équation de Schrödinger de l'atome, vers 
le fondamental. 
Certains modèles simples, bien que non tout à fait conformes à la réalité, peuvent être résolus analytiquement et 
s'avèrent très utiles : 
• particule libre (potentiel nul) ; 
• oscillateur harmonique (potentiel quadratique) ; 
• particule se déplaçant sur un anneau ; 
• particule dans un puits de potentiel rectangulaire ; 
• particule dans un guide d'onde annulaire ; 
• particule dans un potentiel à symétrie sphérique ; 
• particule dans un réseau unidimensionnel (potentiel périodique). 
Dans les autres cas, il faut faire appel aux diverses techniques d'approximation : 
• la théorie des perturbations fournit des expressions analytiques sous la forme de développements 
asymptotiques autour d'un problème non perturbé exactement soluble. 
• l'analyse numérique permet d'explorer des situations inaccessibles par la théorie de perturbation. 
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(7.III).2.3. Hilbert-space representation of quantum measurements  
for unbound microstates with quantum fields 
We consider now microstates of one microsystem but with a composed operation 
of generation (cf. the definitions from (2.I).1). Such a microstate incorporates a 
phenomenon of 'interference of corpuscular-waves', so a non-null quantum potential 
wherefrom quantum fields can emerge. Such a microstate is denoted ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) 
(the index ‘cG(qf)’ is to be understood as: ‘composed operation G of generation involving 
possibility of quantum fields’). Thereby we quit now the first, superficial stratum of 
QMHD that deals with the quasi-classical dynamics of the corpuscular-like singularity 
from the specimens of a microstate ms(unbound,1)G(n-c).  
The microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) constitute the key-category in the endeavour 
toward an intelligible consensual predictive and verifiable conceptualization of 
microstates and micro-phenomena. Though they are still unbound states and so, 
essentially endowed with unstable characters, the inside of the specimens of a microstate 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) cannot any more be conceived to be transparent to the exterior 
context, as it is presupposed to be by the coding postulate (20'). With respect to 
microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) the concepts of 'outside' and 'inside' (cf. 
Atmanspacher&Dalenoort [1994]) acquire full power, and this, in the processes of 
conceptualization, plays an outstanding role108. The opposition outside-inside displaces 
us from upon the very frontier between classical physics and quantum physics, into the 
depth of the 'quantic' stratum of physical substance. It draws us deep into the unlimited 
and a-conceptual 'Universal Physical Substance' in the sense of Spinoza (Natura 
Naturans), as this substance has been specifically conceptualized by de Broglie and 
Bohm. Only here, beneath the frontier with the classical mechanics, does acquire general 
and full contour and density the fundamental question how something of which the 
concept and the name have been formed in the minds, but that is as yet un-known in its 
strict specificity, can be 'separated' from the whole where it belongs in a sense that permit 
to assert that it has become 'the entity to be studied' consensually, and how that can be 
effectively 'studied', which means qualified.  
In the Part I of this work we have dealt already precisely with this question, but 
only in principle, without specifying a model of a microstate; in the Part II we have 
specified the model that works implicitly inside QMHD; and in the chapter 9.III, when we 
shall integrate the structure of "the Second Quantum mechanics QM2" we shall come 
back to the general question mentioned above, and the answer will place us on the path 
toward an answer to the problem of 'Unification'.  
While here we shall try for the moment to continue the construction of a new 
representation of the quantum measurements researched inside this chapter 7.III. for 
microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf), the constructive approach achieved in (7.III).2.3 via the 
Assertion Ass2 for the case of microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c).  
 
(7.III).2.3.1. Critique of the QMHD representation of microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf)  
and of momentum-measurements on such microstates 
For microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) the dynamic of the singularity from the 
physical wave of the specimens of the studied microstate cannot be conceived any more 
to be influenced exclusively by the classical macroscopic fields from a Schrödinger 
Hamiltonia; this Hamiltonian becomes insufficiently rich 109. Correlatively, the QMHD 
                                                      
108 Intimately tied with the opposition 'open'-'closed' that lies on the ground of the concept of 'formal system'. 
109 In QMHD this is compensated by the help of the concepts like "obstacle", "potential-wall", approximations, etc  I 
reproduce from: file:///Users/mms/Desktop/Équation%20de%20Schrödinger%20—%20Wikipédia.webarchive, 14 
March 2018 (without translating): 
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Hilbert-space representation of the microstates microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) becomes 
itself inadequate, which brings forth a limit of the framework [IQM-QMHD]. 
In order to show this we consider for simplicity a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) of 
type (15') with only two components in the operation of generation, for instance a 
Young-interference msG12 generated by an operation of generation G(G1,G2). The QMHD 
Hilbert space-representation of the state-ket of such a microstate (and with the revised 
notations from [IQM-QMHD]) is: 
|ΨG(G1,G2)(r,t)> = λ1|ΨG1(r,t)> + λ2|Ψ G2(r,t)>                  (15'') 
Consider the momentum-observable P. This observable plays a basic role inside 
QMHD (the position-observable R is degenerate from various points of view, while the 
eigenvalues of any other observable A can be represented as a function A(R,P) that 
permits to calculate the eigenvalues of A from those of R and P (cf. 5.II).1)). The 
eigenfunctions of the momentum-observable P are plane wave-functions a.exp(i/—)pj.r 
where pj designate the eigenvalue with index j of P that is tied with the plane-wave 
eigenfunction a.exp(i/—)pj.r. The expansion |ΨG(G1,G2)(r,t)>/P where |ΨG(G1,G2)(r,t)> is 
defined by (15'') yields for the predictive probability of the outcome pj  – let us re-note it 
pj,12 – the well-known representation of form  
π12(pj,12 ) = π1(pj,1 )+π2(pj,2 )+F(π1(pj,1),π2(pj,2 ))                                                  (32) 
with pj,1 and pj,2 the eigenvalues introduced by the expansions  |ΨG1(r,t)>/P and |Ψ 
G2(r,t)>/P, respectively. 
We assert that inside [IQM-QMHD] the prediction (32), and correlatively also the 
representation (15'') are inadequate from conceptual points of view. But furthermore the 
QMHD (32) raise questions concerning the applicability of the coding-postulate (20'), as 
well as questions of effectiveness and of inner logical consistency. We are in presence of 
a sort of block of questions that manifests basic insufficiencies. These have to be 
explicitly formulated and solved. 
Conceptual inadequacy of (15'') with respect to [IQM-QMHD]. As it has been 
already stressed several times, the additive representation (15'') of the state-ket 
|ΨG(G1,G2)(r,t)>/ of a microstate msG12 – though mathematically it is permitted in a vector-
space – suggests semantic features that are misleading from the standpoint of [IQM-
QMHD]: In a certain sense the state-ket |ΨG1(r,t)> and |ΨG2(r,t)> from the second 
member from (15'') do indeed concern the microstates msG1 and msG2. But according to 
[IQM-QMHD] these microstates are not physically realized, and so they do not 'exist': By 
the basic methodological decision MDI from I.1 we have posited a one-to-one relation 
(1) G↔msG between any given operation of generation G and its result denoted msG, and 
in the case considered in (15'') the unique operation of generation that is conceived to 
have been physically realized is G(G1,G2). So exclusively the microstate msG12 
represented by the state-ket |ΨG(G1,G2)(r,t)> is realized. Full stop. The microstates 'msG1' 
and 'msG2' have not been individualized by G(G1,G2)110 because G1 and G2 have not been 
fully and separately realized. These two possible but unrealized microstates have only 
contributed genetically to the global – and abstract – mathematical expression of the 
limiting conditions to be asserted for the solution of the Schrödinger equation of the 
problem, that is tied with the inner 'interference' structure of the microstate msG12 
generated by G(G1,G2). 
 However nothing interdicts to suppose that in QMHD the contents of the second 
member from (15'') have been defined with a purely algorithmic purpose, namely for 
calculating the probabilities of outcomes of measurements on the unique generated and 
                                                      
110  This is not visible inside QMHD where the whole notion of an individual operation of generation of the studied 
microstates remains hidden. 
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studied microstate msG12. If this view is adopted then, in so far that the algorithm is found 
to lead indeed to factually true predictions, this can be considered to suffice for choosing 
the representation (15'') of the state-ket |ΨG(G1,G2)>. So let us focus now on verifiability. 
 
Inadequacy with respect to (15'') of a coding postulate of type (20)-(20'). A 
coding postulate (20') of the type (20) appears to be inadequate with respect to 
momentum measurements on microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf), no matter whether one 
places oneself inside QMHD or inside [IQM-QMHD]. Indeed: 
Inadequacy inside QMHD   
1. The eigenstates of the momentum-observable are plane waves and one of the 
measuring-postulates of QMHD asserts that the result of a measurement on a microstate is 
always an eigenvalue of the measured observable that emerges with the corresponding 
eigenstate (and that immediately after the end of the measurement the 'system' remains in 
this eigenstate) 111. 
On the other hand: 
2. Let us first remark that in a Young interference, a plane wave-structure is 
nowhere spontaneously realized. Strictly speaking, even at an infinite distance from the 
holed screen there still is superposition of contributions from both holes.  
What about the coding-measurement-evolution? Inside QMHD it is explicitly 
admitted that for the momentum-measurements one has to apply the method time-of-
flight. This method requires basically and explicitly the suppression of all the 'external' 
fields that are working (no doubt precisely in order to start a coding-measurement-
evolution that shall generate at finite distance-and-time an eigenstate of the momentum, 
starting from the moment that the measurement-evolution begins). But the quantum 
fields that work in a Young interference are not classical 'exterior' fields and the human 
observer cannot suppress them without suppressing the microstate-to-be-studied. In these 
conditions the coding-postulate (20)-(20') cannot bring forth an eigenstate of the 
momentum-observable.  
So the predicted eigenvalues – with their eigenstates and their probabilities to 
emerge – in fact cannot emerge at all; the QMHD  prediction (32) cannot be verified. 
One might then suggest that – since the structure of the superposition wave-
function from a Young interference becomes spontaneously as near to that of a plane 
wave as one wants when the distance-and-time increase toward infinity – it suffices to 
end each coding-measurement-succession [G.MesP] by a position-registration on a very 
distant sensitive-screen, which will constitute a satisfactory measurement of the 
momentum eigenvalue.  
However it seems clear that it is not acceptable to admit a definition of a coding-
measurement evolution that in its very principle involves either approximations, or a 
non-effective distance-and-time of evolution. A measurement operation has to be a priori 
required rigorous and effective; in its principle.    
3. In short, the situation just described in this point 2 is in direct contradiction with 
the QMHD view recalled in 1, and the prediction (32) involved by it cannot be verified. 
(So the contradiction can last undisturbed).  
Inadequacy inside [IQM-QMHD]   
1'. In [IQM-QMHD]-terms now, the descriptive structure of an interference 
microstate with state-ket |ΨG(G1,G2)(r,t)> is  tied with the two operations of generation G1 
and G2 involved in the unique realized operation G(G1,G2), in the sense of the last 
definition from (1.I)1; and that what is considered to have a 'trajectory' along a maximum 
of presence-probability (the 'particle') is the singularity from the amplitude of the 
                                                      
111  Cf. (5.II).1 (measurement postulates); and also Cohen-Tannnoudji, C., Diu, B. et Laloë, F.  [1973]). 
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individual physical wave represented by the individual de Broglie wave-function 
ΦG(G1,G2)(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) of the specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of msG12 that is involved in any 
one coding-measurement-succession [G(G1,G2).Mes.P] (cf. (6.II).4.2.2). Now, each one 
of the two operations of generation G1 and G2 involved in the unique realized operation 
of generation G(G1,G2) can be considered to induce into the movement of the unique 
singularity from one given ΦG(G1,G2)(r,t) a directional trend, and accordingly to de 
Broglie's guiding law these two distinct directional trends are conceived to combine so as 
to determine for the one involved singularity a trajectory along a maximum of the 
presence-probability determined by the state-ket |ΨG(G1,G2)> that corresponds to 
ΦG(G1,G2)(r,t). Insofar that this is correct: 
The neighbourhood of the singularity from ΦG(G1,G2)(r,t) can never be conceived to 
be populated by a form of wave-movement representable by only one plane wave, 
not even approximately and at ideal infinity; for in the case of a microstate 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) precisely this small neighbourhood is conceived to be quite 
essentially populated by a physical superposition of two wave-movements of 
distinct directions that – together – determine the trajectory.  
And conceiving to wait that 'near infinity' the obstacles disappear amounts in fact 
to waiting (non-effectively) that what you want to study, disappear. 
2'. Since QMHD is part of the framework [IQM-QMHD], the QMHD measuring-
postulates are still acting.  
3'. So again the points 1' and 2' are not mutually consistent, just like above 
according to QMHD.  
So we conclude that:  
In fact the ‘prediction’ (32) consists of just a mathematical definition of the 
predictive probabilities π12(pj,12) that is postulated to be factually true but that cannot be 
verified to be such; it follows that for the category of microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) a 
new coding postulate has to be formulated and that, correlatively, new definitions are 
needed for the concepts of eigenstates and eigenvalues of the momentum-observable, as 
well as for the Hilbert-space representation of the involved state-ket. Nothing interdicts 
such a search.  
The mathematical linear representations of the type (15'') of microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) is just a hurried choice that is permitted by the Hilbert-vector-space 
structure  but is devoid of any necessity of semantic or of logical nature. On the contrary, 
from the standpoint of inner logical-semantic coherence it appears to be inadequate.  
Comment on the critique. One might believe that this whole problem is a false 
problem that stems from IQM, while nothing imposes to accept IQM. One can hold that 
this problem can be evacuated by just refusing the concept of a ‘composed operation of 
generation’ defined in (2.I)1 and by just accepting the direct postulation from QMHD of 
the adequacy of additive representations of state-ket like in (15'') and its consequence 
(32'). But this is not in the least the case. A rejection of the concept of composed 
operations of generation would not change the fact that the predictions (32) raise 
questions with respect to basic postulates of QMHD; nor would it change the fact that the 
coding-postulate (20') cannot be used for verifying the prediction (32) of (15''). The fact 
that this unacceptable situation has been brought forth by the concept of composed 
operation of generation is a strong manifestation of the relevance of this concept.  
So if one wants to construct an effective and intelligible representation of the 
microstates, it is imperative to deal overtly with the problems raised by measurements of 
the momentum observable on microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf).  
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This leads us to the works of Broglie and Bohm, the only ones that have taken fully 
into explicit consideration the quantum potentials and quantum fields involved by most 
microstates, and which are the core of the specificity of quantum physics. 
 
 (7.III).2.3.2. Louis de Broglie, David Bohm, and de Broglie's Double-Solution interpretation of 
QMHD  
What now is called the 'de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics' has 
been much developed in works by P. Holland, B. Hiley, D. Dürr, S. Goldstein, N. 
Zanghi, M. Towler, W. Struyve, and many others 112. But this vast and complex evolving 
domain of research is exterior to the purpose of this work; in this work we make direct 
use of, exclusively: 
- Louis de Broglie's initial model of a micro-'system', as introduced in his Thesis 
and that has been identified in (6.II).1, (6.II).2, (6.II).4.2.2 to be basically incorporated in 
the QMHD-formalism via the concepts of eigenstates and eigenvalues of an observable; 
- The general features of Louis de Broglie's 'double-solution causal interpretation 
of quantum mechanics' ([1956], [1957]) that developed the work of Bohm [1952] 
wherefrom de Broglie has drawn basic features as well as moral support (this has to be 
acknowledged). 
 Only these two essential features – and only in very succinct terms and very 
selected respects – will be connected to the present approach in what follows from this 
point and up to the end. Louis de Broglie's double solution interpretation will be denoted 
dBDS(B) (to be read: ' de Broglie's double-solution interpretation as conceived in relation 
with Bohm's interpretation). 
  Via the ‘theorem of concordance of the phases’ cited in (6.II).1, Louis de 
Broglie's model is tied with the well-known 'guiding law' of the momentum by the phase-
function of the physical corpuscular-like wave assigned to any micro-system113. So the 
guiding law also – alike to the corpuscular-wave model of a specimen of a microstate and 
via this model is equally omnipresent in the QMHD-formalism, implicitly, and carried by 
a restricting equation for eigenfunctions and eigenvalues of a quantum mechanical 
observable (cf. (6.II).1 and what follows); which is organically tied with the critique of 
the representation (15'')-(32) from (7.III).2.3.1). And along this way the guiding-law is 
implicitly but organically available inside the framework [IQM-QMHD], in a still 
potential way that has to be now actualized in suitable generalized terms.  
We begin below by trying to understand what – exactly – withstands application of 
the coding-procedure (20') in the case of a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) of the type of 
that from (15''). This draws attention upon the so widely accepted distinction between 
'observables' and 'beables' introduced by Bell.   
 
 (7.III).2.3.3. On 'observables' and 'beables'  
It has become current to distinguish between 'beable' qualifications and QMHD 
'observables'. The position-vector observable R is considered more or less implicitly to 
behave like a beable, in this sense that the registration of perceivable marks produced by 
a specimen of the studied microstate can be considered to trivially show where 'the 
system' was 'really' placed when the mark emerged. But the case of R is regarded as a 
degenerate case. In general a QMHD observable – the momentum observable included – is 
currently conceived to manifest eigenvalues that are created by the measurement-
                                                      
112 Cf. Wikipedia file:///Users/mms/Desktop/De%20Broglie–Bohm%20theory%20-%20Wikipedia.webarchive. 
113 Let us notice that in contradistinction to de Broglie, Bohm does not explicitly distinguish between the physical wave 
Φ(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) of a specimen of the microstate-to-be-studied, and the statistical state-ket associated to this 
microstate (cf.(6.II).4.2.2). 
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interaction: What is observed and coded by an eigenvalue of the measured quantity is 
conceived to be in general different from the initial beable value, i.e. to have been created 
by the measurement-evolution out of this beable value114.  
But the analyses from (6.II).3 and (6.II).4 – and particularly of the method 'time of 
flight' for measuring momentum observable P – bring forth a view that is directly 
opposed to that recalled above:  
A coding-measurement-evolution of the general form (20') – that, implicitly, is 
conceived inside QMHD to be applicable to any sort of microstate – in fact is expressly 
constructed such as to conserve unchanged the initial 'beable' value of the measured 
quantity and to draw it into the realm of consensual observability – so knowledge –, via 
perceivable marks that permit to identify it on the basis of theoretical arguments and 
calculi. Indeed this is the very essence of the criterion that acts in (20) and in (20') for 
asserting that the procedure can be considered to act as as 'a coding-measurement-
evolution'. And precisely this ceases to be realizable in a controlled way for momentum 
measurements on microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(q-f).  
But why, exactly, does it cease?  
Certainly one of the causes is that in the case of a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) – 
in contradistinction to what happens with microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) – the dynamics 
of that what, in a specimen of the studied microstate, does admit 'mechanical' 
qualifications 115, can never be brought under the controllable dependence of exclusively 
the 'exterior' context of that. According to [IQM-QMHD] this is so by the definition of the 
operation that generates a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf), namely a composed operation 
of generation G(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM). The singularity of any specimen of a microstate 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) is genetically immersed in a quantum potential entailed by the 
physical superposition of the mutually distinct directions of wave-movement instilled by 
the components (G1,G2,...Gm,...GM) of G. The mechanical displacements of this 
singularity are, both, determined by this inner quantum potential, and shielded by it from 
the outside of the whole specimen, continuously, irrepressibly, and in a way that cannot 
be controlled because any inner fluctuation that propagates from the space-time support 
assigned to the operation of generation G(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM), can generate unpredictable 
quantum forces that in general add unknowable changes to the initial value of the 
momentum that characterizes the mechanical displacement to be qualified. So the inside 
of the specimens of a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) is out of the human observer's 
control. No act of measurement tied with 'extinction' and control of the inner fields can 
be conceived, that would – at least only theoretically – preserve from changes the value 
of the mechanical quantity to be measured, throughout the measurement-evolution. All 
that seems possible to be done in this respect is to maintain as stable as possible the 
global immediate outside of any whole specimen of the studied microstate 116.  
But certainly this is not the fundamental explanation of the resistance opposed by 
QMHD-postulates to the application of the coding-postulate (20') for verifying the 
predictions (32) on the results of momentum-measurements drawn from the QMHD 
representation (15'') of a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf). This resistance stems from a still 
more basic level that manifests itself in the various critical remarks from (7.III).2.3.1, 
some of which concern specifically the contradiction between the QMHD measurement-
                                                      
114  I have myself held this view, strongly and for a long time. 
115 In Bohmian mechanics, for instance, the spin quantity is considered not to be a 'mechanical' quantity; it is regarded 
as a qualification of the wave movement.  
116 Here, at this point of the present inquiry, one can realize to what a point the physical reality opposes obstacles to 
factually gained knowledge – not to mental modelling, nor to mental separation from the 'rest' of the Universal Physical 
Substance, but to factual generation in the role of entity-to-be-studied; which, like precisely in the case of a specimen 
of a microstate, can even not insure a global spatial delimitation (cf. (6.II).2), so that the very basic separation 'inside-
outside' becomes vague. And nevertheless it remains important because it has observational consequences, like 
precisely in the case of a factual operation of generation and the inside of the generates entity-to-be-studied. 
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postulates 1 and 2 and the implicit but clear assumption of the unrestricted validity of the 
coding-postulate (20'): this contradiction points toward a too restricted form of the QMHD 
equation for eigenstates and eigenfunctions of the momentum-observable.  
Let us conclude on the concepts of 'beable' and of 'observable'. These concepts do 
not reach the basic feature that opposes resistance when one wants to apply the coding 
postulate (20') to the case of momentum- measurement upon microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf).  
The belief carried by these concepts, that in general a QMHD measurement-
evolution necessarily changes the value possessed by the measured quantity when 
the measurement-evolution begins, might simply be false.  
The essential difference – intuitively targeted but not reached by the concepts of 
'observable' or 'beable' – does not concern the numerical value of the considered 
quantity; it concerns the way in which it is possible to bring this value into consensual 
and verifiable knowledge. And how it concerns this, though not fully clear yet, is likely 
to be connected somehow with the measurement-postulates 1 and 2 from QMHD, so with 
the equation for eigenstates and eigenvalues of the momentum observable P, because in a 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) it is not possible to generate by a coding-measurement-evolution that 
lasts a finite time, an plane-wave-eigenstate of the momentum observable, as it is 
asserted by these postulates and as it is supposed by the coding-postulate (20), admitted 
implicitly inside QMHD for any sort of unbound microstate.  
This is the problem on which we have to focus. 
This problem does not incriminate the representation dBDS(B) since this is a priori 
introduced as only an interpretation of QMHD. But it does flaw QMHD itself that claims 
true and verifiable predictions for any sort of microstate, while for the microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) – that constitute the most specific core of nowadays fundamental 
microphysics – the predictions (32) are not verifiable 117. And it quite essentially 
incriminates the framework [IQM-QMHD] where this flaw emerges.  
The conditions for satisfying the fundamental assertion Ass.1 cease to be realizable 
inside the framework [IQM-QMHD]. In order to treat the case of the microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) the framework [IQM-QMHD] must be modified so as to include 
an adequate coding-procedure for momentum-measurements.  
Here we suspend the general considerations on 'beables' and 'observables', in order 
to focus specifically on the formulation of such a coding-procedure.   
 
(7.III).2.3.4. Doubt on the presumed non-measurability  
of the de Broglie instantaneous guided value of the momentum 
Since in the case of a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) the stable conservation of the 
initial value of the momentum throughout a lasting momentum-measurement-evolution 
cannot be certainly insured until a final interaction that produces observable coding-
marks 118, one is led to try to identify a sort of coding-measurement-evolution for this 
case that consumes the instantaneous value possessed by the momentum at the time when 
the measurement begins, in a process that  – itself – codes for this value: a 'value-
                                                      
117  This, I think, is intimately connected with the very fundamental exchange between Englert & alt. [1992], Dürr & 
alt. [1993], Finkelstein [1995] and Hiley&alt. [2000], on which we come back at the end of this chapter. 
118 Which usually destroys the measured momentum-value, so also the corresponding eigenstate, contrarily to the 
QMHD postulate that any act of measurement leaves the 'system' in the eigenstate of the obtained eigenvalue. But it 
might be possible to realize conditions in which this final destruction is avoided. 
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consuming' process of coding-measurement-evolution. No solution of another sort comes 
to our mind.  
This brings us to the dBDS(B) approach because it is the only one that penetrates 
explicitly into the 'inside' of the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf). This approach is the 
source of the concepts of quantum potentials and quantum fields.  
 
Inside [IQM-QMHD] the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) are characterized by 
composed operations of generation G(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM), m=1,2,..M 119  and these 
introduce a wave-function  ΦG(G1,G2)(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) of which the phase-function β(r,t) 
defines a sort of momentum-value that inside QMHD is not defined, and which, in the 
context of the problem formulated in (7.III).2.3.1 draws attention upon it: Consider de 
Broglie's well-known concept of ‘guiding relation’ 
p(r,t)  = – ł.β(r,t)                                                                                             (33) 
where p(r,t) is the ‘guided’ momentum of the corpuscular-like singularity at the time t 
and β(r,t) is the phase-function at t from the physical individual wave-function 
ΦG(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) that represents the wave of each specimen σΦ(G) of the studied 
microstate (cf. (6.II).2 and (7.III).1.2). This is the very definition of the momentum of the 
singularity from a physical 'corpuscular-like' wave. And inside dBDS(B) : 
The guidance law (33) is asserted deductively and with full generality, both in the 
presence and the absence of quantum fields.  
But this law is quasi-unanimously considered to be un-observable.  
Even de Broglie himself adhered to this view. It is believed that as soon as one 
would try to register the guidance-trajectory in a specimen σΦ(G) of the studied 
microstate, the beginning of the interaction would immediately destroy the inner 
structure of the phase represented by the phase-function β(r,t) and this would 
compromise any global relevance of the data drawn from the interaction. This idea 
however seems to have been admitted on the sole basis of the powers of a priori 
submission to the formalism of QMHD. And notwithstanding these powers: 
- Trace-registrations are currently used in Wilson-chambers, since a long time. 
- For photonic interference states a guided trace has already been experimentally 
registered (cf. A. Steinberg [2011]), which is a very strong indication that an experiment 
with heavy microsystems could equally succeed. 
In fact, I think that nobody as yet has genuinely analysed and tested whether yes or 
not it is possible to choose the values of the parameters involved in a trace-registration on 
a heavy microstate so that to be able to compute out of the registered data the value of the 
momentum at the moment when the trace registration began, in full agreement with the 
theoretical assumptions from dBDS(B) 120.  So this analysis remains to be done. But it has 
to be done without any use of the formalism of QMHD such as it now stands because any 
such use is circular in consequence of the fact that QMHD involves a general validity of 
the coding–postulate (20)-(20') which is incompatible with measurability of guided 
trajectories (33) 121, 122. 
                                                      
119 The dBDS(B) interpretation is devoid of any feature connectable with the [IQM-QMHD] concept of operation of 
generation. But in the nowadays 'Bohmian mechanics' the concept of 'conditional wave-function' plays the role of a sort 
of imagined operation of generation that separates mentally a definite specimen of a microstate inside the universal 
state-function (cf.IOP Science, IP address 195.132.213.223.). This is similar to procedures from the cosmologic theory 
of gravitation. 
120 It even seems that Louis de Broglie's works [1924], [1956], [1957] are not yet available in English, which simply is 
aberration. 
121 I once accomplished a theoretical examination of the measurability of the guided momentum (33) in an interference 
state (MMS [1963]) and it led to a 'proof' that for a globally stable interference microstate (with non-null quantum 
potential but with null permanent quantum fields) it is possible – in full compatibility with dBDS(B) – to register data 
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The time of idolatry with respect to the QMHD formalism and its explicit or implicit 
diktats seem to have revolved. History, once more, brings face-to-face with the as yet 
undone123: 
In an interference-microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf), the momentum-value pj of the 
unique corpuscular-like singularity from any specimen of that microstate generated 
by one realization of the corresponding operation of generation 
G(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM), m=1,2,..M, is determined according to (33) by the phase of a 
wave-movement represented by a wave-function ΦG(G1,G2)(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) where 
the phase-function β(r,t) has never the form of one plane wave. 
One immediately perceives that this is fully consistent with the critique from 
(7.III).2.3.1 of the QMHD-representation (15'') of the state-ket of the considered 
microstate via a linear superposition of other state-ket. Furthermore, surreptitiously, the 
notion begins to gain form that this critique might touch all the QMHD-observables A, 
since any such observable is a function A(R,P) where the eigenket of the observable P 
might appear to be arbitrarily restricted by the equation for eigenket and eigenvalues of 
P; while the Schrödinger equation of evolution does not involve the quantum-potentials 
though these are present in nearly any paradigmatic microstate, like those with "barriers" 
or "walls" or "wells", as well as in any bound microstate.  
 
(7.III).2.3.5. Proposal of an experiment conceived inside [IQM-QMHD] 
Let us imagine the experiment represented in the figure 8 – denoted EXP – that 
involves a very simplified interference-state generated by an operation of generation 
G(G1,G2).  
  
                                                                                                                                                                 
that do permit to calculate from them the corresponding momentum-value from (33) for the time t when these 
registrations have begun. But in that proof the representation of the state-ket had the form (15''). So the cited work, 
more or less implicitly, is likely to involve elements that are not coherent with the present development. Nevertheless it 
still does show that nothing of experimental nature withstood the idea of principle that the de Broglie momentum-value 
(33) for an unbounded interference-microstate can be measured, while this idea was – and still is – unanimously 
banished.  
122 There has been a debate on "Surrealistic Bohmian Trajectories". One of the involved works (Hiley&alt.) considers 
Bohm's approach alone, while the others mix Bohmian formalism with QMHD formalism. But all these works make full 
abstraction of de Broglie's individual physical model as well as of de Broglie's physical wave-function 
Φ(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β12(r,t) of one specimen of the microstate to be studied. In short, the whole own approach of de Broglie 
is ignored; exclusively the statistical state-ket is made use of. All the involved authors accept QMHD just as it now 
stands – with "collapsing" measurements ('reduction') included; and they follow the purpose to show full agreement 
between Bohmian Mechanics and QMHD. Thereby these works – though very interesting and likely to cooperate volens-
nolens toward a new microphysics – are all quite fundamentally different from the construction attempted here inside 
[IQM-QMHD].  
123 This conclusion, I think, is backed by the Steinberg experiment quoted above. 
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Fig.8. A microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(q-f) with operation of generation G(G1,G2). 
The role of the figure 8 and of the corresponding experiment described below, is 
only preliminary: We want to analyse the main features of the physical situation that is 
involved and of the physical interactions entailed by a 'value-consuming' coding-
measurement-evolution that would consist of a registration of a trace left in a sensitive 
medium by p(r,t) from (33) in conditions that permit to calculate the value of p(r,t) from 
characters of this registration. If this analysis leads to a global conclusion of technical 
possibility, the actual experiment can then be realised with a Young interference where 
any a priori approximation or/and restrictive feature in the structure of the studied 
microstate, is eliminated. 
On the Figure 8 the symbol Φo denotes the wave-function of a physical individual 
specimen of a 'preliminary' microstate msGo. Out of Φo a front-wave-divisor splits Φo in 
two parts that are approximately described by, respectively, two other waves '≈Φ1' and 
'≈Φ2' (≈: approximately) – more exactly, trends of wave-movement – tied in the sense 
defined at the end of (1.I).1.2 with the composing operations of generation G1 and G2. 
These combine their effects inside the unique fully realized operation G(G1,G2). The 
directions of propagation of ≈Φ1 and ≈Φ2 make a mutual angle α, while with the axis 0z 
they make angles θ of the same absolute value. In this simplified preliminary 
representation the considered specimen of the interference-microstate to be studied 
msG(G1,G2) is realized only inside the space-time domain where the individual physical 
wave-movements denoted '≈Φ1' and '≈Φ2' superpose physically into one individual 
physical interference-wave-movement denoted by the wave-function Φ12 that 'takes 
place' only on a restricted and definite domain of what is called the 'physical' space-time 
and ceases outside this domain, while inside this domain and on the individual level of 
conceptualization, the phenomenon evolves.  
For each specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of msG(G1,G2) and with respect to the introduced 
referential, the dBDS(B) guidance relation (33) asserts that the corpuscular-like singularity 
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in the amplitude of the respective physical wave with wave-function 
Φ12(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)ϕ(r,t) has a velocity with components vx=vosinθ=const,  vy=vz=0. So the 
momentum-components are   
px=Mvx=Mvosinθ,               py=pz=0                                                          (34)                                                                         
where M denotes the time-dependent ‘quantum mass’ introduced by the involved 
specimen of the studied microsystem in the sense of dBDS(B) ([1956]). For indeed the 
singularity is not a 'particle', it is a localized aspect from the amplitude of the individual 
physical wave represented by the wave-function Φ12(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)ϕ(r,t). 
Imagine now a factual context that is stabilized as much as possible. Imagine a big 
number of repetitions of the operation of generation G(G1,G2) defined above. Each one 
of these repetitions involves its own specimens σΦo and σΦ(G(G1,G2)), so its own individual 
physical wave-movements described by corresponding wave-functions Φo, ≈Φ1, ≈Φ2 and 
Φ12(r,t)=a12(r,t)e(i/—)β12(r,t). That what inside [IQM-QMHD] is represented by a state-ket is 
the global result of all these repetitions placed on the statistical level of conceptualization 
and considered mentally and retroactively as a whole. We just denote this state-ket by 
|ΨG(G1,G2)(r,t)>e(i/—)ϕ12(r,t)> but we do not know yet its Hilbert-space-representation 
because its QMHD representation (15'') has been examined and found to be deficient from 
the viewpoint of [IQM-QMHD]). However it is generally accepted on the basis of factual 
data that the presence-probability inside de space-time support of |ΨG(G1,G2)(r,t)> consists 
of a pattern of fringes of high presence-probability (‘brilliant’ fringes), all parallel to the 
0x axis and mutually separated by fringes of quasi-zero presence-probability ('dark 
fringes'). (We note that there is no way to directly observe these 'fringes', since they are 
only a statistical concept totalized outside any individual observation-time, while the 
individual realizations of a de Broglie guided trajectory do not leave spontaneously a 
perceivable trace. Only cumulated final impacts on a sensitive screen can be perceived). 
We now start describing the proposed experiment EXP. 
The presupposed trajectory of the corpuscular-like singularity from any one 
physical individual dBDS(B) wave-function Φ12 is posited to be parallel to 0x. Now, any 
experimental intrusion in the inside of a given specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of msG(G1,G2) is 
currently posited to entail quantum-fields that destroy the physical phase relation from 
the physical wave of this specimen, represented by the phase-function β12(r,t) from 
Φ12(r,t)=a12(r,t)e(i/—)β12(r,t). One of the main purposes of EXP will be to figure out a 
system of choices of the parameters that – by trial and error – permit to prevent this to 
happen and to control whether yes or not this purpose has been realized. The most 
important parameter is likely to be the kinetic energy of the specimens of msG(G1,G2) that 
are made use of; this should be sufficiently high with respect to: 
- the medium value of the energy of ionization of a molecule from the sensitive medium 
that is made use of; 
- the medium value of the spontaneous fluctuations of the dBDS(B) quantum potential 
(anyhow the forces entailed by such fluctuations act only via the 0z component so that – 
at most – their effect consists of a displacement of the involved singularity on another 
'brilliant fringe', without suppression of the phase relation that determines the 
momentum-value px from (34)); 
This might already suffice for insuring stability of, both, the phase relations from 
Φ12(r,t) and the supposed direction of displacement of the singularity from the amplitude 
of Φ12(r,t).  
The EXP can be structured as a sequence of distinct tests: 
At a distance 0x1, near the entry into the zone of interference, is placed on 0x a very 
thin layer L1 of sensitive substance permitting with maximal probability at most 2 
successive initial acts of ionization. At a second distance 0x2 placed near the end of the 
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interference domain is placed a thick layer L2 of photographic emulsion with high 
density of molecules. When the first ionization occurs in L1 at a time t1  a conveniently 
connected chronometer registers this time. As soon as the corpuscular singularity reaches 
the second layer it produces there nearly certainly and practically on the edge of its entry 
in this layer, a third ionization that is recorded at a time t2. Then other ionizations follow 
until the energy of the corpuscular-like energy is consumed. 
These ionization constitute the operation of measurement, let us denote it Mes.p 
(where: p denotes the de Broglie guided momentum value from (33), not the quantum 
mechanical momentum-observable P).   
A big number of coding-measurement successions [G(G1,G2).Mes.p] is realized. 
We keep all the cases in which either one or two initial ionizations have been registered.  
* When two first ionizations are available they permit to establish via the direction 
of the small segment of line that unites them whether the perturbing quantum-force has 
effectively displaced the corpuscular singularity on another fringe of high presence-
probability, or not. This permits to be aware of the existence of perturbing quantum fields 
and the strength of their effects, and to keep for use in the final calculus only the cases 
without displacement on another fringe-direction.   
* The two ionizations at the two times t1, t2 registered respectively in L1 and L2 can 
furthermore be regarded to define explicitly the direction of the momentum (34) and they 
yield a first estimation of its value (a sort of time-of-flight method ‘internal’ to the 
involved specimen of the studied microstate). 
* The ending set of ionizations inside L2 permits to calculate the absolute value of 
the momentum out of the energy consumed by one ionization and the number of 
ionizations. 
* The statistic of the positions at the time t2 permits to know whether the position 
distribution after the first one or two ionizations is still organized in maxima and minima 
indicating interference fringes; so it verifies the conservation of the initial phase-relation.  
* Since the first impact defines also the initial position r with respect to the 
referential, considered globally the set of registrations specified above would violate the 
Heisenberg principle 124. This would establish that the validity of Heisenberg’s non-
mathematical 'principle' in fact is relative to the experimental procedure. It would also 
establish that:  
The concept of incompatible observables is tied with coding-measurement-
evolutions that freeze the eigenvalue to be identified, as required in (20'). While for 
microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) this concept escapes human control.   
In consequence of this the domain of validity of the mathematical uncertainty 
theorem from QMHD might appear to be devoid of general validity, which, again, points 
toward the adequacy of a non-linear general equation of evolution for a concept of state-
ket that is not implicitly and arbitrarily restricted a priori.    
* The statistic of the registered momentum-values would permit now confrontation 
with the QMHD-prediction (32).  
These considerations establish the very particular stake of an experiment EXP. 
The preceding indications are generalizable to any microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf).  
Finally, let us stress that stricto-sensu QMHD concerns exclusively heavy 
microsystems. So only a realization of EXP for systems with non-null rest-mass would 
possess a full significance of principle (furthermore this mass should be conceived to be 
a variable de Broglie-mass from (34) (cf. de Broglie [1956], chapter X). The best choice 
                                                      
124 Such a violation – of which the possibility has been very explicitly asserted for heavy microstates in MMS [1964] – 
has been recently proven experimentally for photons (cf. Piacentini & altera [2015]). 
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would be to work with a neutron-Young-interference (two holes) that would introduce 
relatively high kinetic energies even for moderate velocities and would involve 
exclusively quantum potentials and fields, thus avoiding any electromagnetic effect 
during the ionizations. 
 
(7.III).2.3.6. On a debate related with the experiment EXP 
 Just a few words on the debate Englert&alt. [1992], Dürr&alt [1993], Finkelstein 
[1995], Hiley&alt [2000] cited in a preceding note.  
It is already clear at this point, I think, that the semantic differences that separate 
from one another the approach practised inside QMHD from that practised in dBDS(B) are 
so numerous and fundamental that any argument on the theoretical possibility or not to 
register a 'trace' in the sense of dBDS(B) is simply devoid of significance if it is 
formulated by the use of the QMHD formalism. 
On the other hand the stake of a valid answer to this problem – centred upon the 
more definite question of the experimental possibility of trace-registrations of the value 
of the dBDS(B) 'guided momentum' (33) – appears to be very high. Indeed this answer can 
decide between: 
♦ Either the nowadays QMHD representation of the microstates which in fact – as it now 
stands – offers reliable consensual and verifiable predictions only on the microstates 
ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) that are devoid of any inner interference phenomenon, or a new 
representation of the microstates that offers verifiable predictions on any sort of unbound 
microstates, with or without inner interferences. 
And it will also decide between: 
♦ Either a de Broglie-Bohm approach dBDS(B) that – if it is organically incorporated into 
a new intelligible quantum mechanics might play there a basic conceptual, operational 
and representational role in which QMHD fails, or a de Broglie-Bohm approach dBDS(B) 
that conserves its present status of only a mathematically expressed metaphysics of 
microphysics that keeps fighting for the title of "interpretation" of an un-intelligible 
QMHD.  
In these conditions the performance of the experiment EXP proposed in 
(7.III).2.3.5 deserves fully the effort for being realized. 
 
(7.III).2.3.7. Extended  framework  [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] 
and a new coding-postulate for the momentum-values of any unbound microstate 
In the present work I shall not await the verdict of EXP for achieving the started 
construction of a global outline of an acceptable representation of the microstates. I shall 
just admit by hypothesis that EXP has been performed and has established the possibility 
to observe experimentally instantaneous guided momentum-values (33). This, I think, is 
very likely to happen soon, in our era of nanotechnologies. This likelihood can only be 
increased by an already pre-existing global outline of a view where such an investigation 
possesses its own and central conceptual place.  
In order to achieve the outline of a fully intelligible second quantum mechanics, 
from now on the framework [IQM-QMHD] is enlarged into a new framework that 
includes dBDS(B) and is denoted [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)].  
We first recall that the guidance law (33) is asserted deductively inside dBDS(B), 
and with full generality, both in the presence and in the absence of quantum fields. So 
inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] we formulate the following coding-postulate for 
momentum-measurements on any sort of unbound microstate, without or with inner 
quantum potential, as well as with one or with several micro-systems (in the sense of the 
definitions from (2.I)1).  
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We posit that: 
P(cod)∀unb.ms. The instantaneous momentum-value of any unbound microstate – 
whether a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) or ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) – can be 
determined by a coding-measurement-succession that obeys the representation 
[Gt .Mes(r, p)]      →  trace       ( rk , pj )t ,      k=1,2,..K;    j=1,2,..J;    ∀msGt            (35) 
where: the sign "∀unb.ms" is to be read "valid for any unbound microstate", ; Gt  is 
posited to generate at the time t – in the sense of (13'') – one unbound individual 
physical specimen σ(Gt) of the studied microstate msGt , initially represented by an 
unknown individual wave-function ΦGt ;  Mes(r, p) denotes one full act of 
measurement of the pair (r, p)t formed at the time t when the measurement begins, 
by [the instantaneous values at t of the position r and the momentum p from (33), 
of the singularity from σ(Gt)] ; the sign '→ trace' is to be read ' identified via a process 
of registration in the sense of EXP ' of the trace of the dBDS(B) guidance-trajectory 
of the singularity from the specimen σΦ(Gt) during Mes(r,p ); (rk , pj )t is the pair of 
values registered for the pair (r,p)t of qualifying quantities. 
Like the coding postulate (20'), the coding-postulate P(cod)∀unb.ms also acts 
exclusively on the individual level of conceptualization. Furthermore, the symbol 
"∀unb.ms" can indicate exclusively a guiding interference effect (33) in absence of any 
classically definable field, and in such a case it transgresses the capacity of 
representation of a QMHD measurement-Hamiltonian H(A). Then (35) falls entirely 
outside the domain of facts that can be represented by a QMHD-Hamiltonian. Which 
means that the Schrödinger equation of evolution simply ceases to be applicable. 
And finally, let us note that:  
The coding postulate (35) violates overtly Heisenberg’s principle, the principle of 
complementarity, as well as the Heisenberg theorem from QMHD 125.  
The postulate P(cod)∀unb.ms is a new descriptional feature from the dBDS(B) 
approach that, inside the present approach, is injected into the domain of 'scientific' i.e. 
communicable, consensual, predictive and verifiable knowledge. The channel of 
adduction into 'scientificity' of descriptional prime-matter from the purely 'interpretative' 
dBDS(B) theory becomes now:  
 [MP(msG,cw),    (1’) Gcw ↔ msG,cw ,  (14) msG,cw ≡ {σ(msG,cw)} ,   (35) P(cod)∀msG )]    (36)               
Thus enriched, the channel (36) might entail a radical transmutation of the mutual 
status of the dBDS(B)-conceptualization and that from QMHD; a genuine inversion of their 
relative conceptual position. Indeed, while QMHD is found to be devoid of verifiability 
for its predictions on momentum-measurements on unbound interference microstates – 
which is a major gap – the present approach might suppress this flaw by use of elements 
from the works of de Broglie and Bohm that are arbitrarily considered to express 'purely' 
interpretive approaches.  
  
                                                      
125  These 'principles' and this theorem – formulated in absolute terms – constitute together a knot of confusions 
between individual temporal characters and statistical characters. This knot deserves a detailed analysis of the type of 
that from (6.II.4.4.3) for the QMHD representation of quantum-measurements: Heisenberg's 'principle' mixes present and 
future individual data, while the 'principle' of complementarity is in fact a consequence of the QMHD Hilbert-space 
definitions of ket-states and of observable-operators. 
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(7.III).2.3.8. Identification of an adequate Hilbert-space representation 
 of an interference microstate  ms(unbound,1)cG(q-f) 
Rule	seventeen	The	proposed	difficulty	must	be	gone	through	be	making	abstraction	of	the	fact	that	some	of	the	involved	terms	are	known	and	other	ones	are	unknown,	by	following	in	a	genuine	walk	the	mutual	dependences.	
Rule	nineteen	It	 is	 by	 this	method	 that	 one	must	 research	 all	 the	 dimensions	 (physical	quantities)	that	are	expressed	in	two	different	ways,	in	terms	either	known	 or	 unknown,	 in	 order	 to	 browse	 directly	 through	 the	difficulty;	 for	 by	 these	 means	 we	 shall	 obtain	 just	 as	 many	comparisons	between	equal	things.	
Rule	twenty.	
It	 is	after	 having	obtained	 the	 equations	 that	we	must	 achieve	 the	 omitted	
operations,	without	ever	making	use	of	multiplication	when	division	is	
necessary	126.		 Descartes,	The	Rules	for	the	direction	of	mind		(Regulae	ad	directionem	ingenii),	toward	1628	–	1629,		Letters	 to	 Elisabeth,	 Wikipedia	 	 (our	 translation	 from	French)	
 
Inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] we are still devoid of an acceptable Hilbert-space 
formal representation for interference-microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf). So we cannot as 
yet extend to the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) a given Hilbert-space form of state-ket 
to be reproduced factually and that permit to obtain an equivalent of the relation (31) 
established for the microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c). Hence for interference-microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) we cannot as yet represent in Hilbert-space terms factually generated 
probability laws that permit to calculate predictions via expansions of such a state-ket.  
We shall now compensate this major lacuna. This – from a methodological 
viewpoint – will be a peculiar exploration. 
On the relation between Φ(r,t) and |Ψ(r,t)>. Since (6.II).4.2.2 we have constantly 
distinguished between the individual wave-function denoted ΦG,(r,t) assigned to each one 
specimen σ(msG) of the studied microstate msG, and the QMHD state-ket |ΨG(r,t)> 
associated with msG. What is the relation between these two sorts of descriptors?  
Consider the coding-postulate (35) that is defined for any sort of unbound 
microstate. According to the completed framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] each one 
given realization of the operation of generation G introduces into the domain of the 
observable one physical individual specimen σΦ(G) of the studied microstate msG, 
represented by a wave-function Φ(r,t). But all this is still only model conceived by 
human conceptor-observers, and operations realized by these. Observation can arise only 
when a whole sequence [Gt .Mes(r , p)] is realized. And prediction-verification can arise 
only if many repetitions of this sequence are realized, the respective results are observed 
and noted, and then – on the statistical level of conceptualization – the whole set of 
obtained results is considered globally, mentally and retroactively, and is represented by 
a well-defined state-ket |ΨG(r,t)> that permits a calculus of probabilistic predictions that 
can be followed by verification of these. So – in basic agreement with the relations (1), 
(1') – the physical and individual descriptor Φ(r,t) has no access to the level of 
prediction-verification. Therefore its mathematical structure can be constrained only a 
posteriori and statistically, via the QMHD use of this tool for predictive calculi that consist 
of a Hilbert-space state-ket |ΨG(r,t)>. Nothing more can be done for defining the form of 
the wave-function Φ(r,t).   
                                                      
126 My italics and bold fonts. 
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In this situation, in order to capture criteria for forming a notion on the relation 
between the mathematical forms of the state-ket of a microstate-to-be-studied and the 
wave functions of its specimens, we first notice that they are both written a priori with 
the same usual general functional form of a "wave-like' representation: 
|Ψ(r,t)>=|aΨ(r,t)e(i/—)ϕ(r,t)> and  Φ(r,t)=aΦ(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t). Then we consider a set of many 
repetitions of a succession [Gt .Mes(rt , pt)] from (35) concerning the chosen microstate 
and we focus upon the obtained set of pairs of results {(rk, pj)}t . In connection with these 
we introduce the following two rather straightforward posits P1 and P2. 
(P1). Any probability of an observable outcome is operationally definable – so also 
verifiable – only by individual acts of measurement. And the square root of the 
'presence'-probability π(rk,t) (assimilated for the sake of effectiveness to (ε,δ,N0)-relative 
frequency) found inside a whole rich set of individual results {(rk, pj)}t  from (35) for the 
outcome rk, is identical to Born's QMHD postulate of presence-probability asserted by 
|Ψ(r,t)>, so at the time t we have πΨ(rk,t) =(aΨ(rk,t))2. On this basis and in agreement with 
history and with nowadays practice, for the amplitudes we posit here – like in dBDS(B) – 
that (aΨ(r,t))2=(aΦ (r,t))2 (normed to 1 and both members being expressed numerically in 
terms of a same convenient unity of length). 
 (P2). Consider now the phase-function ϕ(rk ,t) from the state-ket 
|Ψ(r,t)>=|aΨ(r,t)e(i/—)ϕ(r,t)> of a microstate msG, and the phase-function β(r,t) from the 
individual wave-function Φ(r,t)=aΦ(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) of a specimen σΦ(G) of msG: These phase-
functions also are assigned a priori the same general functional structure. On this basis 
we posit here that at the space-time point (rk,t), the numerical value of the phase function 
ϕ(rk,t) is equal to the mean of the numerical values of the physical individual phase-
functions β(r,t) from the wave-functions Φ(r,t)=aΦ(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) of the set of the specimens 
σΦ(G) of the studied microstate msG that are generated successively by the set of repeated 
coding-measurement-successions [Gt .Mes(rt, pt)] from (35) (in dBDS(B) the concept of 
coding-measurement-succession is absent) 127,  128. 
Back to the notions of observables and beables discussed in (7.III).2.3.3. 
Consider again the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) (for simplicity we make us of the 
basic case of an operation of generation G(G1,G2) with only two components G1 and G2 
and we write in short ΦG(G1,G2)(r,t)≡Φ12(r,t) and |ΨG(G1,G2)(r,t)>≡|Ψ12(r,t)>). The 
examination of the microstate msG12 represented in the Fig.8, associated with the 
tentative posit P2 advanced above, focus attention upon the general fact that features of 
the phase-function β12(r,t) from the wave-functions Φ12(r,t)=a12(Φ)(r,t)e(i/—)β12(r,t) that 
represent the individual physical specimens σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of a microstate msG(G1,G2) 
involved in any measurement on msG(G1,G2) – and that play a determining role in each 
individual outcome – might have remained simply non-represented inside QMHD because 
there – from the start and deliberately – only some sort of means have been researched. 
For momentum measurements on microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) this has even certainly 
happened, along the following way. The QMHD representation of quantum measurements 
                                                      
127 In consequence of this absence, inside dBDS(B) the phase functions ϕ(rk ,t) and β(r,t) are not mutually distinguished. 
128 The two posits P1 and P2 might be found later to be insufficient, or even inadequate (for instance, it might appear 
preferable to posit two different equations of evolution for |Ψ> and Φ). Nevertheless we do formulate these posits in 
order to convey what sort of problems and possibilities emerge when one wants to create a consistent connection 
between dBDS(B) and QMHD. This permits also to better understand why the descriptors Φ and Ψ are currently 
confounded, and even in de Broglie's famous Thesis (cf. (6.II).1) as well as throughout the whole Bohmian 
Mechanics. Only in de Broglie's final approach dBDS(B) [1956] are they distinguished from one another (but the notion 
of repeated coding-measurement-successions [G.MesA] is absent and so the idea of mean value in P2 did not emerge 
and ϕ and β have just been posited to be equal). And, like in the case of the QMHD representation of quantum 
measurements, we are often in presence of the tendency to wipe away the distinction (statistical, so abstract)-
(individual and physical), via a vertical projection onto one common fictitious level of conceptualization. 
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has been constructed without any explicit recourse to de Broglie's Thesis. So, under the 
opaque cover of a total in-distinction between the individual and the statistical (cf. 
(6.II).4.4.3), it remained unnoticed that:  
(a) According to the present approach any act Mes.P of momentum-measurement 
is performed on only one specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of the factually generated microstate-to-
be-studied msG(G1,G2), never on this microstate itself that is just an abstract classical 
concept (cf. (1.I).1.3 and the relations (1), (1')) ; while inside QMHD the concept of a 
factually generated microstate is not even defined, only the shadow of the abstract 
concept of microstate floats there in a basic mist, tied with the word 'system'.  
(b) In each coding-measurement-succession [Gt .Mes(rt ,pt)] from (35), the 
structure of the phase β12(r,t) from the individual physical wave with wave-function 
Φ12(r,t)=a12(Φ)(r,t)e(i/—)β12(r,t) of the involved individual physical specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of 
the studied microstate msG(G1,G2), plays a determining role in the emergence of the 
registered vector-value pj. 
(c) For the particular case of a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf), the structure of the 
wave-movement of the singularity from the wave of σΦ(G(G1,G2)) can never be conceived 
to be that of a plane wave.  
These lacunae explain how it has been possible to formulate the QMHD 
measurement-postulates 1 and 2 according to which the result of any act of momentum 
measurement performed on any sort of microstate would yield an eigenvalue pj of the 
momentum-observable P that: 
♦ Is 'created' by the measurement process, i.e. is different from the beable value at 
the moment when the act of measurement begins. 
 ♦ Emerges necessarily tied to one corresponding plane-wave eigenstate a.e(i/—)pj.r 
of the QMHD-concept of momentum observable P (the measurement postulate 1. 
♦ Subsists even after the closure of the act of measurement, together with its 
corresponding one-plane-wave eigenstate (the measurement-postulate 2). 
When in fact, as already asserted, when one analyses carefully the situations that 
led to (20') and to (35) it appears that : 
✭  The momentum-value pj that is observed for a microstate is never "created" by 
the measurement process, neither for a microstate ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) subjected to 
coding-measurement-evolutions that obey (20'), nor for a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) 
subjected to coding-measurement-evolutions that obey (35): in both these cases the 
momentum-value at the time t when an act of momentum-measurement begins is also the 
final value pj that is observed at the end of the coding-measurement-evolution; only  the 
coding-process is different for these two sorts of microstates. 
✭  In the case of a microstate ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) subjected to momentum-
measurements that accept the coding-postulate (20'), a convenient coding-measurement-
evolution acts as follows: at the time t when a measurement-evolution begins, the 
structure of the wave-movement of the singularity from the wave of σΦ(G(G1,G2)) – in 
general – might not be that of a plane wave; but when the exterior fields are all 
suppressed it can coherently be posited that it immediately acquires a plane-wave 
structure – at least in the quasi point-like neighbourhood of the singularity from the wave 
of σΦ(G) – just in consequence of the immediate lack of reasons that settles in for 
admitting any further influence on the subsequent dynamics of the singularity from σΦ(G) 
(The Occam-razor argument). And for the same sort of reason one has to conceive that 
the wave-movement from the whole wave of σΦ(G) acquires 'rapidly' a plane wave 
structure throughout the process of measurement. So the momentum-value is conserved 
such as it was at the moment t when the considered act of measurement has begun; this is 
the very aim of the coding postulate (20'), and for a momentum-measurement (20') 
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amounts to the method time-of-flight with coding procedure (20) from which it stems) 
129.  So the observed value is the beable value itself, not a created value. 
✭  In the case of a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) subjected to momentum-
measurements, at the moment t when a coding-measurement-evolution (35) begins, the 
singularity from the wave of the involved specimen σΦ(G(G1,G2)) of the studied microstate 
msG(G1,G2)) is already genetically immersed inside the quantum-potential produced by the 
corresponding operation of generation G(G1,G2)) (cf. (7.III).2.3.3). And even though the 
coding-measurement-evolution imposed upon σΦ(G(G1,G2)) by (35) has to be conceived to 
destroy – to consume – the momentum-value pj possessed by the singularity from the 
wave of σΦ(G(G1,G2)) at the time t when the coding-measurement-evolution begins, 
nevertheless, even though it is consumed, this initial value pj is what is finally translated 
from all the data gathered via the posited coding-measurement-evolution. So in this case 
also the observed momentum-value pj  is the beable-value itself, not a value created by 
the process of observation130. 
In short, we can now firmly assert that, as already sensed in (7.III).2.3.3: 
The essential difference between the two sorts of coding-measurement-evolutions 
considered above does not concern the value that is observed; it lies exclusively in 
the way in which the observed momentum-value pj  is drawn into consensual 
knowledge.  
And this difference depends on whether the coding-measurement-evolution is of the type 
(20') or of the type (35); which in its turn depends on the sort of microstate that is 
studied, ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) or ms(unbound,1)cG(qf). But in both cases the registered 
momentum-value pj is that one that is possessed by the singularity from the involved 
specimen of the studied microstate at the time t when the considered act of measurement 
begins: in both cases it is a beable value, it is the value of an 'observable beable'.  
The distinction between beables and observable' evaporates.  
The preceding considerations finally do fully specify in what a sense the concepts 
of 'beable' and 'observable' are very confusing indeed: they pend stagnant above the 
genuinely basic difference that has intuitively suggested them, without reaching it, and 
mirroring it falsely. This leads us to a modification of language: From now on inside the 
framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)]: 
The concept of 'observables' distinct from 'beables' is banished.  
Instead, for the momentum quantity we shall speak of value-conserving coding-
measurement-evolutions (20') that bring into the domain of the observable the 
beable momentum-value of a microstate ms(unbound,1)G(n-c), and of value-
destructive coding-measurement-evolutions (35) that bring into the domain of the 
observable the beable momentum-value of a microstate ms(unbound,1)G(qf). 
All the critiques made in (7.III).2.3.1 and (7.III).2.3.3 on the representation (15'') 
and its consequences emanated from this hidden but precise and basic conceptual source 
finally specified just above 131.  
                                                      
129 So in the case of a microstate ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) it is at most the structure of the global wave-movement from the 
whole wave of a specimen σΦ(G) of the studied microstate msG – not the registered momentum-value pj – that is created 
by the act of measurement. But this does not qualify a mechanical observable, it qualifies a conceptual feature of the 
model of a microstate ms(unbound,1)G(n-c). 
130 And let us add that in both cases, at the end of the considered measurement-evolution the involved specimen of the 
studied microstate has ceased to belong (in the sense of (1)) to the studied micro-state. 
131 This is remarkable. It is a strong retroactive confirmation of IQM with its basic specificities with respect to QMHD:  
The definition (1) that introduces the concept of operation of generation G; a relation between each G and one 'factually 
generated microstate' that introduces a whole set of distinct physical specimens; the concept of composed operation of 
generation; the concept of coding-measurement-evolution; etc. All this is radically absent in QMHD. While here, once 
more, it permits quite basic elucidations, like those obtained in (6.II) for the significance of an eigenket' and the QMHD 
representation of quantum-measurement and the consequences entailed by this significance. I do not speak here of 
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As for what happens once a coding-measurement-evolution is finished, it does not 
seem useful to try to state this in general terms. This can be examined from case to case 
accordingly to deliberate future operational purposes of the conceptors-observers 132.  
Finally we are ready now to enter upon the main problem, that of an acceptable 
Hilbert-space of the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(q-f). 
Hilbert-space representation of the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf). We go back 
to the restriction to a one-plane-wave structure a.exp((i/—)pj .r) imposed by the QMHD 
definition of the momentum-observable P upon the solutions of the QMHD-equation 
P|u(pj,r)>=pj|u(pj,r)> for eingenket and eigenvalues of P. This restriction entails that a 
basis of eigenfunctions of P consists exclusively of one-plane-waves. We have exposed 
above for what complex reasons this requirement is not consistent with the factual 
situation that is realized for microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf). These reasons converge in 
suggesting that the a priori restriction of the QMHD-concepts of momentum-observable P 
and of the corresponding QMHD-equation P|u(pj,r)>=pj|u(pj,r)> are source of the 
resistance that withstands a uniform applicability of a fully intelligible Hilbert-space 
representation of predictive probabilities for any sort of unbound microstates, on the 
basis of an association of [(22) |ψGt1,H(r,t1)>≈pred.{∀A,∀t1, |ψGt1,H(r,t1)>/A}  with 
Gleason's theorem (23)], but transposed in terms of factually generated state-ket, as it has 
been realized for the case of microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) via the relation 
(31) |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  ≠pred.  |ψGt1,H(r,t)>, 
[|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)     ≈pred.  { |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) /A} ,∀A,∀t1}]verif. 
In what follows we obey this suggestion. We proceed in 4 steps.  
1. Summarizing recall. According to [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] any one act of 
momentum-measurement that finishes by a registration of one eigenvalue – whether it 
involves a microstate ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) or a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf)  – is always 
performed upon one physical and individual specimen σΦ(G) of the studied factually 
generated microstate msG, never upon this microstate itself that, by the basic definitions 
(1), (1'), consists of the abstract set of all such specimens and is 'represented' by a state-
ket, in the sense (22). So an adequate equation for eigenvalues and eigen-functions of an 
observable A must concern the individual physical wave-functions ΦG(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) 
that describe the specimens σΦ(G) of the studied microstate msG133.  
As for the probabilistic predictions concerning a microstate, these are represented 
in QMHD by expansions of the form (22). Inside the framework [IQM-QMHD] and for 
microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) the expansions from (22) have been transposed in factual 
terms via individual coding-measurement-successions, and this involves a fully 
intelligible access to Gleason's Hilbert-space representations (23) of the probabilistic 
predictions.  
But our critiques from (7.III).2.3.1 have shown that for microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) and the basic momentum observable P the path recalled above for 
passing from the individual level of conceptualization to the statistical one, is blocked. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
'truth' in an absolute sense, which is mere illusion, but of elucidations in the sense of construction of intelligibility by 
inner semantic-formal consistency of a structure of representation. 
132 All the innumerable QMHD considerations on 'successive measurements' are certainly devoid of general validity. 
Moreover they are much more speculative than factually realizable. In general the effects of the final registration of the 
result of an act of measurement contradict the QMHD postulate 2 (while the postulate 1 is already incompatible with the 
critique of (15'') and (32) and with the consequence (35) of this critique). 
133 Inside QMHD the general occultation of the individual physical features might weaken the perception of this fact.  
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This is so because a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) is generated by a composed operation 
of generation G(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM) where the composing operations G1,G2,...Gm,...GM 
from the unique realized global operation G entail always more than only one trend of 
wave-movement at any possible space-time location of the singularity from the physical 
individual wave ΦGt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM) of which consists any specimen σΦ(G) of the studied 
microstate; which in general entails for the singularity from ΦGt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM) momentum 
vector-values pj  of the 'guided' form (33) that are never tied to only one-plane-wave, and 
so are not compatible with the value-conserving coding-measurement-evolutions (20)-
(20') implicitly presupposed inside QMHD to be universally valid for unbound 
microstates: Guided momentum-values like in (33) require the coding-postulate (35).   
At this point our recall has reached its goal. Namely it has brought forth clearly 
that: In order to construct now inside the framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] a predictive 
algorithm of the form [(22),(23),(31)] that be applicable to also the microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf), the basic concept of momentum-observable P has to be generalized 
in a way such as to make it compatible with also the value-destructive coding-
measurement-evolutions (35). Which requires a corresponding generalization of also the 
QMHD-equation P|u(pj,r)>=pj|u(pj,r)>, ∀j, for eigenket and eigenvalues of the QMHD-
momentum-observable.  
In what follows we want to realize this 134.  
2. A generalized concept of momentum-observable and its equation for eigenket 
and eigenvalues. Let us call the researched generalized momentum-operator a 'value-
conserving or value-destructive momentum-observable, and let us denote it Pvc-vd.  
Consider a microstate msGt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM) of type ms(unbound,1)cG(qf). A given 
succession [G(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)t.MesPvc-vd] from (35) is related via (33) with the phase-
function β(r,t) from the wave-function ΦGt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) of the 
involved specimen σΦGt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM) (in short ΦGt and σΦGt).The phase-function β(r,t) 
from ΦGt can be conceived to stem from an inner structure of the global wave-movement 
expressed by ΦGt that involves more then only one plane-wave, in the following sense: It 
seems necessary to conceive that (in general at least) at any space-time point (r,t) where 
β(r,t) is defined, each component operation Gm from the operation of generation Gt 
(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM) induces its own directional trend of wave-movement. Let us denote 
by km(r,t) the unit-wave-vector of the wave-contribution stemming from the component 
Gm from Gt. According to (1) Gt is posited to come out 'the same' – with respect to the set 
of parameters that define it – each time that it is re-produced. So the local contribution 
from Gm, with its own wave-vector km(r,t), is conceived by definition to be invariant with 
respect to the repetitions of Gt. But in each one given succession [Gt.MesPvc-vd], inside 
                                                      
134 This is not a minor purpose. For in our view the case ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) plays the role of the rule while the case of 
a simple operation of generation G is a rare exception (as already remarked, even in textbook examples with potential-
'barriers', 'walls', 'wells', harmonic oscillators, etc. in fact we dwell with microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) that involve 
interference and non-null quantum potentials). This remains non-singularized by the QMHD formalism where the 
concept of a physical-conceptual operation of generation is absent and its physical-conceptual basic role is replaced by 
the exclusively mathematical notion of 'limiting conditions' imposed upon the Schrödinger solution 'of the problem'. In 
such circumstances one is led to wonder whether the QMHD predictions on the results of momentum measurements have 
ever been seriously subjected to verification; and if this has been done, how the measurements have been realized, 
given that also – or only – non-classical quantum-potentials do act, that are not accessible to human manipulation, so 
that the method time-of flight cannot be applied; while inside QMHD trace-registrations, in principle, are not 'legal' 
procedures for measuring the momentum observable. This whole – enormous – set of questions goes lost in just 
language-solution ("quantum-tunneling", etc.); or, for bound states, in global "effects" (Zeemann, Stark", etc.) that are 
made use of as measurement-operations, after many approximations for defining the state-ket.   
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the one involved wave-function ΦGt, the wave-vector km(r,t) is in general a variable with 
respect to passage from one space-time point (r,t) to another one, for any given m 135. 
We posit that, at the time t when the act of measurement begins (that indexes Gt), 
the momentum vector-eigenvalue of Pvc-vd registered by any momentum-measurement-
succession [Gt.MesPvc-vd] – whether making use of the coding postulate (20') or (35) 136  – 
is : 
pj(r,t) = – ł.β(r)t  =  (∑m (pjm km(r))t  ,        m=1,2,..M                           (33') 
where:  
- pjm is the projection of pj(r,t) on km(r) at the time t ;  
- j=1,2,.....J  and J is an arbitrarily big finite integer (the discrete character assumed for 
the succession of the values pj(r,t) being entailed and determined by, and relative to, the 
choices of the involved units of measurement (we write in short ∀j)).  
The relation (33') amounts to an explicit and general connection between the de 
Broglie guidance law (33), and the basic IQM-concept of operation of generation (via its 
re-definition (1')). As such it completes the modelling postulate (35) MP({σ(msG,cw)}) 
from (6.II).2 and the channel (36) of adduction into consensual predictive-verifiable 
'scientificity' of descriptional prime-matter from the purely 'interpretative' dBDS(B) 
theory; this channel now becomes 
[MP(msG,cw),(1’)Gcw↔msG,cw,(14)msG,cw≡{σ(msG,cw)},(35)P(cod)∀msG),(33')pj(r,t)=ł.β(r)t=∑m(pjmkm(r)t  ]  
(36') 
According to (33') the 'mechanical' momentum vector-value pj(r,t) of the 
singularity from each one wave-function ΦGt(σΦ(Gt)) of the one specimen σΦ(Gt) of 
the studied microstate msGt involved in one measurement-succession [Gt.MesPvc-vd] 
– at the space-point r where it happens to be – depends essentially on time as soon 
as m>1. 
The relation (33') is just a posited definition that amounts to assert that the eigen-
function – an eigen-wave-function – that corresponds to pj(r,t) is:   
∏m (a.exp((i/—) (pjm.km(r))t .r) = a.exp ((i/—) (∑m pjm km(r))t  .r),       ∀j,  m=1,2,..M     (37) 
where M is a small integer.  
The calculus that totalizes the coefficient ∑m(pjmkm(r))t of the position-vector r is 
deliberately left non-effectuated in (37) because the effectuated sum would lead to the 
first member from (33') that has been assigned the mechanical meaning of a momentum-
vector; while – in order to strictly respect rules of conceptual homogeneity that work 
more or les non-explicitly throughout the human conceptualization 137 – we want to keep 
mutually distinct the two meanings of, on the one hand a wave-movement, and on the 
other hand a mechanical qualification of the mechanical displacement of the singularity 
from the amplitude of this wave-movement. So from a purely mathematical point of view, 
                                                      
135 Moreover km(r,t) can be symbolically tied with a corresponding whole plane-wave a.exp[(i/—) (pjmkm).r – where pjm 
is the projection on km of pj at the time t – that acts like just a sample of arbitrary extension of the direction of wave-
movement instilled at (r,t) by Gm (cf. (6.II).1).  
136 We recall that inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the guiding relation (33) can be conceived to be valid consistently with 
the whole QMHD formalism, in consequence of the identification in (6.II).1 of the significance of any eigenstate and of 
the fact that in dBDS(B) the guiding theorem is obtained for any sort of microstate, with or without an inner quantum 
potential.   
137 The fact that Louis de Broglie has written "corpuscular phases" has introduced much confusion, and in particular, 
the arbitrary restriction that just now we are trying to suppress.  
 
 
 
172 
inside (37) the signs pjm, m=1,2,..M work as just numerical coefficients, one can made 
total abstraction of their connection (33') with a concept of 'momentum', so (37) defines 
pure wave-functions, there is nothing specifically mechanical in these as long as the 
definition (33') is not added. On the other hand, the writing (37) expresses explicitly in 
mathematical terms the inner structure assigned by (33') to the phase β(r,t) of the 
considered physical wave ΦGt – namely the structure of a physical superposition of M 
plane-waves imparted to this wave at any given point (r,t) by its operation of generation 
Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)) (with m≥1); concerning the eigenvalue of the mechanical concept 
of momentum it asserts strictly nothing.  
So finally inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the equation for the eigen-waves and 
eigen-values of the mechanical observable  Pvc-vd = (—/i)—   has to be written as:  
Pvc-vd . ∏m (a.exp((i/—) (pjm.km(r))t .r) =  (∑m pjm.km(r) )t  . ∏m (a.exp((i/—) (pjm.km(r))t .r)= 
=(∑m pjm.km(r))t  .  a.exp ((i/—) (∑m pjm km(r))t  .r),        ∀j, m=1,2,..M,                           (38) 
The calculus from (38) isolates now the sum (∑mpjm.km(r))t  from the phase of the 
eigenfunction and it expulses this sum in front of the expression of the wave-function. And 
since now this sum is available in a position that separates it from the expression of the 
eigen-wave, we finally can, without violating semantic homogeneities, make use of "both 
equations" required by Descartes in the motto from the beginning of (7.III).2.3.7 (in our case 
these two equations are (33') and (38)). So accordingly to the twentieth rule quoted in this 
motto we can perform the addition from (33') and write a last unifying equation for 
eigenstates – eigen-waves in fact – and eigenvalues pj(r,t) of the generalized mechanical 
momentum-observable Pvc-vd; we can write this safely from a semantic viewpoint, i.e. 
without mixing the meanings. Which finally yields the researched generalized equation 
Pvc-vd .∏m (a.exp((i/—) (pjm.km(r))t .r)= pj(r,t). a.exp ((i/—) (∑m pjm km(r))t .r),    ∀j, m=1,2,..M,      
(38')  
that – quite remarkably – distinguishes efficiently between the eigen-values pj(r,t) of the 
mechanical momentum that appear only in the coefficient placed in front of the second 
member, and the eigen-wave-functions   a.exp ((i/—) (∑m pjm km(r))t .r), where the wave-
vector-values  
(∑m pjm km(r))t .r 
from the phase-functions are now 'free' to define accordingly to (33') the eigenvalues of 
the mechanical-momentum-observable Pvc-vd with the whole generality imposed by the 
structure of the acting operation of generation Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)) (with m≥1. Indeed 
the equation 38') respects now explicitly that the two quantities represented by the 
symbols pj(r,t) and (∑mpjmkm(r))t .r have different conceptual-physical natures and can be 
combined numerically only because the corresponding mathematical concepts have from 
the start the same dimensional definition 138. This procedure avoids the confusions 
                                                      
138 This lesson delivered by Descartes over centuries seems to me so noteworthy that I take the liberty to confess the 
process that led to (38). After more than a whole year of incapacity to formulate a wholly convenient generalization of 
the QMHD-equation for eigenvalues and eigenket of the momentum observable, I had an accidental insight that clarified 
the conceptual situation. I told this to a very learned friend, Carlos Lobo, and he showed me the Descartes rules. These 
brought into luminous evidence why I had stagnated such a long time: Mathematically there is no imposed distinction 
between the non-effectuated form of the sum ∑
m
(pjmkm )t.r from the second member of (38), and its effectuated form 
pj.r, and in consequence of this one glides nearly irrepressibly into the effectuated form. But on the other hand the 
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entailed throughout QMHD by the heritage of de Broglie's initial notations that had mixed 
wave-qualifications and mechanical qualifications (deliberately no doubt, in order to 
draw attention upon his 'corpuscular-like' model (then usually called the wave-'particle' 
model)) 139. 
For a microstate ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) we have m=1 ; so Gt(G1,G2,….Gm,…..GM) ≡ 
Gt and the index t can be dropped; everything becomes time-independent and Pvc-vd 
reduces to P. So (38') becomes the QMHD equation for eigenfunctions and eigenvalues of 
the momentum observable P and the coding postulate (20') also can be utilized. While for 
m≥2 exclusively the coding-postulate (35) is valid.  
The researched generalization of the QMHD equation is now fully achieved. 
Which finally closes a rather complex loop.  
3. The state-ket of a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf). Instead of the inadequate 
additive QMHD-representation of type (15’'), inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] we now can 
assign to a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf)  a one-term representation  
|Ψ(r,t)Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)(r,t)>                                                                            (39) 
 
The physical content of |Ψ(r,t)Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)(r,t)> is determined by:  
- the operation of generation Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM));   
- the model MP(msGt,cw) of a microstate;   
- the individual wave-function ΦGt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t)  of any specimen 
σΦ(Gt) of the studied microstate msGt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM);   
- the coding-postulate (35);   
- the connection between ΦG and |ΨG> posited by P1 and P2.  
Together, the sources enumerated above constitute a rather complex constraint.   
4. Hilbert-space representation of the predictions. Inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the 
expansion with respect to Pvc-vd  of a state-ket (39), |Ψ(r,t)Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)(r,t)>/Pvc-vd , is 
to be written by use of an ortho-normalized basis of wave-eigenket  
{  |∏m (a.exp((i/—) (pjm.km(r))t .r >} = {  |a.exp ((i/—) (∑m pjm km(r))t  .r) >},  ∀j,  m=1,2,..M  
(in short  { | u(r, pj, M)> }t ) 140                                                                      (40) 
                                                                                                                                                                 
effectuated form a.exp[(i/—) pj.r] describes one plane wave. Whereas physically, at the moment t when begins the act of 
measurement MesPvc-vd from the succession [Gt.MesPvc-vd], the wave-function of a specimen of a microstate 
ms(unbound,1)cG(q-f) has, at any space point r, the inner structure of an evolving superposition of M plane waves, not the 
stable and restrictive form of one plane-wave function, and this is why in general the vector-value pj(t)=∑m(pjmkm)t 
cannot be conserved during a measurement evolution as it is required for applicability of the coding-postulate (20'). 
And precisely this has led in this work to the necessity of recourse to the value-destructive trace-registrations (33) and 
to the coding-postulate (35). Which shows that the choice of the adequate coding-measurement-evolution depends 
quintessentially on the inner structure imparted to a physical individual wave ΦGt  of a physical individual specimen 
σΦ(Gt) of the studied microstate msGt, by its operation of generation. So it was crucial indeed not to glide too early into 
the effectuated form of the sum ∑
m
(pjmkm)t (when one wants to make the sum of several apples with several prunes, one 
also has to first have become able to speak of 'fruit'). But such a warning cannot be conceived inside the statistical 
algorithmic representations from QMHD where even the basic significance of the mathematical concept of eigenfunction 
is entirely ignored. This illustrates the unpredictable specificities that, inside Mathematical Physics, can – and must – 
distinguish a representation constantly guided by semantic-mathematical criteria, from a representation guided by 
purely mathematical criteria. Mathematical Physics cannot be reduced to Mathematics. And it is impressing to learn 
how explicitly Descartes was aware of this.  
139 In its turn, the distinction between (38) and (38') constitutes an explicit connection with our critique in (7.III).2.3.1 
of non-verifiability of the prediction from (15)-(32). 
140 In de Broglie ([1956], pp. 119-133, a fascinating science-fiction-like chapter) in a microstate obtained by reflection 
on a mirror of an incident state there are places where the corpuscular-like singularity – endowed with a 'quantum 
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So finally: 
 
Gleason’s theorem (23) permits to place now the numbers  
π(pj) =  |cj(t)|2  = |Pr.j |Ψ(r,t)Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)(r,t) >|2 
from the expansion |Ψ(r,t)Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)(r,t)>/Pvc-vd on the axes of the basis (40) 
introduced  in the Hilbert-space of state-ket |Ψ(r,t)Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)(r,t)>, each one 
of these axes being labelled by an eigenket from (40). 
The mathematical representation of the physical effects entailed by the co-presence 
of (G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)) inside the unique fully realized operation of generation 
Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)), upon the prediction-verification probability-distributions of 
registered momentum-values, is now entirely taken in charge by the enriched basis of 
wave-eigenket and by the corresponding enriched equation for eigenket and eigenvalues 
(38') and the basis of eigenket (40). The QMHD mathematical interaction between 
expansion-coefficients from the additive combination of the two state-ket from (15'') – 
that leads to the non-verifiable prediction (32) – is finally replaced by a conceptually 
grounded mathematical representation that inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] is logically 
coherent with all the three involved sources, IQM and QMHD and dBDS(B).  
Since any quantum-mechanical observable is by construction a symmetrized 
function A(R,P) of the position-observable R and the momentum-observable P, the 
results obtained above for the momentum observable can be extended to any 
observable A.  
So the relation (31) can now be extended step by step – factually – to also the 
microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf).  
This leads to a fully intelligibe, consensual, observational, predictive and 
verifiable representation of the quantum measurements on unbound microstates of 
any kind (in the sense of the definitions from (2.I).1).  
 
 (7.III).2.3.9. Conclusion on the [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)]-representation of the microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf)   
We summarize.  
The main lines of a Hilbert-space representation inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)], of 
the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf), researched in (7.III).2.3, are now sketched out. Of 
course many points remain to be worked out (for instance the orthogonalization of (40), 
the Dirac-transformations, etc.). But the essence of the specific problems and of the 
corresponding solutions is clarified. And, as asserted above, on this new foundation and 
by use of:  
- the coding postulate (35); 
- the definition (33'); 
- the equation (38'); 
- the definition (39) of the state-ket of a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) ; 
- the expansions (22) with respect to the generalized momentum-observable Pvc-vd , 
so on the basis (40); 
- Gleason's theorem (23) 
                                                                                                                                                                 
mass' – is at rest, or in other circumstances it becomes imaginary; so one should systematically work with the concept 
of 'quantum mass' and admit a priori also eigenvalues pj(r,t)=0 (and also 'imaginary' eigenvalues ?). This is likely to 
be tied with teleportation. 
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The proof of the assertion Ass.2 can now obviously be extended point by point to 
the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf). Which leads to a representation (31) of the state-ket 
(39). The desired general factually constructed equivalent of the central predictive QMHD 
algorithm of form ((22)-(23)), is gained for also the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf). 
We can now proceed to close our action of Hilbert-space representation of the 
category of unbound microstates inside the framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] by a 
succinct examination of also the last case defined in (2.I).1, of one unbound microstate of 
two or more micro-systems. 
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(7.III).3. THE CASE OF  
ONE UNBOUND MICRO-STATE OF TWO OR MORE MICRO-SYSTEMS 
Consider now the case of one micro-state of n micro-systems, which we denote by 
ms(unbound,n)cG(qf). In what follows we restrict ourselves to the case ms(unbound,2)cG(qf) 
with only two micro-systems that is involved in Bell’s theorem on non-locality (cf. 
(3.I).1) (the generalization of the considerations to cases n≥2 is obvious).  
I have already examined Bell's theorem in other works, variously and thoroughly 
141. So here I shall add only the following very rapid considerations specifically 
connected with the context from the Part II of this work. 
Consider the probability tree from the part I of this work that is tied with a Bell-
experiment (fig 4, (3.I).2). Since the two involved micro-systems S1 and S2 belong by 
definition to one common micro-state msG(2S) (in the sense of (2.I).1) there is no reason 
whatever to posit a priori that the spin-values registered for S1 and S2 by one 
measurement-succession [G(2S).Mes12(spin1.spin2)] should come out to be non-
correlated (the sign Mes(spin1.spin2) applies the general notation Mes12(A1,B2) from 
(3.I).2); quite on the contrary, and all the more so as in this case the considered sort of 
correlation is to be awaited to be stronger than the generally present 'meta'-correlations 
(11), (11') from the probability-tree of any sort of unbound microstate, because by 
conceptual-factual construction it stems from the interior of each one individual event 
brought forth by each one complete measurement-succession from one branch of the 
corresponding probability-tree, whereas the correlations (11), (11') involve globally 
considered whole probability laws. This is a very unusual conceptual situation, as much 
with respect to the classical mechanical characterizations of 'mobiles', as with respect to 
the classical calculus of probabilities 142. The mechanics of microstates brings in – both – 
the individual specimens of the studied microstates considered globally and their inner 
structure, because that what admits mechanical qualifications is inside the wave-like 
'whole' called 'one specimen of a microstate' (in the sense of (1), (1') and represented by 
individual wave-functions ΦGt(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)β(r,t) 143.  
In such conditions, what is the point in hasting for changing the orientations of the 
spin-measurement devices just at the last moment before the registration? A predictive 
calculus can determine quite calmly all the possible observable spin-correlations 
generated by the various orientations of the registering devices. These potentialities do 
not depend on time. A high-pressure last-moment choice of the orientations of the 
devices that register spin-values is expected to do, what? To trick a mathematical 
implication of the formalism of QMHD that violates Einstein's principle of macroscopic 
locality by forcing the observational effects of micro-phenomena to dominate this 
mathematical violation? Such a procedure possesses meaning only with respect to: 
- An a priori refusal of the possibility of existence of any correlation.  
                                                      
141 It has the merit to have released a revolution inside the Bohr-orthodoxy. It has acted as a very active ferment in the 
scientific conceptualization of the microphysical reality. In order to fix Psycho-social reference-elements on the time-
dimension, I have reproduced in the Prologue to the first part of this work an 1979 lecture on Bell's theorem; and in 
(MMS [2013] v.3 and in [2017], French texts) can be found what I call a 'conceptual' invalidation of Bell’s proof (I 
have shown that the conclusion – such as it is expressed verbally by Bell – does not follow from the mathematical 
proof, though this – considered independently – is valid. I have also succeeded to construct a counterexample to Bell's 
formulation of his only asserted conclusion (MMS [1987]) that has been confirmed by Bordley [1989]) as 'factually 
possible'. But the most relevant new data concerning the problems raised by Bell consist of the content from the sub-
section (3.I).2 from this work (completely established only since 2012). 
142 In order to bring into explicit evidence the general peculiarities of such a situation, a systematic preorganization of 
the involved concepts and language – like that from IQM – is a sine qua non pre-condition; if only concepts and words 
from the current languages are made use of, in this case one gets lost for speaking and reasoning in a precise way.  
143 That corresponds to but is distinct from the involved state-ket |ΨGt> that – via its expansions (22) |ΨGt>/A – 
describes abstract statistics of results of individual coding-measurement-successions [G.MesA] measurements where 
are involved the individual wave-movements described by the wave-function ΦGt(r,t). In order to genuinely understand 
the physical and the conceptual situation one should have a clear view on all this. 
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- The research of a factual estimation of the value of the velocity of a 'transmission of 
influences' between the two involved micro-systems, that according to Bell's theorem 
would necessarily exist.  
But the second assumption recalled above is false: Bell's mathematical calculus 
and logical reasoning prove exclusively the existence of a correlation accordingly to the 
QMHD-formalism, which is known ; they do not prove also the necessity of an 'influence' 
that entail the correlation (MMS [2013] 144). 
The notions of 'influence' and so also of a velocity of transmission of it, are exterior 
to Bell's logical-mathematical proof. They are just asserted – directly and 
exclusively – in Bell's verbal formulation of his conclusion.  
And these notions are founded upon a furtive supplementary and independent 
assumption, namely that: The "two systems" must have 'separated' when they have come 
'far enough' from one another 145. Which amounts to wipe away the inside-outside 
specificities of the mechanics of a micro-'system' (a de Broglie corpuscular-like 
singularity in the wave of a specimen of a microstate) and to treat it like a classical 
mobile 146. 
The preceding remarks brings us now to the following central question: What is the 
ground for imposing so dramatically a universal Einstein condition of locality, when this 
condition has been endowed with a well-defined significance and role for – specifically – 
macroscopic mobiles that are directly perceived with definite global contours that 
individualize them mutually, by human observers that are imprisoned in differently 
moving inertial frames of reference wherefrom they communicate via light signals?  
When two or more such observers do all survey such a mobile, and in such 
conditions, a scientific representation does indeed require some rules of consensus 
concerning the identification of the mobile and of its dynamic. Some invariants are 
indeed necessary for generating, for instance, a consensual significance for the basic 
assertion that these observers are all perceiving the 'same' mobile.  
But for microstates, each human observer gathers a knowledge of the kind 
structured in IQM; a knowledge constructed very indirectly and in a solitary way, by 
each researcher isolated alone in his own Laboratory, without perceiving anything else 
than cryptic marks on devices out of which he draws some significance only by use of 
previously elaborated conceptual-mathematical rules and treatments and of operational 
actions (physical or abstract) decided on the basis of a model that involves unlimited 
waves,  etc., etc.. In such circumstances, the a priori importation into fundamental 
microphysics of all the requirements of the macroscopic relativistic mechanics is very far 
from being an obvious necessity. It even is a highly arbitrary constraint that manifests 
the impressive blinding force of the inertial urge to assert the absolute general validity of 
anything that has been strikingly efficient inside some particular context.  
Einstein's requirement of locality has a methodological nature. It is not an absolute 
factual truth. A fortiori there is no reason whatever to require it universally. Not any 
group of invariance has to be uniformly asserted in any cognitive situation. 
We conclude that the structure of Bell’s theorem seems to have been entailed by a 
model of two solid balls that are receding from one another147.  
                                                      
144 The proof of this last assertion is what I have called 'conceptual' invalidation of Bell's theorem. 
145 In the text-books one finds systematically the assertion that when they are still close to one another "the systems can 
interact" but "when the systems are sufficiently far from one another they must have separated".   
146 This illustrates the major role of the model in a consensual predictive and verifiable description of the microstates, 
that Bohr wanted to 'free' from any model, by a philosophical diktat. 
147 Of course all the preceding considerations also are founded upon models. But by now, I think, it has become clear 
that without any model one cannot try to construct a theory of microstates; one even cannot reason, prove, conceive, 
speak and write. And indeed the whole non-locality problem concerns a model, a more or less hidden one that involves 
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The cognitive situation of the human conceptor-observer with respect to this or that 
domain of physical entities is what decides the relevant conditions of consensus to 
be required. 
 A unification of Physics cannot be realized directly by representations of 
assertions of absolute factual truths. It can be realized only indirectly, only 
methodologically, inside a general and basically relativized common methodological 
framework that, by convenient particularizations, leads to a relativized representation of 
this or that particular domain of facts.  
We now quit the problem of non-locality and, from the specific and humble 
viewpoint of the purpose of this chapter 7.III, we consider specifically the case of one 
microstate of two or more microsystems. From this point of view the significant 
conclusion is the following one:  
Nothing withstands the extension of the assertion Ass.2 and of the equivalence 
(31), to the microstates of one unbound micro-state of two or more micro-systems. The 
proofs worked out in (7.III).2.3 for microstates ms(unbound,1)G(qf) can be transposed 
point by point to also this category of microstates. Louis de Broglie's model of a 
specimen of the considered microstate suggests that inside any microstate of two or more 
micro-systems, non-null quantum potentials act, tied with the distinct dynamics of the 
two or more involved corpuscular-like singularities from the amplitude of the common 
physical wave ΦG: The global operation of generation G that has to be realized for 
generating one unbound micro-state of two or more micro-systems, somehow involves 
corresponding two or more composing operations of generation, i.e. it is of the form 
G(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM), which involves a quantum potential and possible quantum fields. 
So the Schrödinger equation of evolution is not appropriated in the strict sense of this 
word, because the QMHD-hamiltonian does not include quantum potentials. 
Thereby the exploration begun in (7.III).2.1 is closed and we can formulate the 
following global conclusion on the whole sub-section (7.III).2. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
itself huge questions like the nature of space and time ('physical' nature, basically? primarily an only psychical nature, 
for time (Bergson)?); and what about the indefinitely multiform and variable separations in relative wholes that the 
human minds instil in what we call 'physical reality', each one of which entails its own pair of an inside and an outside? 
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(7.III).4. THE RELATION (31) FOR UNBOUND MICROSTATES 
VERSUS  
THE EQUATION OF EVOLUTION  
 
When also classical macroscopic fields are active in the considered global "external 
situation" situation, one can still write a QMHD-Hamiltonian where only these classical 
fields are explicitly present, while the quantum-fields are only implicitly introduced by 
the limiting conditions; which then obliges to research a solution of the equation by 
fragmenting the spatial domain in separate zones with mutually different limiting-
conditions and by producing an expression of the interference effects via additive 
superpositions of local solutions (like in the paradigmatic cases of "potential barriers", 
"walls", etc.) that inside the framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] are rejected. But when 
any classical field is absent, it appears nakedly that the Schrödinger equation of evolution 
is not sufficiently comprehensive. The interference effects should be representable 
basically and independently inside the equation itself, not only a posteriori, in the 
solution, where they are introduced independently, furtively and approximately, by ad 
hoc mathematical procedures and correlative ad hoc considerations and denominations 
("quantum tunneling", etc.). Limiting conditions imposed by composed operations of 
generation of type Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM) and the re-formulations (38') and (40) 
concerning the equation for eigenket and eigenvalues of the momentum-observable, 
cannot compensate fully the absence of any correlative representation of the quantum 
potentials inside the equation of evolution itself. It seems obvious that such an absence 
must entail some specific deleterious descriptional consequences that cannot be avoided 
by idealizations and approximations. 
Thereby we enter the domain of de Broglie's "double solution" representation 
[1956], actively developed now by the new Portuguese School of Broca and Araujo 
[2010] (cf. Gatta, Rica da Silva, Araujo, Croca and Silva, Cordovil,Moreira, Magalhäes, 
Alves, Santos) into a very interesting and fundamental new representation of what here 
we call 'the Universal Substance'. We come back upon this in the chapter (8.III). 
But inside the framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the face-à-face between the 
bottom-up construction of the representation (31), and the Schrödinger predictions (22) 
constructed top-down, entails already noteworthy new possibilities of direct optimization 
of the predictive outputs concerning quantum measurement.  
Consider the Schrödinger equation σΦ(Gt))   
i—(d/dt) |ψG,H(r,t)> = H|ψG,H(r,t)> 
Schrödinger, when he his equation, imposed a priori a general wave-like form of 
the solutions – Ψ(r,t)=a(r,t)e(i/—)ϕ(r,t) – that, at that time, he conceived to represent 
physical waves. Therefrom stems, and stubbornly persists up to this day, a total 
confusion between individual entities – specimens σΦ(Gt)) of the studied microstate, 
wave-functions ΦGt(r,t), individual coding-measurement-successions [Gt.MesA]) that are 
involved in coding-postulate (20') where operates a measurement-hamiltonian H(A) – 
and on the other hand state-ket |ψG,H(r,t)> that represent abstract statistics. This 
permitted to start, to connect the mathematical techniques to those from Maxwell's 
mathematical representation of electro-magnetic waves, and to have rapid and 
spectacular successes. But very soon the ambiguity between 'statistical waves' and 
physical waves as well as the unintelligible dimensionality and structure of the 
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'propagation- space' 148 , began to deteriorate the conceptual situation. The dimensionality 
and the lack of conceptual homogeneity of the 'propagation-space' of the equation 
involve an inextricable mixture of representation of individual features (tensor-products 
of spaces of individual "systems") and representation of statistical features, that prolong 
and amplify the multi-face mixture that flaws the QMHD-representation of quantum 
measurements. The present approach reacts to this situation. Now, what is the possible 
role of the Schrödinger equation, inside the present approach?  
To begin with, consider a Hamiltonian situation. It is often said that the initial 
state-ket |ψG,H(r,to)> is determined by imposing the limiting conditions upon the general 
solution of the Schrödinger equation of the problem. But if on the whole spatial domain 
globally delimited by the limiting conditions the physical initial situation varies in space 
in a way that is stable but nevertheless escapes mathematically specifiable knowledge (as 
nearly always is the case in a non-idealized factual situation), the limiting conditions 
alone i.e. not exhaustively the initial state-ket |ψG,H(r,to)>), might not suffice for a 
satisfactory degree of specification of the statistical contents of the initial state-ket. 
Moreover when the problem involves a non-stationary hamiltonian it is generally 
questionable whether the corresponding Schrödinger equation can determine with an 
acceptable accuracy the time-dependent probabilistic predictions. In short, when the 
equation exists, the predictions, in general, emerge flawed by ignorance and 
approximation.  
And how they are flawed, and to what a degree, can be known only a posteriori, by 
verification-measurements.  
But consider the expression (31). The involved prediction involves already 
verification, by construction. So if the predictions calculated via the Schrödinger 
equation of the problem are founded upon factually constructed initial predictions from 
(31) (the initial state-ket from (31), for to), the conclusions calculated via the equation for 
subsequent time t>to will also be endowed with factual truth, insofar that the equation 
itself is well-constructed.  
Consider now a physical situation that is not Hamiltonian. Then the Schrödinger 
equation cannot be written.  
In such conditions the equivalence (31) entails the possibility of principle to fully 
replace the equation. 
So inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the optimal use of the Schrödinger equation is to 
compose it with the use of the equivalence (31), as follows: 
- One can systematically begin by constructing factually the involved expansion 
|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)/A from (31) for the considered observable A, via individual 
measurements (like in the description (9'') DM from IQM) by following the factual-formal 
constructive procedure from (7.III).2.2.2. The expansions from the second member of  
(31) express the whole and certainly true initial statistical situation that – factually – 
generates for any subsequent time t>to a corresponding statistical distribution that, 
factually, is certainly true. The involved Go or Gt embodies the limiting conditions that 
act factually, while the factual-formal character of the whole constructive procedure 
entails maximal sensitivity with respect to the specificities of the whole factual initial 
ground encompassed by the limiting conditions, which specificities can (in principle) 
acquire a formal expression only if the limiting conditions are furthermore completed by 
                                                      
148 The dimensionality and the lack of conceptual homogeneity of the 'propagation-space' involve an inextricable 
mixture of individual physical features and statistical-abstract ones that prolong and amplify the mixture that flaws the 
QMHD-representation of the quantum measurements. 
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the construction for t=to of the whole considered factual-formal expansion with respect to 
A of the state-ket |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  from (31). 
Once the initial factually generated expansions (31) is thus determined: 
- If the Schrödinger equation of the problem exists, then one can continue by 
determining mathematically by its use the state-ket entailed by it for any moment t>to, 
when this seems economical.   
- One can also generate factually the state-ket (31) just in order to compare it to the 
corresponding expansions (22) determined by the equation. 
In short, inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the assertion Ass2 and the formal-factual 
construct (31) that expresses it, endow the representation of prediction-verification for 
unbound microstates with the possibility: 
- To replace radically this equation when it is not available, or too difficultly available, or 
too marked by unavoidable idealizations and approximations.  
- To associate the use of the equation, if it is available, with that of the factually 
generated representation (31), in order to realize various sorts of optimization (extended 
domain of applicability, control, economies). 
In a phase when the computational powers have become so high and continue to 
increase so rapidly, and when the techniques for making use of big data are in vertiginous 
progress, the conclusion stated above seems natural. 
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(7.III).5. BOUND MICROSTATES 
We finally consider also the case of bound microstates. In [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)]-
terms these are:  
stable micro-structures of specimens of several sorts of microstates, all the 
corpuscular-like singularities of which circulate inside a very limited domain of the 
'physical' space. 
Thereby we come back to the general introduction to this work. Let us stabilize this 
loop by expressing explicitly the connexion.  
Historically the representation of this sort of micro-structures has begun inside the 
classical physics via a top-down approach that associated classical 'planetary' models to 
entities from chemistry and molecular and atomic physics. Around 1900 this 
extrapolating progression came short of logical consistency with the classical physics, 
and so to stagnation, and consequently the first 'quantum' postulates were formulated 
(Bohr, Plank, Einstein's explanation of the photoelectric effect). These postulates have 
acted like close precursors of the dramatic full reversion, by Louis de Broglie, of the 
direction and the nature of the construction of scientific knowledge on micro-
phenomena; de Broglie's corpuscular-wave model initiated a decidedly bottom up 
approach along the vertical of conceptualization, that ties the classical level of 
conceptualization to the as yet never represented before 'Universal Substance' (in the 
Spinozian sense). And Schrödinger's equation, by its first applications, has yielded so 
striking results that a new phase of construction instilled itself furtively into the scientific 
thought. 
But it began there where Schrödinger's equation placed the new start. Namely with 
mathematical representations of predictive statistics of results of quantum measurements, 
of which the processes of verification by long series of necessarily individual acts of 
measurement, that were not yet represented. 
Only now, after nearly a century, IQM represents an explicitly structured 
representation of this lacking foundation.  
But with respect to the essential specificities of the descriptions of microstates such 
as these have been organized in this work, first inside IQM and then inside the two 
successive frameworks [IQM-QMHD] and [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)], the case of bound 
microstates is now placed far up under the classical roof, under an accumulation of a 
mixture of hyphens of various natures between specifically quantum features and 
classical ones. Under the cover this transitional texture the strongest conceptual and 
formal specificities of the microstates remain devoid of a clean contour:  
- For a bound microstate the human observer did not himself achieve deliberately 
the involved operation of generation Gt . This operation has been achieved naturally 
before the beginning of the human investigation. So from the point of view of its 
availability for being studied, a bound microstate is like a classical “object”, it just pre-
exists ‘there outside'. In the light spread by IQM one can understand what loss of 
specificity is entailed by this absence: 
- In the absence of a deliberate human operation of generation of the microstate, the 
measurements have to be conceived in the classical manner, without successions 
[Gt.MesA] each one of which involves first a realization of Gt. So, explicitly at least, the 
measurement-operations MesA are achieved directly, by use of test-microstates (for 
which the measurement evolution can obey the coding-postulate (20') (for instance 
Compton collisions), or they are incorporated to field-effects (Stark, Zeeman). 
Furthermore the measurement-interaction itself is often realized statistically, by the 
action, from the start, of a big set of simultaneous 'test-operations' upon a big set of 
replicas of the studied microstate (monochromatic radiation incident on a collection of 
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atoms of a definite kind, etc.) so that the result is expressed as a mean drawn factually 
from the involved eigenvalues, that remain unknown individually. 
- Because a bound microstate (its specimens) is permanently stably captured inside 
a small global space-time support assigned mentally to the physical entities that are 
involved, the only mental nature of this spatial delimitation has been abstracted away; 
which entails that the spatially unlimited wave-aspects that are devoid of a separable 
observable significance, have been posited to be altogether devoid of any sort of 
significance. Which brings back to the remarks from (7.III).2.4 on the configuration 
spaces introduced via the Schrödinger equation;  indeed this artificially delimited 
physical space-time support is what is associated with an abstract representation space 
where are lodged all the values considered on the mechanical dimensions of qualification 
of all the involved micro-systems. In a classical configuration space this happens 
currently and nobody wonders why more than only four dimensions of 'physical' 
representation are considered. If in the case of a bound microstate one begins to wonder 
about this, then much place for confusion is opened up. But precisely this happens 
because the general absence of intelligibility of the formalism entails a general attitude of 
suspicion. 
- For a bound microstate – like in the case of an unbound one – the formal 
distinction is very feeble between the state-function from the statistical state-ket of a 
considered microstate |ψGt> and the corresponding de Broglie wave-function ΦGt. But for 
a bound state even the conceptual-physical distinction – so progressively and painfully 
specified in this work – is subjected to a new sort of confusion. Namely, for a bound 
structure of microstates the physical specimens of the involved microstates are all stably 
co-present inside a very small domain of physical and they concentrate the attention on 
them, while the abstract statistical features represented by the corresponding state-ket are 
perceived as such, like in the classical physics; whereas for an unbound microstate the 
strict reverse happened, the existence and the role of the physical specimens have been 
occulted and the abstract representation by a state-ket has been reified because the 
formalism works exclusively with this. Moreover the involved state-ket is from the start 
conceived to be also one actually realized eigenket of the total energy observable H, 
which is represented by one wave-functionΦGt (in this case this is formally possible by 
'degeneration' and factually true at any given time. But potentially there are many such 
wave-functions, since the equation is linear. So, conceptually, a huge stratified confusion 
steps in between: the descriptor of a given actual physical wave-movement; the abstract 
set of possible mutually distinct such descriptors; and the descriptor of a set of sets of 
predictive counts on results of measurement on the one involved sort of physical entity.  
Etc. 
All this creates many conceptual ghost-problems that here we want to avoid. All 
the more so as a theory of, specifically, quantum measurements, is not imperatively 
necessary for measurements on bound states.  
In these circumstances and since in the present work the aim is to bring forth the 
specific principles of a fully intelligible representation of the microstates, the bound 
microstates have a very marginal conceptual role, which permits to postpone their 
treatment. 
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 (7.III).6. SUMMARIZING CONCLUSION ON THE CHAPTER 7.III 
The global results from the chapter 7.III can be stated as follows. First in the 
framework [IQM-QMHD] and then in the completed framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)], 
we have outlined constructively a new representation of the quantum measurements.  
This representation has been centred upon:  
- The necessary performance of an operation of generation G that necessarily has 
an individual and factual character.  
- The necessarily individual and physical-operational character of the coding-
measurement-successions [G.MesA] that unavoidably must be performed.  
- The deliberate requirement of a general and fully intelligible Hilbert-space 
representation of the factual probability laws constructed for the outcomes of long series 
of coding-measurement-successions [G.MesA], because – quite independently of the 
concept of a microstate – a Hilbert-space representation of these is indeed a very 
expressive and efficient representation of any probability law, accordingly to Gleason's 
theorem. 
In more detail now: 
In the section (7.III).1 – via a fundamental first assertion Ass.1 and the argument 
Arg(Ass.1) that founds it  – we have brought into evidence a conceptual constraint that 
permits to organize a basic operational and logical coherence between IQM and QMHD 
with respect to the basic requirement of statistical-probabilistic predictions and the 
verifiability of these, that inside IQM have been insured factually and bottom-up while 
inside QMHD the predictions have been claimed to be established via top-down and 
mathematically and the representation of the process of verification raises problems since 
nearly a century. At a first sight the assertion Ass.1 seems to be trivial. But a closer 
examination has brought forth an essential character tied with major consequences: 
- As soon as a bottom-up approach is practised the operations of quantum 
measurement can play a major constructive role for also the elaboration of predictions, 
not only a role of verification of pre-calculated predictions.  
- By a strict use of a small number of definite conditions of compatibility, IQM can 
strongly guide the elaboration of a new, fully intelligible Quantum Mechanics that 
incorporate the whole stratum of individual conceptualization of the microstates, thus 
compensating a huge lacuna that distorts QMHD.  
In the section (7.III).2, by systematic reference to IQM, we have proved a second 
assertion Ass.2, and this – for the particular case of microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) – 
produced the formal-factual equivalence  
(31) [|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)     ≈pred.  { |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) /A} ,∀A,∀t1}]verif 
where the factually constructed state-ket [|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) and all its expansions 
{ |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) /A}  emerge by construction already verified, so endowed with 
certain factual truth; thereby these factual-formal descriptors entail predictions that – in 
general – are different from those drawn the corresponding QMHD-state-ket: 
|ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM)  ≠pred. |ψGt1,H(r,t)> 
Just like to the expansions (22) from QMHD, the expansions { |ψGt,H(r,t1)>fact(DM) 
/A} ,∀A,∀t1}  from (31) insure, for microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c), a direct access to a 
Hilbert-space representation (23) of the predictions on the results of measurements. They 
do this without the use of the Schrödinger equation of the problem, via the 'factual-
formal' procedure that generates them. This feature is fully consonant with the very new 
and specific computing possibilities of our present time.   
In the section (7.III).2 we have tried to extend the result (31) to also the microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) that involve interference phenomena and a corresponding quantum 
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potential. But it appeared that the QMHD-representation of the state-ket of microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) involves obstacles that hinder the verification of the predictions on 
the outcomes of measurements of the basic momentum observable P. We have identified 
the source of these obstacles and this has led us to require a modified Hilbert-space 
representation of the state-ket of microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) and a new sort of coding 
postulate for the momentum-observable P, different from 'the method time-of-flight'; 
while inside QMHD it is presupposed – vaguely and implicitly – that a generalization of 
'the method time-of-flight' is valid for measuring any observable on any sort of 
microstate. This led us to de Broglie's concept of guided momentum. Along the path 
opened up by the concept of guided momentum we achieved a convenient generalized 
equation (38') for the eigenfunctions and eigenvalues of a generalized concept Pvc-vd of 
momentum-observable. Therefrom emerged a new Hilbert-space representation (38')-
(39)-(40) of the probabilistic predictions on the results of momentum-measurements on 
microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf).  
Since any QMHD-observable is a symmetrized function A(R,P) of the position-
observable R and the momentum-observable P, the mentioned result extends rigorously 
the assertion Ass.2 and the equivalence (31) to also the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf), 
for any observable defined inside the framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)].   
And finally it appeared that nothing hinders to apply the assertion Ass.2 and (31) to 
also a one micro-state of two or several micro-systems, for any observable.  
So inside (7.III).2 a fully intelligible factually rooted representation of the quantum 
measurements has revealed its whole contour; this is defined by the set of assertions and 
mathematical expressions 
  
[Ass.1,  Ass.2, (23), (31), (38'), (39), (40) ] 
 
In (7.III).3 we have specified the peculiar conceptual position of the case of bound 
microstates, with respect to the representation of the quantum measurements constructed 
in (7.III).2.  
In (7.III).4 we have shown that the factually rooted representation of the quantum 
measurements constructed in (7.III).2 permits to optimize the use of the Schrödinger 
equation, when it is available, and to replace it when it cannot be solved or even cannot 
be written. 
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 8.III 
 
PRINCIPLES  OF A FULLY INTELLIGIBLE SECOND QUANTUM MECHANICS: 
 QM2  
 
The representation of the quantum measurements constructed inside the two 
successive frameworks [IQM-QMHD] and [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] is the core of the fully 
intelligible Second Quantum Mechanics, QM2, researched in this work. This core is now 
alive. It beats already in the summarizing conclusion of the chapter III.7. By a somewhat 
uneasy act of conceptual surgery we shall now enact around it the essence of a whole 
abstract (and skeletal) organization that function coherently and meaningfully.  
We drop now any scaffold and by just a few integrative gestures we try to 
constitute QM2.  
 
(8.III).1. THE THREE SOURCE-DOMAINS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ROLES 
IN THE ORGANIZATION OF QM2 
The prime matter for constructing QM2 has been drawn out of IQM, QMHD and the 
approach dBDS(B). The respective roles of these three source-domains will indicate the 
way in which they subsist inside the result to which they have contributed. 
 
(8.III).1.1. The Infra-(Quantum Mechanics) IQM. 
IQM has been constructed with the overt purpose to benefit of an infra-discipline 
from which to induce the whole conceptual-operational-methodological structure of 
QM2, by reference and immersion, in a sense similar to that in which the structure of a 
living being is induced by its genetic code. And indeed IQM has acted in this way. It has 
offered instructional constraints that have permitted to identify meanings, lacunae, 
potentialities, and to construct accordingly to a previously defined structure.  
✙  IQM has revealed:  
! The unacceptable character of the orthodox interdiction, in QMHD, of a general 
model of a microstate. 
! The total void inside QMHD of an explicit and organized level of individual 
conceptualization; more specifically,  
✛ the absence inside QMHD of an explicit definition of the unavoidable 
concept of a factual physical operation G 'of generation' of the microstate-to-
be-studied;  
✛ the absence inside QMHD of explicit definitions of the different sorts of 
'microstates'; 
✛ the absence inside QMHD of explicit definitions of coding-measurement 
successions [G.MesA] founded on the posited general model of a 'microstate'. 
✙  IQM has permitted to identify the general model of a microstate that – covertly – 
works inside the whole formalism of QMHD. 
✙  IQM has permitted to identify the coding-measurement-succession that is implicitly 
supposed to generally for any sort of act on measurement and any sort of microstate. 
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✙  IQM has permitted to identify the gross fallacies that vitiate the nowadays 
representation of quantum measurements, thereby founding a radical rejection of this 
representation. 
✙  IQM has guided toward the refusal of the QMHD Hilbert-space representation of the 
microstates that involve a quantum-potential and toward a satisfactory alternative 
representation.   
In short, throughout the chapters 6.II and 7.III of this work IQM has dictated local 
refusals or specifications, re-organizations, new constructs. While achieving these there 
emerged progressively zones of a reconstructed formalism where IQM got incorporated. 
So IQM as a whole will be part of the substance of the integrated modified representation 
of the microstates that will be defined in (8.III).2. 
 
(8.III).1.2. The nowadays Hilbert-Dirac formulation of Quantum Mechanics, QMHD 
The QMHD representation of the microstates has been criticized throughout the 
chapters II.5 and II.6 of this work. In particular the QMHD-theory of quantum 
measurements has been entirely rejected. And in the chapter III.7 the additive 
representation (15'') of the state-ket of a microstate ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) has been found to 
lead to predictions that cannot be verified.  
On the other hand, in consequence of Gleason's theorem (23) a Hilbert-space 
representation of the state-ket of any microstate is highly convenient for expressing 
formally the probabilistic predictions on the outcomes of quantum measurements, in 
connection with the relation (22). All the more so that inside QMHD – in association with 
the algebra of the observables that represent the mechanical qualifying concepts and with 
Dirac's bra-ket formalism – the Hilbert-space representation of the state-ket has become 
an organic part of a very complex and powerful network of mathematical tools. So the 
preservation of a non-restricted representation of any sort of microstate, by a state-ket 
from a Hilbert-space, constitutes a considerable practical purpose, notwithstanding the 
fundamental inadequacies from QMHD .  
That is why in 7.III we have so decidedly researched an unquestionable new 
Hilbert-space representation for the unbound microstates that involve a quantum 
potential.  
So the Hilbert-Dirac mathematical formalism is conserved inside QM2, though 
modified in a way that endows it with semantic consistency and with full verifiability of 
the asserted predictions.  
 
(8.III).1.3. The de Broglie-Bohm approach, dBDS(B) 
This approach started in Louis de Broglie’s Thesis, with the Jacobi formulation of 
classical mechanics-and-optics where the conditions that restrict to the 'geometric 
approximation' have been suppressed so that a prolongation into arbitrarily small space-
time dimensions emerged (de Broglie [1924], [1956], [1963], [1987]). Thereby – in 
continuity with the classical physics – de Broglie has proceeded toward a sort of 
mathematical representation of the Universal Substance in Spinoza's.  
To this global mathematical model de Broglie's superposed an equation of 
evolution (de Broglie [1956)], [1957] [1987]). This equation is first written in very 
general and relativistic terms, with formal places explicitly secured for all the sorts of 
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classical as well as quantum fields. Therefrom can then be drawn various 
particularizations or approximations149.  
As far as I know, up to now this is the unique available mathematical 
representation of the whole physical substance that covers the whole domain of possible 
space-time dimensions.  
The concept itself of a representation of this sort is very significant with respect to 
the purpose of an explicit unification of the sciences of matter; another concept that 
is at least as significant as this one is that of a general method of consensual 
conceptualization, predictive and verifiable. 
Coming back to the dBDS(B) approach, the way in which one could make effective 
use of the general equation written by de Broglie – according to which criteria the 
limiting conditions are specified and how one could determine the initial conditions – is 
not considered.  In fact it is implicitly supposed that this can always be performed 
mentally in an efficient way. Which is utterly false. It is the cognitive situation – that 
varies with the involved space-time dimensions – that entails what is to be performed 
mentally and what has to be performed factually, and what conceptual and observational 
effects are entailed by the sort of performance that is imposed by the cognitive situation.  
That is one of the main reasons why each scientific discipline should founded in a 
corresponding infra-discipline that play with respect to it the role that IQM plays with 
respect to a theory of the microstates.    
The dBDS(B) representation is entirely and passively referred to the current 
quantum mechanical formalism. It is conceived as the adjunction to the current quantum 
mechanics, of a mathematically expressed description of the physical substance that 
underlies it directly. The concept of a microstate is not individualized from inside the 
general model of a microstate, neither in a factually operational way nor only mentally. 
The conceptual-mathematical representation remains quintessentially global and mental. 
Local forms are just zoomed upon in imagination. Though individualizing words and 
ways of speaking do appear often in relation with a particularization or an approximation 
of the general equation, nevertheless – from the viewpoint of IQM – the conceptual 
distinction between individual or statistical features is very feeble, as well as the 
distinction between wave-features and mechanical features. Moreover features of these 
two different natures are often introduced inside one same descriptor. This is reminiscent 
of de Broglie's initial attitude in his Thesis where he initiated himself the use of the 
unhappy word 'particle', even though on the other hand he has quite explicitly presented 
his model as exclusively a wave endowed with a 'corpuscular-like' singularity; as he also 
defined 'a wave with a corpuscular phase' and he associated a statistical 'wave-packet' 
with one 'particle'. For de Broglie such associations even seem to correspond to a 
personal esthetical preference. However, form a methodological point of view economies 
of this sort introduce a dangerously slippery slope, because the theoretical physicists tend 
to consider exclusively the mathematical expressions and to neglect the meanings that 
these carry.   
In the deduction of the famous relation p=h/λ the confrontation of the perceptions 
of two different observers plays an important role, but these are 'pure' imaginary 
observers that do not accomplish physical operations. Etc.  
Even de Broglie’s theory of quantum measurements in de Broglie [1956)], [1957)] 
remains just an explanation of the a priori and fully accepted theory of measurements 
from QMHD such as it stands. 
The theory as a whole is presented as a global, mental, that – directly – cannot be 
verified. But to this model is superposed an equation of evolution that is relativistic – 
                                                      
149 The general view expressed in these works is what here we have denoted dBDS(B)) because it integrates elements 
from Bohm's view, and later it has been associated with Viger-Bohm concept of sub-quantum fluctuations.  
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which involves quintessentially conditions imposed to the processes of observation; 
moreover the equation cannot be solved – even in its most simplifying approximations – 
without limiting conditions and a posited initial state that presuppose an operation G of 
generation. These are methodological inconsistencies150. 
In short, Louis de Broglie has conceived his own representation like exclusively an 
interpretation of QMHD that is entirely accepted. He has never claimed another status for 
this representation 151. 
But inside the framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the assignation to de Broglie's 
representation of an exclusively interpretive character appeared very likely to constitute a 
radical under-estimation. What acts in favour of this under-estimation is a general 
psychological submission to a formalism that has been developed under the intimidating 
pressure of a confrontation with a still very new and very cryptic cognitive situation. The 
physics of planets, stars and galaxies, like also that of the world of objects that we 
currently perceive everywhere around us, have started thousands of years ago. But a 
scientific exploration of a domain of physical facts where the space and time dimensions 
are so small that not only they exclude any sort of direct perception, but furthermore they 
cannot even be conceived, is a very recent feat. 
The elaboration of IQM is a reaction to this situation. And inside the integration of 
QM2 that follows just below the place inside Physics of the approach dBDS(B)] is 
reconsidered drastically.  
 
(8.III).2. THE SKELETON OF QM2  
Throughout the chapters 6.II and 7.III various features of what has been a priori 
named QM2 have emerged in a scattered chaotic way. Now these features will just be 
summarized in a more organized way. The summary, moreover, will be synthetic in the 
extreme. Any elaboration will be banished. As stated from the start, inside this work the 
purpose is not to offer a fully achieved new theory of microstates; it is only to identify 
the conceptual loci in QMHD wherefrom spouts of un-intelligibility burst out, to suppress 
these, and to realize a well-defined new basic structure where is acting a method that 
guarantees full intelligibility and inner consistency for subsequent developments. We 
want to integrate only the Principles, literally, of a Second Quantum Mechanics.  
Below we communicate this integration by an enumeration of the postulates 
followed by a brief verbal description of the semantic contents tied with these postulates. 
 
 (8.III).2.1. The postulates from QM2  
1. The postulate of immersion in IQM: IQM as a whole is conserved inside QM2 
in the role of an explicit pre-organized instructional epistemological-operational-
methodological structure that constrains a priori the process of construction of QM2.  
2. The postulates from MQHD are conserved, with the exceptions that appear at 
the points 4, 8, 9.  
- The measurement-postulates are all suppressed. 
3. The individual modelling postulate of a factually generated microstate:  
[MP(msG,cw) + (1')(G↔msG,cw)] 
                                                      
150 Nevertheless these contain suggestions for the development of QM2. 
151 The same is valid concerning Bohm’s 1952 work. 
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is posited to be valid for any sort of factually generated microstate. 
4. The equation of evolution of the state-ket of a microstat: 
- The Schrödinger equation is maintained for the microstates without quantum-
potential.  
- For microstates with quantum potential the general equation of evolution remains 
still an open problem to be solved on the basis of:  
* de Broglie's approach ([1956], [1964], [1987]);  
* the results of the investigations that are developed by the Lisbon group (cf. 
Croca&Araujo [2010]);  
* the methodological constraints from MCR concerning chains of meta-descriptions 
(MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006]) (in order to represent conveniently the superposed 
effects of classical macroscopic fields and of quantum fields interior to the studied 
microstate).  
5.  Louis de Broglie's definition (33) of an evolving guided momentum-value 
p(r,t) – posited by him for ANY sort of microstate – is posited to be MEASURABLE. 
6. The coding-measurement postulate (35) 
[Gt .Mes(r, p)]      →  trace       ( rk , pj )t ,      k=1,2,..K;    j=1,2,..J;    ∀msGt              
 is posited to be valid for ANY unbound microstate. 
7. The coding-measurement postulate (20')  
[(Gt1→σΦ ).MesA(σΦ)]    →  H(A)      (marks registered in (ΔrΔt)j > ‘aj’)       
is posited to be valid for the microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c). 
8. The generalized representation (38') 
Pvc-vd .∏m (a.exp((i/—) (pjm.km(r))t .r)= pj(r,t). a.exp ((i/—) (∑m pjm km(r))t .r), ∀j, m=1,2,..M    
of the concept Pvc-vd of a momentum-observable, with the corresponding basis of eigenket  
(40)     
{ |∏m (a.exp((i/—) (pjm.km(r))t .r >} = { |a.exp ((i/—) (∑m pjm km(r))t  .r)>},  ∀j,  m=1,2,..M,    
replace the QMHD-definition of the momentum observable. 
9. The Hilbert-Dirac representation (39) 
|Ψ(r,t)Gt(G1,G2,...Gm,...GM)(r,t)>                                                                                                      
replaces the QMHD representation of the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(q-f).  
 
--------- 
Via the postulates 3, 4, 5, the dBDS(B) representation fuses with QM2 whereby it 
gains access to the consensual, predictive and verifiable representation of the microstates 
from QM2. 
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 (8.III).2.2. Remarks on the process of construction of QM2 
A. On the constructive role of IQM 
* Throughout the chapters 6.II and 7.III, IQM has instilled an organizing distinction 
between the individual level of conceptualization, the statistical-probabilistic level, and 
the meta-statistical level of correlations between whole probability spaces.  
* The IQM request of an explicit model of a microstate has led in (6.II).1 to the 
modelling postulate MP(msG,cw) associated with the re-definition (1’) G↔msG,cw of the 
concept of operation G of factual generation of the microstate-to-be-studied and to the 
model (14) msG,cw≡{σ(msG,cw)} of such a microstate. In 7.III this model has then founded 
the coding-postulates (20') and (35) as well as the modified Hilbert-space representation 
(38')-(39)-(40) of the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf).. 
* Via the basic assertions Ass.1 and Ass.2, IQM has instilled into QM2 a 
remarkable fusion expressed by the formula (31), between the IQM-definition (9'') of the 
"primordial transferred description" of the studied microstate – the central descriptional 
concept from IQM – and on the other hand the Hilbert-space mathematical formalism 
from QM2 such as it is perceived in the light of Gleason's theorem that general power of 
the Hilbert-space mathematics to represent any probability law in very convenient terms 
that are different those that Kolmogorov had chosen.  
* The construct (31) doubles and controls factually the purely mathematical 
outputs of the Schrödinger equation of the problem, when these can effectively be 
generated; while when these cannot be obtained, this construct offers inside QM2 
independence with respect to outputs of the equation of evolution. So inside QM2 the 
construction and the solution of the Schrödinger equation of the problem cease to be a 
necessity. The unconditional acceptance of effects of approximations that cannot be 
foreseen, can be refused and compensated 152.  
On the basis of Gleason's theorem alone, the whole essence of the QMHD-algorithm 
(22)-(23) for prediction-and-verification is insured inside QM2 by the equivalence 
(31).   
B. On the constructive role of dBDS(B) 
The supply from the part of dBDS(B) is quite considerable: 
** dBDS(B) connects QM2 with the Hamilton-Jacobi formulation of the classical 
Mechanics and Electromagnetic Optics (i.e. with the whole essence of the classical 
Physics; while on the other hand, via the 'corpuscular-like-wave' model of a microstate, 
dBDS(B) roots QM2 into the microphysical factuality. 
** Via the channel of adduction into the factually operational representation from 
QM2 (36') : 
[MP(msG,cw), (1’)Gcw↔msG,cw, (14)msG,cw≡{σ(msG,cw)}, (35)P(cod)∀msG), 
(33')pj(r,t)=ł.β(r)t=∑m(pjmkm(r)t]   
the  metaphysical mathematical formalizations from dBDS(B) are transmuted into a rich 
reservoir of deeply conceived and carefully worked out representations, available for a 
                                                      
152 In the era of Moore's law (that still works and of which anyhow the already accumulated effects will subsist), of Big 
Data, and of the perspective of "the Singularity" in the human evolution, the realization of the contents of the 
equivalence (31) should not be a problem. 
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future development inside the factual-operational and consensual representation from 
QM2. In order to illustrate this potentiality we add the following remarks. 
The approach dBDS(B) is quasi unanimously considered to be only an interpretation 
of QMHD. But this sort of relation between dBDS(B) and QMHD might soon suffer a sort of 
inversion: 
Both approaches dBDS(B) and QMHD define any classical dynamical quantity A as a 
function A(r,p), like in the classical mechanics. On the other hand the coding-postulate 
(35) is posited to be valid for any sort of unbound microstate. So:  
Insofar that the guided momenta (33) can indeed be measured accordingly to (35) – 
any unbound microstate can be subjected to simultaneous position-and-
momentum measurements.  
Thereby, inside [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the statistical notion of mutually 
incompatible mechanical qualifying-quantities can be circumvented. This entails that the 
probability-trees with mutually incompatible branches can be avoided and replaced by 
one-trunk probability-trees that – graphically – are similar to that from the Fig.3 from 
(3.I).1 but have a different content, namely:  
The physical-operational acts of measurement Mes(r,p) are achieved accordingly 
to (35), by registration of the trace of de Broglie's guided momentum; and the 
values of any dynamical quantity A (regarded like in the classical mechanics, as just 
a mechanical qualification not as a quantum mechanical 'observable') are 
calculated after the performance of the physical-operational acts of measurement 
Mes(r,p), from the obtained pairs of results (r,p).  
So the probability-tree from the Fig.2 reduces to only one physically-operational 
trunk that is common to all the classical mechanical quantities A(r,p) and is topped by a 
crown of only conceptually worked out probability spaces mutually connected inside a 
meta-statistical level of correlations: 
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META-PROBABILISTIC CROWN 
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Fig. 3'. One-trunk probability-tree tied with the codingpPostulate (35), 
constructible for any sort of unbound microstate and any pair ((A(r,p), B(r,p)) of derived 
qualifying quantities. 
 
In this way there appears a quite general category of physical operations and of 
corresponding representations that penetrate deeper into the a-conceptual physical 
reality than those tied with the quasi-classical microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) for which 
the coding-postulate (20') is valid. The mentioned operations and representations 
concern the radically non-classical region of the a-conceptual physical factuality 
wherefrom are 'extracted' – in the sense of (1') – the microstates ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) of 
which the corpuscular-like singularities are immersed in 'inner' non-null quantum 
potentials that cannot be manipulated from the outside of the microstate, as it is required 
by the coding-postulate (20'). 
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With respect to the generally possible representation from the Fig.3', the 
probability trees with mutually incompatible branches of the type represented in 
the Fig.2 appear now as a particular alternative possibility characteristic of 
exclusively the microstates ms(unbound,1)G(n-c), that are subjected to Heisenberg's 
principle of uncertainty iff the coding-postulate (20') is employed for them 153. 
So inside the framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the channel (36) entails the 
massive adduction into 'scientific' knowledge – communicable, consensual, predictive 
and verifiable knowledge – of the new outputs of the universal possibility of one-trunk 
probability-trees represented in the Fig.3'.  
Correlatively, inside the framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the degree of 
'communication' between the purely mental representations from dBDS(B) and the 
predictive representations from QM2, tends to evolve. For instance, consider the [IQM-
QMHD-dBDS(B)] probability π(pj) that the result of a momentum-measurement 
performed at a time t on a microstate with state-ket |ΨG(r,t)> be pj. In dBDS(B) terms this 
probability can be symbolized as  
π(pj) =! [π(r).π[∇β(r,t)=pj]]dr  =  ! [|ψG(r,t )| 2π[∇ϕ(r,t)]=pj]dr    
(the writing π[∇β(r,t)=pj] is to be read: the probability that the guided momentum 
∇β(r,t) possess the value pj). The purely conceptual (i.e. not physically operational) 
approach dBDS(B) does not define ways of verifying the factual truth of this 
symbolization. But conceptually, it permits to consider this symbolization as a dBDS(B) 
representation of Born's postulate: 
| c(pj ,t)| 2 = π(pj) =! [π(r).π [∇β(r,t)=pj]]dr  =  ! [|ψG(r,t )| 2π [∇ϕ(r,t)]=pj]dr   
Which acts as a dBDS(B) specification of the significance of Born's postulate. And 
furthermore inside the framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] the pertinence of this 
significance can be verified factually by use of the equivalence (31) constructed for a 
microstate ms(unbound,1)G(n-c) and, alternatively, accordingly to the coding-postulate 
(35) or accordingly to the coding-postulate (20'), taking into account the posit P2 from 
(7.III).2.3.8.  
This illustrates how inside the framework [IQM-QMHD-dBDS(B)] new possibilities 
arise of developing the consensual, predictive and verifiable representation of the 
microstates from QM2154. 
The investigations performed by the new Portuguese school (cf. Broca & Araujo 
[2010]) enforce notably this last assertion: Louis de Broglie's representation of a 
general – and relativistic – equation of propagation – that is valid everywhere inside 
modern Physics, on all the various levels of space-time dimensions – can be re-
examined and stabilized, together with all its possible approximations or its 
particularizations to this or that cognitive situation; and it can be associated with the 
channel (36') of adduction into the factually operational representations from QM2. 
This – together with the dBDS(B) mathematical representation of the Universal 
Substance, and with the generalization of IQM achieved in the Method of 
Relativized Conceptualization, MCR (cf. MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006]), would 
constitute a genuinely general framework where, just by the specification of the 
mutual characteristics entailed for the pairs (G,Mes.A) by the acting cognitive 
                                                      
153 It appears that that the non-boolean Birkhoff-voan Neumann 'logical' structure characterizes the way in which it is 
possible to code the results of measurerments, not the microstates themselves.   
154 Louis de Broglie's analyses of various cases of interference states where he makes use of the concept of variable 
'quantum-mass (cf. dB [1987] might lead to a genuinely scientific theory of teleportation. 
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situations, each given physical theory of a definite domain of physical facts would 
obtain a clear definition and a clear characterization with respect to any other 
theory of another definite domain of physical facts.  
Which amounts to achieving a methodological unification of Physics that nothing seems 
to hinder. In  9.III we come back on this major question. 
Globally considered, the preceding considerations point toward a genuine 
inversion of the conceptual status of the approach dBDS(B) with respect to that of QMHD. 
The dBDS(B) representation tends to gain a basic conceptual status with respect to the 
un-intelligible QMHD-algorithms for representing the quantum measurements.  
C. On the constructive role of QMHD. 
Notwithstanding the radical modification of the representation of the quantum 
measurements, the basic features of the QMHD mathematical representation via a Hilbert-
Dirac state-ket, of the probabilistic predictions on the results of quantum measurements 
on a given microstate, is entirely conserved inside QM2. But it is conserved cleaned of 
all the conceptually unacceptable confusions brought forth by reference to IQM, and 
modified and/or extended in coherence with the criteria imposed by IQM. 
 
(8.III).2.3. The main specificities of the second quantum mechanics QM2   
Consider now finally the global inner structure of the formalism from QM2. 
This formalism satisfies strictly all the general requirements of IQM; these are 
recalled beneath: 
° More or less deeply, the representations from QM2 are all rooted directly in the 
a-conceptual factual physical-operational reality. This establishes a zero-level of 
conceptualization. Therefrom the process of conceptualization progresses constructively 
bottom-up along the vertical of human conceptualization, toward the classical Physics 
(cf. Fig.1). 
° The individual level of conceptualization, and the statistical one, are explicitly 
and radically distinguished from one-another. 
° The microstates are classified according to the definitions from (2.I)1.  
° Each passage from the individual level of conceptualization, to the statistical one, 
is webbed factually by long series of repetitions of a given individual coding-
measurement-succession [G.MesA].  
° What sort of acts of acts of measurement MesA is possible inside the coding-
measurement-successions [G.MesA] – which inside the only general approach IQM 
remained undefined – is determined inside QM2 for each class of microstates separately, 
on the common basis that consists of the general model posited for any microstate, 
namely de Broglie's model of a wave with a corpuscular-like singularity in its amplitude, 
and by taking into account also the specificities of the considered sort of microstate. 
° The description of any microstate is a primordially transferred [ε ,δ ,N0]-
probabilistic description (9''). 
° If the coding-postulate that is involved is of the type (20') – which according to 
QM2 is possible only for the class of microstates ms(free,1)G(n-c) without quantum 
potential – then the construction of the corresponding primordially transferred 
probabilistic description can be inserted into a tree-like structure of the general type 
defined in (3.I).1 (Fig.2 and the Fig.9 below) of which the content varies in its details 
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with the type, in the sense of the definitions from (2.I)1), of the considered microstate. 
(cf. Fig.2, Fig.3, Fig.4).  
° If the involved coding-postulate is of the type (35) – which according to QM2 is 
possible for ANY unbound microstate but is the unique possibility for the microstates 
from the class ms(free,1)cG(qf) – the corresponding primordially transferred probabilistic 
description can be represented by a one-trunk probability-tree (cf. Fig.3' and Fig.9 
below).   
Inside QM2 these tree-like structures summarize in graphic language a deep and 
complex unity of the representation of quantum measurements.  
Furthermore, in MRC it appears that the tree-like representation of a probability 
law is endowed with universality and constitutes a feature of a deep unity between 
relativized and extended versions of the three most basic sorts of human 
conceptualization, namely the logical conceptualization, the probabilistic one, and 
Shannon's informational conceptualization 155. 
We reproduce beneath a superposition of the Fig.2 and a generalization of the 
Fig.3 entailed by the postulates 6 and 8).  
  
                                                      
155 The most complete account of this unity can be found in  MMS [2006]. Less detailed and complete accounts can be 
found in MMS [2002A], [2002B]). 
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Fig.9. The one-trunk-tree consisting of simultaneous measurement of r and p 
surmounted by the two only conceptually worked out probabilistic crowns, corresponds 
to the coding postulate (35) that is generally valid. This one-trunk probability-tree of 
any microstate – whether a microstate ms(free,1)G(n-c)) or a microstate ms(free,1)cG(q-f) – 
is rooted deeper into the a-conceptual factuality than any branches-probability-tree of a 
microstate ms(free,1)G(n-c)). 
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(8.III).2.4. Global summary 
QM2 is inserted in IQM and has been constructed under all the constraints imposed 
by IQM; whereby IQM has been infused in the structure of QM2.  
QM2 has been constructed with the purpose to offer a unified and intelligible 
Hilbert-Dirac mathematical representation of the quantum measurements, incorporating 
consensual prediction and verification. This has been realized via the assertions Ass.1 and 
Ass.2 associated with the predictive Hilbert-space algorithm (22)-(23) from QMHD, re-
considered in the light of Gleason's theorem.  
The representation that emerged in this way is in principle independent of the 
Schrödinger equation of evolution.  
QM2 involves a radical re-structuration of the representation of the microstates 
ms(unbound,1)cG(qf) with non-null quantum potential. This restructuration has required 
recourse to the de Broglie-Bohm approach dBDS(B) that is derived from Hamilton-Jacoby 
formulation of the classical mechanics and optics. Thereby QM2 emerges connected with 
the essence of the whole classical Physics. While accordingly to IQM the roots of QM2 
are directly implanted into the a-conceptual physical factuality. In consequence of this, 
and of the methodological structure instilled into QM2 by the Infra-(quantum-mechanics) 
IQM: 
The representation of the microstates offered by QM2 can naturally be connected 
with any domain of Physics. Which is a source of comparability, so also a source of 
an explicitly definable way toward a methodological unification of the whole 
Physics.   
So QM2 is, I think, fully intelligible from all the major points of view – genetic, 
factual, logical, mathematical, and contextual. It can now work. From now on QM2 needs 
only growth, development (in particular in order to install in mathematical terms its 
requirement of effectiveness, so of finiteness). 
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 9.III  
BRIEF FINAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
(9.III).1. ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF QUANTUM MECHANICS 
It is often felt that QMHD is endowed with a particular sort of universality and it is 
sometimes asserted that this is entailed by the fact that any material entity is a structure 
of microstates. But this belief is illusory, for at least two reasons, one epistemological 
and the other one formal. 
The epistemological reason. Inside quantum mechanics a fragment of physical 
reality that is considered in order to create new scientific knowledge156 on, specifically, 
this fragment, is placed just upon the extreme frontier between a still strict absence of  
any such knowledge, and on the other hand all that has already been previously 
conceptualized in scientific terms (Fig.1, Fig.2). This extreme character of the "position" 
inside the volume of the conceptualized, of the entities-to-be-studied, is not immediately 
perceivable because inside QMHD the individual level of scientific conceptualization is 
occulted in consequence of a nearly exclusively top-down approach. Only the statistical 
level is represented explicitly because it has been the first one encountered by the top-
down progression. Nevertheless the individual level is irrepressibly involved and active. 
And the radically marginal, the limit-location of the origin the processes of creation of 
knowledge concerning factually generated microstates, imprints upon the emerging 
descriptions – the ‘primordially transferred descriptions’ that in IQM have been denoted 
D/G,msG,V / – certain specific characters that are not apparent in the descriptions that are 
familiar to us.  
Now, I hold that those who perceive universality in the formalism of quantum 
mechanics (cf. Aerts [1981]), in fact, more or less clearly, perceive: 
- The specificities of ‘primordially transferred descriptions’ of factually generated 
microstates, with the unavoidable relativities that mark them. 
- The statistical character that for such descriptions emerges irrepressibly.  
They also feel more or less faintly that this sort of 'primordial' descriptions is not 
confined to the case of microstates; that the symbol ‘msG’ can be replaced by the symbol 
of a quite general sort of entity, say ‘œG’ (the 'object-entity-to-be-studied') that is 
generated as such by the operation of generation ‘G’ 157. They somehow perceive, though 
in a still unspeakable way, that the study of microstates introduces just an instance of 
certain general epistemological features that call for a method for starting a chain of 
knowledge at no matter what local but total relative zero of knowledge and for then 
developing the started chain into an unlimited process of creation of communicable 
knowledge that, by its structure, be consensual, predictive and verifiable.  
And indeed transferred descriptions emerge also, quite currently, inside the 
classical processes of conceptualization 158 . But in the case of factually generated 
microstates – because they are so totally unperceivable directly, and so difficultly 
accessible to deliberate interactions – all the involved descriptive features are filtered out 
radicalized, non-degenerate, mutually separable, pure; and that is why the concept of 
primordially transferred description – though universal – has revealed itself explicitly for 
                                                      
156 That is, communicable, consensual and verifiable knowledge, not a subjective one, for instance imagined or 
metaphysical. 
157 cf. MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006], [2014], etc. 
158 Henri Boulouet brought into evidence this very important conceptual fact, both in private communications and in 
his PhD thesis [2014], Univ. of Valenciennes. 
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the very first time only inside microphysics, and has only therefrom entailed new and 
striking questions of intelligibility as well as mathematical specificities. 
The formal reason. Via Gleason’s theorem the concept of Hilbert-vector-space 
revealed itself as a very expressive framework for just lodging inside it "factual 
probability laws" (MMS [2014]) that have been established outside this Hilbert-vector-
space. Now, the concept of probability is omnipresent inside human thought.  
But the mentioned possibility – little known and little understood – has no 
necessary connection whatever with, specifically, microstates. It is illusory to believe that 
there exists a direct logical relation between, for instance, social sciences in general, and 
on the other hand the concept of microstate; or even between the psychology of classical 
conceptualization, and microstates. In this sense expressions like "quantum social 
science" or "quantum cognitive science" are utterly misleading. 
The way of representing factual probabilities via vectors from a Hilbert-space, has 
to be radically separated from the concept of microstate.  
The general and basic construction of relativized descriptions and of the 
representational structures generated by these, constitute the object of a general discipline 
– a general Method of Relativized Conceptualization denoted MRC – that is independent 
of the study of microstates, notwithstanding that it has been suggested by a slow and long 
examination of the formalism of the nowadays quantum mechanics. I have developed 
MRC itself into an independent and rather complex whole where logic, probabilities and 
information theory become unified. And: 
This whole incorporates IQM as a particular application of MRC to the case of 
descriptions of factually generated microstates. But this does not in the least entail 
that MRC itself is a 'quantum' method: in order to realize the mentioned 
application I had to construct from A to Z the bridge called IQM between, 
specifically, descriptions of factually generated microstates, and on the other hand, 
the general method of relativized conceptualization, MRC. 
For each application of MRC to a definite domain of facts, the construction of an 
analogous bridge is necessary, this cannot be economized without being captured in 
unpredictable confusions.  
As for mathematical physics in general, and even for any mathematical scientific 
representation of a domain of "reality", we are still far from thoroughly understanding the 
conditions that restrict the acceptable, or fertile, or optimal association between, on the 
one hand this or that mathematical formal system, and on the other hand a given domain 
of what we call ‘reality’, physical or social or economical reality, etc.  
This introduces the following point. 
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(9.III).2. FACTS, MATHEMATICS, KNOWLEDGE, METHOD, TECHNIQUES, 
AND UNIFICATION 
 
Facts, cognitive features, mathematics. 
The approach developed in this work brings into evidence very general and 
fundamental questions concerning the relations, inside a mathematical theory of a 
domain of physical facts, between:  
* The nature of the considered physical factuality;  
* The descriptional purpose that acts. 
* The cognitive situation that is involved.  
* The mathematical tools that are made use of. 
In this work, in order to generate in a guided manner an intelligible representation 
of the microstates, I have created comparability between two different and mutually 
independent sorts of descriptive systems – IQM and QMHD – and then, by the help of 
effective comparisons, I have explicated the conditions that permit to organize a mutual 
consistency between IQM and QMHD and I have constructed a realization of these 
conditions.  
This process has permitted to perceive that, if one wants to insure in an intelligible 
way, consensual and verifiable prediction, it is an unavoidable necessity to pour into the 
mathematical descriptors well-defined factual contents, and the corresponding semantic, 
as it is conceived by the human observers-conceptors; indeed in the absence of such 
contents and such a semantic the mathematical tools that are claimed to "fit" the 
considered domain of physical entities, in fact remain largely disconnected from it; they 
simply do not.......‘make sense’ in a definite way. This is so because a mathematical 
system is a formal system, so a closed system; it is delimited, and the way of delimiting it 
– via axioms, definitions, well-formed expressions, laws of transformation of a well-
formed expression – involves an own semantic (this is often occulted, if not even 
explicitly negated). So the closed semantic imported by the mathematical tools has to be 
quintessentially compatible with the factual semantic implied by the domain of facts to 
be represented, which is an open and unlimited semantic, fundamentally relative to the 
human ways of perceiving, of thinking, of "understanding" i.e. of experiencing a feeling 
of existence of "meaning". For this to happen it is necessary that the intersection (in the 
logical sense) between the own semantic of the mathematical tools and the semantic 
induced by the involved domain of facts be non-null and identified. For if the mentioned 
conditions of compatibility are not known and specifically fulfilled, the mathematical 
representations delivered by the mathematical system are not fully intelligible, and so 
they are exaggerated, or under-utilized, or distorted, and they push toward "interpretation 
problems" that attract more or less fantastic "solutions" (like that of "parallel universes" 
generated by each humble act of a quantum measurement). From a strictly logical point 
of view such a fantastic solution can be coherent, and in this case, in the absence of a 
more definite [syntactic-semantic] point of view, it tends to last. So the requirement of 
intelligibility can indefinitely stay violated. 
Now, when inside a mathematical theory of a domain of physical entities there 
subsists some semantic incompatibility between the considered facts and the 
mathematical representation of these, the physicists always feel this. Usually they 
apprehend it as an unintelligibility of which the source cannot be located, nor specified. 
If this happens, the physicist's minds – nowadays at least – secrete a propensity to 
consider the mathematical formalism as if it were itself a physical reality of some 
superior essence, out of reach and immutable like a galaxy, which absolves from trying 
to change it. And so:  
 
 
 
202 
A mathematical formalism that is applied to an important domain of physical 
entities without having previously worked out a thorough understanding of all the 
semantic features that are involved – those brought in by the cognitive features 
generated by the involved cognitive situation and those brought in by the 
mathematical tools – induces unintelligibility, which induces a reification of the 
formalism.  
The formalism is confounded with a datum and thereby it slips out of conceptual 
control. And often, in order to hold this back, inside many minds, the formalism 
undergoes a sort of divinisation: from a tool it is transmuted into an idol. (Jung and René 
Girard would have had much to say about this sort of effects of the modern collective 
unconscious).  
Moreover this process also secretes a superposed penchant to generalize to 
everything the ill understood and divinised mathematical representation. It becomes a 
general must. This is what happens now with Einstein's General Relativity and the 
'essential non-determinism' of Quantum Mechanics; with both in the same time. There 
exists a tendency to regard as general both these organizations of knowledge; which 
generates an artificial contradiction that leads to arbitrary, long and very difficult 
elaborations that are devoid of any sort of necessity. 
Therefore I think that in the present stage of development of the human thought it 
has become urgent to focus much attention and effort upon the way in which, in variable 
cognitive situations, we generate a certain definite sort of knowledge that we agree to 
uniformly call "scientific" knowledge, i.e. communicable and consensually predictive 
and verifiable knowledge. This new urgency is entailed by the fact that we have only 
very recently reached a stage when we try to create scientific knowledge in the radical 
absence of the direct and ancestral basis of possibility of direct human perception, that 
has supported us since probably some 200.000 thousand years and has deeply shaped our 
"classical" laws of thought. In order to acquire the capacity to deal efficiently with this 
new challenge it has become acutely important to elaborate an explicit method for 
organizing the way in which is performed the passage from the scientific representations 
that are tied with a given cognitive situation, to any other scientific representation that is 
tied with another cognitive situation.  
There are differences between the systems of knowledge that are tied to different 
cognitive situations; but there are also common features and these characterize the 
"scientific knowledge" as a whole.  
While: 
No sort of constructible knowledge can be identified with a definition of "the way 
in which the physical reality truly – absolutely – is in itself", because this is just an 
impossible notion, a basic and fragrant self-contradiction, the Fata Morgana of the 
nowadays concept of "scientific realism" that I call naïve realism.   
Realism, knowledge, method, unification 
I have spent much time for the aim sketched out above. The results have been 
exposed elsewhere (MMS [2002A], [2002B], [2006]). I have called them a Method of 
Relativized Conceptualization, MRC.  Here, in order to orient more precisely toward the 
meaning that I attach to the preceding very rapid considerations, I just add the following 
utterly synthetic illustration that concerns specifically the question of unification of the 
modern microphysics with the relativistic theory of gravitation. 
- The physicists usually presuppose that a "physical reality" exists independently of 
our knowledge of it; if they did not they would be solipsists and solipsism is rare among 
physicists. 
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- But this posit of independent existence should be radically distinguished from 
the concept of scientific knowledge; it has to be explicitly and severely confined to the 
status of a strictly non-verifiable concept of merely mental existence. Kant, since already 
1788, has confined this concept inside the metaphysics159.  
So let us stay resolutely inside the realm of scientific knowledge. 
- Scientific knowledge is consensual, communicable, predictive and verifiable 
descriptions, by definition. 
- Description is qualification of something, by definition.  
- Any description involves an object-entity-to-be-described and qualifications of 
this entity, by definition.  
The object-entity-to-be-described has to have been somehow separated from the 
whole of the physical reality, by some operation that has generated it as an object-entity-
to-be-described, in this role; for if not it is not possible to think or to speak of "it" in a 
scientific sense, nor a fortiori to act on "it". Let us denote by G this operation of 
generation (that can itself be purely mental, or factual-conceptual, or purely factual, or 
only selective, or also creative, or it can consist of some combination of such 
possibilities). 
The object-entity-to-be-described generated by G can be denoted by œG.  
Consider now the qualifying-structure. We call it a view, we denote it by V, and 
posit that it possesses the formal structure of a union of aspect-views, V=∪αVα with 
α=1,2,....m, where the index α designates a qualifying aspect (mental or conceptual-
physical-operational (act of measurement) and each qualifying aspect Vα introduces a 
semantic dimension of qualification denoted α that carries a finite number rα  of freely 
chosen values αk of the aspect α, with k=1,2,.... rα (this takes us very far away from the 
classical notion of "predicate")  
So any description involves an operation of generation G that generates an object-
entity-to-be-described œG, and a qualifying view V that, acting on œG via its aspect-
views Vα , qualifies œG in terms of qualifying values αk. So any description 
involves a pair (G,V): this is called the epistemic referential of the considered 
description. So the description itself can be symbolized by D/G,œG,V/. It is called a 
relative description of œG with respect to the qualifying view V.  
The general Method of Relativized Conceptualization mentioned above, MRC, 
constitutes a new sort of independent discipline that develops chains of hierarchically 
related relative descriptions. The chains do mutually connect in well-defined 
descriptional knots and then they separate again, thus generating progressively a rather 
complex network of radically relativized scientific knowledge. While the postulate of 
mere existence of a "physical reality" – without specifying a mental model of it – that 
founds MRC, can pertinently be called a postulate of minimal realism.  
The scientific knowledge constructed accordingly to MRC excludes by construction 
any false problems and paradoxes. And, in particular, it excludes by construction 
any false "impossibilities".  
I say "false" problems, paradoxes, impossibilities, because inside MRC these 
dissolve; they are replaced by constructive conditions that avoid their emergence. The 
methodological rules of construction from MRC explicate the differences and the 
connections between the descriptions from the network of scientific knowledge, via the 
way in which the epistemic referential changes when one passes from a description from 
the network, to another one.  
                                                      
159 The thing in itself (Ding an sich) is a concept Kantian concept that means "the such as it could be thought 
independently of any possible experimentation (in the dBDS(B) style). 
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As an example we consider the case of a description from the Quantum Mechanics 
(QM) and a description from the Relativistic Theory of Gravitation (RTG): 
- Consider first a description D/G,œG,V/ from the relativized version QM2 of QM, 
that is subjected to IQM.  
When D/G,œG,V/ concerns an object-entity that consists of an unbound microstate 
msG (i.e. œG≡msG) then (in contradistinction to what happens for bound microstates that 
in general are pre-existing structures, atoms, molecules) the human observer has to first 
generate factually that unbound microstate in a way that make it factually available in the 
role of object-entity-to-be-studied.  
And in this case, as expressed by (1), the involved operation G of factual generation 
unavoidably induces into the generated object-entity-t-be-studied œG a statistical-
probabilistic character that cannot be eliminated on the basis of considerations of 
"imprecisions" in the acts of generation, because this character stems from the opposition 
between the finiteness of the possible definition of G and the unavoidably unlimited and 
unknown character of the physical reality on which G works.  
The unique aim of the process of research is to establish consensually predictable 
and verifiable statistical-probabilistic distributions of the eigenvalues aj of the quantum 
observable A.  
And this aim is tied with the possibility to repeat as many time as one wants coding-
measurement successions [G.MesA] that act on specimens of a microstate that nobody 
can observe directly and that is conceived to have the nature of a wave, while the unique 
feature from this wave that admits mechanical qualifications, consists of a very localized 
singularity in the amplitude of the wave; so it is interior to this wave, while the operation 
of generation G – without separating the whole wave from the rest of the physical reality 
– brings into the realm of the observable only marks produced by this singularity. 
(Whether this model is "really true", or not, is not the point here, the point in this context 
is that such a model is possible, and it is possible, by use of it, to produce consensual 
predictions and consensual verifications of these).  
What is called "the observed eigenvalue" consists of registered observable marks that 
can wait an arbitrarily long time to be read by the human observer.  
Given the considered cognitive situation, the aim of the description, and the way in 
which this aim is realized, the unique condition of consensus that can be pertinently 
required is the following one: The statistical-probabilistic distributions of observable 
marks that code for the eigenvalues of the measured observable, that are obtained 
separately in various Laboratories via the same procedure applied to the same sort of 
microstate, must be all "identical" inside pre-specified limits of permitted difference. No 
light signals are involved, the state of movement of the observer and the Lorentz 
transformations play no role in the process. 
The whole description – though only implicitly – is quintessentially relative to a 
definite sort of epistemic referential (G,V); in particular, it is fundamentally dependent on 
an operation of generation G that is physically operational.   
- Consider now RTG.  
This is a theory of macroscopic and/or cosmic object-entities that in general cannot 
be generated factually by the human observers-conceptors. These object-entities are 
conceived to pre-exist. Inside the nowadays Physics the concept of operation of 
generation is not even conceived with respect to these object-entities. We are in presence 
of a totally classical conception that works in terms of "subjects" and "predicates" that 
just "are there" in the air of time, like in the current languages and the corresponding 
logic. 
The operations of generation G involved in RTG in general are purely mental, they 
consist of focusing the attention upon a certain conceptual representation that – with 
respect to some definite qualifying aspects – a "View" V in the sense of MCR – isolates 
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conceptually the considered physical entity from inside the whole of the physical reality, 
just like in the classical languages, grammars, logic: the operations of generation G are 
realized via classical definitions.  
From the structure of descriptions that constitute RTG, it is tried to draw 
deductively certain observable consequences that in general are isolated events that 
cannot be produced deliberately, so a fortiori they cannot be repeated deliberately. They 
can only be predicted to happen observably in certain definite conditions, in a way 
characterized in terms of values gk of the aspect-views Vg from the view V. 
The aim is to verify that these observable events do happen indeed, and such as 
they have been predicted.  
The measurements that are involved for this aim must establish values gk of aspect-
views Vg that can concern very big mobiles that are conceived to mutually totally 
separated and that can be very distant form one another and from the human observers. 
The human observers also can be very distant from one another, carried by different 
ways of moving. So a same mobile or non-repeatable event can be observed from 
different frames of reference that can have themselves various relative movements 
characterized by big velocities and sometimes also by accelerations.  
In such conditions the consensus on the results of the measurements made by these 
different observers concerning the same non-repeatable event or the same mobile, do 
indeed involve in an essential role transformation laws and light signals.  
And when measurements of this sort are realized factually, the differences (in some 
definite sense) that can be detected in the results declared by different observers can in 
general be interpreted in terms of "imprecisions" that can be neglected in consequence of 
comparisons of orders of magnitude and of the admitted deterministic principle. 
 In Einstein's theories of relativity there is no trace of consciousness of the fact that, 
while knowledge is qualification, any qualification is inextricably relative as much to the 
way in which it emerges as to what is qualified, which entails that knowledge of the 
reality as it "really is ", is not a scientific concept. The basic conception RTG is "naïvely 
realistic".  
The cognitive situations considered in QM2 and RTG, the descriptional aims, the 
procedures employed in order to realize these aims, are radically different. This – via 
descriptional relativities that cannot be suppressed – leads to radically different 
representations.  
There is no contradiction between these theories. They simply are tso radically 
different that they cannot even be pertinently compared directly (direct comparison 
presupposes some common features (MMS [2006])). But both are "scientific 
theories" in this sense that they both obey MRC. From a methodological point of 
view, the specific way in which each one of these theories is immersed in MRC via 
its own epistemic referential (G,V) can be analysed with as much  detail as one 
wants. And these methodological features do permit comparability.  
In general terms now: 
The unique sort of unity between the different physical theories that can be 
pertinently required, does not consist of a common mathematical representation; it 
consists of a common method for representing any scientific theory of a physical domain 
of facts, so that the methodological elements that are involved be clearly comparable. 
And MRC is such a method. For any scientific description it requires a corresponding 
pair (G,V) and it permits to explain the differences between the various scientific theories 
by the way in which these pairs have to be defined and to be made use of in order to 
satisfy the constraints imposed by the involved cognitive situation and by the descriptive 
aim. The unity stems from the fact that any knowledge is a structure of relative 
descriptions and that consequently all the scientific theories are subjected to a same 
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unique texture of general legal relativizing structural features inside which there are 
ways to pass from any relativized representation of a given theory, to the relativized 
representation of any other relativized theory. 
And furthermore, because inside MRC any consensual descriptional aim can find an 
adequate expression in terms of a network of chains of relativized descriptions, the 
methodological unification indicated above can include the technical aims of 
construction of artefacts. Which means inclusion of a relativized theory of systems and a 
relativized representation of engineering. 
 This has been the Ph.D. subject of the Thesis of Henri Boulouet [2014] (cf. 
www.mersyse.com/en/org_team.php). 
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EPILOGUE 
 
UNIFICATION VERSUS TIM MAUDLIN'S VIEW 
I feel uneasy to confess that I discovered only two weeks ago Tim Maudlin's book 
on Quantum Non-Locality & Relativity, and by chance. I have read this book in a 
continuously rising state of unexpected good surprise. Of course, such a state can stem 
only from a feeling of mutual agreement. To close this chapter 9 I just reproduce several 
brief extracts from TM, to which I add telegraphic comments. 
From the page 22: 
« 1. The quantum connection is unattenuated 
The fall of a sparrow in Yougoslavia may have its effects in New Brunswick and on Saturn and beyond, but the 
effect becomes progressively smaller the farther away one goes. Since the gravitational force drops off as the square of 
the distance it eventually becomes negligible if one is concerned with observable effects.....  
The quantum connection, in contrast, appears to be unaffected by the distance......... » 
 
So TM detects specificities that – in our language – are tied with the "inside" and 
the "outside" of an entity-to-be-studied. And he draws attention on the fact that while 
according to the classical mechanics the "objects" that are studied are given as closed 
wholes that interact at distance only via "fields of forces" that lie entirely outside these 
"objects", in quantum mechanics two distinct entities that interact can be part of one 
same non-delimited whole, inside which they interact otherwise than via "forces" in the 
classical sense (cf. the definitions from (I.2).1, and the Fig. 3 with its IQM meanings). 
   « 2. The quantum connection is discriminating 
Gravitational forces affect similarly situated objects in in the same way .....  
The quantum connection, however, is a private arrangement between our two photons. When one is measured 
its twin is affected , but no other particle in the universe need be......... » 
 
So TM detects the specific effect of an operation G of generation!!! 
 
   « 2. The quantum connection is faster than light 
..... For although no classical forces are unattenuated or discriminating, all were at least originally described as 
instantaneous......Any change in that global distribution would therefore have immediate effects on the forces felt 
everywhere .... »  
So TM detects also consequences of the classical void of operations G of 
generation.  
Pages 255-259:  
The Methodological Situation (title) 
The term "Methodological" is employed, which suggests that TM somehow 
requires also a methodological solution. Indeed on the page 256 he writes: 
« ....We have somehow ended up in a world that seems , in its spatio-temporal aspect, to be relativistic, but also 
to be populated with matter governed by non-local laws.... »  
A perfect characterisation of the mixed characteristics of the dBDS(B) approach (cf 
(8.III).1.3. in this work). And on the page 257 he writes: 
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« ....But the very radical falsity of the picture presents us with a methodological puzzle. Why, in the first place 
did we seek a theory that retains a relativistic account of space-time on the most fundamental level? Because that 
account of space-time structure has been so successful in making predictions that are checked at the macroscopic level. 
....... This desire of a fully relativistic theory is, on the face of it, puzzling. Space and time do not come under our 
immediate experimental gaze........ » 
And: 
« ....The microscopic distribution of matter is not open to our direct inspection, but neither is the structure of 
space-time at any scale.... » 
All these remarks stem from a hidden thrive toward a "minimal realism" and a 
methodological solution (in the sense specified above in (9.III).2. Realism, knowledge, 
method, unification); or at least, a potentiality to agree with such a composition. 
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INSTEAD OF A GENERAL CONCLUSION 
It is likely that the reader of this attempt has often been surprised and even 
repelled. In as much as this is so the reason, I think, is that it is very unusual in physics to 
make explicit use of epistemological and methodological arguments and constructions. 
Irrepressibly this is perceived as a noxious intrusion of "philosophy" into science.   
But since now finally this work is entirely exposed, it has become possible to 
weigh whether the sort of philosophical intrusion that it involves has hindered or has 
enhanced the process of construction of a new representation of the microstates. So it has 
become possible to accept or to reject advisedly the procedure that has been employed, 
and its result.  
In the present work QM2 has reached the status of only a conceptual skeleton. But 
– as such – it might manifest force of life. In the realm of human representations this sort 
of miracle is current. The principles and the method are the spirit, and they can breathe 
life into the descriptional matter. If this does happen in the present case, then a whole 
new body of formal representation will grow for the skeleton constructed here, by its 
subsequent interactions with other minds. 
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